

New Delhi.  
The 24th April, 1948.

# Sardar Patel

I wrote to you regarding the position of Seva Dal regarding the instructions which we have issued regarding the banning of volunteer organisations and the holding of drills, marches etc. of a military character. Subsequently Jugal Kishore said to me and placed before you. I shall be glad to know what has been.

Yours sincerely,  
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon'ble Dr. Rajendra Prasad,  
1, Queen Victoria Road,  
New Delhi.

... whom I met in Orissa on the question wanted to know whether we have not consulted public opinion in Orissa and Khars either on the question of the States or should meet with Bihar.

## Select Correspondence 1945-1950

3. I am sure you will appreciate that the policy followed in the case of Orissa States is the same as has been followed in the case of Mah States. That policy is a result of the fact that Orissa were recognised as States only recently; and they were little more than glorified zamindars. I do not think we can come up with a solution other than what has already been achieved.

Yours sincerely,  
Vallabhbhai Patel

अखिल भारतीय कांग्रेस समिति  
ALL INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE  
Aurangzeb Road,  
Delhi. 8th Feb


I received in Ahmedabad three cheques for a total amount of Rs. 25,000 (Twentyfive thousands only) with the express condition that the amount should be returned to Ahmedabad for purposes of relief of refugees who are already there. I am, therefore, crediting the amount to the Punjab Relief Fund, but I am sending a cheque for an equivalent amount to Ahmedabad for an equivalent relief in the district. I hope you will endorse this action.

Yours sincerely,  
Vallabhbhai Patel

Dr. Rajendra Prasad,  
1, Queen Victoria Road,  
New Delhi.

Edited by  
V. Shankar





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**SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE  
OF  
SARDAR PATEL  
1945-50**

**VOLUME 1**

**EDITED BY  
V. SHANKAR**



**NAVAJIVAN PUBLISHING HOUSE  
AHMEDABAD-380 014**

**Rupees Two Hundred**

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First Edition, 1,000 Copies, March 1977

Reprint, 1,000 Copies, May 2011

Total : 2,000 Copies

ISBN 81-7229-426-3


Printed and Published by  
Jitendra T. Desai  
Navajivan Publishing House  
Ahmedabad-380 014  
( INDIA )

Phone : 079 – 27540635, 27542634

Fax : 079 – 27541329

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**Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel**

Birth : 31-10-1875

Death : 15-12-1950



## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

In view of the birth centenary of Sardar Patel Navajivan Trust has published a series of his historic correspondence in English running into ten volumes under the title *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*. Even while this correspondence, edited by late Shri Durga Das, was being published during 1972-74 there was an insistent demand from the readers that all these volumes should be published in Hindi and Gujarati also.

Looking to the high cost of translation and publication it was not possible to carry out the scheme in spite of our desire to publish all the ten volumes in Hindi and Gujarati. But we thought that it was possible to publish in Hindi and Gujarati a compilation of selected important letters from these ten volumes. So we requested Shri V. Shankar, the then Private Secretary to Sardar Patel, to prepare a compiled edition of the selected letters from the above ten volumes. He willingly accepted the responsibility and prepared such a compiled edition with his Introduction and Postscript.

In the beginning we thought that such an edition would cover 600 to 800 pages. But we soon realized that it was difficult to cover all the important correspondence in so many pages. Hence this compiled edition is being published in two volumes of about 700 to 750 pages each. Due to increase in page numbers we could not make it available to the reader in time. Our original idea to publish both the compiled volumes on the Sardar Birth Centenary Day also is not fulfilled and they are being published rather late. But no doubt these volumes will have a place of their own in all the various publications published on Sardar during this centenary year.

The original ten volumes in English were well received by the country. We present these independent English, Hindi and Gujarati compilations in two volumes to the reader with the confidence that they also will get the same response from them.

26-1-1976



## INTRODUCTION

The Navajivan Trust has already published under the distinguished editorship of the late Shri Durga Das, Sardar Patel's Correspondence in ten volumes. Although every effort was made to arrange the correspondence under specific subjects, it was impossible in doing so fully to take into account the relationship of subjects with each other or to string together connected correspondence or extracts thereof under one appropriate heading. Having regard to the wide range of subjects that were covered by the correspondence and their significance, it was felt necessary that a selection should be made of the more important letters with a view to presenting them in a connected series and projecting them in the light of the background and the relevance of those letters in the context of momentous events and developments of the period which laid the foundation not only of the fabric but also of many basic policies of the country. Navajivan Trust were good enough to assign to me the onerous responsibility of making the selections, editing them and providing the background material and commentaries. With the help of my very good friend Mr. C. Ganesan who worked with me in the Ministry of States during that period I have been able to apply to the best of my capacity my judgment to the process of selection and also to the collecting of background material and the relevance of the required comments.

2. Since the Navajivan Trust for very laudable reasons intended to bring all the volumes of Select Correspondence in the Centenary Year of Sardar Patel's birth, 31st October 1974-1975, the work of selection had to be completed within a few months and I am very grateful to Mr. Ganesan and the staff of stenographers who worked at great speed to help me finish the work in fairly good time.

3. We in India are not habituated to keeping diaries or to preserving relevant material or discussions which take place

off the record and which not only provide a background to the correspondence but often put a different complexion on it and have a determinative role in the final result. This lacuna in the recorded material would continue to be felt by historians, writers and students of Indian history unless it is made up otherwise. Due to my closeness to Sardar Patel, I had the privilege of being close to events in which the late Prime Minister Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and other eminent contemporary leaders figured and therefore can bear witness to the many developments which took place outside the correspondence and bring out the correspondence, the march of events that took place and the relationship that prevailed between those leaders in a different aspect. Of all the leaders of the time, Sardar suffered from this handicap most and in the process there is no doubt that it has affected to some, if not to a large, extent any subsequent assessment and appreciation of the great nation-building work that he did, the part he took in shaping contemporary events and policies and the attitudes he expressed either in writing or in public during that formative period in the life of independent India. He was Dr. Johnson without a Boswell and Lord Mountbatten without a Campbell (Johnson).

4. Sardar's indefatigable, self-denying and self-sacrificing shadow, daughter Maniben, did keep a diary of daily events but except for the latter period the narrative is by no means complete and even otherwise many discussions took place when she was absent and consequently of them she was not even a silent witness. However, whenever that diary does see the light of day, it will in part provide contemporaneous material which would throw some light on the inside story of those years. I had been privileged to have access to that diary and both Mr. Ganesan and myself have drawn upon our own storehouse of memory which I found even after 25 years to be fairly accurate because of the vivid impressions that the outstanding nature and importance of the events of that period have left on our minds. We could supplement that memory with some records of those days which were available

to us either in published or unpublished forms. For obvious reasons we have eschewed access to any official records lest we should unwarily tread on official toes. We are fully conscious of some gaps here and there but our hope is that despite those gaps what we are presenting to the reader would be considered by him to be worth his while.

5. More than this, our object would be served if we are able to provide to the reader with a faithful interpretation of Sardar's mind as it worked not only on the various problems which the correspondence covered but on the correspondence itself. Sardar justly acquired the reputation of a man of few words but even within that narrow compass, the late Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan said, "he meant what he said and said what he meant". Consequently whatever he said either to his confidential circle or to his colleagues including Mahatma Gandhi and the late Pandit Nenru was always pregnant with wisdom and meaning. He had no academic qualification which might not mean everything but does mean something in life. He made up for this deficiency by a massive commonsense which compassed the intricacies and complexities of various problems and reduced them to remarkable simplicity.

6. Sardar's unerring touchstone on most of the matters that came to him was patriotism. His one criterion used to be whether a particular policy or a particular development was in the interest of the country; at the organisational level it was the interest of the organisation and the country that dominated his thought. For example, in the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan despite its undesirable features and despite the fact that in many aspects it went against the established policy of the Congress he was guided by one simple factor namely the sooner the British left India the better it was for the country so that it would be free not only to settle its problems but also to shape its future in freedom and immunity from the presence of a third party. After his release from Ahmednagar Fort, he was convinced that the longer the British stayed in India the more difficult it would

be to achieve these objectives. During his entire political life his guiding star was the vision of India's greatness and its unity. For reasons in which it is unnecessary to dwell at length at this stage, he came to the conclusion after the entry of the League into the coalition Government and experiencing the consequences of such entry that it was better to partition and preserve that unity for as much part of the sub-continent as it was at that time feasible and on that unity to build its greatness.

7. Throughout the period, before and after independence, these were the ruling ideas in his mind. He was conscious of the fact that the country would have to make every sacrifice for attaining these aims but he knew that in history such sacrifices were often an indispensable aid to the achievement of freedom and greatness. Even after independence he never hesitated or missed an opportunity to take the country into confidence and while projecting before it the picture of the greatness that it could achieve, to spell out the stupendous efforts and sacrifices that were involved.

8. I hope that when the reader goes through the background material and commentaries and the relevant correspondence he will obtain at least some idea of the manner in which he strove to translate those ruling ideas into actual practice. He will, I hope, also appreciate not only the working of Sardar's mind but also the manner and method of his handling the various problems and issues and the labours which he put forth at the advanced age of 72-75 years for the cause of the country. Even though he had a sturdy constitution and his health stood him so well through the transfer of power and for some months thereafter, his health was none too satisfactory after the severe heart attack in March 1948. The exacting official and public life and the demanding contemporary generation would not let him have the leisure that he so badly needed nor would he spare himself on his own to seek that leisure to the extent required so that he might have been preserved for the country for a somewhat longer time. However,

one thing he valued in consequence more than many of his contemporaries and that was the time factor. More than once he referred in public speeches and statements the speedy march of time and the little time that was left to himself. It was the impending sense of urgency on one side and the limitations of time that he had at his disposal that impelled him to strive even more than he would probably have done if he knew that some more years would be available to him.

9. In retrospect, both the historian and the reader cannot, I am sure, help feeling that the achievements to which the select correspondence bears witness and which the background material and comments seek to explain were remarkable not only for their intrinsic contents but also for the speed with which they were secured and the clockwork efficiency which characterised the implementation of his ideas and policies.

10. Many views have been expressed on the quality of Sardar's views and policies. Some see in them his reactionary outlook, some credit him with needless caution while some see in them a bias in favour of capitalists and against labour. Let all such critics remember that Sardar Patel was not living in a vacuum. He had acquired throughout his life a remarkable insight into the mood and capacity and capability of his countrymen. He also had an idea of what could be achieved with the material, manpower and monetary resources available to the country. Profiting from the lessons of history, he fully realised the need of united endeavour. As an intensely practical person endowed with administrative genius, he knew the value of teamwork. As a successful politician he could also assess at their true worth the virtues of practical wisdom and expediency. Above all, he was fully conscious of our inherent weaknesses and the legacies of centuries of history. He also took note of the backwardness of the country in relation to the advance which western countries under the impact of science and technology had already achieved. It was the combined effect of all these factors that moulded his thoughts on the practical problems that faced the country. He need not have made any apology

for having been guided by the cumulative effect of these factors for this is what a sagacious statesman and a wise politician must do if he has to pull his country out of times of grave trouble or if he has to build up despite out of severe handicaps, limitations, differences of caste, creed and ideology and the shock that partition and transfer of power administered, the fabric and administrative system of the country.

## POSTSCRIPT

[ With special reference to the book *Freedom At Midnight* by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre ]

As these pages were being printed, there was published, in several countries in Europe as well as in the United States of America, a new book on the transfer of power in India—*Freedom At Midnight* by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre. This book appears to have enjoyed deservedly, in so far as its excellence of style and publication goes, large sales in Europe—particularly in France and Spain—and fairly considerable sales in Great Britain and the United States of America. In India too considerable publicity has been given to the book and to the various incidents in it—especially by co-author Dominique Lapierre, who through various techniques has succeeded in creating an avid public interest in the incidents narrated in the book—mainly related to the transfer of power, the communal uprising of 1947, the accession of the princely States, and the assassination of Gandhiji. The book has been a “best seller” employing the familiar techniques of dramatisation of events. A claim has been made repeatedly that the work seeks to project the history of the times to which it relates and its completion has involved very extensive and painstaking research. As Mr. Lapierre is reported to have said, “The book is an authentic tribute to history.” Despite such pains and research, however, the book is replete with inaccuracies and departures from facts which detract from its historical character and the treatment of personalities involved does not appear to have been done in a true historical spirit or with a sound historical approach. Indeed, in their account of the events that led up to India’s independence, the authors have shown a profound and surprising ignorance or lack of appreciation of the basic facts of the situation, of the significance of the events that made partition of India an inevitable

development, and of the role and responsibility of the various parties and individuals in the events of 1946 and 1947.

Sardar himself does not find very prominent mention in the book. There is an account of his youth, his family background, of how he became a barrister and practised in Ahmedabad, and of how he left that practice to follow Gandhiji and thereby committed himself to a political career. Even in this brief account there are mistakes. It is not correct to say, as the authors have done, that Sardar left the land shortly after boyhood to work in the great textile mills of Ahmedabad. Any biography of Sardar would have told the authors that, after passing his matriculation examination, Sardar read for law and set up practice after passing the pleader's examination. It was in this practice that he saved enough money to send his brother and for himself to go to England to read for the bar. Another incident which is overdramatised is a narration of what happened to minute which Sardar recorded in a file, to which Mountbatten took exception and wanted withdrawn. As far as we know, there were in fact no tantrums, no obdurances. When the Governor-General explained to Sardar that he considered the minute as reflecting on the Governor-General personally, Sardar, true to his own generous instincts, without any fuss agreed to withdraw it. Sardar was a person who knew his mind, and concentrated on the vital issues before the country and the Congress, of which he was the organisational head. He never created unnecessary difficulties over matters of trifling importance. In any case the account given, particularly in some cases the language used, casts doubts on its accuracy.

Apart from these, the references to Sardar are brief, almost casual. But the omissions and inaccuracies in the book reflect on the personality of Sardar as it emerges from this correspondence, and it has therefore been considered necessary to add a brief postscript with reference to the book.

In the first place, it is contrary to the facts of Indian history to claim, as the authors have done, that British rule

had “painstakingly erected” a unity in India. The authors themselves have in one place quoted the oft-repeated if inaccurate statement that there were two Indias under British India which according to the authors was administered by the Central Government, and the separate Indian India of the Indian States. This statement itself requires elaboration, as it does not do justice to the whole truth. The provinces were not administered by the Central Government. Under the Constitution of 1935, which came into force on 1st April 1937, the provinces and the Centre functioned in separate and well-defined compartments, administering the subjects allotted to them by the Act of 1935. The keystone of the arch of Indian administration unity was a British appointee of the Crown functioning “in his discretion” at new Delhi as the Governor-General (with the style and title of Viceroy) and subject not to a Legislature in India but to the British Government and the British Parliament. The five hundred and odd Indian States were as many separated territorial jurisdictions not one separate Indian India but so many different miniature Indias, each ruled by its Chief and subject to the paramountcy of the British Crown, exercised through a functionary known as the Crown Representative combined with that of the Governor-General. Thus although this office was held by the same person who was Governor-General, he did not function through the Government of India; he had a whole separate set-up for the exercise of these functions—a super authority called the Political Department. This artificial distinction was made in the 1935 Act after more than a century of the Indian States having been dealt with by the Governor-General in Council.

Indian public opinion both at the time and subsequently held that this separation of functions was deliberately done to put in another spoke in the wheel of India’s constitutional advance towards self-government. This has to be made clear because it was the statesmanship of Sardar, with the assistance of V. P. Menon, which for the first time brought about organic unity in the country on a democratic

basis. And no small thanks are due to the patriotic self-sacrifice of the Rulers of Indian States, which made this transition to organic unity a smooth process, nor can one minimise the undoubted assistance which Lord Mountbatten gave to Sardar Patel in securing the accession of Indian States to the Indian Dominion in August 1947. Nevertheless the subsequent integration of these States with the rest of India was due to the great vision and statesmanship of Sardar who literally won the hearts of Princes as no British Viceroy had done before. Although the problem presented by the hundreds of Indian States in achieving unity was a formidable one, British policy in India particularly after the Mutiny of 1857 when it discriminated between Hindus and Muslims to the advantage of the former and after the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 when they encouraged the Muslims and sounded the virtual "war-cry" of Muslim separatism had driven many more wedges into the so-called unity of India. The result was that the unitary system which prevailed in the administration of India up to the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 was very seriously affected by substantial dents made by political and psychological factors promoted by the British policy in India. Prominent British politicians and retired British Indian Civil Servants as also Governors-General and Governors never failed to harp upon these differences as standing in the way of India achieving unity and the reverberations of these pronouncements could be felt even after India achieved independence.

Nor have the authors of the book touched on the background of the political situation in India in which Mountbatten found himself when he came over as Governor-General. It is surely too facile a simplification of the situation to say, as they have done:

"Britain was trapped between these two irreconcilable positions (the demand of the Muslim League for Pakistan and Congress insistence that the unity of the country should be maintained), sinking slowly into a

quagmire from which she seemed unable to extricate herself. Time and again British efforts to resolve the problem had failed."

The fact is that the British, who had really the power to solve the situation shirked their responsibility to do so. It suited their ends to promote communal tensions. So long as Linlithgow was Governor-General, the object of Linlithgow-Amery-Churchill axis was to maintain the indefinite continuance of British rule over India after the war—allied victory was in fact in sight when Linlithgow demitted office. The Hindu-Muslim differences came in as a handy pretext for denying Indian independence. Wavell was more realistic. He saw that the British could not continue to rule India for long after the war ended. And, against the wishes of Churchill, he pressurised the British Government to agree to his holding the famous Simla Conference and making an effort to get a representative and responsible Executive Council, composed of the political party representatives, functioning. Congress and all other parties, impressed by his obvious sincerity, promptly agreed to co-operate. But the course of the former traditions was still on Wavell. At the last moment, much to the relief of Churchill, he got cold feet and could not deal with the problem as it should have been. Muslim League, that is, Jinnah, demanded that he and he alone had the right to name the Muslim members of the Executive Council. Wavell naturally could not admit this preposterous claim. Wavell could have called Jinnah's bluff simply by going ahead without Jinnah; instead, he preferred to capitulate and give up his effort. At this point, it can truly be said that Jinnah was satisfied that all he had to do was to adopt a non-possumus attitude and stand aloof; his intransigence would become his rewarding virtue and his obstinacy his great asset.

The further developments that took place did not do any thing to dispel this confidence. The latest example of British hesitation to face the Muslim League with a clear-cut decision was when Wavell manoeuvred the entry of

Muslim League nominees in the Interim Government in September 1946 but could not compel Jinnah to implement the specific understanding given by him that they would cooperate in running an efficient administration and also join the Constituent Assembly. Sardar, experienced statesman that he was, was not content with Wavell's assurances to Jawaharlal; he wanted Jinnah to give this in writing but he was overruled. When Sardar's fears were confirmed and the League refused to join the Constituent Assembly, Wavell could not persuade himself to ask for the resignation of the League members of the Executive Council. He and the British Government wavered, called everyone for discussions in London, gave an award about grouping, went on hesitating even after Congress accepted it, and then on 20th February 1947 came out with the declaration pledging the British Government to transfer of power by June 1948 qualified by the dangerous statement that, if it should appear to the British Government that an agreed constitution would not have been worked by June 1948, the British Government would consider to whom it would transfer powers of the Central Government :

“Whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing provincial Governments. . . . ”

Thus did Jinnah's dream of Pakistan begin to assume concrete shape through the active help of the Viceroy and of the British Government and the Congress was faced with the prospect of “existing Provinces” which included large non-Muslim areas going to Pakistan. It was then that for the first time Congress had to insist on a partition of Bengal and Punjab in the event of division of the country.

Meanwhile, developments in the Punjab gave more cause for alarm to the Congress. That province was able, after the elections of 1946 to muster sufficient strength against the extreme communal forces of the Muslim League to form a Unionist-Congress-Sikh alliance Government which was able

to remain in office till March 1947. But in that month, to the astonishment of everyone, Khizar Hyat Khan, the Premier, resigned and the Governor—Sir Evan Jenkins—took over the Government of the province under his personal rule. The agitation started earlier by the Muslim League was intensified. From street fighting in Lahore the trouble developed into a frenzy of stabbing and killing which spread to other towns. The position of the Congress, and Sardar as Home Member, was difficult in the extreme. He and the Central Government found themselves helpless spectators of a rapidly deteriorating situation. As friend, philosopher and guide of the Congress Ministries, he managed to ensure that there was by and large peace and order in the provinces under Congress rule; but, as in Bengal in 1946, where the Governor, with all his special responsibility for peace and tranquillity, failed in his job, the Punjab was also getting out of control. The only possible solution was the imposition of martial law. Martial law had been imposed in the Punjab in 1919 when the situation was far less serious—in fact at that time there was no widespread disturbance. But the situation was now dangerous, and Sardar repeatedly urged it on the Governor-General with all the emphasis at his command. But there appears to have been a strange reluctance on the part of the Governor-General to alienate the Muslim League, even to put down a widespread conflagration. Neither Wavell nor his successor in office would impose Martial law or enforce law and order; and Punjab continued to present the hideous spectacle of arson, rape, murders and even some migration of the minority communities.

It was in these circumstances that Mountbatten had to tackle the problem of transferring power. Anyone who reviews the events of those times will look back with admiration on the energy and enthusiasm with which Mountbatten handled his job. But, at the same time, it has also to be recognised—though this recognition has not dawned upon Messrs Collins and Lapierre—that the solution to the problem was found not by Mountbatten, but by Indians, particularly Pandit Nehru, Sardar and V. P. Menon. Mountbatten seems to have had

nothing better to suggest than that the Provinces should be unilaterally and simultaneously granted independence—it being assumed that those in the north-west and the north-east would combine as a Muslim State called Pakistan, and those provinces in the centre and south of India would prefer to unite as a Hindu State, or India. The plan envisaged the splitting up of Bengal and the Punjab. Boundary Commissions would have to be set up and the army and the administrative services split up and reorganised, but while this was going on there could still be a Central Government which by June 1948 or a good deal earlier would hand over power to the new States. This seems to have been a modification of Wavell's plan which was earlier rejected out of hand by Attlee after both Mountbatten and Ismay had seen it and considered it unworkable.

The effect on Nehru of the disclosure of Mountbatten's plan may well be imagined. The balkanisation of India would by itself have led to utter chaos and turmoil, and add to this the emergence of over 500 States as independent units. *Freedom At Midnight* rightly reports the extent of Nehru's consternation but it gets right away from what happened when it says:

“Mountbatten informed Menon that, by that evening, he would have to redraft the charter that would give India independence. . . . Menon finished his task in accordance with Mountbatten's instructions.”

What actually happened has been reported in several books containing authentic accounts of the events of those months—more particularly in Menon's own book on the transfer of power in India. An alternative plan had already been discussed earlier between Sardar and Menon; and the outline of the plan had been sent to London, where apparently it had been seen by Mountbatten. The essence of the plan was partition of the Punjab and Bengal and the immediate transfer of power to two Central Governments on the basis of Dominion Status. At that stage, no one had taken any serious notice of the

plan. Now, when Mountbatten found himself at the end of his tether and enveloped in perhaps the greatest crisis affecting his career, Menon was again admitted to his counsels, from which he had temporarily been excluded; and he used the opportunity to explain the plan. In the absence of a determination on the part of the British to hold the law and order position in the Punjab (Martial law was, in Sardar's opinion, the only measure likely to be effective—an opinion in which I believe he had the backing of Sir B. N. Rau), the situation could not be allowed to continue as it would only deteriorate, and spread to other parts of India. Even as it was, the Congress Government in the North-West Frontier Province was just able to contain the civil disobedience movement of the Muslim League in the province, but it was finding this a difficult job, and generally the situation was explosive enough. It is to the everlasting credit of Mountbatten that he immediately saw the merits of this plan and was prepared to push it through even if Jinnah opposed it. And it is typical of his dynamism that he pushed it through with steadfastness and dynamism. But the plan itself was—

(a) the result of a situation arising because of the continuous desire of the British Government and of British officers to placate Jinnah which left few options open;

(b) a constructive contribution of Indian leadership.

The failure to put this matter in its true perspective is a major blemish in a book which has claims to historical worth.

A major issue on which the book seeks unjustifiably to enhance the stature of Mountbatten, at the cost of Indian political leaders—particularly Sardar—is in the picture it draws of the accession of Indian States. No book catering to popular sensation can avoid picking up from here and there legends circulating about the Rulers of Indian States, and presenting a lurid picture of their lives and deeds. The temptation to caricature the Princes about whom unauthenticated stories and legends circulated both in India and outside has proved

irresistible to many an author. Stories of their supposed sex orgies and whimsical behaviour have pushed up the sales of many books. The Princes themselves have been too sure of themselves or too indifferent to defend themselves. Even in the recent past stories such as have figured in this chapter have been the means of building up of some fortunes to the misfortune of the Rulers. One could have expected a book claiming to be history to rise above such temptations and avoid falling into fictional traps but even the twilight and succeeding gloom failed to evoke a sense of charity or chivalry and the Princes, the butt-end of many an author in the past, have been undeservedly pilloried as a class before a credulous reading public.

This has been the weakness of writers from Kipling downwards. It is not necessary to go into detail about the chapter on "Palaces and Tigers, Elephants and Jewels" ! The lack of care exercised in the narrative of the Princes will be evident from the references to the Maharaja of Orissa. It is said:

"Orissa's throne was an enormous bed. He had bought it from an antique dealer in London and studded it with an appropriate number of jewels. Its particular charm stemmed from the fact that it was an exact copy of Queen Victoria's bed."

Again—

"The Maharaja of Orissa was trapped in his palace by a mob which refused to let him leave until he had signed the Instrument of Accession."

The fact is, however, that there was no Indian State of the name of Orissa and no Maharaja of that State ! Orissa was a province of British India after 1st April 1937 ruled over by a British Governor until 1946 when an Indian was appointed Governor of that Province. It is now a State of the Union of India.

Fanciful also is the story that a Maharaja of Baroda was tried and found guilty of attempting to poison the British

Resident by slipping diamond dust into his dinner. The facts are that there was an attempt to poison the Resident. (These events happened in 1874 and historical accounts exist.) Two of the Resident's servants confessed that they had been bribed by the Maharaja to do so. A commission of six persons was appointed by the Governor-General to enquire into the guilt of the Maharaja. Three of them found the charge proved, but three held that it was not proved. The Government of India acquitted him of the charge of attempted murder. Nevertheless the Governor-General recommended to the Secretary of State that the Maharaja be deposed; and the proclamation of deposition mentioned only misgovernment. So much for the circumstantial account in the book about the Brahmins' assurances about the quantity of poison used and so on !

But we have now to deal with the events leading up to the accession of the Rulers to the Indian Dominion in 1947. The authors of the book have said, contrary to the facts of history, that it was Mountbatten who thought up the scheme of accession. He was the man who proposed the plan to Sardar. They say:

“If Congress, he (Mountbatten) said, would agree to allow the Princes to retain their titles, palaces, privy purses, immunity from arrest, right to British decorations . . . he, in turn would try to persuade them to sign an Instrument of Accession renouncing their temporal power, acceding to the Indian Union and abandoning their claim to independence.”

What happened was that the Ministry of States was set up in July 1947, with Sardar as Member in charge and V. P. Menon as his Secretary; on the 5th of that month Sardar issued a statement calling on the Princes to accede to the Dominion of India on the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications. There was no question at the time of asking the Princes for anything more. Subject to the accession, their sovereignty was to remain unimpaired. No question arose of their “renouncing their temporal power”.

That was a later development—some months and in some cases years after *Freedom At Midnight* and the transfer of power. Messrs Collins and Lapierre have confused accession with the subsequent process of integration (The position has been set out in the chapter on “Indian States”). A plan of securing accession on the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications had long ago been drawn up by V. P. Menon and sent to Lord Linlithgow during his Governor-Generalship. He, however, is reported to have locked it up in a black box and done nothing about it. With Sardar’s enthusiastic approval and in accordance with his directions V. P. Menon revived and adapted the scheme; and it was in pursuance of the scheme that Sardar issued his statement of 5th July 1947 calling on the Indian States and their Rulers to accede to the Dominion of India. Even before Mountbatten took a hand in the matter Sardar had prepared the ground by informal discussions with the leading Princes of enlightened views. Even subsequently he had personally to canvass certain other Princes. The ground was thus prepared for Mountbatten to clinch the issue by utilising his position as the Crown Representative. Mountbatten, with his quick grasp of matters and his wonted energy, also accorded his approval to the plan and, in his capacity as the Crown Representative in its relations with Indian States, agreed to pursue it and try and persuade the Princes to accede. He considered it as a very practical plan for retaining India’s basic unity. He kept the political Department—Sir Conrad Corfield and his team of officers—out of the picture, and further negotiations were handled by Mountbatten, Sardar and V. P. Menon. Also, contrary to what Messers Collins and Lapierre have said, there was no bargaining between Sardar and Mountbatten like carpet merchants. Apart from Kashmir, whose geographical position and population variety—Hindus, Muslims (but quite different in all respects from the Muslims of Pakistan) and Buddhists—made it *sui generis*, it was agreed that all the States contiguous to India should accede to the Indian Union. And they did too—all except Hyderabad and Junagadh.

Messrs Collins and Lapierre have gone to a great deal of trouble in collecting anecdotes about Princes of a bygone age—many of them hearsay, many of them relating to a distant past. If they had taken the trouble to sift available material on recent history, they would have been able to present a truer picture of events as they took place.

One word about the communal disturbances. It must be emphasised that the main responsibility for not preventing the conflagration that swept North-West India in 1947 must remain that of the British rulers who were actually in power. It was in the hope that it could be arrested by agreeing to partition that the plan of 3rd June 1947 was evolved by Sardar and Menon and put forward to Mountbatten. That it failed in its purpose must again be laid at the door of the Muslim League. It has already been made abundantly clear in public discussion in India that the story of Nehru and Sardar asking Mountbatten to take over responsibility in 1947 is not in accordance with fact. In fact, they had before them the experience of the Punjab Boundary Force, under the control of the Joint Defence Council—a force of 50,000 men with a high proportion of British officers, which failed to keep the peace in the Punjab border. There is no secret of the fact that Mountbatten, Nehru and Sardar acted as a team in the days of the Delhi trouble. As Michael Edwardes, a British historian, has put it—

“When the terror of that reality was actually brought home to them all acted with vigour. Mountbatten was responsible for the strategy. Patel put into practice with that ruthlessness which he had always shown. Nehru involved himself personally by touring the streets and rushing unarmed into riotous mobs.”

A quite different picture from the one painted by the authors when they say that for one last moment India was run by an Englishman ! The factual and sober contemporary accounts of Campbell-Johnson and V. P. Menon's and Hodson's objective account based on Mountbatten's records are in quite a different key.

The spirit of teamwork was present throughout the period of nine months during which Mountbatten remained on as Governor-General. Any chronicler of the history of the period will accept with enthusiasm that Mountbatten's association with Indian administration at a critical juncture was of great advantage to India. It is however quite another thing to build up Mountbatten to the extent of playing down the role of India's great statesmen. They were the architects of Indian freedom and the builders of Indian unity. They were the consolidators of India's independence and in many instances succeeded where Mountbatten had failed or retrieved the situation from Mountbatten's legacy. Theirs was the leadership which guided the country through the troublous years of stress and storm to unity and strength. A historian has said of Lord Clive: "He was the founder of the glory and greatness of an empire of which a little island in the Atlantic is the parent trunk and Hindustan the noblest branch." It was nearly 200 years of that foundation that destiny brought at the helm of Indian affairs three great men, Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel who converted that "noblest branch" into an Independent tree as sturdy and strong as the British oak itself or to indigenise the species as strong and comprehensive as the Indian banyan tree. History will always bear witness to the saga of this epoch-making transformation. Many would be the contributors to this consummation; on the British side Attlee and Mountbatten will lead the gathering but many others, Linlithgow, Amery and Churchill among them would have to answer before the bar of history the charge of disloyalty to the ringing words of the Queen's Proclamation of 1st January 1858: "In their prosperity shall be our strength, in their contentment our security and in their gratitude our best reward."

The authors of the book have dealt sympathetically with Gandhiji's great contribution to securing peace in Calcutta and healing the wounds in Noakhali. Sardar kept in touch with Gandhiji throughout those wanderings and achievement mostly through the emissary role of Jaswant Singh who gets deservedly honourable mention in the book. The task of per-

suading Gandhiji to acquiesce in partition was a self-imposed one for Sardar; he was encouraged in assuming it by his oft-proved faith in Gandhiji's capacity to see gleams of reality. That faith was once again vindicated through the moving and closely reasoned appeal Gandhiji made to the AICC when supporting the Working Committee's Resolution accepting the June 3 plan of partition on the basis of two Dominions.

Discretion should have prompted the authors to eschew the temptation to deal with some controversial details of Gandhiji's life. However, there are authoritative witnesses of those details who can deal with the episodes with better credentials and claims to authenticity. In dealing with the last tragic phase of his life ending in assassination the authors seem to have conceded to the surviving self-confessed conspirators greater credibility than they deserved and to have ignored the contemporary evidence in the court of law and the judgment of the High Court Bench which dealt with the appeals and confirmation of the death sentences. They seem to have preferred unsworn testimony to evidence given on oath and wisdom after the event to contemporary assessment. So far as Sardar is concerned with this part of their account, it is only in regard to measures of security taken to protect Gandhiji. The whole issue came up before Parliament on a question put by Shri Ananthasayanam Ayyangar and was disposed of by that august body to the discomfiture of doubting Thomases and uncharitable but not disinterested critics but as Burke has put it: "Argument is exhausted, reason is fatigued, experience has given judgment but obstinacy is not conquered."

It is too much to expect that the authors of the book in the atmosphere of contemporary applause and more than responsive market will see the errors of their ways but it is to be hoped that the impartial reader will be able to separate the grain from the chaff and see the events and personalities in their true perspective. If these observations will prove of help to him in his enlightenment the object of this postscript would have been served.

## PROMINENT CONTEMPORARY PERSONALITIES

[*Note* : This is not a WHO'S WHO. It only mentions the positions of the various personalities during the relevant period—1945-50.]

ABDULLAH, SHEIKH MOHAMMAD ("SHEIKH SAHIB"): Prominent leader of the Kashmir Valley. Imprisoned by the Ruler for the "Quit Kashmir" movement of 1946. Head of the Emergency Administration in Jammu and Kashmir State, Oct. 1947. Prime Minister of the State from March 1948 to August 1953 when he was removed from office by the Sadar-i-Riyasat. He was subsequently detained but later released. Has again taken office as Chief Minister of the State.

ABELL, G.E.B. (later Sir George): Indian Civil Service. Private Secretary to the Viceroy and Governor-General till 15 August 1947.

AHMED, SHAFAT. One time League leader but later left it. Minister in the Interim Government formed by Jawaharlal Nehru in September 1946. Attacked and seriously injured before taking office.

AHMED, SULTAN : Advocate and Judge of Bihar. At one time member of Governor-General's Executive Council. Was Advisor to the Nizam for a brief period.

ALEXANDER, A. V. : Minister in C. R. Attlee's Cabinet after general election of 1945 in Great Britain. Member, Cabinet Mission to India, 1946.

ALI, ASAF : Prominent Congress leader of Delhi. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet. Ambassador to the United States. Governor of Orissa.

AMBEDKAR, B. R. : Leader of the Scheduled Castes and eminent jurist. Law Minister in Nehru's Cabinet. Chairman of Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly.

AMRIT KAUR, RAJKUMARI : Prominent follower of Gandhiji and Congress-woman. Health Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

ANEY, M.S. : Congress leader at one time; later Member of Governor-General's Ex-Council. Governor of Bihar, 1948-52.

ATTLEE, C. R. (later Lord) : Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1945-51 and responsible for sending Cabinet Mission to India and subsequent developments leading to transfer of power, 15-8-1947.

AUCHINLECK, SIR CLAUDE : Commander-in-Chief, India, in 1941. Supreme Commander of the India-Pakistan forces at the time of partition.

AYYANGAR, N. GOPALASWAMI : Sometime Prime Minister, Jammu & Kashmir; Minister in Nehru's Cabinet from 1947 to 1953.

AYYAR, C. P. RAMASWAMI : Dewan (Prime Minister) of Travancore till 1947.

AZAD, MAULANA ABUL KALAM : Staunch Nationalist Muslim and eminent Congress leader, who was Congress President, 1939-46. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

BAGAL, M. K. : President, Kolhapur State Congress before its merger with Bombay in 1949.

BAJPAI, GIRJA SHANKAR : Indian Civil Service. Secretary-General, External Affairs Ministry. Governor of Bombay, 1952-54.

BAKSHI, GHULAM MOHAMMAD : Prominent Nationalist political leader of Jammu & Kashmir, and Deputy of Sheikh Abdullah till 1953. Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir from 1953-62.

**BARDOLOI, GOPINATH :** Congress leader of Assam. Premier of Assam, 1937-39 and again from 1945 onwards till his death in 1950.

**BEG, MIRZA AFZAL :** Associate of Sheikh Abdullah in Jammu & Kashmir. Minister of the State since March, 1948. Member, Constituent Assembly of India.

**BEVIN, ERNEST :** Foreign Secretary in the United Kingdom Cabinet under Attlee.

**BHABHA, C. H. :** Prominent banker and businessman. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1946-49.

**BHARGAVA, GOPICHAND :** Congress leader in the Punjab. Premier of the Punjab after partition, 1947-1951.

**BHATT, GOKULBHAI D. :** Prominent leader of Rajasthan. Chief Minister, Sirohi State, 1948-49.

**BHAVE, VINOBA :** Gandhian leader who later pioneered the Bhoodan (land-gift) movement.

**BHOPAL, NAWAB HAMMIDULLA KHAN OF :** Ruler of Bhopal. Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes till March 1946.

**BINDU, D. C.:** President of the Hyderabad State Congress, 1950.

**BIRLA, B. M. :** Leading Industrialist. The Birla family rendered great assistance to the Congress in its freedom struggle.

**BIRLA, G. D. :** Leading industrialist and respected both in official and non-official circles. Rendered great assistance to the Congress in its freedom struggle.

**BOSE, SARAT CHANDRA :** Leading Congressman of Bengal. Brother of Subhas Chandra Bose.

**BOSE, SUBHAS CHANDRA ("NETAJI") :** Congress President at Haripura and Tripuri sessions. Head of Azad Hind Government and Indian National Army (set up during World War II).

BUCH, N. M. : Indian Civil Service. Joint Secretary, Ministry of States, under Sardar.

CAMPBELL-JOHNSON, ALAN. : Press Attache to Viceroy and Governor-General Lord Mountbatten.

CARIAPPA, GENERAL K. M. : Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, 1949-53.

CHAGLA, M. C. : Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, 1947-58; later High Commissioner in U.K. & Ambassador to U.S.A.

CHALIHA, B. P. : Political leader of Assam. Parliamentary Secretary in the Bardoloi Ministry of 1946.

CHAUDHURI, MAJOR-GENERAL J. N. : Commander of the the Indian forces which entered Hyderabad in the course of the police action in 1948. Military Governor of the Hyderabad State after police action.

CHETTY, R. K. SHANMUKHAM : First Finance Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

CHUNDRIGAR, I. I. : Muslim League Member of Interim Government under Nehru, 1946-47.

COLVILLE, SIR JOHN : Governor of Bombay. Acted as Governor-General three times during absence of Wavell and Mountbatten.

CORFIELD, SIR CONRAD : Indian Political Department. Political Advisor to the Viceroy for Indian States.

CRIPPS, SIR STAFORD : Minister in the British Cabinet under C. R. Attlee. Member, Cabinet Mission to India 1946.

DAS, BISWNATH : Congress leader of Orissa.

DAS, SETH GOVIND : Prominent Congressman of the Central Provinces. Strong protagonist of Hindi.

DASAPPA, H. C. : Prominent Congressman of Mysore State. Finance Minister of Mysore during 1948 and the following years.

DEO, SHANKARRAO : Prominent Congress leader of Maharashtra.

DESAI, BHULABHAI J.: Prominent Advocate of Bombay and Congress leader. Took a prominent part as Defence Counsel in the I. N. A. trials.

DESAI, JANARDAN : Prominent member of Hyderabad State Congress.

DESAI, KHANDUBHAI : Close associate of Sardar. Labour leader and organiser of the Indian National Trade Union Congress.

DESAI, MORARJI : Prominent Congress leader of Bombay. Minister in the State from 1937-39 and again from 1946-52. Later became Chief Minister and subsequently member of Nehru's Cabinet and Mrs. Indira Gandhi's cabinet.

DESHMUKH, C. D. : Indian Civil Service. Governor, Reserve Bank of India, 1943-49. Finance Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1950-56.

DESHMUKH, RAMRAO M. : Prime Minister, Vindhya Pradesh Union (dissolved in 1950) from 1947 to 1948.

DHEBAR, U. N. : Congress leader of Saurashtra. Chief Minister, Saurashtra Union, from 1947.

DIWAKAR. R. R. : Prominent Congressman of Karnataka. Took over from Sardar as Minister, Information and Broadcasting, 1948-52.

EDROOS, SYED AHMED EL : Commander-in-Chief, Hyderabad State forces at the time of police action.

GADGIL, N. V. : Prominent Congress leader of Maharashtra; Minister in the Nehru's Cabinet.

GANDHI, DEVDAS : Son of Gandhiji and son-in-law of Shri C. Rajagopalachari; Managing Editor, Hindustan Times of Delhi.

GANDHI, SHRIMATI INDIRA : Daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru. Congress worker since her early years and now Prime Minister of India.

GHAZNAVI, MAULANA DAUD : Prominent Congressman of the Punjab and President of the Provincial Congress Committee for several years.

GHOSH, PRAFULLA CHANDRA : Congress leader of Bengal. Chief Minister of West Bengal until succeeded in 1949 by B. C. Roy.

GIDWANI, CHOITHRAM P. : Congress leader of Sind.

GIRI, V. V. : Congress leader of Andhra and eminent Trade Union leader. Elected to Madras Legislative Assembly in 1946. Later held offices as Governor and President of India.

GUPTA, C. B. : Prominent Congress leader and at one time Chief Minister of the United Provinces. Minister under Govind Ballabh Pant in 1946 and succeeding years.

GUPTA, DESHBANDHU : Prominent Congress leader of Delhi.

HAQ, A. K. FAZLUL : Leader of the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal. Held office of the Premier of Bengal.

HASAN, S. M. : Minister, Central Provinces, 1946-47.

HENDERSON, ARTHUR : Under Secretary for India and Burma in Attlee's Cabinet.

HUSAIN, ZAKIR : Muslim Educationalist; later President of India.

HYDARI, SIR AKBAR : Indian Civil Service. Governor of Assam after independence.

IENGAR, H. V. R. : Indian Civil Service. Principal Private-Secretary to the Prime Minister. Later Home Secretary under Sardar.

ISMAIL, MUHAMMAD : President, Indian Muslim League after independence.

ISMAY, LORD : Chief of Staff to Mountbatten, 1947 and a confidant of Sir Winston Churchill.

JAIN, S. P. : Prominent industrialist.

JAIRAMDAS DOULATRAM : Congress leader of Sind. Governor of Bihar, 1947. Later Minister in Nehru's Cabinet and Governor of Assam.

JENKINS, SIR EVAN : Indian Civil Service. Governor of the Punjab before partition.

JANG, ALI YAVAR : Minister in Hyderabad during the Nizam's regime. Resigned in 1947 owing to differences about transfer of power. Later Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University. Ambassador of India in Cairo, Paris and Washington and Governor of Maharashtra.

JINNAH, MUHAMMAD ALI : Supreme leader of Muslim League. Became first Governor-General of Pakistan after partition.

KACHRU, DWARKANATH : Associate of Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah; Secretary, All India States Peoples' Conference.

KAIRON, PRATAP SINGH : Congress Sikh leader of the Punjab. Minister in East Punjab after 1947 and later Chief Minister.

KAK, RAMCHANDRA : Prime Minister, Jammu & Kashmir State, 1945-47.

KAMARAJ, K. (NADAR) : Distinguished Congressman of Madras. President, Tamil Nad Congress Committee, 1940-54.

KANIA, H. J. : Chief Justice of India after 1947.

KATJU, K. N. : Lawyer and Congress leader of the United Provinces. Governor of Orissa, 1947-48 and West Bengal, 1948-51.

KHAN, ABDUL GAFFAR ("FRONTIER GANDHI") : Gandhian political leader of the North-West Frontier Province. Organised the "Khudai Khidmatgars" (Servants of God) in that Province.

KHAN, GHAZNFAR ALI : Muslim League Member of Interim Government, 1946-47.

KHAN, LIAQUAT ALI : Muslim League leader of the United Provinces. Minister in Nehru's Interim Government, 1946-47. Prime Minister of Pakistan after partition.

KHAN, MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA : Judge of Federal Court before Partition. Foreign Minister of Pakistan after partition.

KHAN, SAADULLA : Son of Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of the North-West Frontier Province, and follower of Abdul Gaffar Khan.

KHAN SAHIB, DR. : Elder brother of Abdul Gaffar Khan. Congress Premier, North-West Frontier Province, till partition, when he was dismissed by Jinnah.

KHARE, N. B. : Congress Premier in the Central Provinces, 1937. Afterwards left Congress.

KIDWAI, RAFI AHMED : Prominent Congress Muslim leader of the United Provinces. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet. Confidant of Nehru.

LAL, SHAVAX A. : Secretary, Ministry of Law. Later Secretary to the President.

LATTHE, A. B. : Congressman and Minister in Bombay, 1937-39. Held office as Dewan of Kolhapur State before its integration.

LOCKHART, GENERAL SIR ROBERT. : Commander-in-Chief, India, at the time of Independence in 1947. Later Governor of N.W.F.P.

MAHAJAN, MEHRCHAND : Judge, Punjab High Court. Prime Minister, Jammu & Kashmir State, 1947-48. Later Advisor to the Maharaja of Bikaner.

MAHTAB, HARE KRUSHNA : Prominent Congress leader of Orissa. Premier, Orissa, 1946-50. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1950.

MATTHAI, JOHN : Educationist and Industrialist. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1947-50.

MAVALANKAR, G. V. : Congress leader of Gujarat. President, Central Legislative Assembly, 1946-50 and Speaker, Lok Sabha, thereafter.

MALAVIYA, K. D. : Congress leader of the United Provinces.

MEDHI, BISHNURAM : Congress Minister in Assam, 1946-50. Succeeded Gopinath Bardoloi as Chief Minister.

MEHTA, JIVRAJ : Eminent physician, and Congress leader of Bombay and Baroda. Held office as Dewan of the Baroda State till its integration in Bombay Province in 1949.

MEHTA, N. C. : Indian Civil Service. Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Chief Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh.

MENON, V. K. KRISHNA : Close friend of Jawaharlal Nehru. Indian High Commissioner in London, 1947-52.

MENON, V. P. : Constitutional Adviser to the Governor-General till August, 1947. Secretary, Ministry of States, under Sardar from July, 1947 onwards. Officiated as Governor of Orissa.

MIEVILLE, E. C. (SIR ERIC). : Member of Lord Mountbatten's staff.

MISHRA, D. P. : Staunch and Prominent Congress leader of the Central Provinces (Madhya Pradesh). Minister, 1937-39 and again in 1946.

MITTER, B. L. : Prominent Advocate of Bengal who held several high offices under the British Government. Dewan of Baroda at the time of independence.

MONCKTON, SIR WALTER : Legal and Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam and a close friend of Lord Mountbatten and Sir Winston Churchill.

MOOKERJEE, SYAMA PRASAD : Hindu Mahasabha leader. Member in Nehru's Cabinet till 1950.

MOUNTBATTEN, LORD : Viceroy and Governor-General of India, March to August 1947. Governor-General of the Dominion of India, August 1947 to June 1948.

**MUDALIAR, RAMASWAMI :** Prominent Justice Party leader of Madras. Dewan, of Mysore, 1946-49. Earlier Member of Governor-General's Executive Council. Led deligation to U.N. prior to Independence.

**MUDIE, SIR FRANCIS :** Indian Civil Service. Home Member of India, 1944-46. Governor of Sind, 1946-47. Governor of West Punjab (Pakistan) after partition.

**MUNSHI, K. M. :** Prominent Congress leader and Advocate of Bombay. Government of India's Agent-General in Hyderabad, 1948. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

**NAIDU, MISS PADMAJA :** Daughter of Shrimati Sarojini Naidu. Took a great deal of interest in Hyderabad affairs after the police action. Later Governor of West Bengal.

**NAIDU, SHRIMATI SAROJINI :** Prominent Congress leader belonging to Hyderabad. Became Governor of Uttar Pradesh.

**NANDA, GULZARILAL :** Congress leader and Labour leader of Gujarat. Minister in Bombay Province, 1946-50. Later Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

**NANJAPPA, V. :** Indian Civil Service. Administrator, Kolhapur, until its integration with Bombay in 1949. Special Commissioner, Hyderabad. Later, Chief Commissioner, Cooch-Bihar and Tripura.

**NARAYAN, JAYA PRAKASH. :** Founder Secretary, Socialist Party of India. Later Sarvodaya Leader.

**NAYYAR, SHRIMATI SUSHILA :** Follower of Gandhiji. Did considerable relief work during the communal disturbances, following partition. At one time Executive Councillor in Delhi Administration and Member of Loksabha.

**NEHRU, JAWAHARLAL :** In the forefront of India's freedom movement. President, Indian National Congress for several terms. President, All India States Peoples' Conference. Prime Minister of India, 1947-64.

**NEOGY, K. C. :** Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1947-50.

NISHTAR, ABDUL RAB : Minister belonging to the Muslim League in Interim Government, 1946-47.

NIZAM, MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN OF HYDERABAD : Ruler of the State.

PANIKKAR, K. M. : Administrator with long association with Indian States. Prime Minister of Bikaner for some years prior to, and after, independence. Later Ambassador in China.

PANT GOVIND BALLABH : Eminent Congress leader of the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh). Congress Premier of the Province in 1937 and again from 1946-55. Later Home Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

PATEL, H. M. : Indian Civil Service. Secretary to the Cabinet, 1946-47. Thereafter Defence Secretary.

PATEL, MISS MANIBEN : Daughter of Sardar Patel.

PATIL, R. K. : Resigned from Indian Civil Service to join Congress. Minister, Central Provinces and Berar after 1946 election.

PATIL, S. K. : Prominent Congress leader of Bombay. A close associate of Sardar. President, Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, 1946. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1957-62.

PETHICK-LAWRENCE, LORD : Secretary of State for India in Labour Ministry formed in 1945. Leader of the Cabinet Mission to India, 1946.

PORTER, A. E. : Indian Civil Service. Secretary, Home Ministry, 1946-47.

PRAKASA, SRI : Prominent Congress leader of the United Provinces. India's High Commissioner in Pakistan, 1947-49. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet. Governor of Assam.

PRAKASAM, T. : Eminent Congress leader of Andhra Pradesh. Premier of Madras Province, 1946-47.

PRASAD, SHANKAR : Indian Civil Service. Chief Commissioner, Ajmer-Merwara, 1947-48. Chief Commissioner of Delhi, 1948-54.

**PRASAD, DR. RAJENDRA** : Eminent Congress leader of Bihar. Close associate of Gandhiji, Nehru and Sardar. President of the Congress, 1947-48. President of the Constituent Assembly. Member, Nehru's Cabinet. First President, Indian Republic.

**RAJAGOPALACHARI, C. ("RAJAJI")**: Veteran Congress leader from Madras. Resigned from Congress in 1942, but rejoined later. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, Governor of West Bengal. Governor-General of India (1948-50) and Union Minister from July 1950.

**RAM, JAG JIVAN** : Congress Leader of Bihar. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

**RANDHAWA, M. S.** : Indian Civil Service. Deputy Commissioner, of Delhi, after partition and during the days of communal trouble.

**RANGA, N. G.** : Congress leader of Andhra Pradesh.

**RAO, B. RAMAKRISHNA** : Prominent Congressman of Hyderabad. Became Chief Minister of the State in 1952.

**RAZVI KASIM.** : Organised the Razakars, a militant band of Muslim communalists, in Hyderabad.

**REDDI, B. GOPALA** : Congress leader of Andhra Pradesh. Minister, Madras, 1947.

**REDDY, K. C.** : Mysore State Congress leader. Chief Minister, Mysore, 1947-52.

**REES, MAJOR-GENERAL T. W.** : Head of the Military Engineering staff attached to the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet.

**ROY, BIDHAN CHANDRA** : Eminent physician and Congress leader of Bengal. Became Premier (later Chief Minister) of the Province in 1949.

**ROY, KIRAN SHANKAR** : Congress leader of Bengal.

**RUIKAR, R. S.** : Labour leader of Bombay.

**SAADULLA, MUHAMMAD** : Muslim League leader of Assam Sometime Premier (from 1939).

**SACHAR, BHIMSEN** : Congress leader of the Punjab. Minister in Khizr Hyat Khan's Ministry which resigned in March 1947. Finance Minister, East Punjab, 1947-49. Became Chief Minister of Punjab.

**SAHAY, VISHNU** : Indian Civil Service. Sometime Secretary to the Government of India for Kashmir affairs.

**SARAN, RAGHUNANDAN** : Congress leader of Delhi.

**SARKAR, NALINI RANJAN** : Prominent Politician and industrialist of Bengal. Was Minister in that province after partition. Also Member of Governor-General's Council upto 1942.

**SARMAH, DEBESWAR.** : Congress leader of Assam. Dominion Agent in Manipur. President, Assam Provincial Congress Committee.

**SAXENA, MOHANLAL** : Congressman from the United Provinces. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1948-50.

**SHAH, SHANTILAL H.** : Founder Member, Indian National Trade Union Congress. In charge of the Congress Election Office, 1945-47.

**SHANKAR, VIDYA** : Indian Civil Service. Private Secretary to Sardar, 1946-50.

**SHARMA, M. S. M.** : Editor, Daily Gazette, Karachi.

**SHASTRI, HIRALAL** : Congress leader of Jaipur State; Chief Minister, Rajasthan, 1949.

**SHASTRI, LAL BAHADUR** : Prominent Congressman of the United Provinces. Minister in the State Cabinet after 1946.

**SHUKLA, RAVI SHANKAR** : Premier, Central Provinces and Berar (later Madhya Pradesh) from 1946 onwards.

**SINGH, BALDEV** : Prominent Sikh leader of the Punjab. Defence Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1947.

**SINGH, DALIP** : Agent to the Government of India in Jammu & Kashmir State for a short period in 1948.

**SINGH, KARAN** (Yuvraj of Kashmir) : Son of Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir. Became Regent in 1949. Later Minister in Central Cabinet.

**SINGH, MAJOR-GENERAL KULWANT** : In charge of military operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947.

**SINGH, MAHARAJA HARI** : Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir.

**SINGH, SWARAN** : Prominent Congress Sikh leader of the Punjab. Minister in East Punjab, 1947 onwards. Later Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

**SINGH, MASTER TARA** : Akali Sikh leader of the Punjab. Agitated for separate State for the Sikhs.

**SINGH, TRILOKI** : Congress Member of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, 1946. Formed Jan Congress, 1950 and was leader of the Opposition, 1950-52.

**SINHA, ANUGRAH NARAIN** : Finance Minister, Bihar, 1946. Rival of Shri Krishna Sinha.

**SINHA, SRI KRISHNA** : Congress Premier (Chief Minister after 1950) of Bihar, 1946 onwards.

**SINHA, SATYA NARAIN** : Prominent Congressman of Bihar. Chief whip of the Congress party in the Central Legislature and Parliament. Minister in Nehru's Cabinet. Later Governor of Madhya Pradesh.

**SITARAMAYYA, PATTABHI** : Congress leader of Andhra Pradesh. Congress President, 1948-50.

**SUBBĀRAYAN, P.** : Congress leader of Madras; Minister, 1937-39 and again in 1947-48. Later Minister in Nehru's Cabinet, 1957-62.

**SUHRAWARDY, H. SHAHEED** : Muslim League politician of Bengal. Premier of the Province at the time of partition.

**TANDON, PURUSHOTTAMDAS D.** : Leading Congressman of the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh). Elected Congress President, 1950.

TIRTHA, SWAMI RAMANAND : Leader of the freedom Movement in Hyderabad. President of the State Congress till 1950.

TRIVEDI, C. M. : Indian Civil Service. Governor of East Punjab after partition.

TYAGI, MAHAVIR : Congressman from the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh), Minister in Nehru's Cabinet.

VAZIRANI, NIHCHALDAS : Advocate of Karachi. Sometime Minister in Sind.

VARMA, MANIKYALAL : Chief Minister, Rajasthan Union before its integration with Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer in 1949.

VELLODI, M. K. : Indian Civil Service. Chief Minister, Hyderabad, 1949-52.

VENKATACHAR, C. S. : Indian Civil Service. Dewan of Jodhpur, 1946-47. Prime Minister of Bikaner, 1948-49. Later Secretary to Ministry of States.

WAVELL, LORD : Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1943-47.

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**SELECT CORRESPONDENCE  
OF  
SARDAR PATEL**

**VOL. 1**



## CHAPTER 1

# THE CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS 1945-46.

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

On 21 August 1945 Viceroy Wavell announced that general elections to the Central and Provincial Legislative Assemblies would be held in the cold weather of 1945-46. These bodies had already been functioning for an unduly long time. Elections to the Central Assembly were last held in 1934, and to the Provincial Assemblies early in 1937. They had been continued because of the war, except of course in those Provinces where they had been suspended consequent on the suspension of popular Government and Ministries and the taking over of the administration by the Governors under section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935, after the resignation of the Congress Ministries. The sense of urgency in the holding of elections generated by a realistic assessment of the situation and relevant factors after the Second World War was so great that the Viceroy announced that there would be no major changes in the then existing franchise, as that would delay the elections considerably, not less than two years. Not even the wholesale preparation of new electoral rolls would be possible; all that was intended was that the existing electoral rolls prepared nearly eight years ago would be revised as thoroughly as the circumstances permitted.

On the importance of the new elections no one had any doubt. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, whose Labour Party had been voted to power in Great Britain with a big majority in the general elections of 1945, had already pledged his party to a policy of complete independence for India as an "immediate" development. And the Viceroy also announced that he would, as soon as the results of the general elections

were published, take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which would have the support of the political parties of India; he would also hold discussions with the representative of those elected to the new Legislatures, and with the representatives of Indian States, to determine the form which the Constituent Assembly should take, and its powers and procedure. To quote Sardar from one of his statements some time later—

“The ship has reached the shore...the freedom of India is near at hand.”

To understand the political situation at the time it would be helpful to begin with a brief resume of the important developments since 1937. Jinnah and the Muslim League fared badly in the general elections of 1937, and were not able to win more than a fraction of the Muslim seats in the Legislative Assemblies, even though the system of communal electorates was operating. Out of a total of 485 Muslim seats in all the Provincial Assemblies, the share of the Muslim League was no more than 108. In the Punjab and Bengal particularly, the electorate voted in favour of parties with a non-communal appeal for the Unionists in the Punjab led by Sikandar Hayat Khan and the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal led by Fazlul Haq. Significantly, Jinnah was at the time not even thinking in the direction of Pakistan. Within three years, however, the outlook of the Muslim League and Jinnah underwent a startling change, and their support from the Muslims as a whole showed an enormous increase. Jinnah, and Muslim opposition to Congress, received a considerable boost from moderate-minded Muslim leaders of the United Provinces (now named Uttar Pradesh) when Nehru and Congress decided to exclude Muslims from the Ministry there, unless they joined the Congress party and subscribed to the Congress creed. This accretion of strength enabled Jinnah to evolve his theory that the Muslims were a separate “Nation” and develop it to its conclusion that, as a separate Nation, they were entitled to a separate homeland. The bargaining position of the Congress vis-a-vis the British Government had moreover been weakened

by the resignations in October 1939, of the Congress Ministries in the seven Provinces of Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, the Central Province, Bihar, Orissa and the North-West Frontier Province, and their failure to respond to Linlithgow's appeal in his famous Bombay Orient Club speech early in 1940. Above all, the firm and oft-repeated British declarations that there could be no freedom for India except on a basis agreed to by the Muslim League, and the open encouragement given to the League by British officials, added to its popularity among the Muslims both among the educated classes and the masses. The Pakistan resolution passed by the League rather tentatively in Lahore in March 1940 (a strange coincidence with the Congress rejection of the Viceroy's olive branch) became, as the years went by, the cornerstone of its approach to the Indian political problem. By no means an inconsiderable contribution to the strength of the League was provided by the negotiations initiated in 1943 by C. Rajagopalachari, with Gandhiji's blessings, in which the principle of Pakistan was virtually conceded. A striking example of the power of the Muslim League to hold up political progress with British co-operation was furnished when in 1945 Wavell gave up his plan to Indianise the Executive Council because Jinnah demanded that the Council should have no Muslim member other than those nominated by the Muslim League—a demand which Wavell himself found unacceptable. This demand was in fact preposterous; it would not only unduly tie the hands of the Congress but also deny representation to the Unionists of the Punjab, who had run a stable and reasonably efficient administration during the war and had whole-heartedly cooperated with the British Government and the war effort. The net result of all this was that the popularity of the League among the Muslim intelligentsia as well as the masses increased from year to year and Muslim opinion not only in the Muslim majority provinces but also elsewhere aligned itself in support of the demand for Pakistan—the North-West Frontier Province under the leadership of the Khan brothers being the sole exception. The North-West Frontier Province was the one

place where Congress still swayed the Muslim masses. Thanks to the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, under the brave and dedicated leadership of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, the large bulk of the people there were with Congress. But elsewhere, so confident was Jinnah about Muslim support that he declared that the elections would show the League's representative character; and on the basis of this he would settle for nothing less than the establishment of Pakistan.

The other important minority, influential and locally based in the Punjab, was the Sikhs. Though they counted only in the Punjab, they had by their contribution to the wealth of that Province, more especially in developing its agriculture and making it the granary of India, built up for themselves a position of great importance. On the issue of Pakistan, the Sikhs were whole-heartedly with the Congress. The Partition of India was to them nothing less than a nightmare. Jinnah's strident assertions of a Muslim Nation filled them with consternation, because they felt, justly as events were to show, that if the Punjab were to break away from India and become part of a theocratic Muslim State, the shrift they would get would be very short indeed. The Congress and its leaders they could trust; but their apprehension was that, when it came to a question of a showdown, the British Government might let them down in order to placate the Muslim League. They felt grave doubts whether Congress would be in a position to save the country from partition. At this stage Tara Singh emerged as their leader and organised a considerable number of Sikhs as a separate Akali party. The main demand of this party was that, if Jinnah and the Muslim League were allowed to press the demand for Pakistan, the Sikhs should be allowed a separate State of their own. However, there were also many in that enlightened community who threw in their lot with the Congress, as a national organisation working for the independence and welfare of the country as a whole.

Thus, against the divisive forces represented by the Muslim League, the rest of political opinion in India was solidly behind

the Congress in their view that the integrity of India should be maintained.

This was broadly speaking the background of the situation when the Congress leaders, newly released from the prisons, sought to repair the damage done to their organisation by their long incarceration and to establish contact with the people in a bid to win the elections. Fully realising the importance of the elections for the future of India, Congress immediately set up a Central Election Board presided over by its President, Abul Kalam Azad; the other members of the Board were Sardar himself, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Govind Ballabh Pant, Asaf Ali, Shankarrao Deo and J. B. Kripalani, the last named in his capacity as General Secretary of the Congress. The Board appointed Shantilal H. Shah as its Secretary and he opened its office in Bombay on 1 October 1945. One of its first acts was to settle a procedure to be followed by it. At a meeting held on 25 September it took the following decisions :

- (1) In the case of reports from a Pradesh Congress Committee containing the name of one candidate for a constituency, and where there was no contest among Congressmen, Sardar was given authority to approve the proposal.
- (2) In other cases the names were to be circulated with Sardar's recommendations to the other members of the Board for their comments.

Sardar was at this time in Poona, suffering from an obstinate stomach ailment, and the treatment at the Nature Cure clinic, where Gandhiji was also receiving treatment, does not appear to have much effect. Even so, for the Congress the election stakes were high and no risks could be taken. Sardar was the organiser of the 1937 elections, when he was Chairman of the Parliamentary sub-Committee of the Congress which selected party candidates for the elections; and the main responsibility for organising the election campaign for the 1945-46 elections also devolved on him. He was also the principal, probably the only, fund raiser for the elections and

he discharged this role so outstandingly well that no one had any complaints that he was starved of funds.

It was not long before Sardar found that the procedure of circulation was so cumbrous as to be unworkable. Members of the Board were not easily available. The President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, was himself ill and spent a considerable part of his time convalescing in Bindhachal, a somewhat inaccessible place in the United Provinces. Govind Ballabh Pant was moving about electioneering in his Province and Rajendra Prasad was doing the same in Bihar. We therefore find Sardar writing to Abul Kalam Azad on 15 October 1945 on the subject, pointing out that, if the procedure for circulation was followed, it would not be possible to dispose of the applications in time; that it was not possible to call a meeting which members of the Board could attend at short notice; and that in the circumstances Sardar had no alternative but "to give a decision according to my own light in case replies are not received in time from the members of the Committee" (Serial No. 4)

Elections to the Central Assembly were held first and these elections were over by the end of 1945. The result of these elections showed a clear indication that the rift between the Congress and the Muslim League was now complete and deepseated, and encouraged Jinnah in his negative attitude. On the other hand it also showed the support which the country as a whole gave to the Congress. The Congress polled 91.3 per cent of the non-Muslim votes, while the League got 86.6 per cent of the Muslim votes. The Congress won the great majority of the non-Muslim seats, 57 in all. The Muslim League won all the 30 Muslim seats. There were five independents and the share of the Akali Sikhs was two. Eight seats went to Europeans.

Already we see from Sardar's correspondence that the procedure for selection of candidates was not very satisfactory. Jawaharlal Nehru was not in the organisational set-up for choosing candidates. He was touring the country, making elec-

tion speeches and arousing enthusiasm for the Congress wherever he went. But he could not help noticing that, while there was tremendous popular enthusiasm for the Congress, there was also a gap in several Provinces between the general public and the local groups in control in the various Committees. He brought this to Sardar's notice. Sardar himself realised that the old provincial Committees were in several cases

“out of touch with the present day atmosphere and they do not enjoy the confidence of the real workers of the Congress. If the selection is left to the provinces... there will be serious trouble and it will be difficult to impose discipline.”

He added that, if the final selections were to be made by the Board—

“we must send our instructions to the Provinces as soon as possible and must also decide about the procedure to be adopted by the Board.”

This was in his letter to Abul Kalam Azad which he wrote on 6 November 1945. (Serial No. 7) Sardar repeated these difficulties in letter to Jawaharlal Nehru (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 2, No. 75) :

“Regarding the Central Election Board I am in a fix. Maulana is not keeping good health. He proposes to call a meeting of the Working Committee in Calcutta by the end of the December. It will be very late. Asaf Ali is busy with his own election and with the INA Defence Committee Work. Rajen Babu and Pantji are touring their provinces for the Central Assembly elections and other important Congress work. I have no authority to dispose of urgent proposals coming from the provinces... and the Board is not meeting.”

For the Central Assembly elections the selection of candidates in the Punjab and Bengal was made by Abul Kalam Azad. The situation was, however, confused and disconcerting partly because even a stalwart of the calibre of Khizr Hyat

Khan decided to support the Muslim League on all India issues, while opposing it in the provincial elections. We thus find Sardar as early as December 1945, striking a pessimistic note on the chances of Congress winning the Muslim and Sikh seats in the Punjab. (Serial No. 14)

On the other hand, so far as the general constituencies were concerned, Sardar rightly calculated that the Congress would be able to win practically all these seats and he therefore definitely turned down all proposals for compromise with parties like the Hindu Mahasabha. The Mahasabha was at that time led by Syama Prasad Mookerji who had a great hold on the masses as well as intelligentsia all over India. Sardar was willing to consider giving him a seat, but as for other members of the Hindu Mahasabha he felt that there were none among them who had even a fifty per cent chance against the Congress. (Serial No. 2)

In the Provincial elections, as mentioned above, Sardar was confident of winning in a big way in Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces, Orissa, and even in Assam. The basis of Congress policy was its uncompromising opposition to the Muslim League and its policy of partition and, in order to vindicate the unity of India, the Congress decided to support other parties like the Unionists in the Punjab who adopted a similar stand. The real Congress effort had to be in the Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province, each of which threw up problems of its own. In the Punjab, Khizr Hyat Khan had still a big hold on the electorate. The Unionist Party of which he was the head, had been formed early in the twenties; it was an agrarian alliance of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, and though in terms of strength there were more Muslims in it, its agrarian character had been very diligently cultivated and maintained both by Sikandar Hyat Khan, under whose leadership it swept the polls in 1937, and after his death by his successor Khizr Hyat Khan. The Unionists were not particularly enamoured of the partition of India but they were totally opposed to any proposal

for the division of the Punjab and this brought them into conflict with the Muslim League and Jinnah. Besides, the Muslim Unionists were not willing to leave their influential Hindu and Sikh partners. The result was that the Unionists were the means of providing a secular basis for the elections in the Punjab. The Congress realised that the Punjab, along with Bengal, would hold a key position in the election. The situation here was, however, complicated by various factors. So far as finance was concerned, Sardar considered that the Province should help itself to a certain extent at least; but he was prepared, if necessary, to find whatever funds would be required. But this was not all. An electoral arrangement had to be worked out with the Unionists, as well as with the Sikhs. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad himself went to the Punjab to tackle the question, but apparently the arrangement he worked out did not operate smoothly; as we have seen, the Muslim League had captured all the seats in the Central Legislative Assembly, with the acquiescence of Khizr Hyat Khan. The Unionists, however, decided to set up their own candidates in the Muslim Constituencies against the Muslim League in the elections to the Punjab Assembly. In this Sardar and the other Congress leaders decided to co-operate and support Khizr Hyat Khan. Thus the main contest for the Muslim Seats in the Punjab came to be between the Unionists and the Muslim League. But here another complication presented itself. The Congress organisation in the Punjab was a house divided against itself. The situation was so bad that Sardar had to remark (Serial No 15) :

“Unfortunately the Punjab has been divided into groups and factions of a very bitter type and hardly two men trust each other. All sacrifices of the people of the Punjab end in nothing on account of disunity, distrust and consequent demoralisation. The two provinces that have suffered from these maladies are the Punjab and Bengal.”

Sardar was distressed to find that even good Congressmen were not united in the Punjab. The result of this was that Sardar could not be confident about securing a big group which

was strong enough to count for something. He lamented, "Can nothing be done to make Congress workers realise their sense of responsibility at this critical period?" Baldev Singh clearly told Sardar that, if any kind of detente with the Unionists were to be practicable, it would have to be with the group led by Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and not by the group opposed to him.

Sardar had also to tackle the problem of the Sikhs. Here the Akalis led by Tara Singh proved to be very difficult. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had authorised the provincial Congress Chief Daud Ghaznavi, along with Gopi Chand Bhargava and Pratap Singh Kairon to negotiate with the Akalis; but apparently these negotiations failed and Maulana Azad left it to Sardar, if he considered it desirable, to negotiate a settlement. Sardar did call some of the Punjab leaders and they left with a formula, which apparently did not work. (Serial No. 25)

The result of the election from the point of view of the Congress, was depressing. The Unionists, who were playing the role of bulwark against Muslim League reaction, were able to capture only 20 seats. The Muslim League won as many as 75 Muslim seats out of a total of 86; the Congress could not win a single Muslim seat, and had to be content with 51 general seats. The Panthic Akalis got 22 Sikh seats, and there were seven independents. Sardar admitted his disappointment. (Serial No. 40)

"I see that there is no possibility of our getting any seat from the Muslim constituencies nor have the independent Muslims any chance. It seems that efforts and resources there have been wasted and all hopes given were false and the calculations and expectations were wrong."

In Bengal Congress strategy was left entirely to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad; the results were equally disappointing, while Congress was able to obtain 87 seats, 113 out of the 119 Muslim seats were won by the Muslim League.

The results in Sind were also not satisfactory. The Muslim League won 31 Muslim seats but some of these broke off from Jinnah and formed a splinter group under G. M. Syed. Nationalist Muslims gained three seats; and there was one independent Muslim. The Congress won 21 general seats and one went to an independent. There were four Europeans, who provided the Muslim League sympathiser Governor Francis Mudie with a convenient opportunity of playing his own game in favour of the League....The North-West Frontier Province results were more encouraging. Congress won 17 general seats and 13 Muslim seats. Muslim League got 17 seats. There were two other Muslims and one Akali Sikh.

In the other Provinces the number of Muslim seats was comparatively small and as expected the Muslim voters for the most part rallied under the League banner, but the Congress had such a hold on the electorate as a whole that it was able to get a big majority.

Certain features in these elections are highlighted in the correspondence. The procedure generally followed was to get recommendations from Election Boards set up in the various Pradeshes; Congress had from the beginning set up regional bodies for the various linguistic areas (each known as a "Pradesh") and the Parliamentary Boards were also set up on this basis. Thus there were three bodies for the old composite Madras State, one for Tamil Nad, one for Andhra and a third for Kerala. Similarly, the Bombay Province had four Congress bodies—one for Maharashtra, one for Gujarat, one for Karnataka and one for the metropolitan area of Bombay.

The Central Board, as we have seen, had its office in Bombay, but except for Bengal and the Punjab, Sardar had to undertake the responsibility for making the final selections. It is clear from the correspondence that he consistently strove to maintain the institutional character of the Board and to uphold the prestige of the Pradesh Boards to the extent possible, while at the same time maintaining the ultimate responsibility

of the Central Board. He observed in a letter to Kamaraj (Serial No. 16) :

“You are aware that the decisions in the matter of selection of candidates rests with the Central Parliamentary Board. If the local selection Board does not represent all important claims and interests, it would naturally throw a greater burden on the centre and create difficulties for smoother working.”

At the same time, he claims that there has been no instance of any action on the part of the Central Board which would suggest the slightest desire to impose decisions on local Committees.

The correspondence shows that in some cases Sardar came into conflict with the Congress President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Maulana Azad, who was most of the time away in Bengal and the Punjab and recuperating his health in the United Provinces, wanted at one stage to function as an appellate authority to dispose of complaints against the decisions of the Board. Sardar had to point out to him that the Board had to function as a body and that no individual member of it could overrule its decisions. He said :

“There can be no appeal against Central Board's decision. Besides, such a course would encourage indiscipline and endless disputes.”

Nevertheless, it seems that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad continued to overrule some of the selections made by the Board. One particularly glaring case arose in Mahakoshal (Central Provinces) where a complaint from a rejected candidate was accepted by Maulana Azad. The Pradesh Chief had already obtained an assurance from Sardar that no changes would be made in the selections and no appeals entertained in the nominations and was very bitter about decision (Serial No. 46). Sardar found it necessary to take the matter up vigorously with the Congress President. He told the latter that he could not function as appellate authority and the adoption

of the "strange procedure" had "lowered our (i.e. Congress) prestige in the eyes of the people". (Serial No. 47) Certain other circumstances had also arisen which made Sardar feel that he had lost the confidence of the Congress President. Sardar went to the extreme step of asking to be allowed to resign from the Central Board and the Working Committee. Maulana Azad's apology had no apparent effect on Sardar who pressed that his resignation be accepted. (Apparently the matter was later smoothed over.)

An interesting incident in the course of the election campaign arose over the position of C. Rajagopalachari (affectionately and respectfully called Rajaji) in Madras. Rajaji was one of the most senior and respected Congressmen in the country. He had a life-long record of service and sacrifice in the Congress cause and had distinguished himself as the Premier in the Congress Ministry in 1937. He had, however, parted company with the Congress in 1942 on the vital "Quit India" issue, and he had later spear-headed a movement for Congress acknowledgement of the Muslim League demand for partition. He had, however, rejoined the Congress when all the efforts at conciliating Jinnah and the Muslim League had failed. But in Tamil Nad there was a faction against him which resisted even his admission on technical grounds. Sardar was quite clear in his mind that Rajaji should not only be admitted to the Congress but should also take the place of leadership which he had earned by his outstanding qualities; but Sardar did not wish to impose his will on Tamilnad. Sardar clearly enunciated his view on the attitude to be adopted in such cases (Serial No. 13):

I do not believe for a moment that the Congress would close its doors against people who have taken no part in the last struggle. All our sacrifices would be in vain if we would not absorb talents at our disposal and decided to close our doors against people who have rendered services in the past and made sacrifices more than we

have done during our times simply because on one occasion they differed from us."

So far as Rajaji was concerned Sardar's opinion of him was very high indeed. He said (Serial No. 13) :

"I would any day welcome Rajaji's coming back to the legislature, because I know that he is head and shoulders above all Congressmen in the Province in ability, integrity and sincerity."

But, though Sardar unhesitatingly expressed this opinion, he made it clear that he would not take any hand in settling the question of leadership. That, he said, rested entirely in the Province, and no one from outside wanted to "impose" Rajaji on Madras if he was not wanted.

At first Sardar thought that Rajaji's rehabilitation would be best served by nominating him to a place in the Central Legislative Assembly and sent word through Kamaraj asking him to see Rajaji and make the offer; but owing to a misunderstanding attributed by Rajaji to the fact that Kamaraj did not make a serious proposal that Rajaji should stand for the Central Assembly, this proposal fell through. Sardar thought that Rajaji wanted provincial leadership and did not wish to be nominated to the Central Assembly while Rajaji thought that Sardar did not seriously wish him to be a candidate for the Centre. Thus there was complete misunderstanding. (Serial Nos. 9-11) But when the elections to the Provincial Assemblies came round, Sardar insisted that Rajaji should be fully in the picture for the selection of Congress candidates for Tamil Nad. He insisted on members of the Rajaji group being given due representation in the Pradesh Election Board and on Rajaji's functioning in all respects as if he was a member of the Board. (Serial No. 23) In several cases he on behalf of the Central Election Board accepted Rajaji's recommendations in preference to those of the Board. And Rajaji himself was selected for the Universities seat. All this would probably have given Rajaji a commanding position in the

State after the elections; but to Sardar's great disappointment and chagrin, Rajaji himself foiled all Sardar's efforts by deciding at the last moment to withdraw his candidature to the Madras Legislative Assembly. (Serial No. 42)

As already stated, these elections only resulted in the polarisation of the Nationalist and the Muslim separatist votes. The results in Assam, Bihar, the United Provinces, Bombay, Madras, the Central Provinces and Orissa are summarised as follows :

- (1) In Assam the Congress won all the 58 general seats, and the Muslim League all the 27 Muslim seats.
- (2) In Bihar the Congress won 98 seats, including 1 Muslim seat, the Muslim League 34, the Momins 5, and Independents 15;
- (3) In the United Provinces the Congress won 152 seats and the Muslim League 54 out of the 66 Muslim seats.
- (4) In Bombay the Congress won 126 seats, and all the thirty Muslim seats went to the Muslim League.
- (5) In Madras, the Congress won 164 general seats and the Muslim League all the 29 Muslim seats.
- (6) In the Central Provinces and Berar the Congress won 92 seats, and the Muslim League 13 out of the 14 Muslim seats.
- (7) In Orissa the Congress won 47 seats, and the Muslim League won all the 4 Muslim seats.

The first step to be taken after the completion of elections in the Provinces was the formation of Ministries. In Assam and Sind, two Provinces where elections were held first, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad made overtures to the Muslim League, offering composite Ministries composed by both the parties. Nothing came of this effort, but the reaction of the Sind offer in the Punjab was rather unfortunate, because in that Province the Congress was openly supporting the Unionists in opposing the Muslim League. Sardar himself was quite

definite that Congress would have "no truck with the League" and differed from the Congress President. He was of the view that an all party Government would never work and that such an offer should not have been made (Serial No. 51). In the Punjab, the Congress was able to form an alliance with the Unionists and the Akalis and a Ministry was formed under the leadership of Khizr Hyat Khan; but not before Congress President tried to come to an arrangement with the Muslim League. Sardar's opposition to a coalition arrangement with the League appears to have been overruled.

The only two Provinces where the Muslim League was able to form Ministries were Sind and Bengal. In all the other Provinces, except the Punjab, Congress was able to form Ministries which commanded a sufficiently stable support to enable them to carry on the government.

In Sind there was a split in the Muslim League, a splinter group under G. M. Syed capturing four seats. A curious situation arose. The Muslim League had 29 seats. The combined opposition which formed a coalition under G. M. Syed's leadership also had 29 members—21 Congressmen, 4 from G. M. Syed's group, three Nationalist Muslims, and one independent. The Governor however sent for the Muslim League leader to form a Ministry and this Ministry was maintained in office by the expedient of not calling a meeting of the Assembly. When eventually the meeting was called the Speaker, a Muslim League nominee, resigned and neither the League nor the coalition was willing to put up a candidate and thereby sacrifice a vote. The Governor Francis Mudie then dissolved the Assembly and in the general elections the Muslim League got a majority and formed a Ministry.

The correspondence shows how differences in Madras continued. The Central Congress leadership was anxious that if at all possible Rajaji should be the Premier of Madras but did not wish to force the issue, while making their views clear; they were in the form of suggestions rather than directives. It was not desired to impose leadership from above and Sardar

said that if democracy chose to go wrong it had a right to do so. The central leadership was particularly anxious to keep T. Prakasam out of the leadership, and suggested various alternatives. But in the state of factional politics that persisted, this advice was not accepted. The Andhra Members solidly voted for Prakasam. Tamil Nad votes were split. Rajaji was not even proposed for leadership, and Prakasam won the ballot. Sardar appears to have felt this very keenly. He said (Serial No. 63):

“It is all a painful affair. We have been behaving like petty minded, irresponsible people and are influenced by party cliques and personal prejudices at a critical juncture when we should have set better examples....The Congress has already lost its prestige in the South and it now brings the Central Organisation into contempt and ridicule....”

By way of postscript a brief account of the Ministries may be given here. It has already been mentioned how the tottering Sind Muslim League Ministry was held up by Governor Mudie and how as a result of dissolution the Muslim League got a clear majority. In the Punjab, the Unionist Ministry of Khizr Hyat Khan functioned in spite of Muslim League opposition, which subsequently organised itself as a civil resistance movement, till following the British Government declaration of 20 February 1947, Khizr Hyat Khan decided to resign (in a surprise move) on 2 March 1947; the Muslim League leader, the Khan of Mamdot, was called upon to form a Ministry, but in the face of determined Hindu & Sikh opposition, he could not do so and the Province remained under Governor's rule till partition. In Madras in-fighting in the party continued. In March 1947, a vote of no confidence in Prakasam was brought before a party meeting. Prakasam then resigned and O. P. Ramaswami Reddiar formed a Ministry. His Ministry was also short lived and he was supplanted by P. S. Kumaraswami Raja. The province remained under weak leadership till Rajaji came back in 1953. In other provinces, including the

North-West Frontier Province, where the Muslim League had started a civil resistance movement the Ministries set up in 1946 continued till partition came.

The correspondence published is not complete or comprehensive. Many matters of importance were left to personal discussion of which there is no record; and some of the letters mentioned are apparently missing. But from the published letters Sardar emerges with the stature of a hero; and India seemed inevitably to be moving towards partition.

## *SELECT CORRESPONDENCE*

### 1. CENTRAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1945, CONGRESS MANIFESTO

*(Drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru)*

For sixty years the National Congress has laboured for the freedom of India. During this long span of years its history has been the history of the Indian people, straining at the leash that has held them in bondage, ever trying to break the chains of subjection and alien rule. From small beginnings it has progressively grown and spread in this vast country, carrying the message of freedom to the masses of our people in the towns as well as the remotest villages. From these masses it has gained power and strength and developed into a mighty organisation, the living and vibrant symbol of India's will to freedom and independence. From generation it has dedicated itself to this sacred cause, and in its name and under its banner innumerable countrymen and countrywomen of ours have laid down their lives and undergone life-long suffering in order to redeem the pledge they had taken. By service and sacrifice it has enshrined itself in the hearts of our people; by its refusal to submit to any dishonour to our nation it has built up a powerful movement of resistance to foreign imperialist rule.

The career of the Congress has been one of both constructive effort for the good of the people and of unceasing struggle to gain freedom. In this struggle it has faced numerous crises and come repeatedly into direct conflict with the armed might of a great Empire. Following peaceful methods, it has not only survived these conflicts but has gained new strength from them. After the recent three years of an unprecedented mass upheaval and its cruel and ruthless suppression, involving terrible suffering for our people, the Congress has risen again stronger than ever and more loved by the people by whom it has stood through storm and stress.

The Congress has stood for the independence of India and for equal rights and opportunities for every citizen of India. It has stood for the unity of all communities and religious groups in India and for tolerance and goodwill between them. It has stood for the right of the Indian people as a whole to have full opportunities for growth and self-development according to their own wishes and the genius of the nation; it has stood also for the freedom of each group and territorial area **within the nation to develop its life and culture within the larger framework and for this purpose such territorial areas or provinces should be constituted, as far as possible, on a linguistic and cultural basis.** For those who suffer from social tyranny and injustice, it has stood for the removal of all barriers to equality, and special help from the State and society in order to raise them from their backward and depressed state.

The Congress has envisaged a free, democratic State with the fundamental rights and civil liberties of all its citizens guaranteed in the Constitution. This Constitution, in its view, should be a federal one with a great deal of autonomy for its constituent units, and its legislative organs elected under adult franchise. In regard to the franchise, as other matters, sex should be no bar, and women should take full part as citizens in national activities.

A hundred and fifty years and more of foreign rule have arrested the growth of the country and produced numerous vital problems that demand immediate solution. Intensive exploitation of the country and the people during this period **has reduced the masses to the depths of misery, starvation and beggary.** The country has not only been politically kept under subjection and humiliated, but has also suffered economic, social, cultural and spiritual degradation. During the years of war, and even now, this process of exploitation by irresponsible authority and complete ignoring of Indian interests and views has reached a new height of incompetence in the administration, leading to terrible famine and widespread misery

among our people. There is no way to solve any of these urgent problems except through freedom and independence. But the content of political freedom must be economic and social freedom also.

The most vital and urgent of India's problems is how to remove the curse of poverty and raise the standards of the masses. It is to the well-being and progress of these masses that the Congress had directed its special attention and its constructive activities. It is by their well-being and advancement that it has judged every proposal and every change, and it has declared that anything that comes in the way of good of the masses of our country must be removed. Industry and agriculture, the social services and public utilities must be encouraged, modernised and rapidly extended in order to add to the wealth of the country and give it the capacity for self-growth, without dependence on others. But all this must be done with the primary objects and paramount duty of benefiting the masses of our people and raising their economic, cultural and spiritual level, removing unemployment, and adding to the dignity of the individual. For this purpose it will be necessary to plan and co-ordinate social advance in all its many fields, to prevent the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of individuals and groups, to prevent vested interests inimical to society from growing and to have social control of the mineral resources, means of transport and the principal methods of production and distribution, as well as of banking and exchange. Co-operation should be encouraged in land, industry and in other departments of national activity so that free India may develop into a co-operative commonwealth.

In international affairs the Congress stands for the establishment of a world federation of free nations. Till such a time as such a federation takes shape, India must develop friendly relation with all nations and particularly with her neighbours on the east and the west and the north. In the Far East, in South-East Asia and in Western Asia, India has

had trade and cultural relations for thousands of years and it is inevitable that with freedom she should renew and develop these relations. Reasons of security and future trends of trade also demand these closer contacts with these regions. India, which has conducted her own struggle for freedom on a non-violent basis, will always throw her weight on the side of world peace and co-operation. She will also champion the freedom of all other subject nations and peoples, for only on the basis of this freedom and the elimination of imperialism everywhere can world peace be established.

On the 8th of August 1942 the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution, since then famous in India's story, and in this resolution it gave the battle-cry 'Quit India'. By that demand and challenge the Congress stands today and it has reaffirmed the national and international objective of that August resolution. It is on the basis of this resolution and with this battle-cry that the Congress faces the elections for **the Central and Provincial Assemblies.**

The Central Legislative Assembly is a body with no power or authority and is practically an advisory body whose advice has been constantly flouted and ignored. It is completely out of date and is based on a very restricted franchise. The electoral registers for it are full of errors and omissions and no opportunities for correcting or adding to them have been given. Large numbers of our countrymen are still in prison and many others who have been released are disqualified from standing for election. Obstructions in the way of holding public meetings still continue in many places. Yet, with all these and other handicaps and drawbacks, the Congress has decided to contest the elections on the issue of independence and 'Quit India'. In this election petty issues do not count, nor do individuals, nor sectarian cries—only one thing counts; the freedom and independence of our motherland, from which all other freedoms will flow to our people.

So the Congress appeals to the voters for the Central Assembly all over the country to support the Congress candi-

dates in every way at the forthcoming elections, and to stand by the Congress at this critical juncture, which is so pregnant with future possibilities. Many a time the people of India have taken the pledge of independence; that pledge has yet to be redeemed, and the well-beloved cause for which it stands and which has summoned us so often, still beckons to us. But the time is coming when we shall redeem it in full, not by the election but by what comes after it. Meanwhile, this election is a small test for us, a preparation for the greater things to come. Let all those who care and long for freedom and the independence of India meet this test with strength and confidence, and march together to the free India of our dreams.

2. SARDAR TO RAJENDRA PRASAD,  
DATED 8 OCTOBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

...I do not think that the Hindu Mahasabha can get any seat except in Bengal. It has no strength in any other province. I do not know anything about Bihar, but after having shown so much strength in the present struggle I do not doubt that Bihar can render a very good account of itself in the elections. My view is that excepting Syama Prasad there is hardly any man whom we can accept and sacrifice our seat instead. It would not be wise to lose both ways. On the side the League is attacking us and we have to rely largely upon our strength in non-Muslim constituencies. We cannot afford to surrender without cause any of the seat which we can easily secure. If in an individual case we find that Hindu Mahasabha has a 50 per cent chance against the Congress we can settle with them and allow them that seat. But I personally feel that there will be no such case in the whole of India....

3. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 12 OCTOBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

...Rajen Babu (Rajendra Prasad) had written to me also about his meeting with Syama Prasad Mookerjee. I had also written to him that the Congress cannot think of any settlement with the Hindu Mahasabha. Besides, there is absolutely no need as the Congress will easily secure all the seats in the Central Assembly so far as non-Muslim constituencies are concerned, except perhaps Dr. Syama Prasad's own seat, which by courtesy the Bengal Congress Committee may think it proper to allow without contest. There is no other place where we can allow any one else to get in. The other suggestions made by Syama Prasad to Rajen Babu are wholly irrelevant and premature. I had written to him strongly about it....

4. SARDAR TO ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

...I am afraid the procedure of circulation is cumbrous and lengthy. In many cases there will be more candidates than one for a constituency and there will be disputes. If I have to depend upon the procedure of circulation and wait for the replies from members I am afraid it would not be possible to dispose of the applications in time, nor is it possible to call a meeting where all members can attend in such a short time. Almost all the nomination dates are fixed in the last week of this month. There is therefore hardly any time for a meeting. Under the circumstances I will have no alternative but to give a decision according to my own-light in case the replies are not received in time from the members of the Committee....

5. SARDAR TO ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 26 OCTOBER 1945

I have received your letter of the 21st instant today (not printed). Your telegram about Mr. B. Das of Orissa was received late last night and I have replied as under :

COMMITTEE REJECTED B. DAS FOR GOOD REASONS. CALLED FOR SUBSTITUTE WHOSE NAME ALREADY SANCTIONED AND COMMUNICATED. IMPOSSIBLE CHANGE NOW.

Mr. (H.K.) Mahtab had discussed this matter with me while he was at Poona and he himself was opposed to his nomination. Apart from his being physically not quite fit for being sent to Central Assembly, there were other reasons also. Subsequently, no doubt, his name was recommended as no other candidate probably was available within the short period of the notice for application. But the Committee at Poona considered the whole question carefully and wired to Shri Mahtab to send fresh proposals which were eventually received and sanctioned by the Committee. The proposal was communicated to Shri Mahtab and also the candidate. It was, therefore, impossible at this stage to make any changes as suggested in your telegram. Mr. B. Das was also informed about the decision of the Committee.

About the Frontier I am arranging for help immediately.

In the Punjab, the Akalis are on the warpath. They have started violence in public meetings. The two candidates selected by us are fairly strong and the Akalis have lost their temper. Maulana Daud Gaznavi and Diwan Chamanlal had both come to me at Poona and we have fixed up the nominations in consultation with them. They have accompanied me to Bombay and both of them left yesterday for Lahore. Dr. Gopichand (Bhargava) is here at my instance for securing financial assistance from here for the Punjab. He will be returning back after a couple of days.

The Bengal Central Assembly elections are a little later than in other provinces. I have not yet received the proposals from there. The provincial elections will, I believe, take place in February or March. But no programme has yet been announced. **Sarat Babu (Sarat Chandra Bose)** is still at Kurseong. I believe he has written to you about his talks with the Muslim groups. But unfortunately you are not in a fit state of health. Unless you, Prafulla Babu (P. C. Ghosh), Sarat and the Muslim leaders meet and decide as to the whole plan of action in Bengal we cannot see our way clearly. You may also be able to ascertain roughly what should be the amount required for fighting the elections in Bengal. There should be no difficulty in raising the money required from Bengal, but even if there is any difficulty we can meet with it if we have some idea about your requirements there.

It is good that you have kept the cheque for Rs. 20,000 presented to you in the Punjab for the work to be done there at present.

Your telegram about selecting Shri Krishna Lulla from Sind for the Central Assembly at the suggestion of Maula Baksh was also received very late after the decision of the Committee was communicated to the Sind Provincial Congress Committee. I have wired to Jairamdas (Doulatram) if it is possible to readjust the matter in the light of your recommendation. But I fear they would not be able to do so at this late stage.

The Hindu Mahasabha has been creating unnecessary trouble by putting up candidates everywhere. In Bombay they have at the last moment put up two worthless candidates, the principal one of whom was defeated badly in a municipal by-election last year. But for this nominal opposition there would have been no contest in Bombay. But this will involve us expenditure for nothing.

In Gujarat so far as the Central Assembly is concerned, our candidates go unopposed. So in Mahakoshal. But in

Maharashtra, the Hindu Mahasabha has been opposing us. Probably they will do so except in Gujarat and Mahakoshal.

I have also received a letter from Rajen Babu asking for financial help, and I am arranging to meet this demand immediately.

Arrangements are also being made for Assam. Prabhu Dayal came here yesterday as I had written to him from Poona. I have seen his requirements and there will be no difficulty about that province at all. I have advised him to contest all the Muslim seats. They had at first decided not to contest a large number of Muslim seats for fear of financial difficulties. But I have advised them as above and they have accepted my advice.

At present I am concentrating on my work here and later on when I am able to leave the clinic at Poona, I will go to some other places where it would be necessary for me to go for finishing my work.

In Delhi also I hear from Mr. Asaf Ali that the Hindu Mahasabha is putting up a candidate against him. I do not know whether this kind of opposition is intended to coerce us to enter into a settlement with them or whether there is any other object behind it.

What does the Hindu Mahasabha propose to do in Bengal about the Central Assembly seats?

I hear reports that you intend to go according to medical advice for rest somewhere outside Bengal. Please let me know what is the truth about this matter.

*(Author's Note :* The Congress had been out of active political life for three years. In the meantime other parties under the patronage of the British Government had occupied the stage. Sardar's task in directing the election campaign included picking up the organisational threads again. This letter indicates how soon he had acquired a grip over the situation and how he had been able to assess the various personalities involved, both local and Central.)

6. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

...The selection of candidates for the election is a bad business. I have been flooded with applications, appeals, complaints, protests and recommendations from various quarters. It is a sad thing to see this mad competition for going into the Councils. We must discourage this. Most of these complaints are absolutely false. No selection is possible which would satisfy all. There are complaints from all provinces. You say that you cannot help feeling disturbed at some of the choices made or proposed in the Punjab, Bengal and Sind. I do not know whether you refer to the selections for the Central Assembly or for the provinces. So far as the Central Assembly is concerned no selections were made from Bengal till the date of your letter to me, i. e., on the 31st. I got the telegram about the Bengal selections on the 1st. The Bengal selections have all been made by Maulana (Azad) himself. I have no knowledge about these selections. About Sind, there is only one seat in the Central Assembly, and the man selected has been returned unopposed. His was a unanimous recommendation. His rival approached Asaf Ali at Delhi and Maulana at Calcutta and also came here to see me personally. He has never been in the Congress but he is a good lawyer and secured a recommendation from Asaf Ali and Maulana. About the Punjab, there is a complaint about the selection of Dr. Gopichand's brother. He was also recommended by Asaf Ali. You know there are two strong parties in the Punjab. Dr. Satyapal's group sent numerous letters, telegrams and protests against the selection to all members of the Board. The selection was made by the Board after calling Maulana Daud Ghaznavi from the Punjab and in consultation with him by the Board at Poona. About the provincial nominations I have not yet received any proposals.

7. SARDAR TO ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 6 NOVEMBER 1945

On my return from Bombay on the 3rd evening, I learned from Bapu that you propose to call a meeting of the Working Committee at Calcutta on or about 16 December. A subsequent letter from Prafulla Babu indicates your intention to keep it in the last week of December. As it is, the middle of December will in itself be late, but the end of December will be too late. I expected that you will keep it in the first week of December when Bapu reaches there. You know we have promised a manifesto to the AICC for the provincial elections. The elections in some provinces will be in early January and we must be ready with the manifesto. It all depends upon your health, and if you are going out for a change then it would not be possible to keep the meeting earlier.

About the Central Election Board, an early meeting is very necessary. We have to decide our attitude regarding the proposals for nominations for the provincial elections. In Sind they have already made some tentative proposals and I expect they will be submitting them to us shortly. These proposals will be of a very controversial nature and it would not be possible to dispose of them by correspondence. I, therefore, propose to call a meeting here on Friday, 16 November, and settle the question of policy to be adopted in the matter of these elections. As far as the Central Assembly was concerned, we had decided that the provinces should send their proposals with their report and the final selection was to be made by us. In several provinces the old committees are out of touch with the present-day atmosphere and they do not enjoy the confidence of the real workers of the Congress. If the selection is to be left to the provinces I am afraid there will be serious trouble and it will be difficult to impose discipline. If the final selections are to be made by the Board, we must

send our instructions to the provinces as soon as possible and we must also decide about the procedure to be adopted by our Board in this behalf. Regarding the Central Assembly elections, we had very little time and therefore some of the complaints were received even after the nomination date was over. So far as the provinces are concerned much difficulty is likely to arise if we delay the decision regarding the procedure to be adopted in this matter.

I know that you would not be able to leave Calcutta or perhaps you will be going soon to some place for a change. Hence your coming to any place for the meeting is impossible. But if the rest of the members meet and discuss amongst themselves all the different points involved in the matter of selection of provincial nominations, it would be easy for the Board to make a report for your advice and opinion, and then we can come to some final decision. We may not take any decision in the Board till your approval is obtained, but the informal talks would be very helpful. If you suggest any other procedure I would unhesitatingly adopt it, but at present no other way occurs to me for the solution of this difficulty. I shall expect your reply whether the meeting should be called on the 16th or not by wire so that I can communicate with other members of the Board in time.

I have arranged to send a cheque of Rs. 25,000 from Bombay which you must have received by this time. Yesterday I received Prafulla Babu's letter giving me an idea of your joint deliberations about the estimate which I had asked for. His letter indicates a huge sum. Indeed, for one province alone it is staggering, but I shall try to do my best and see that our cause does not suffer on that account.

Today Sarat Babu is coming in the afternoon and I propose to send this letter with him.

I am expecting to hear from you where and when you are going for a change and when you expect to return, so that in case of emergency I may possibly communicate with you through a messenger.

I hope you are taking care of your health. I am leaving this place for Bombay on the 19th. Bapu also goes on that day.

8. C. RAJAGOPALACHARI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

... Kamaraj is, I am afraid, playing a deceitful game. With friends who talk to him about me, he pleads for time to extricate himself from his erstwhile companions. Though he is obviously deceiving, I am giving him the time, taking all he says at face value.

He signed and sent me a draft which he said he would read at the Madura meeting of the PCC. But he did not fulfil his promise. He omitted vital matters and acted contrary to his proposed intentions. He now explains his default as due to want of sufficient boldness to break off suddenly from his friends.

I had asked those who gathered there and who were wanting to do many things on my behalf to drop everything. As many as 75 members out of a total of 175 members present had actually signed and given a requisition for resolutions supporting me and opposing the campaign against me. But my friends on my advice accepted Kamaraj's plea for peace and withdrew all their propositions. But on his part he immediately failed to keep up and filled the PCC with 30 or 35 co-opted members, all opposed to me, and ever since is repeating his double game. He has done nothing to execute his promise to end the conflict.

I fear the province will go into the hands of criminals. This may appear to be strong language but I tell you it is just that and nothing else. Intimidation and corruption will be ruling. They do not want one who will not yield to these things and who has public support of his own.

You say you are pained to note the developments here and wish to know how you can help. I know you can help if you

make up your mind. They are still carrying on a whispering propaganda campaign that you are behind the move to destroy me !

You will ruin this fair province if you allow the present Tamil Nad Working Committee to manage the selections....

(*Author's Note* : The leadership of the Tamil Nad Congress Committee and later of the Madras Legislative Party—which latter included members from Tamil Nad, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala—was one of the problems that taxed the Congress Working Committee and Sardar. Despite Rajaji's "heresy" over the Quit India movement, Rajaji continued to command the respect and affection of Sardar, though he had forfeited the same so far as Jawaharlal Nehru and a number of other Congressmen were concerned. The feeling was even more bitter locally. At the same time, Gandhiji and Sardar wished to continue to utilise Rajaji's services. This and other correspondence shows the extent to which feelings of distrust had been roused among the two main contestants and some leading lights of local Congress. It was not surprising therefore that an atmosphere of intrigue prevailed which filled Sardar with disgust. At the same time Sardar was opposed to dictation from above. This will show how on organisational matters Sardar gave considerable weight to local opinion and feeling. This was perhaps the secret of the hold he exercised over the rank and file.)

9. RAJAJI TO SARDAR, DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

...I wish to explain to you one thing. There was no offer to me to accept a place in the Central Legislature. You never wrote or wired to me. I should have thought several times before rejecting a definite proposal or desire on your part. I was not enthusiastic enough to seize a casual mention of it by others. In fact it was only when I asked Kamaraj Nadar generally what happened when he met you and whether you

advised him to do anything, he laughed and said in a most casual way that you suggested I might stand for the Madras seat of the Central Legislature. In the meantime other names were being canvassed. I had no notion that any serious thought was entertained about my accepting it. I write all this because Dr. Subbarayan told me that you had thought this was a way out. Otherwise it is irrelevant. If Kamaraj told or wired to you that I refused to accept a definite proposal he was wrong.

#### 10. SARDAR TO RAJAJI, DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1945

I have received your letter of the 21st instant (Serial No. 9). Dr. Subbarayan met me at Poona twice and I have explained to him about my suggestion for your going to the Central Assembly. Sjt. Kamaraj Nadar told me that he had already made such a proposal to you through Sjt. Gopala Reddy of Andhra but you declined to accept it. As I found that both the Andhra and Tamil leaders were willing to send you to the Centre, I handed over the Madras city proposal and sent Sjt. Kamaraj back to Madras with instructions that he should first see you and make you this offer. In case you accepted this proposal, he was instructed to communicate your acceptance to me by wire. In the event of your refusal, he was to find out a Christian candidate, if possible. The third alternative was of Mrs. Swaminathan. I am enclosing herewith a copy of the letter received by me from Sjt. Kamaraj on 26 October. I do not know why you declined to accept that offer. If I thought that your way in the province was easy, I would not have suggested that you should go to the Centre. As I sensed many difficulties in your way for the provincial leadership, I made this suggestion, which could have cleared your way for the future, but I thought that perhaps you did not agree with my reading of the situation and you may be able to smoothen the affairs of the province and so you rejected this offer.

11. RAJAJI TO SARDAR, DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

I have your kind letter of the 23rd. (Serial No. 10). I am surprised to read the last paragraph of Shri Kamaraj's letter to you dated 26 October. Kamaraj did not convey to me any serious proposal that I should stand for the Central Assembly. The suggestion was never lifted above the level of casual and indirect reference. It is a tragedy. I wish you had written or wired to me direct. If you had done so, the position would have been wholly different.

12. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

...About my Punjab impressions, I imagine that both the Congress Sikh candidates will win, but it is difficult for me to judge from a brief tour. Everywhere I was told that Baldev Singh was using Government officials to bring pressure on voters for the Akali Dal candidates. Indeed, the contest was more against these officials than against the Akali Dal itself. I think the Sikh elections have served a good purpose, whatever the results. It has brought all the progressive Sikh forces together in line with the Congress.

About the Punjab generally, the position seems to me fairly good so far as the public reaction is concerned, but bad so far as the Congress organisation is concerned. The old party spirit is rampant and Congressmen work against each other. Daud Ghaznavi, the president (Punjab PCC) is, I think, a good man and not connected with any party. Dr. Gopichand, while having a strong position among the Hindus, is especially disliked by the non-Hindu groups as well as by the opposite party in the Congress. In the choice of candidates there is a great deal of party feeling involved. For the present the

Congress has done very little in the way of big propaganda. They simply cannot function in a big way. They plead lack of funds also. The main contest for the Muslim seats is between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party, both of whom are spending money on a lavish scale. In spite of this I am sure the Congress will do well in the elections provided a strong line is taken, suitable candidates chosen and financed.

I cannot say definitely in regard to the Muslim candidates, whether it will be better in the Punjab to set up direct Congress candidates or allow the Muslim Nationalist Board to set them up on its behalf. But my general impression has been, more especially in the United Provinces, that the direct Congress appeal goes farthest. Especially in the rural areas in the United Provinces the Congress is popular amongst the Muslims. They have hardly heard of the Jamiat or the Muslim Board. The contest Kazmi *versus* Liaquat Ali Khan is a close one and on the whole there has been very good work done in it. It is possible that Kazmi might win. If he loses, he will do so by a small number of votes. I was told repeatedly that the Muslim League had got thoroughly frightened there and was distributing money to voters. What effect this will have I do not know.

Whatever the results of these Muslim elections, they have had a very good effect on our workers and on the situation generally. We have discovered that there is a very good response among them to our appeal and we have certainly laid the foundations of a favourable drive for the provincial elections. I do hope that, as you said, we shall contest every Muslim seat....

(*Author's Note* : This letter shows how misplaced Nehru's confidence in the Muslim voters was. This assessment is in direct conflict with the results of the elections in which Muslims in large numbers voted for the League candidates. A comparison in the 1945-46 elections with that of the 1937 elections would show how much ground the Congress had lost to the League within nine years, seven out of which were

spent out of office and three in detention. This also shows to what extent the British policy of encouraging the Muslims and Sikhs to run counter to the Congress had succeeded. However, they did not succeed in the case of the Scheduled Castes who retained their faith in the Congress.)

13. SARDAR TO D. R. ARUNACHALAM,  
DATED 20 DECEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

... There is no desire on my part of forcing him (Rajaji) in your midst as you suggest in your letter, but you cannot expect me to suppress my opinion if it is asked for, especially when I was told that my name was being exploited for making propaganda against Rajaji's return to the Congress.

I do not believe for a moment that the Congress should close its doors against people who have taken no part in the last struggle. All our sacrifices would be in vain if we would not absorb talents at our disposal and decided to close its doors against people who have rendered services in the past and made sacrifices more than we have done during our time, simply because on one occasion they differed from us.

My opinion about C. R. given in that letter (that Rajaji was head and shoulders above all Congressmen in Madras province, in ability, integrity and sincerity) was not intended for publication. It was written in reply to a letter received from a Congressman. But I stand by every word of what I have said in that letter. You talk of hatred for his leadership in your letter, which will perhaps not allow you to appreciate or understand my viewpoint. We have worked together practically for a lifetime and we know each other's worth. We have differed occasionally on vital matters but difference of opinion, however strong and unpleasant, had not affected nor will it affect in the future our regards and affection as well as our understanding of each other. You cannot expect me to suppress my opinion about his worth but the question of leadership

does not rest with me. It rests entirely with the province and nobody from outside wants to impose him if he is not wanted.

14. SARDAR TO MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 21 DECEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

I received your telegram of the 19th instant yesterday evening (not printed). I have already sent a cheque for Rs. 50,000 but I am afraid we are wasting good money for nothing and Congress reputation will in the end suffer badly. I am enclosing herewith a Press cutting from which you will see what type of candidates are being put up by the Ahrar party in the Punjab for whom they want our help. From this cutting you will see that immediately the League candidates' nominations were declared invalid, the Ahrar candidates, who remained on the scene and whose nominations were declared valid, joined the Muslim League. It is very sad that such candidates are chosen to oppose the League. In any case it is very unwise that we should be mixed up with such a shady transaction. I would still request you to reconsider the whole position and withhold the help. May I again remind you that my information is that the Ahrars will get no place except one or two in the Punjab?

I am afraid we have mishandled the whole Punjab situation. We have to fight the Akalis as there has been no settlement as was expected and we will not get more than 5 or 6 seats after a good deal of expense which could be easily avoided.

Please excuse me for bringing these facts to your notice, but I have done so as I have been considerably oppressed by a feeling of failure in duty at the critical juncture in one of the most important provinces in these elections. I do not wish to blame anybody but I do feel that if we continue to handle affairs in the same fashion, we will suffer a serious defeat in spite of such huge expenditure and a good deal of time and energy being spent over it. . . .

15. SARDAR TO BHIM SEN SACHAR,  
DATED 25 DECEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

I have received your letter of the 13th instant (not printed). We would indeed be very glad to be of any help to your province and to have greater opportunities of personal contact with you so that you may be able to understand us better and also be able to render greater service to your province. Unfortunately, the Punjab has been divided into groups and factions of a very bitter type and hardly two men trust each other. All sacrifices of the people of the Punjab end in nothing on account of the disunity, distrust and consequent demoralisation. The two provinces that have suffered from these maladies are the Punjab and Bengal. I have noticed that you have been trying to steer clear of parties, but that is not enough. It may give you peace of mind but individual peace is of no consequence when we see all round our work being undone by our colleagues and comrades. I do not mean to attach any blame to you for your keeping aloof from parties; that is the least that is expected from good Congressmen. But unless there is some one who can assert and enforce his will without caring for the displeasure of those who are in the wrong, no progress can be made....

16. SARDAR TO KAMARAJ, DATED 26 DECEMBER 1945

I received your telegram (not printed) this morning which came to me as a surprise. The Working Committee naturally is anxious to see that the atmosphere in the province is settled before the elections. But it is unfortunate that your attitude is not helpful at all. Your telegram contains a veiled threat of indisciplines if not of revolt. There is no question of imposing any decisions from above but you and your colleagues must

realise that the Working Committee has also a responsibility and it cannot abdicate its functions if it has been approached by as many as about one-third of the members of your provincial Congress committee. It is but natural that we should like to see the formation of a Parliamentary Board for your province so constituted as to include all groups and interests as far as possible leaving no ground for any reasonable complaint. Mr. Asaf Ali was sent to your province to bring about an amicable settlement. Instead of being helpful to him, some of you have thought it proper to threaten indiscipline and to refuse to listen to any advice given purely in the interests of the province. You are aware that the decision in the matter of selection of candidates rests with the Central Parliamentary Board. If the local selection Board does not represent all important claims and interests, it would naturally throw a greater burden on the centre and create difficulties for smooth working. Will you point out any instance or action on (our) part from which you can suggest the slightest inference for a desire to impose decision on your committee? All I can say is that your telegram was wholly unexpected and uncalled for.

17. TELEGRAM FROM K. KAMARAJ TO SARDAR,  
DATED 29 DECEMBER 1945

MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR KIND ADVICE (Sardar was able to bring about an amicable settlement on Tamil Nadu dispute in verbal discussion). ACTING ACCORDINGLY. MEANWHILE HAVE TELEGRAPHED ASAFALI AS FOLLOWS. QUOTE YOURS THANKS. RAJAJI PROMISED IN YOUR PRESENCE TO COMMUNICATE TO ME THE TIME SUITABLE TO HIM FOR MY MEETING HIM NEXT DAY THROUGH DOCTOR SUBBARAYAN. WHILE WAITING FOR APPOINTMENT READ A PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED TO THE API ONLY A FEW HOURS AFTER YOUR DEPARTURE BY DOCTOR RAJAN AND OTHERS. THE STATEMENT BEGINS: THE PUBLIC ALREADY KNOW THAT WE WENT ON A DEPUTATION TO THE CONGRESS PRESIDENT AND THE WORKING COMMITTEE TO REPRESENT CERTAIN MATTERS REGARDING

THE TAMILNAD PROVINCIAL CONGRESS COMMITTEE AND ABOUT THE FORMATION OF A PARLIAMENTARY BOARD. MR. ASAFALI WHO CAME HERE ON BEHALF OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE TO MAKE ENQUIRIES ON THE SPOT HAS GIVEN HIS DECISION ON CERTAIN POINTS AND HAS RESERVED SOME FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. WE MAY EXPECT TO BE INFORMED OF THEIR CONCLUSIONS IN A FEW DAYS UNQUOTE. I REGRETFULLY CONCLUDED AS IS OBVIOUS FROM THE STATEMENT THAT RAJAJI DID NOT WANT TO MEET ME BUT WAS EXPECTING AN ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE HIGH COMMAND REGARDING RECONSTITUTION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY BOARD. THE PUBLICATION OF THAT STATEMENT CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH IF I MET RAJAJI THE PUBLIC WOULD HAVE FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT I WAS DOING SO UNDER DURESS. SURELY THAT WAS NOT THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A FRUITFUL TALK. DOCTOR SUBBARAYAN WHO WAS TO HAVE ARRANGED THE TIME FOR THE MEETING TELEPHONED TO ME ON THE TWENTY FIFTH MORNING BUT WHEN I WENT TO HIS HOUSE THAT NOON HE WAS AWAY. I HEARD NOTHING FROM HIM ON THE TWENTYSIXTH. ON THE TWENTYSEVENTH I WENT TO DOCTOR SUBBARAYAN'S HOUSE AT HIS REQUEST AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS AGREEABLE TO TAKE RAJAJI'S MEN IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SUBCOMMITTEE. ACCORDING TO ME NOT ADVISABLE TO TAKE RAJAJI HIMSELF IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE. I TOLD SUBBARAYAN THAT IF WHAT I NOW SAY WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO RAJAJI I SHALL CERTAINLY GO TO HIM AND COME TO AN ARRANGEMENT ON THIS BASIS. AT ALL EVENTS I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO ALLOW TWO OR THREE DAYS SO THAT THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY RAJAN'S STATEMENT MIGHT CLEAR UP. IT WAS WHEN I HAD MADE UP MY MIND TO SEE RAJAJI MYSELF THAT THE PRESS RECEIVED YOUR TELEGRAM FROM DELHI. PUBLICATION OF THAT TELEGRAM AGAIN CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT I AM ACTING UNDER DURESS AND I FELT COMPELLED TO GIVE UP THE IDEA OF MEETING RAJAJI. BUT FORTUNATELY THE ATMOSPHERE CREATED BY YOUR TELEGRAM HAS BEEN NEUTRALISED BY A LETTER THAT I JUST RECEIVED FROM RAJAJI IN WHICH HE HAS ASKED ME TO GO AND SEE HIM AT TWO PM TODAY. I AM DOING SO.

18. TELEGRAM FROM K. KAMARAJ TO SARDAR,  
DATED 29 DECEMBER 1945

I HAVE IN CONSULTATION WITH RAJAJI SETTLED AS FOLLOWS. ELECTION BOARD FOR PROVINCE WILL CONSIST OF MYSELF, MUTHURANGA, RAMASAMI REDDY, AVANASHILANGAM, MRS LAKSHMIPATHI, SUBBIAH, MUNISWAMI PILLAI, AND ANNAMALAIPILLAI. I SHALL CONSULT RAJAJI IN WORK OF SELECTION AT ALL STAGES. I REQUEST THIS ARRANGEMENT MAY BE ACCEPTED.

19. TELEGRAM FROM K. KAMARAJ TO SARDAR,  
DATED 29 DECEMBER 1945

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. EARLIER TELEGRAM WAS DRAFTED BY RAJAJI AND COPIES SENT TO MAHATMAJI MAULANA AND ASAF ALI. I ACCEPTED ALL NAMES SUGGESTED BY RAJAJI WHICH MEANS OUT OF EIGHT HIS GROUP GETS THREE. ALTHOUGH OTHER GROUP INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED STILL IN VIEW OF (THE) MESSAGE THROUGH SRINIVASAN I TAKE IT I HAVE CARRIED OUT YOUR ADVICE. DEPEND UPON YOU FOR HELP IN FUTURE WORK.

20. SARDAR TO K. KAMARAJ,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1945  
(EXTRACT)

I got three telegrams from you yesterday, the first one being about your reference to my advice and your telegram to Sjt. Asaf Ali, the second containing information about the settlement you made with Rajaji on the formation of the provincial election board; the third one was for my information only. I am extremely glad that at last you have all agreed on a joint formula. We are passing through a very critical period. You know that we have to fight internally and externally; internally with the Muslim League and the local bureaucracy and externally with the mighty British Empire,

which is sitting upon our chest. We cannot afford to quarrel simultaneously on all fronts. You also know that a deputation is coming to visit this country from England. We would make a sorry exhibition of our strength and solidarity if we were to allow our dirty linen to be washed in the public at the time of their visit. Rightly or wrongly Rajaji happens to be an international figure. Outsiders coming to visit this country would without fail meet him when they would come to Madras. It would be unwise to antagonise him altogether and throw him away. We must use him and his talents for the good of the country, as far as possible, without compromising our principles. You also know that Gandhiji is coming to Madras in the beginning of February. He, who has raised us and the country to such a high level, would be extremely distressed if he were to find that we are not capable of dealing with our own problems with goodwill, tolerance and affection amongst ourselves, in spite of our differences. Under the circumstances, I congratulate you all, particularly you, for the settlement that you have made and I sincerely trust that you all will try and succeed in maintaining peace and harmony in the province, so that we can march together in comradeship for the freedom of our land, for which we have been making and calling upon our people to make such tremendous sacrifices. . . .

21. BHIM SEN SACHAR TO SARDAR,

DATED 2 JANUARY 1946

(EXTRACT)

...As it is, given proper transport facilities, for which again funds are necessary, we expect to capture the following seats:

(a) General seats ... 33. The total number of general seats is 43. The losses represent Scheduled Caste seats and Hindu seats from Ambala Division and Kangra district.

(b) The estimate of Sikh seats varies from six to seven. It is urged that if properly financed two or three extra seats can be won.

(c) The Congress may hardly get two Muslim seats.

(d) From the special seats we expect to secure the University and the Commerce seats. We are experiencing sufficient difficulties in these seats, but I expect we shall ultimately succeed by the grace of God.

(e) Nothing can as yet be said with certainty about the Labour seats. The chances are not without hope....

22. BALDEV SINGH TO SARDAR,  
DATED 5 JANUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

I have written to you a separate letter today giving some details of the activities of local Congressmen which have created a most unfortunate situation in this province. Here I would like to make a few observations on matters which Malik Khizr Hyat and I have discussed....

3. Regarding the Sikh position, I am constrained to say that precisely for reasons explained above, and unless the rot in Congress ranks can be arrested, a group may arise which will tend to work against the Congress group within the Legislature. What its implications might be I cannot foresee at this stage. All I will say is that it has not been an easy task for me to weaken the anti-Congress elements among the Sikhs. These elements may raise their heads again, if there is the least fear—as I have explained in the other letter—of some Congressmen seeking political alliance with the League. The anti-Congress Sikhs will in such a case do likewise and break up Sikh nationalist solidarity built up with so much labour.

4. I would earnestly beg you to give due weight to my observations. You may discuss the matter with your colleagues, for the situation is grave enough in the province, but I would not like you at this stage to disclose the source of this information. The position of Malik Sahib is most delicate.

23. SARDAR TC K. KAMARAJ, DATED 6 JANUARY 1946

Sjt. Srinivasan met me yesterday after his return from Madras. He was present at the time when Sjt. Nagaraj sought my advice. It was given on the express understanding that it will be accepted there by you and others concerned. On this assurance, I gave the advice which was communicated to you by them through telephone. The terms of my advice were clear and unambiguous. I now understand from Sjt. Srinivasan that an attempt is being made to put a different interpretation to one of the most important terms, viz., that Rajaji was to be consulted at every stage in the matter of selection of candidates and he was to be treated in all respects as a member of the election board, although formally he was not to be taken as a member. You have accepted my advice and I have communicated the terms of my advice which you have accepted to Maulana Azad and Sjt. Asaf Ali. If any effort is now made to do anything which is inconsistent with these terms by putting a different interpretation, you will put yourself unnecessarily in trouble. Sjt. Srinivasan reports to me that some of your colleagues advise you to consider it enough to consult Rajaji but not to allow him to be present in the meeting of the Election Board. This would be a direct violation of the important term. I had not invited anybody to seek my advice but if after the acceptance of the terms anything is done which would result in the breach of the understanding, it will have serious consequences. Whether the report given to me is correct or not, I do not know, but I expect that you will not invite trouble to yourself by putting yourself morally in the wrong. Sjt. Srinivasan is also quite clear in his mind that there was no scope for any misunderstanding about the interpretation of that term. He bears me out fully and he must have written to you also about it.

#### 24. SARDAR TO RAJAJI, DATED 6 JANUARY 1946

I am enclosing herewith copy of a letter which I have written today to Sjt. Kamaraj Nadar (Serial No. 23). It was unfortunate that you called him and made a settlement, which appear to be at variance with what I had proposed. You must have received my letter in which I have stated the terms of my advice which was accepted by him when it was communicated to him by telephone by Sjt. Nagaraj, but as you called him, evidently not knowing that he had already got my advice, he readily accepted the terms you offered which were perhaps more suitable to him than those contained in my advice, but as he had accepted my terms, I am insisting on its observance by him. Yesterday I learnt that they are trying to wriggle out of the principal term, viz., to treat you as a member in all respects except your being formally taken as a member. Now what they propose to do is to send Sjt. Kamaraj simply to consult you after their discussions are over in their meeting and decisions are taken. Taking advantage of the understanding arrived at between you and him, they probably want to ignore my advice but I am insisting on its observance in toto.

In spite of all this, I am not sure that things will be easy for you. However, I am awaiting to hear from you about the reactions of all these there. For the present, the open controversy and wranglings appear to have ceased. That probably is the only advantage. The concrete result can be seen when the board begins to function.

**25. SARDAR TO GOPICHAND BHARGAVA,  
DATED 8 JANUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)**

...Gilani has come here also. He and Sudarshan had a discussion in my presence. They have, after a good deal of discussion, come to a tentative agreement about the Sikh constituencies, and if this agreement is adopted there, perhaps much of the trouble would disappear. I have written to Sardar Baldev Singh and I am enclosing herewith copies of my letters to Maulana Daud and to Sardar Baldev Singh and Bhim Sen Sachar for your information. If your attitude would be helpful and all of you think that this is a good workable arrangement, it should be allowed to go through....

**26. SARDAR TO BALDEV SINGH,  
DATED 8 JANUARY 1946**

I have received your letter of the 5th instant (Serial No. 22) through Mr. Gilani yesterday. It is unfortunate that Punjab affairs have become more complicated. If you had been able to come to Calcutta when a message was sent, perhaps things would have taken a turn for the better. Yesterday both Seth Sudarshan and Mr. Gilani met at my place. They had frank and free discussions and as a result of this they have agreed upon some proposals for the settlement of the Congress-Akali dispute regarding the elections. They are both coming there and if these proposals are accepted by you and the local Congress, this unfortunate chapter may end and, so far as the Congress and the Akalis are concerned, it may also clear the way for a better understanding between the Congress and the Unionist Party. As these two friends have agreed on a common formula with concrete proposals, it will be, I hope, easy for both parties to accept it. If you will contribute your own share

in the settlement in the proper spirit, I think that the affairs will be straightened there.

27. SARDAR TO ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 10 JANUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

I have received your letter of the 6th instant. In my previous letter I had informed you that there is a possibility of the Sikh question in the Punjab being solved by an amicable settlement if the parties there agree on the tentative arrangement settled between Seth Sudarshan and Mr. Gilani here. I am awaiting the result on their report. Perhaps you will hear about it at Delhi.

Mr. Gilani had brought a letter from Baldev Singh to me, but as Seth Sudarshan was present, I asked him to discuss the whole question with Gilani and come to some understanding, if possible. He has done so, and so I had to make no suggestion.

The most important question, so far as the Punjab is concerned, is the determination of our attitude towards the Unionist Party, because soon after the elections are over there will be no time left to settle this matter. The Congress in the Punjab is not united and as there is no responsible man there who can settle this matter, we must do so at Delhi when we meet. . . .

28. K. KAMARAJ TO SARDAR, DATED 23 JANUARY 1946

Since writing to you with reference to your letter about the terms of the settlement (Serial No. 23), I have been in consultation with Rajaji. I have not heard yet from Sjt. K. Srinivasan of Bombay. When Rajaji and I fixed up the terms, neither of us understood the clause about consultation as you interpret in your letter. I have however been acting in full

consultation with him and I am quite confident that he himself will have no occasion to complain to you in the matter.

29. SARDAR TO K. KAMARAJ, DATED 27 JANUARY 1946

I have not been able to deal with your letter of the 23rd instant (Serial No. 28) as well as the previous one. I am surprised that you profess ignorance about the terms of settlement that were taken from me by Sjt. Nagarajan who on your behalf met me in Bombay along with Srinivasan. The terms were communicated to you by a telephonic message and after the approval given by you they again met me and informed me of your acceptance. If Nagarajan now pretends ignorance about these terms which were given in detail he will have to answer for it. You may have your quarrels with Rajaji in which I will not interfere. But I will not be fooled in this manner. If you want any explanation in this matter, you may see me in Bombay when I am there.

As I am overworked at present, I have not been able to deal with your letters. Nagarajan has written to me a short letter which has also surprised me.

I will have to say nothing if you have been acting in full consultation with Rajaji and if he will have no occasion to complain as you assure me in your letter. But if he has anything to complain regarding the settlement made with me, I will see that it is enforced in full. It would, therefore, still be wise for you to act up to it without creating any trouble.

30. SARDAR TO K. KAMARAJ, DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...I am surprised that you still seem to disregard my instructions. You say that you had consulted Rajaji both before and after the meeting, when this question was considered. I have asked you to carry out your undertaking with me that Rajaji is to be treated as a member in all respects except his being a formal member of the Board. Consultation before or after has no meaning. He has to hear the arguments and the discussions in the committee and must have an opportunity to influence the members of the committee by his own presence as well as by his persuasive ability. You cannot treat him as an untouchable and not allow him to sit near you. At any rate, this is not the spirit in which the settlement was to be executed. If you will not carry out the terms of the agreement, I will have to take strong measures in order to see that it is fully enforced. All these difficulties have been created in this case because of your not having invited Rajaji for the meeting. . . .

31. RAVI SHANKER SHUKLA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...The announcement of candidates has met with universal approval here except among some of the rejected candidates. . . . Their airing of dissatisfaction publicly is encouraging the opponents of the Congress to offer opposition to our candidates. Of course this opposition in most of the constituencies will be only technical, and feeble too, but all the same it will force us to make all the arrangements an election involves. It would be in the best interest of the province if the regular candidates are firmly told that after the list had been finally approved the all-India Board could not hear appeals against

its own decision. But unfortunately what has happened in the province of UP is encouraging the mischief-mongers in this province. I met Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant at Lucknow. I found him rather sad as Maulana Sahib (Azad) has replaced some of the candidates even after their names had been published by the all-India Board. While this short of action may be merely unfortunate in a province like UP, it is sure to prove disastrous in a composite province like ours.

32. B. S. GILANI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...Affairs in Sind have taken an adverse turn. Maulana Sahib's offer of coalition to the League came as a great surprise after what you had already settled. I am afraid this has not been without its repercussions here. Somehow these offers come at a time when people begin to see the end of communalism and then the same old fears start afresh again. Anti-Muslim League Muslims cannot understand these things, nor can the rest of us. Coming at this time, the news was upsetting, as you will doubtless appreciate.

You must have heard the good news that Dr. Gopichand (Bhargava) has defeated his opponent. He worked against heavy odds and opposition came from wholly unexpected quarters. His victory is the one relieving feature in so many difficulties with which the province is faced.

The aftermath of no settlement with the Sikhs is disconcerting, to say the least. Bitterness is going deep and is spreading. Already there are the old whispers of a pro-League drift all over again, which I must not conceal from you. All this along with what I have said above makes a sorry picture. And yet we struggle on with faith. My hope is that somehow you will yet find it possible to give this province your helping hand. By this time next week, the result of the current elections

will be clearer than they are today. I will, if possible, speak to you on the phone if you are in Bombay.

33. TELEGRAM FROM K. KAMARAJ TO SARDAR,  
DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1946

ON ACCOUNT GANDHIJI'S REFERENCE TAMILNAD CONGRESS IN HIS ARTICLE (Gandhiji's article entitled "Curious" is reproduced in Serial No. 34) ON RAJAJI I HAVE RESIGNED MEMBERSHIP PARLIAMENTARY BOARD. BOARD CONTINUES CONSIDERING APPLICATIONS RAJAJI ATTENDING WILL TRANSMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOURTEENTH. REPLIES YOUR LETTERS REGARDING MASILAMANI PILLAI AND RAIPET FOLLOW.

34. CURIOUS

(Article by Gandhiji in *Harijan* dated 10-2-1946)

On my return journey from Palni some one gave me at one of the halts a letter reviling Shri Rajaji and Shri Gopala-swami and informing me that they would not allow any one against them to come near me. Now I know to the contrary. No one who wanted to say anything worthwhile could be prevented from seeing me or writing to me. The delivery of the very letter disproves the allegation. Shri Kamaraj Nadar was with me on the same special. He was with me in the temple on the Palni Hill. But there is no doubt that both Rajaji and Gopala-swami were closest to me during the journey. They had arranged it. Rajaji is one of my oldest friends and was known to be the best exponent in word and deed of all I stand for. That in 1942 he differed from me I know. All honour for the boldness with which he publicly avowed the difference. He is a great social reformer, never afraid to act according to his belief. His political wisdom and integrity are beyond question. I was, therefore, pained to find a clique against him. It is a clique that evidently counts in the official Congress in Madras. But the masses are devoted to Rajaji. I am neither vain nor foolish enough to feel that I could have had the huge public

demonstrations all along the route of the pilgrimage if he had no influence with the masses in Tamil Nad. Congressmen in the South will act as they think best. But I would be less than loyal to the organisation if I did not warn them against losing the valuable services which no one can shoulder as Rajaji can at the present moment.

En route to Wardha, 5-2-1946

The foregoing was written before Bezwada was reached at 5-30 in the morning. At Bezwada a note in Hindustani from Shri A. Subrahmanyam was delivered, the gist of which is given below:

“There is a belief spread in Andhradesh that you have come to Madras with a view to make Rajaji Premier. Several Congressmen have been carrying on such propaganda. Taking up the theme, some Telugu newspapers have been writing even against Hindustani. Please give your opinion on this.”

I felt bound, therefore, to give my reply. I said that my journey was purely for the purpose of celebrating the silver jubilee of the Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha—now Hindustani Prachar Sabha—and incidentally for Madura and Palni temples. The visit was conceived soon after my premature discharge (from prison) and before the Congress resumption of parliamentary work was even conceived. My visit has nothing to do with Rajaji being the Premier. My life had no secrecy about it. If I wanted to give an opinion, I was in the habit of giving it openly. But I had rejected the advances of friends to guide them for I was not interested in elections and offices. But since I was challenged I had no hesitation in saying that Rajaji was by far the best man for the purpose in the Southern Presidency and if I had the disposal in my hands I would call Rajaji to office, if I did not give it to myself. But the disposal was with the Provincial Congress Committee and finally with the Working Committee. My opinion was only that of an individual, to be taken for what it was worth.

35. SARDAR TO K. KAMARAJ, DATED 13 FEBRUARY 1946

I have your wire of yesterday (Serial No. 33) stating that you have resigned membership of the Parliamentary Board on account of Gandhiji's article referring to the Tamil Nad Congress. It has surprised me nor do I get any clear idea as to why you have resigned from the Parliamentary Board. You are the head of the Provincial Congress Committee and your protest by way of resignation from the Parliamentary Board against Gandhiji's statement is more than I can understand. However, as you have not waited even for consulting me or taking my advice, I can say nothing more than that this is not the proper way of discharging one's responsibility. I expected you here with your proposals this week but got your telegraphic resignation instead for something which Gandhiji has written. I do not know whether Gandhiji's article refers to your conduct as a member of the Parliamentary Board. Perhaps you know more of Gandhiji's mind and so you have taken this step. This will certainly lead to more public controversy and will not help the province just on the eve of elections.

36. SARDAR TO B. S. GILANI, DATED 13 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...In Sind the Governor, who is reputed to be pro-League, is trying his hand at the game and he has unduly favoured the League leader in calling him. His act was thoroughly unconstitutional, but I hope that this false show will not last long.

Maulana's offer is his own and is not likely to affect much. He went to Assam and made a similar offer which is still pending. Nothing is going to come out of it....

37. ABUL KALAM AZAD TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1946

I caught fever on my arrival at Shillong, which is still persisting.

The differences between the Assam Valley and the Surma Valley have gone deep in Assam, and now every question is viewed from the same point of view. The rivalry of these groups went on in regard to Ministry also, and as you know, other groups had their demands too. However, I have tried that these sentiments may not surge up any further, so that the demands of various groups as well as the efficiency of the Cabinet may not suffer. A great deal of success has, therefore, been achieved, and so far as I could gauge, I have found that the whole province was satisfied and happy over it. Basanto Babu has been taken in the Ministry, Mr. Sarma has been nominated for Speakership from the Assam Valley, who will prove a suitable person for it.

Only one man, Abdul Mutalib, out of the three Nationalist Muslims returned to the legislature, deserved to be included in the Ministry. He has, therefore, been taken. The remaining two seats have been kept vacant. Saadullah has been told that if he co-operates with the Congress Party work and its parliamentary programme then the Congress will gladly include two of his men in the Ministry. I have prepared Saadullah for this, but Jinnah will probably not agree to such a proposal. However, we have clarified our position.

On my arrival here I got the message of the Viceroy that he desired to meet me. If I get fit I shall leave for Delhi on the 15th. After which I may have to go to Peshawar and Lahore. Under the circumstances it is difficult for me to get time to go to Bombay. You have called the Parliamentary Board on the 16th. It should finish the work of the remaining

provinces. If any appeal will be filed in this connection, you would send it to me and I will decide it in consultation with you.

38. TELEGRAM FROM K. KAMARAJ TO SARDAR,  
DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1946

YOUR LETTER DATED THIRTEENTH (Serial No. 35). NEVER PROPOSED SHIRKING RESPONSIBILITY. STATEMENT CLEARLY STATED MY ACCEPTANCE CARRYING OUT NECESSARY WORK. SHALL MEET YOU AFTER SELECTIONS ARE OVER.

39. GOPINATH BARDOLOI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...Maulana Sahib's meeting with Sir Muhammad (Saadullah) and his offer to the League, became the subject (of) criticism among a large number of people. I am afraid my statement on a former occasion may have something to do with it, wherein I followed you in saying that after having given the last Government (primarily a League one) the chance to run it with our support, and the deplorable condition to which we were subjected, I strongly protested against any government but on party lines. The Maulana addressed a meeting of the party members and explained that if the League accepted the offer of the Congress to join on the basis of work according to the Congress manifesto, the whole morale of the League would break down. The League, however, has chosen to turn a deaf ear to it and the two vacancies in the Cabinet yet remain so. The non-inclusion of a tribal in the Cabinet left room for propaganda and the Governor himself showed interest in the subject, but the Maulana's statement to the effect that if a properly efficient man was available a tribal would also be taken in may help to remove the fear that was fanned by interested tribal leaders. I need inform you in this connection that in our province the following are the constituent populations : Hindus, with scheduled castes

45 lakhs (scheduled castes 7 lakhs), tribals about 20 lakhs and Muslim 34 lakhs (in the included area).

Thanks so much for your enquiry about my health, which continues just as before with blood pressure.

(*Author's Note* : It will always remain a matter of speculation whether it was a blessing or the reverse that at this crucial phase of India's history Maulana Abul Kalam Azad happened to be the President of the Congress. According to his own account (*India Wins Freedom*) he was out of sympathy with Gandhiji's policies and came into conflict with him, Sardar and Rajendra Prasad and sometimes even with Nehru. It is clear that, if the constitutional problems were to be satisfactorily settled negotiations with the British Government and with Jinnah were unavoidable. Neither of them had any regard for Nationalist Muslims. Maulana Azad's views on safeguards for minorities were contained in a plan which he had submitted to Gandhiji in August 1945. This plan envisaged a weak federal structure of fully autonomous units having residuary powers as well as the right to secede, parity for Hindus and Muslims in the central legislature and central executive, alternately a Hindu and a Muslim head of the Indian Federation and freedom to the Muslims to decide their status in a future Constitution of India. A person holding such views and out of sympathy with the views of the other leaders of the Congress could hardly be expected to represent the Congress viewpoint effectively. It is true that Nehru often accompanied him. But that was hardly a dignified solution. The result was that in the election campaign of 1945-46 he exercised his authority in his own way in the Muslim majority Provinces of the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province and Bengal and also in Assam where Muslims were in effective strength. The Congress lost in the Muslim pockets in all these Provinces, except in the Frontier Province where the personalities of Abdul Gaffar Khan (Badshah Khan) and Khan Sahib prevailed. Any tactical gains as a result of a Nationalist Muslim leading the Congress was neutralised by the prejudice in which the British

Government held them and the hostility with which the League leaders treated them. It was not surprising that Maulana Azad's leadership was like a red rag to the bull to Jinnah and that in the later stages his own colleagues lost faith in him.

Further in his dealings with Sind politics, in his manoeuvres in the Punjab, and in his attempt to come to an understanding with elements of the Muslim League in Bengal and Assam, he committed both errors of judgement and tactical mistakes. There was a chance in Sind of winning over the small but decisive group led by Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, but this chance was missed. In the Punjab it is clear that Maulana Azad could not assess the mood of the electorate, nor could he satisfactorily deal with the Sikhs and the Unionists. In Assam his move with Mohammad Saadullah failed. In Bengal he was out-manoeuvred by Jinnah. The 1945-46 elections were bound to be decisive : it is a pity that during the elections, as the correspondence would show Congress counsels were divided and the Maulana attempted to run the machinery in his own way without the knowledge or the sense of strategy and tactics that were needed.)

40. SARDAR TO BHIM SEN SACHAR,  
DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...It is unfortunate that the Unionist Party has suffered a set-back. Its strength has been greatly reduced. The League has scored better than expected. It is not good for the Province nor for the country. We have therefore not much to enthuse over our strength. I see that there is no possibility of our getting any seat from the Muslim constituencies nor have the independent Muslims any chance. It means that all our efforts and resources there have been wasted and all hopes given were false and the calculations and expectations were wrong.

There is a lot of misapprehension prevailing in the Punjab about our attitude. I do not know why it should be so. We

can have no truck with the League. Our position regarding coalition with the Unionists and the Akalis stands unaffected and with the combination of three forces, the League will have no chance. Of course, it will give more trouble because of its strength at the polls, but if we can handle the situation with a spirit of sacrifice and with unity, we will still be able to brush aside all difficulties. I do wish that the Congress ranks will realise how delicate the situation is and will resist the temptation of running after offices and entering into competition for getting a due share of posts.

41. RAJAJI TO SARDAR, DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1946

Kindly forgive me for the step I have taken.

Here is a copy of a letter I have sent Bapu. (Serial No. 42).

42. RAJAJI TO GANDHIJI, DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1946

What you said about me publicly has, like the churning of the ocean, brought up all the poison and you have to swallow it like Rudra ! I know you can. But it has made my old longing for peace too strong to resist. I haven't the strength to stand it any longer. I bore much all these days. I struggled hard to work without minding the calumniators but I give it up now. I have often asked myself the question is it worthwhile ? I feel it is not. I must yield to the longing of my heart not to be misunderstood. Why should I be thought to be seeking 'power' when it is not the case at all ? I must prove it, although the proof is one that leaves no good behind but the mere proof.

Now that the urgent job of selections for the legislature is all over, let me leave the scene.

For my place (the University seat) there is Sambamurti available. He has not been given any seat nor did he apply. The position he has occupied in Andhra's public life for over

a quarter of a century, the unrivalled manner in which he fulfilled his duties as Speaker and his drive and energy are well known and it would be wrong to leave him out. He can easily take my place in the nomination for the University.

I beg of you to approve of my action and pass it on at once to Sardar so that he may do the needful. Nominations must be officially filed before 1 March.

PS. I slept over this last night and am posting it this morning.

43. SARDAR TO RAJAJI, DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...What grieves me more is the shocking news just received when I am dictating this letter that you have published a letter addressed to Gandhiji in which you ask his permission to withdraw from the scene altogether. This is what I was afraid of all the while. You do not realise how unfair and unjust you are to others. After all this trouble, you want now to let us down! How can anybody support you if you were to act like this? You do not even consult us, but that has always been your way of life. I cannot understand you. I have not seen that letter yet, but I can guess.

44. SARDAR TO T. PRAKASAM,  
DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1946

I am enclosing herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Bezwada dated 15th instant (not printed). Ordinarily I would have ignored such a letter but there is a specific allegation in this letter which I believe requires immediate contradiction. It is about your having collected Rs. 50,000. I do not know whether there is any truth in this matter but if you have collected such an amount, it must have been credited to the Congress account in your province. This kind of scandal

should not be allowed to be spread and therefore I would suggest that you may take such step either by public contradiction or by such other method as you may deem appropriate to prevent the spread of such scandals.

45. T. PRAKASAM TO SARDAR,  
DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1946

Thanks for the letter that was delivered to me yesterday (Serial No. 44) when I was with you in your C. P. Board meeting.

Some kind friends have been after me scandal-mongering. It is all due primarily to ignorance from out of which envy, jealousy, ill-will, cruelty spring. Such misguided men demand the heads of innocent men. Sometimes those in power fall victim to the tricks and machinations of such misguided men. I am glad you have proved an exception and advised me to issue a contradiction to a particular scandal. If one should engage oneself in contradicting scandals, even one's full length of 125 years' life would not be sufficient for that purpose alone.

Therefore I don't adopt your advice about contradicting. I am thinking of adopting another method. The conspiracy of a group to pull down one in their effort to pull up another, is growing day after day. As soon as I go to Madras, I shall hand over all the papers to my lawyers and seek their opinion as to the nature of action that I should take. I shall let you know after I get the legal opinion. I am not fond of law courts, yet, if one is compelled he will have to do it.

Thank you for the enclosure you were good enough to send me with your letter yesterday. That supplies the missing link, even though it might be a false letter by a false person.

Now that you are anxious about my reputation and that of the Congress, I enclose herein a memo that I have taken today from Rajya Lakshammamma which will give you an idea of the nature of the fund presented to me and the nature of the disposal of such fund by me.

Shri Rajya Lakshmamma is the lady who argued her own appeal before you on the 19th inst. in BPCC building in my presence. When she came to me this morning, I took the enclosed note from her with a view to send it to you and Mahatmaji.

I have taken your letter and the enclosure as a confirmation of Mahatma's correspondence with me recently. I request you therefore to pass on to Mahatmaji your letter of yesterday and this reply of mine for his information.

46. RAVI SHANKER SHUKLA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1946

Notwithstanding the assurances contained in your letters of the 6th, 8th and 16th I am informed by (D.P.) Mishraji on the phone that Maulana Sahib has allowed K. P. Pandey, an arch-intriguer to enter the Assembly. I also learn that some change is being made even at this stage (after nominations) in the Dhamtari constituency of this district. God only knows what is in store for us in this unfortunate province.

47. SARDAR TO ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1946

In continuation of our telephonic conversation yesterday, I feel bound to make it clear that the nomination of Sjt. Pandey is nothing but an unexpected letting down of the Central Board and a total disregard of ordinary courtesy. If you wanted to change the decisions, you should have at least consulted us. The analogy of the change in the UP decisions is not at all applicable here. That question was settled at the time when the decisions were taken by the Board and the matter was left open in certain cases; even there it was decided that nothing is to be done without consulting the provincial leaders, including Pantji, one of the members of the Board

concerned. In Mahakoshal no such reservation was made. There can be no appeal against the decision of the Board, including you as chairman, and if such authority were vested in you, there should have been a specific provision in the Working Committee's resolution. Besides, if you were the appellate authority, you cannot at the same time be the Chairman of the Board, whose decisions are appealable to you alone. This is a strange procedure and your action has lowered our prestige in the eyes of the people of that province. I enclose herewith a copy of a letter received from (R.S.) Shuklaji, who was also not consulted by you. I had issued a public statement that the decisions of Mahakoshal are final and are not appealable and hence there will be no change. You referred to certain documents in your telephonic conversation, which were shown to me also. Sjt. Chedilal was here and he had explained to me about it. Sjt. Pandey was also here and I had seen Sjt. Kishorelal Mashruwalla. They were informed that there will be no change. I had not the slightest idea that they will come to you and get a reversal of the Board's decision. If I had known that they were to come to you, I would have written to you about it. I had also seen your Press statement to the effect that these decisions were final. If you had taken all the powers alone and disposed of all the nominations, nobody would have been more glad than myself. The procedure adopted in this case is such that I cannot understand it at all.

From your conversation on the phone, I also understood that my coming to Lahore is likely to embarrass you and that I should rather not go there. But for Maulana Daud's (Ghaznavi) invitation to go there, I would not have agreed to do so, particularly in my present state of health. In Sind also, I went there because a special messenger came to call me simultaneously when another came to Delhi to call you. If you had expressed the slightest desire that I should not go, I would have agreed with the greatest pleasure. But I feel from your conversation that I have lost your confidence and

therefore you don't want me to go there. I do not wish to say anything about what has been represented to you and about the group that has given you that impression but the least that I could do in the circumstances is that in view of your attitude I propose to immediately tender my resignation from the Central Board as well as the Working Committee. I should be grateful if you will relieve me without any delay as my continuance in the present state is likely to give me constant mental trouble and anxiety. I regret very much to say that I have to take this action at a very critical juncture but I feel that the treatment that has been given to me is, to say the least, unexpected and undeserved and hence no alternative is left to me.

48. SARDAR TO B. S. GILANI, DATED 24 FEBRUARY 1946

. . . The result of the elections is very disappointing. The Unionists' strength is considerably crippled and their existence almost precarious. With the acceptance of office in coalition with the Congress and the Akalis, they may be able to increase their strength after some time, but for the present they have been floored. The Akalis will be guided by Master Tara Singh and his colleagues, who are a difficult lot to deal with. They distrust everybody and their policy is uncertain. Let us hope things will be all right.

49. SARDAR TO T. PRAKASAM,  
DATED 25 FEBRUARY 1946

I have received your letter of the 22nd inst. (Serial No. 45). Since then I have seen Bapu's article in the Harijan entitled "Purses for Public Men". Evidently he has also received some complaints about this matter. You want me to pass on our correspondence to Bapu and therefore I am doing so, but I am afraid neither your reply nor the enclosure which you have sent along with it explains the matter properly.

I assumed when I wrote to you that the purses alleged to have been collected by you to the extent of Rs. 50,000 must have been sent by you to the Provincial Congress Committee and therefore I suggested that you should contradict the report that you had used this amount for personal purpose. The enclosure that you have sent me confirms rather than contradicts the allegation. If the amount of Rs. 2,000 were collected from villagers and presented to you on their behalf along with an address for your services, it would be improper to use them for personal purpose, even if they so desired. A Congress leader doing so would be charged with exploiting the poor, ignorant villagers and if such examples were set by a Congressman holding a high position, it would be a dangerous precedent. If you have therefore collected Rs. 50,000 in this manner, I would strongly advise you to credit that amount to the PCC. In this matter no legal advice is needed and I do not think that any lawyer will advise you to go to a court of law for redress. The enclosure is a piece of evidence more against you than in your favour and if you will ever go to the court in this matter, the man against whom you will file a complaint will have the upper hand against you. I would strongly suggest to you to reconsider your position and refund whatever amount you have collected by way of public purses to the PCC so that there may be no more scandal about it.

*(Author's Note : The Prakasam episode is instructive in that it shows how intrigues could defy leadership and also reveals Sardar's attitude on the indiscretions of Congress leaders. He applied a high standard of probity to conduct in public life.)*

50. ABUL KALAM AZAD TO SARDAR,  
DATED 28 FEBRUARY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

I have received your letter of 23 February 1946 (Serial No. 47). I am extremely sorry that you were put to so much trouble owing to this affair. I assure you that I had not viewed this matter in the light you have taken it, nor was I

under the slightest impression that I am taking a decision against the decision of the Board. You are aware that I had received appeals of certain candidates for the Central Assembly as well, and there was a case about which I had personal knowledge and I held quite a contrary view about it to that of the decision of the Board. Nevertheless, I did not like to take any action on it, more than that I apprised you of my impressions. And when you replied that a change would be improper, I accepted your view unhesitatingly, and rejected the appeal. Under the circumstances it is obvious that there could be no reason for me to adopt a different attitude in this matter, or would have knowingly desired to undermine the prestige of the Board. You can never expect such a thing from me.

We are working together for the last 26 years in perfect unison. Every morning and evening of our public life has passed in amity and concord. We should not hurry in forming opinions against one another. I always expect a generous attitude from you and other co-workers, and I think that I deserve it. . . .

. . . I tell you once again that I am really very sorry over this situation, and assure you that whatever was done was due to the fact that I did not know of any announcement of the Board in this respect. . . .

51. SARDAR TO GOPINATH BARDOLOI,

DATED 1 MARCH 1946

(EXTRACT)

. . . I myself did not like the idea of offering any share in the Ministry to the League. An all-party Government can never work and we should not have made any such offer, but Maulana's view is different and in such matters we are guided by him.

Now that the League has turned down the proposal, we must revise the whole thing and include some tribal members in the Cabinet. It is unfair to give no share to the tribals,

whose population is so big. Absence of representation in the Cabinet of a class whose population is as big as 20 lakhs is bound to create disaffection and we must remedy this wrong at the earliest possible opportunity. You had better send your proposal after consulting your colleagues for consideration by us as early as possible.

Please keep me informed of the working of your Ministry and also of your difficulties, if any, in its working.

52. SARDAR TO ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 6 MARCH 1946  
(EXTRACT)

I have received your letter of 28th February today (Serial No. 50).

I know that you had received appeals of certain candidates for the Central Assembly and in one case you differed from the decision of the Board but at that time also I had made it clear that no appeal can be entertained by you on the decisions of the Board. I do not know how you have got such an idea even now. I may also bring to your notice that in that particular case, the papers were circulated amongst the members of the Board who were not likely to attend and that they had sent their opinion. You were also informed that the proposal of Sjt. Bhargava in that case was strongly supported by Sjt. Asaf Ali, who had personal knowledge about the merits of the candidates concerned. You had not sent your opinion in time and the Board finally decided after consulting Maulana Daud in Poona. This decision was announced and also communicated to the candidate concerned. Supporters of the rejected candidate approached you at Calcutta and you insisted on a change till the last moment on the ground of your having received an appeal.

You did not conceal your resentment against the decision of the Board and gave vent to your feelings when we met at Calcutta, in the presence of some of the interested parties, but

I thought it better to keep quiet at that time. You are certainly entitled to claim a generous attitude from us and I have done my best to do so, but you must also make allowance for an honest difference of opinion. You cannot insist that your opinion is the only correct one. In the Punjab we honestly held different opinions but you have never recognised that there is scope for such a difference of opinion in that matter and you have missed no opportunity to remind us about it.

You are certainly entitled to a generous attitude from us; personally I have done my best to do so. In the Punjab I have differed strongly from you in the matter of the election campaign on many points, including the question of financial help to be given to the Congress party. I was expected to help them only in the matter of Muslim constituencies. In this they have lost all (along) the line and I knew that they were going to lose. They insisted on financial help being given for non-Muslim constituencies and tried to put pressure on me through you. I have agreed without hesitaion to whatever you suggested in this connection. They have avoided all responsibility but as you were all working against heavy odds, I thought it my duty to accept your suggestions without question. In the matter of selection of candidates in the Punjab also, we had differences but we have endorsed everything that you have done without the slightest hesitation. . . .

. . . Your non-interference in the matter of appeals pouring in from Madras and Andhra referred to in your letter cannot in any manner justify the arbitrary and exparte decision in Mahakoshal ignoring the Board altogether. I am afraid you have not realised the ridiculous position in which we are placed in the whole of that province.

Perhaps it may be that your approach to these questions is different from mine and therefore it is difficult for me to understand or appreciate it. It would therefore be better to relieve me from this embarrassing position altogether, as early as possible.

53. GODFREY DAVIS TO SARDAR,  
DATED 18 MARCH 1946

Very many thanks for your letter. It was a great wrench leaving India but I had decided to go before the June 1948 announcement and I was surprised when some of the Sind Ministers came and asked me not to go and I had to say that if there was serious trouble and the Sind Government wanted me to come back for a time, I would do so. I had never thought of running away and I owe so much to India to leave if I could help but I do not think I could help in Sind. My views and outlook differ entirely from that of the new Governor, Sir Francis Mudie. He is different from any man in our Service I have ever met, and I could only conclude that the training and traditions of the ICS in North India differ greatly from that in Bombay and as he is Governor and I am not, it is as well I left. He was anxious that I should resign my office of Chief Justice before I left. So, I believe that Sir Ghulam's nephew could be made a permanent judge of our Chief Court at once. But both the RA (Revenue Account) and the Comptroller thought I should not resign my office of Chief Justice until my leave expires. So it was not necessary for me to do so and I had to promise some of the Ministers I would not resign in case circumstances required I should return. This is for yourself alone but I thought you ought to know, should the case come before you.

I am staying here with relations. The country is very like England. There are some good newspapers. . . . Do not trouble to answer.

*(Author's Note :* Godfrey Davis was an ICS Officer who had appeared for his bar examination with Sardar. A strong bond of friendship had developed between them. His comments on the Sind Governor Francis Mudie, whose improper conduct

are in dealing with the Sind Ministerial crisis was brought to Wavell's notice by Sardar, are interesting. Mudie had the unenviable reputation of being an arch reactionary and hater of the Congress. He belonged to the Hallett School of thought during the "Quit India" days and was credited with having sabotaged the Simla Conference while he was Home Member of the Viceroy's Council. He was a confidant of Jinnah and after independence earned gubernatorial office in West Punjab.)

54. SARDAR TO K. KAMARAJ, DATED 19 MARCH 1946

The elections will soon be over and the Governor will want to call the Leader of the Congress Assembly Party for the formation of a ministry. No time should be lost, therefore, in the selection of the Leader. I should like to know whether you have thought of this question and if so who is your choice. If you have not decided yet, some of you who count must meet immediately and let me know on whom the choice is going to fall. I understand that the Governor had invited you and I presume that he must have called you to ascertain from you about the prospects of leadership. Please let me have your views as soon as possible.

55. M. S. M. SHARMA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 20 MARCH 1946  
(EXTRACT)

Here is a bit of interesting information for what it is worth. Of his own accord, Khuhro told me yesterday that the Ministry might break. He even hinted that the actual breaking would be not over the no-confidence motion but over the budget demands. I did not know what importance to attach to this voluntary information....

56. SARDAR TO B. GOPALA REDDI,  
DATED 25 MARCH 1946

I have received your telegram (requesting Sardar to attend first meeting of Madras Legislature Party). I do not know why my presence is required at the party meeting for appointing a Leader. The proper course would be for the leaders of the three provinces of Andhra, Tamil Nad and Kerala to put their heads together and come to some uniform decision. It is unfortunate that in the scramble for power, there has been no unity and there is no leader who can command the confidence of all the groups. Rajaji's absence has left a vacuum and there seems to be no one who can take his place. I would advise you to arrange a meeting of the leaders and discuss the question amongst yourselves and come to a unanimous decision. We are all very busy and we can hardly spare time at present to attend meetings of Assembly parties for such a purpose. It is the party's business to elect its own Leader. We can only hope that Madras will not make a sorry exhibition when the Cabinet Mission has come to India to discuss the question of transferring full responsibility.

57. SARDAR TO M.S.M. SHARMA,  
DATED 25 MARCH 1946  
(EXTRACT)

I have received your letter of the 20th instant (Serial No. 55). . . .

It is surprising that the Mudie Ministry has lasted so long. I was almost certain that it would collapse at the very first sitting of the Assembly but Sind is a peculiar province and often unexpected things happen. In fact, the ministry could never have been formed but for the Governor. Since its

formation its fall was expected every minute. This expectation is still not abandoned and you need not hesitate to accept the offer for the renewal of your agreement because of the existence of the League Ministry, as its existence is so precarious that you need not have the slightest fear of its effective life.

58. SARDAR TO LALJI MEHROTRA  
DATED 27 MARCH 1946  
(EXTRACT)

Upto now the Coalition Party was able to hold its head high as it stood on clean record and on principles. By making a settlement with Mir Bunde Ali, the Coalition Party compromised its position and damaged its reputation, as it had to offer a very high price for inducing him to come out of his party and join the Coalition. On top of this, the failure of Mir Bunde Ali to stand by his promises made the position of the Coalition more vulnerable and ridiculous. Sometimes even improper actions are covered and forgotten if they result in achieving the objective. Here the failure exposed the impropriety of the action more aggressively. Undoubtedly there was pressure to which he succumbed, but that should have been expected. Besides there was a price paid to him which he might have considered sufficient as it kept him on square with his electorate as he had not to leave the party to which he belonged. We have a very weak case to look to the higher authorities for help as our initial action is not exceptional. If Mir. Bunde Ali had left the League without any offer of inducement or price, it would have been possible to effectively attack the source that put pressure on him. Our hands not being clean, it is difficult to expect help on the principle that he who seeks equity must also do equity.

The budget session will be over by the end of this month and perhaps they will not call the Assembly again for a long time to come and so the present ministry is fairly fixed unless something unexpected happens in the interval. . . .

59. SARDAR TO V. V. GIRI, DATED 6 APRIL 1946  
(EXTRACT)

....Everybody is anxious to see that a proper selection is made but there seem to be enormous difficulties and the one man who could run the show with efficiency and integrity is not likely to be selected for various reasons. The Andhras have made a dead set against him. The Malabar people also seem to be opposed and Tamil Nad is divided. The Andhras are united in opposition only but are divided amongst themselves in finding a substitute. We have called some of the leading Congressmen from the three provinces and if they come, we propose to enquire and give them our advice. More than that we cannot do. There is no doubt that we are very apprehensive of the shape of things to come in the absence of a good leader. However, that cannot be helped. I am not coming to Madras at present.

60. TELEGRAM FROM PRAKASAM, MADHAVA MENON,  
KAMARAJ NADAR, V. V. GIRI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 18 APRIL 1946

TELEGRAPHED CONGRESS PRESIDENT MUSSOORIE. QUOTE. MADRAS CONGRESS LEGISLATURE PARTY MET TODAY. 188 OUT OF 196 ATTENDED. YOUR MESSAGE ADVISING ELECT RAJAGOPALACHARI LEADER AND SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAMS PLACED BEFORE PARTY. AFTER FULL DISCUSSION PARTY RECORDED INABILITY TO ACCEPT YOUR ADVISE BY 148 VOTES AGAINST 38 NEUTRALS 2. MEETING ADJOURNED 4 PM 19TH FOR ELECTING LEADER UNQUOTE.

61. SARDAR TO V. V. GIRI, DATED 20 APRIL 1946

I received your joint telegrams of the 18th and 19th inst. (See Serial No. 60) yesterday and this morning respectively. I had no more advice to give, as responsible people there were not in a mood to listen to our advice. Maulana Sahib has gone to Mussoorie and he may deal with your telegrams from there. All through this unfortunate controversy, I have advised consistently that the election of the leader rests with the party, we can only give advice and it is for the party to accept or reject it. If democracy chooses to go wrong, it has a right to do so. In this case, it has grievously erred in not coming to a decision long ago. I had written to all the leaders of the province to meet together and come to some unanimous decision. They failed to do so, because of cliques and parties, as also due to personal prejudices amongst themselves and there was no evidence of any wider vision for the common good of the province, much less of the country. I can understand their objection to Rajaji's leadership, but I cannot understand their failure to come to a decision in due time and thus expose the Congress organisation to the kind of attacks and criticism to which it has been subjected in (British) Parliament, the proceedings of which must have been seen by you all. This is the first instance in Congress history where responsible Congressmen have failed to respond to a reasonable appeal from the leaders. It is not Rajaji's leadership that was objected to, but what we disliked was the motives which influenced all to combine in that opposition.

Apart from the question of Rajaji's leadership, another important advice was given to those who had come here, but that has been contemptuously disregarded, for which there is no justification at all. Privately almost all of them had agreed that we were right but openly they all combined, after going there, in coming to a unanimous decision of rejecting that

advice. This is indeed a very strange disclosure of mentality for which we were quite unprepared. It has given us a shock and we have great apprehensions for the future of your province, which may result in discrediting the Congress organisation as a whole. Let us hope that our apprehensions may prove to be unjustified. Your telegrams to me were unnecessary as all of them knew all throughout that my own attitude has been to throw the responsibility on the party in the event of refusal to listen to our advice.

62. SARDAR TO A. KALESHWARA RAO,  
DATED 20 APRIL 1946

I have received your letter of the 16th inst. (not printed). Shri Prakasam's popularity in the province is well known. His sacrifices and suffering all his life and his steadfast loyalty to the Congress have earned for him his popularity, but both Gandhiji and myself feel that in his own interest he should keep out of office at this juncture. We had given our advice to those who came here also but whether this advice will be listened to or not, we expected that at least Shri Prakasam would not go against our advice. So far as the opposition to Rajaji is concerned, we knew about it and it is understandable. The election of the Leader must have now been over and let us hope that this controversy will end. People learn by experience. This is the first time in which advice from the top has been rejected lightheartedly. Future will show how wrong were those who did so. Of course if Shri Giri is elected, there can be no objection to it and we will all be happy to hear about it, but I doubt whether they will do so.

63. SARDAR TO V. V. GIRI, DATED 21 APRIL 1946

I received your telegram of yesterday (not printed) this morning. I have nothing to add to what I have written in my letter of yesterday, which must have reached you, except that I thoroughly disapprove of what is being done about this whole affair by both ends. Maulana Sahib is not here and I cannot come in contact with him nor can I give any instructions in this affair, as it may create further complications if I were to do so from this place. I have received a telegram from Madhava Menon and Kamaraj today simultaneously with yours, which takes a different stand from yours. It is all a painful affair. We have been behaving like petty-minded, irresponsible people, and are influenced by party cliques and personal prejudices at a critical juncture when we should have set better examples.

I do not propose to answer any of the constitutional questions and objections raised in your telegram. The Congress has already lost its prestige in the South and it now brings the central organisation into contempt and ridicule, but as I have already stated, I do not wish to say anything more,

64. SARDAR TO V. V. GIRI, DATED 30 APRIL 1946  
(EXTRACT)

... We have seen the formation of the ministry in the Press and you have all decided to go your own way. It would be a fraud on the public to lead them to believe that what is being done by the party is being endorsed or acquiesced in by us. It would be also wrong to assume that we have abdicated our functions and that we will allow things to go wrong or to let the party have its own way in everything. At present we have decided to wait and watch and to allow the party to go its own way but when the limit is reached and our

responsibilities are affected by any action that is being done there, we will not hesitate to take adequate action. It must not be forgotten that the Assembly members of the party have given a definite pledge individually on the strength of which they have been selected by the Board and returned by the electorate. It has already been violated to a certain extent. Perhaps its implications are not properly realised over there and we do not wish to enforce our will in the present conditions, as it is likely to be misunderstood.

You said in your letter that if I had come there, things would have taken a different turn. I have my own views on the question and I know more than you do about the inner working of the party, groups, cliques and individual ambitions very well. We hope that future working may prove us to be in the wrong and if your party and the ministry bring credit to the Congress, we shall indeed be very glad. We cannot conceal our apprehensions and therefore I have written this letter to you. . . .

65. SARDAR TO RAJAJI, DATED 13 MAY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

. . . .It is said that Congress name is being dragged in the mud and its reputation is being jeopardised. But you know that there has been a revolt in the South and we have not thought of any plan to meet with the situation as yet. It is not an easy matter. Democratic organisations can work only with the willing co-operation of the people. It is unfortunate that there is no other personality there to assert his will and put the Congress organisation on the right path. . . .

66. SARDAR TO V. V. GIRI, DATED 6 JUNE 1946

It is very strange that in the matter of the nominations that have been made by the Madras Government to the Legislative Council, I have not been able to obtain information asked for by me in my letter of 16 May. It should not be difficult to give me this information forthwith. The simple question is whether these nominations have been made by the Prime Minister or by him in consultation with the Ministry or whether they have been made by the Governor ignoring the Ministry altogether or whether he has done so rejecting the recommendations of the Ministry. This is not a matter which can be lightly treated. It involves serious principles and these nominations are entirely at variance with the policy of the Congress. It is therefore necessary that you should give me this information before we consider this question in the Working Committee at Delhi. You must have asked the Prime Minister about it and I do not see why there should be so much delay in sending me the information. I am going to Delhi tomorrow and I shall await your reply by return of post.

PS.

I have been informed that in the party meeting Shri Prakasam was asked about this (and he said) that they were the Governor's choice and he had no power in this matter. I wish to know whether this is true. I hesitate to believe this story, as you told me at Delhi when we met on the last occasion that the Governor had nothing to do with these nominations and he was not interested at all.

67. SARDAR TO V. V. GIRI, DATED 12 JUNE 1946

I have received your letter of the 5th inst. (not printed). It is surprising that all nominations were made by the Governor and the Prime Minister was not consulted at all. There is a lacuna in your letter explaining this matter. The new Governor, according to your letter, announced the nominations obviously as having been made by his predecessor without any further consultation with the Prime Minister. But this does not explain whether any consultation was necessary. As the new Governor was led to believe that all necessary consultation was completed by his predecessor and as the formal announcement was to be made by him, he completed the formality by making the announcement. To me, all this seems to be thoroughly unsatisfactory and I am surprised that such important questions have been handled in this manner. I do not know whether the party was satisfied with this explanation but this has certainly discredited the Congress organisation. It seems nothing would have been known about this matter if I had not asked for the information.

68. SARDAR TO T. PRAKASAM, DATED 12 JUNE 1946

I am enclosing a copy of Shri Giri's letter dated 5th inst. from which it seems that the nominations in Madras to the Upper House were made by the new Governor without consulting you (not printed). The letter does not explain whether any consultation was necessary or whether the necessary consultations were finished in the previous Governor's time. In any case, I cannot understand how all these nominations could be made without your direct or indirect consent and if they were made by the Governor ignoring you, why should you have allowed such a thing to happen. This is the first assault on

the constitutional rights and privileges of the Ministry and you should have resisted this encroachment upon your rights or the breach of understanding by which this privilege was secured when we agreed to form the ministries on the previous occasion. Please let me know whether consultation with you by the previous Governor on this matter was completed and whether you had given anything in writing stating your views for or against these nominations and whether you have recorded any protest against the announcement. I wish to place this matter before the Working Committee and therefore please submit your report fully.

69. T. PRAKASAM TO SARDAR, DATED 7 JULY 1946

Your letter of yesterday together with the two enclosures was delivered to me yesterday in the meeting hall (not printed). What happened with regard to the nominations to the Legislative Council in Madras was this.

I met the Governor at the appointed time and had a talk with him on some other matters. After that was over, he referred to the question of nominations to the Council and he took out a paper from his pocket on which the names of seven persons had been already written. Taking the paper out he said that he would be proposing seven names and I might propose two. He said at the very outset that the Congress party had got such a big majority and he would in his discretion like to propose seven out of the nine names with a view to give representation to some non-Congress persons or interests. He read out the seven names one after another and asked me to propose the remaining two names. Then I suggested the name of P. R. K. Sharma. When I was about to suggest the other name, he said he was not closing the subject then and that we might consider the matter later on another occasion. All these were done in a few minutes.

I did not give anything in writing stating my views on the names read out by him at the time. My belief was, according

to the statement made by the Governor, that we would meet again to continue our discussion on the matter. There was no occasion for recording any protest against his announcement. He did not repudiate the convention. On the other hand, he said, as the matter was one entirely in his discretion, he would propose seven names and that I might propose two. Because he said the matter was not closed then and that we would meet again to continue our discussion, there was no need or occasion to protest. The matter did not come up again before the old Governor before he left or before the new Governor within a few days after he assumed office. A few days later I left for Bezwada just for a day to hand over charge of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee Presidentship. While I was in Bezwada some one brought a newspaper and showed to me the news announcing the eight names for the Upper House. After I returned to Madras on the third day I told the new Governor what had happened. As the names had already been announced and he was not a party to what had happened before he came, nothing could be done by him or even by me.

Some one in the Assembly raised a question asking who made the nominations. The Secretariat office suggested a reply to disallow the question on the ground that it was a matter entirely in the discretion of the Governor. On that file I wrote that the question should not be disallowed because of the convention entered into in 1937 before we accepted office. Then I wrote on the file as a reply to the question what I had stated above.

This is the history of the nominations about which you wanted information.

70. SARDAR TO T. PRAKASAM,  
DATED 10 JULY 1946

I have received your letter of the 7th inst. (Serial No. 69).

The whole matter seems to me to be very badly handled. When the Governor said that he would, in his discretion, like to propose seven out of the nine names, with a view to give representation to non-Congress persons, you should have protested immediately and asserted your claim to give advice regarding nominations, which he was bound to accept according to the convention. The Governor has no right to provide for representation to non-Congress persons. He has nothing to do with political parties. He is entitled to see that minority interests are represented, but to meddle with political interests and parties is beyond his scope. Apart from that, when India is soon going to be free, the Governor has to exercise his own discretion consistent with the coming freedom. When he read out seven names, then you should have said that you were going to propose all the names and that you were not going to accept his nominations. When you suggested the name of Shri P. R. K. Sharma, he naturally concluded that you have accepted his nominations, because he asked you to suggest only two names, after reading the names of his 7 nominees. When the names were read out to you, you must have seen that there were names of persons, who can never be accepted by the Congress and it was for you to raise your objection at that time. It was all a sad business and we can do nothing in the matter now, as you say.

71. SARDAR TO JAIRAMDAS DOULATRAM,  
DATED 30 JULY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

. . . I see that the Governor has after all fixed 5 September as the day for the Sind Assembly meeting. But I am not sure what repercussions the boycott resolution will have in your province. It is quite possible that the fanaticism of the Muslim masses will once again be roused to such a pitch that those who were against the present ministry may not be able to hold on their position till the last. I expect we will have trouble in India, because the League seems determined to wreck the scheme, as they have found that they have gained nothing and lost all along the line in the negotiations. I am afraid there will be more trouble in your province than anywhere else. But there is no help. We have to go through this ordeal.

72. CHOITHRAM P. GIDWANI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 3 AUGUST 1946  
(EXTRACT)

. . . Subsequent to the passing of the resolutions in the recent meeting of the Council of the All India Muslim League held at Bombay, communal tension in Sind has worsened. . . . Such statements made by responsible ministers are all the more deplorable and are very likely to further increase lawlessness in this unfortunate province unless immediate steps are taken to remedy the situation.

73. SARDAR TO CHOITHRAM GIDWANI,  
DATED 5 AUGUST 1946

I received your letter of the 3rd inst. along with its enclosures yesterday. I am not surprised that the communal situation has since worsened in your province and it is due to the inexcusable behaviour of responsible Ministers. Greater responsibility is that of the Governor who is encouraging this by his unconstitutional conduct. The nation, however, has to pass through this trial and I hope that in the test it will not be found wanting.

74. SARDAR TO R. K. SIDHWA,  
DATED 27 AUGUST 1946  
(EXTRACT)

... The Muslim League tried its programme of direct action in Calcutta and to their great bewilderment they have found out that two can play at the game although it may be started by one. The poor Muslims in Calcutta have suffered terribly and the League has discredited itself by their doings in Calcutta. If they follow the same method of arson, loot, murder and anarchy, they may be able to inflict hardship on the non-Muslims but eventually that way will without doubt lead the League organisation to ruin and destruction.

I am not sure that your Governor will allow any violence or disturbance to take place, because he is much too clever not to understand his own responsibility and his own reputation would be at stake. He will no doubt try his best to keep the Ministry in office but he will not allow his own reputation to suffer. I hope things will ultimately straighten themselves.

75. WAVELL TO SARDAR, DATED 27 OCTOBER 1946

Thank you for showing me Mr. Syed's letter of 24 October which I return. I have sent a copy to the Governor and asked for his comments. As you know, Governor is doing all he can to ensure that the elections are properly conducted and that Government servants are impartial.

76. SARDAR TO WAVELL, DATED 28 OCTOBER 1946

Many thanks for your letter dated 27 October 1946 regarding Mr. Syed's letter of 24 October.

I wish I could share Your Excellency's confidence in the Governor's ability or willingness to ensure free elections in Sind. If what Mr. Syed has stated is correct and Mr. Masud is still being continued as District Magistrate of Nawabshah by resort to cancellation of leave, there can be only one conclusion, and that is that he is being retained for a special purpose.

77. SARDAR TO NIHCHALDAS C. VAZIRANI,  
DATED 16 DECEMBER 1946

I am extremely sorry to see that in Sind the Congress has lost all along the line. All the efforts and money spent have been sheer waste and we have purchased bitterness and enmity in the bargain. I hope this experience will put you on guard for the future and you would work on different lines hereafter. I should like to know what the future plans of the party in Sind are.

PS.

I have just received your letter of the 13th inst. after I dictated the above.

I do not think that anything can be done from the Centre to report on the facts. The position is well known. Goondaism was not unexpected. It is a foretaste of what Pakistan would be, and therefore we have to be more careful in our future plans. We can do nothing against the Civil Service for such misconduct (which probably is not misconduct but 'good conduct' according to the opinion of the local Government whom they are serving), and so we must put up with these things.

It would certainly be a good result if Maula Bux, Syed, and others joined the Congress instead of keeping apart.

78. T. PRAKASAM TO SARDAR,  
DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1947

I thank you for your having left me in the company of Shri Rajendra Babu this evening in your room when you rushed into the Assembly in response to the bell call. I explained the legal and constitutional position of the so-called no-confidence motion about which so much undue publicity has been given by the irresponsible men violating the rules laid down by the Congress President recently. After leaving your room I read the statement of the President of the Tamil Nad Congress Committee in which he said that there were no groups formed in the Madras Legislative Congress party. Before coming to Delhi I wired to the Congress President to hold a secret session of the Congress Working Committee to enquire (1) into the Coimbatore mill affair, and (2) the group system that prevailed in the Madras Legislative Congress Party and its evils. Owing to the absence of the Congress President in the city, these matters could not be enquired into. The truth about these matters will have to be ascertained before the so-called no-confidence motion could be considered by the party itself. Again the question whether under the rules of the Congress Legislative Party a no-confidence motion can be moved in the party meeting has also to be decided. As soon as I reach Madras tomorrow evening I shall proceed to decide these

matters before calling for the party meeting itself. I explained my views, on this second question to Babu Rajendra Prasad. Some of you could apply yourself to the gravity of the situation created by the labour strike fomented by some of the Congress people themselves. I thank you, Sir, for all the help you have been giving me in regard to the provincial troubles I had to face. I placed all these matters relating to the Coimbatore labour strike before my Cabinet on the 14th night. I shall be reporting about these matters every fortnight to the Congress President as desired by him. A special report will be sent to you also with regard to the above two matters.

79. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO T. PRAKASAM,  
DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1947

I have received the copy of the letter you sent to Sardar Patel. I do not know what you propose to do in the matter and I have no particular desire to interfere. It is for the Working Committee or the Congress President to do so if they think it desirable. But obviously I am anxious that the Congress prestige and our work should not suffer; and conditions in Madras are distressing. I am not in a position to judge or to cast blame on any one, but when such a state of affairs exists in any province it brings discredit to all concerned.

2. Of one thing I am quite sure. There can be no proper or effective Government in a province from the democratic point of view or any other unless there is mutual understanding and co-operation between the Ministry and the majority party which supports it. There must, therefore, be constant consultation between the two. If there is any suspicion that a Ministry is holding on without the sanction of the party, the Government will gradually come to a standstill and the Ministry will be discredited.

3. I am personally acquainted chiefly with the working of the Central Assembly Congress Party here and the U. P.

Assembly Congress Party. Both meet frequently, sometimes from day to day to consider important matters with the Ministers. There is often some conflict between them, but an attempt is continuously made to resolve this conflict by full discussion. The moment that attempt fails, the Ministry will go regardless of the fact as to whether it is in the right or wrong.

4. I do not know how frequently you have been having meetings of your Assembly Congress Party or any consultations with them. In any event it is highly necessary that a very early meeting of the party should be held and a full discussion should take place. The final arbiter must be the party. There is no other way. It also seems to me dangerous to delay having a meeting of the party. When a challenge is made that has to be accepted immediately without a day's delay. Delay makes matters worse. I hope, therefore, that you will hold a very early meeting of your party, tell them what you have in mind and hear what they say. The matter is so important that no sudden decision should be taken and full time should be given for consideration.

80. SARDAR TO T. PRAKASAM,  
DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1947

I got your letter which you sent at my place just before leaving Delhi. You had also sent a copy of it to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and he has already replied to you (Serial No. 79). I have nothing to add except to say that we are all interested in maintaining the reputation of our organisation, and I hope you will do nothing which would discredit the Congress in South India.

The proper course for any self-respecting man is to tender resignation from leadership of the party, in case he loses the confidence of a majority of the party. This best course would be to allow the party to decide this issue without raising any other side issues or technical questions of breach

of rules or resolutions of the Congress executive. All these pale into insignificance in the matter of decision of the no-confidence' motion, and they all can be decided on their own merits independently of this question.

I have seen the resolution of the executive committee of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee in the Press. A number of telegrams are also received expressing confidence in you, and also expressing no-confidence from several others. All this agitation & Press Propaganda would not do us any credit and would stop only when the party decision is taken. You are too seasoned a politician to need any advice, and I am sure you will do nothing that would injure the cause of the Congress to which you have dedicated your life and for which you have made so many sacrifices.

81. J. B. KRIPALANI TO T. PRAKASAM,  
DATED 3 MARCH 1947

Shri Shankarrao Deo has given me the report of what happened on the 28th. There appears to be no controversy about the facts. They were all reported in the Press. Shri Shankarrao tells me that before the meeting he tried to approach the two parties with a view to some sort of compromise. But he tells me that this could not be brought about.

In the meeting of 28 February you ruled out the consideration of the no-confidence motion on technical grounds. Now that it is clear that a large majority of the Congress members of the Madras Assembly Party are against your continuing to be the leader of the party and the Premier, I would like you to consider if it is worth your while to flout this clear decision merely on technical grounds. Would it not be more dignified for you to take this verdict of your colleagues in the legislature as conclusive and place your resignation in the hands of the party, and if the party so desires, hand over

person who now commands the confidence of the majority of Congress members of the Assembly to form a new ministry? If you do this you would be discharging a patriotic duty however unpleasant it may be to you personally. At this stage of your life and with your unbroken record of nearly thirty years of public service it should not be difficult for you to act as I have suggested. I am sure the whole country will greatly appreciate such an action of yours. If however you take up your stand on technical grounds the Parliamentary Board will have to go into the question and give its directive. I hope you will not put the strain of deciding the question on the Parliamentary Board.

You will please wire to me what you propose to do to enable me to put the case before the Parliamentary Board and also before the Working Committee as the latter is meeting on the 6th instant.

May God guide you to do the right thing by the Congress and the country.

(This letter appears to have been addressed by J. B. Kripalani as Congress President.)

## 82. SARDAR TO T. PRAKASAM, DATED 8 MAY 1947

Please refer to your letter of the 2nd instant (not printed). Since the point raised by you refers to a resolution of the Working Committee, I have sent it to the Congress President who will no doubt give you an appropriate reply.

I am sorry to see, however, that you still persist in thinking and also representing that I was largely responsible for the fall of your Ministry. I have seen references to this both in the press and in your statements. You know that I have taken no interest in your question at any stage since your appointment right up to this day. If, in spite of that, you still choose to entertain any grievance against me, I have nothing more to say.

## CHAPTER 2

# THE CABINET MISSION, INTERIM GOVERNMENT, PARTITION, INDEPENDENCE

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

The Cabinet Mission—consisting of three members of the British Cabinet, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Stafford Cripps, the President of Board of Trade, and A. V. Alexander, first Lord of the Admiralty, came out to India on 24th March 1946. The results of the General Elections had shown that, just as the Muslims had voted solidly in favour of the Muslim League, whose election slogan was the establishment of Pakistan, Congress had a no less impressive hold on the rest of the people of India, in fact on every one outside the adherents of the Muslim League. The main difference between the two parties centred round the issue of immediate independence and maintenance of the unity of the sub-continent. The elections encouraged the Muslim League in its attitude of intransigence and, with British Government virtually conceding to it a decisive vote if not a veto, it fully capitalised on the situation. Consequently the rift between the League and the Congress continued to widen. In the matter of a fortnight or so of the arrival of the three British Ministers, by 10 April 1946, Jinnah convened a meeting of the Muslim League members of the newly elected legislatures; they passed a resolution reiterating the League demand for Pakistan, defining Pakistan as including Bengal, Assam, the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. In practical terms the resolution demanded the setting up of two Constitution-making bodies, one for Pakistan and one for Hindustan. The tortuous course of the Cabinet Mission's discussions over the next seven weeks or so need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that, starting from a determined attitude on the preservation of India's

unity, the British Ministers diluted their stand in order to achieve a consensus, but failed to bring it about, and on 16th May the Mission had to come out with their own declaration. The claim of the Muslim League for a separate State of Pakistan was categorically turned down but the scheme had to centre round a weak Centre and contain the germs of Pakistan in the not very distant future. The basic conclusions of the Mission were:

- (1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications; and which should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for these subjects.
- (2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British Indian and States representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting.
- (3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and residuary powers should vest in the provinces.
- (4) The Indian States would retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.
- (5) Provinces should be free to form groups, with executives and legislatures, and each group should determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common.
- (6) The Constitutions of the Union and the provinces should contain a provision whereby any Province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.

The Constituent Assembly, which was to hammer out a Constitution within this basic frame-work, was to have a total membership of 389. On the basis of one member for every million of the population, 93 of these were allotted to the Indian States and 292 to the Provinces. In addition, four members were to represent the Chief Commissioners' Provinces, one each for Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg and British Baluchistan. Details of allocation of these seats, as well as the procedure of election, were laid down. Having allotted to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, this provincial allocation was divided among the "main communities", again in proportion to the population. Three "main communities" were recognised : General, Muslim and Sikhs, the General community including all persons other than Muslims and Sikhs. **Separate representation for Sikhs was confined to the Punjab.** The members of the Constituent Assembly were to be elected by the representatives of each community in the Provincial Assembly by the method of proportional representation with the single transferable vote. The method of selection of the representative of the Indian States was left to be settled by consultation.

The Procedure for the functioning of the Constituent Assembly was also spelt out in some detail. It was envisaged that, after a preliminary meeting, the Provincial representatives would divide into three sections, Section B for the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Sind; Section C for the Bengal and Assam; and Section A for the other provinces. The statement said :

"These sections shall proceed to settle the provincial Constitutions for the provinces included in the Sections, and shall also decide whether any Group Constitution shall also be set up for these provinces, and if so, with what provincial subjects the group should deal. Provinces shall have the powers to opt out of the Groups in accordance with the provisions of Sub-Clause (viii)."

This sub-clause laid down that, as soon as the new constitutional arrangements had come into force, it would be open to any province to come out of any Group in which it had been placed. Such a decision was to be taken by the new Legislature of the province after the first general election under the new Constitution.

Discussions with the Cabinet Missions, on behalf of the Congress appear to have been carried on mainly by Abul Kalam Azad, President of the Congress until 6th July 1946, when Jawaharlal Nehru took over as President. From the published correspondence, however, it appears that Sardar played an important role in getting the Congress to accept the scheme. In his letter to Stafford Cripps dated 15th December 1946 (Serial No. 22) he mentioned that "when Gandhiji was strongly against our settlement I threw my weight in favour of it." Sardar particularly rejoiced that the idea of Pakistan was "buried for ever" (Serial No. 2). He said in one of his letters :

"Jinnah and the League have secured nothing for the Muslims after a struggle of five years against the Congress and after the spreading of so much communal bitterness. His main demand for Pakistan is buried for ever. His demand for parity is not accepted. The Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces have lost weightage in the Constituent Assembly. They will be in a hopeless minority. The only thing that he got, as a face saving device, is grouping which will be seriously opposed by his own people."

While this was a correct analysis of the Cabinet Mission Plan, subsequent events were to change the situation out of recognition.

On the Congress side the contention was raised that the provision made for compulsory inclusion of certain Provinces in Sections was inconsistent with the freedom promised to them; and that according to the statement itself the respective provinces

would have the right to choose even in the first instance whether they should or should not belong to section in which they should be placed. The clarification given by the Cabinet Mission itself that this interpretation was incorrect was not enough to make it acceptable to the Congress. The Congress was however to accept it under compulsion of events only after another eight months.

However, on this point also Sardar appears to have favoured a softer line of approach. He wholly agreed with the Congress view on grouping. He thought that on principle the Cabinet Mission could not and should not coerce any province to go into a group against its will. But he thought that it was unnecessary either to go into the details of contradictions and omissions on this and other points, or to ask for further explanations (Serial No. 3); he observed that the document was final and that the proper time to deal with the issue would come when the Constituent Assembly met. He added:

“ I do not think it is wise to open up these matters at this stage. If we find the proposals otherwise satisfactory, and the interim arrangement is made to our satisfaction, it would be wise to accept the proposals.”

Sardar attached more importance to the vital matter of the composition of the interim Government, and making a start with the framing of the Constitution than to postpone it by dilatory wrangles over interpretation.

Perhaps because of this wise attitude of caution and forbearance, the Congress in its resolution of 25 June 1947 merely repeated what was stated by the Cabinet Mission itself—that there was scope for enlarging and strengthening the Central authority and for fully ensuring the right of a province to act according to choice in regard to grouping. But Congress categorically rejected the Viceroy's proposal for the formation of an interim Executive Council which was weighted in favour of the League point of view and based on the precarious

adjustment, not necessarily balance, between various conflicting interests. (This matter is dealt with later in this note.) The Muslim League for its part also accepted the plan on 6 June and declared itself willing to join the Constituent Assembly, keeping in view the opportunity and right of secession of provinces or groups from the Union which according to the League had been provided in the plan by implication. The emphasis was on partition, Pakistan and Secession, but it seems that Sardar still entertained the hope that the plan had killed the Pakistan idea and that the Assembly would be given every chance of functioning. The League however contested the fact that the Congress had accepted the Plan, forgetting that its own resolution on the subject was full of reservations. Nevertheless the Cabinet Mission conceded, much to the annoyance and chagrin of Jinnah, that by its acceptance of the plan the Congress had acquired the right to participate in the interim Government. This angered Jinnah so much that he lost his usual balance and withdrew his acceptance, thereby forfeiting the Muslim League's right to join the interim Government.

Jawaharlal Nehru also gave Jinnah a justifiable *casus belli* by stating on 10 July 1946, a few days after he took over as Congress President in succession to Abul Kalam Azad, at a Press Conference that the issue of minorities was a domestic problem and that he would not accept the British Government's interference; and as regards grouping, he said that, approached from any point of view, there was going to be no grouping. He also dealt with the powers of the Union Centre and stated that there would inevitably be a very considerable expansion of the range of the powers of the Union Centre. He also stressed the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly to propound that it was free to make alterations in the Plan. Jinnah took this up at once and described Nehru's views as being a complete repudiation of the basic form on which the Cabinet Mission's scheme rested and all its fundamentals. Even assurances given by British Ministers in the Houses of Parliament failed to reassure the Muslim League and at its

meeting held on 27 July 1946 the League Council revoked that body's acceptance of the Scheme. It appears that Sardar was not happy at this development—perhaps naturally, because the Pakistan demand was renewed and in addition the Muslim League decided on 'direct action'. Writing to D. P. Misra on 29 July 1946 Sardar refers to Nehru's Press Conference, immediately after the AICC session, as an act of emotional insanity which puts "tremendous strain on us to put matters right".

This takes us to the question of the Interim Government. The Cabinet Mission's statement of 16 May 1946 had touched on this subject; but, since this was a matter primarily for the Viceroy, the statement merely recognised that it was essential, while the constitution-making process was going on, that there should be set up at once an Interim Government in which all the portfolios, including that of War member, would be held by Indians having the full confidence of the people; that the Viceroy, who was holding discussions to this end, hoped soon to form such a Government; and that for its part the British Government, recognising the changes in the Government of India, would give the fullest measure of co-operation to the Government so formed in the accomplishment of its tasks and in bringing about as rapid and smooth a transition as possible. On the 16th June, after infructuous consultations with the Congress and Muslim League leaders—infructuous because no basis of agreement emerged—Wavell and the Cabinet Mission issued a statement announcing a proposal to set up an Executive Council of 14 persons, six belonging to the Congress, five to the Muslim League, one Sikh, one Indian Christian, and one Parsi. As mentioned earlier, this proposal was meant substantially to concede the demands of Jinnah, especially the one which Congress as a National Organisation would never accept, namely, that Congress should not nominate a Muslim. As we have seen Congress had no hesitation in rejecting this proposal out of hand. The statement of 16 June had added:

“In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the Statement of May 16th.”

Jinnah, who accepted the proposals, hopefully looked forward to the Muslim League being asked to join the Executive Council, to the exclusion of the Congress; and was deeply disappointed when on 26 June the Cabinet Mission announced among other things that further negotiations on the reconstitution of the Executive Council by the appointment of representatives of Indian political parties would be postponed by a short time and that elections to the Constituent Assembly would be held.

This disappointment had perhaps something to do with the hasty withdrawal by the Muslim League of their acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Be that as it may, at the same meeting in which the Council of the Muslim League passed the resolution revoking their acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan, it also asked the Working Committee to draw up a plan of direct action and Jinnah publicly announced that the League would no longer be committed to “constitutional methods”. The Working Committee in due course called upon Muslims to observe 16 August 1946 as Direct Action day; and this decision had a most tragic sequel in Bengal. Bloody riots broke out and there was a great killing both of Hindus and Muslims.

Meanwhile on 22 July the Viceroy Wavell again wrote to Nehru and Jinnah making fresh proposals for reconstituting the Viceroy's Executive Council—six members to be nominated by Congress, five by Muslim League and three representatives of the minorities to be nominated by the Viceroy. Nehru replied the next day withholding his co-operation because of his demand for the basis of “independence in action” for the provisional Government.

With the Muslim League's declaration on 29 July that it no longer accepted the Cabinet Mission's scheme, there was a radical transformation in the situation. The Congress Party was the only major political party which, in terms of the statement of 16 June 1946 was willing to accept the Cabinet Mission's proposals of May 16th.

It is interesting to note Rajagopalachari's advice. He said in a letter to Sardar (Serial No. 10) :

“Now that Jinnah and the League are certain to create trouble it has become our unavoidable and bounden duty to accept the challenge. We cannot refuse any offer about the Interim Government now, without opening ourselves to the charge that we funk accepting responsibility under difficult conditions. We should take up Government anyhow and carry on anyhow. It is more important now than even the Constituent Assembly. That too we must tackle.”

The month of August 1946 was one of hectic activity, filled with consultations between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, discussions between the Viceroy and Congress leaders—Gandhiji, Nehru and Azad and discussions between Nehru and Jinnah, not to speak of the meetings of the Congress Working Committee. In his discussions with Nehru, Wavell made it clear that he would not go any further than he had done on the issue of formal assurances about “independence in action” of the new Government. The Secretary of State suggested to the Viceroy that the latter might urge on Nehru the ‘paramount need’ for including the Muslim League in the Interim Government, even if that party had not accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan; but apparently did not press this in view of the Viceroy's advice that Jinnah should not be allowed a premium for his intransigence, and that they could not disregard the commitment that the Government would consist of these parties which had accepted the Plan. Eventually it was agreed between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State as follows :

1. An offer should be made to Nehru to form an Interim Government.
2. It was realised that Muslim League would not come in; and the Viceroy was allowed to decide whether the five places intended for them were to be filled or kept vacant.

In the meantime the Viceroy had got an inkling of Sardar's attitude that the Congress would join the Interim Government if asked, and his further action was based on this impression. In fact he conveyed it to the Secretary of State in justification of his action. Wavell wrote to Nehru on 6th August 1946 inviting him to suggest names for appointment to the Executive Council. The Viceroy left it to Nehru to decide whether to consult Jinnah and try to get the Muslim League's co-operation in forming a composite Executive Council consisting mainly of the Congress and the League. At Nehru's suggestion the Viceroy on 12 August also issued a communique announcing his offer to Nehru and Nehru's acceptance thereof. Nehru then met Jinnah and tried to induce him to join the interim government—he offered the Muslim League five seats, to be filled by persons nominated by the League. Jinnah, however, refused to co-operate; the Viceroy then tried to persuade Nehru to leave the five Muslim League vacancies unfilled, but to this Nehru would not agree; and eventually Nehru and his colleagues took office.

Very soon, however, the Viceroy, Wavell, began to have second thoughts. After a visit he paid to Calcutta he met Gandhiji and Nehru and, in another effort to bring the Muslim League, he made another effort to induce the Congress leadership unequivocally to accept the position that the intention of the Cabinet Mission's Statement of 16 May 1946 was that:

“Provinces cannot exercise any option affecting their membership of the sections or of the groups if formed, until the decision contemplated in paragraph 19 (viii) of the Statement of 16th May is taken by the new Legislature

after the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation and the first general elections have been held."

The discussion took quite an acrimonious tone, Wavell threatening not to convene the Constituent Assembly if the formula was not accepted by the Congress. Gandhiji had to remind the Viceroy that the 'minatory' language used at the meeting and the Viceroy's threat was not consistent with the invitation extended to the Congress to form the Interim Government (Serial No. 13). The Congress, Gandhiji said, could not be expected to bend itself and adopt what was wrong because of the brutal exhibition recently witnessed in Bengal.

But Wavell persisted and wished this matter to be considered by the Working Committee. This was also done; the Working Committee adhered to the previous stand that any dispute as to the interpretation of any portion of the clauses relating to grouping should be considered by the federal court and that Congress could not accept a position under which such a reference was ruled out.

The result of all this was an irreconcilable difference of view between the Congress and the Viceroy. The Congress was of course in a strong position now because the British government would not countenance anything which would result in an open breach with the party; and since it was now in power, and Wavell could not very well dismiss it without very serious repercussions. Nevertheless Wavell did not give up trying to get the Muslim League into the Government by some means or other; and he was eventually successful. A fresh series of discussions started with Jinnah in the middle of September 1946 and these meetings went on into October. Jinnah had been insisting (a) that all Muslim members should come through the League and the Congress or any other party should not nominate a Muslim, (b) that a convention should be accepted that major communal issues would require a majority vote of both the communities. He now added another condition, that the Vice-President of the Executive Council, which would correspond to Prime

Ministership in rank, though there were important differences, should be held in rotation by Congress and Muslim League nominees (Serial No. 14). Wavell could not get the Congress to agree to any of these demands—they were all clearly unreasonable—and very soon Jinnah found himself in a position in which he either had to give up these demands or keep out of the Executive Council. He sought elucidation on nine issues, the most important of which were the three matters already mentioned, on which he got a negative reply. But he also said that the question of the settlement of the long term plan should stand over until a better and more conducive atmosphere is created. To this Wavell replied that, since the basis for participation in the Cabinet was acceptance of the Statement of 16 May, he “assumed” that the League Council would meet at a very early date to reconsider its Bombay resolution (Serial No. 15).

Meanwhile Gandhiji and the Nawab of Bhopal had met and evolved a formula which greatly strengthened Jinnah’s hands. It read as follows (Serial No. 16) :

“The Congress does not challenge and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic principles they alone have today an unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that any restriction of limitation should be put upon the Congress to choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress as their representatives.

It is understood that all the Ministers of the Interim Government will work as a team for the good of the whole of India and will never invoke the intervention of the Government of India. I accept this formula.”

It transpired however that Gandhiji’s acceptance had been misconstrued and the Nawab had to beat a retreat.

In conversation and correspondence with Nehru, Jinnah, however, insisted that the Congress should first accept the first paragraph; Nehru was naturally reluctant to accept such a wholesale surrender of the Congress position with reference to the Muslims; and subsequently he also pointed out that the second paragraph, by which all the Ministers undertook to work as a team for the good of India and would never invoke the intervention of the Government of India was also part of the formula. Jinnah, however, maintained that Congress should formally accept the first paragraph and he himself would not be committed to the important principle contained in the second, because, he said (See V. P. Menon—*Transfer of Power in India*—p. 314), it was not part of the formula. The discussions between Jinnah and Nehru did not result in any agreement, naturally perhaps because the whole series of events shows that Jinnah would at no time come to any agreement with the Congress, but always looked to the Viceroy to find a *modus vivendi*. Jinnah was convinced by this time that these were matters on which the Congress would not give in. But he would give in to the Viceroy and not to the Congress. So comes the next act in the drama. Having got an assurance from the Viceroy that the Muslim League could include a Scheduled Castes representative—a move obviously intended to spite the Congress rather than serve the Scheduled Castes—the Muslim League Working Committee proceeded to express its disapproval of the “basis and scheme” of setting up the Interim Government and then declared (in a letter Jinnah wrote to Wavell) :

“... In the interest of Mussalmans and other communities it would be fatal to leave the entire field of administration of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress. Besides, you may be forced to have in your Government Muslims who do not command the respect and confidence of Muslim India. . . .”

The Muslim League then proceeded to say that they had decided to nominate five members to the Governor-General's

Executive Council. On the basis of this communication the Viceroy and Nehru between them accepted Jinnah's nominations and the Executive Council was reconstituted on 26th October 1946, regrettably without insisting on what Sardar was most keen, that the League should unequivocally accept the long-term Plan and give an assurance of joining the Constituent Assembly. The seed of Pakistan, which had to be conceded eventually by the Congress, lay in the omission. Obviously, both Viceroy Wavell and Jawaharlal Nehru were tricked into accepting a so-called oral assurance which was later disowned by Jinnah. Congress had on its part agreed to enter into sections but it was not possible (nor would it be correct) to ask them for further commitments. Nevertheless the Viceroy wrote to Nehru as follows on 23 October 1946 :

“I have made it clear to Mr. Jinnah that the Muslim League's entry into the Interim Government is conditional on its acceptance of the scheme of May 16th and that he must call his Council at an early date to agree to this. As I have told you, Mr. Jinnah has assured me that the Muslim League will come into the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly with the intention of co-operating.”

Sardar, it is clear, was not satisfied with this kind of vague assurance. On 20 October, he wrote to Wavell in clear and specific terms (Serial No. 19). He was particularly referring to a speech made by Ghazanfar Ali Khan, one of Jinnah's nominees to the Executive Council, in which, far from showing any disposition to work the Cabinet Mission scheme, Ghazanfar Ali Khan had defined the attainment of Pakistan as the goal of the Muslim League and declared that the Interim Government was one of the fronts of the direct action campaign. Sardar made it clear that, if wrangles over partition and fomenting of trouble were to take the place of the immediate work of the administration, it would be a question for the Congress to revise its attitude about shouldering the burden it had taken over in response to the Viceroy's invitation. In

particular he asked that before the coalition came into being and the portfolios were redistributed there should be a clear announcement by the Council of the Muslim League accepting the long-term arrangement, and that the text of the resolution of the League should be supplied to the then members of the Cabinet. But Nehru himself does not seem to have considered it worth while to insist on pinning Jinnah down to a definite commitment on these matters. It is possible that his ill-fated visit to the Frontier about this time made him give less attention to this very unfortunate development.

Meanwhile the date of calling the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly was approaching, the Assembly having been summoned on 9 December; and, in spite of the best efforts of Wavell, Jinnah refused to allow the Muslim League to participate. There followed hectic consultations between Wavell and the Secretary of State, and discussions between Wavell, and the Indian leaders, particularly, Nehru and Jinnah. Eventually the Prime Minister of Great Britain decided to have discussions in London with the Viceroy and the Indian Political leaders. Sardar himself though invited to this meeting was unwilling to go, since he saw little possibility of a successful outcome. He has expressed his views with characteristic forthrightness in a letter to Rajkumari Amrit Kaur dated 28-11-1946 (Serial No. 21). To him the issues were simple:

1. Jinnah and the Viceroy assured Congress before taking office that the League would participate in the Constituent Assembly. This assurance had been repudiated.
2. The invitation, in spite of all denials to the contrary meant either the reopening of the question or putting pressure on the Congress to make more concessions to League.
3. The procedure for the Assembly would be according to the document and, if any interpretation was in question, it would be referred to the Federal Court.

Sardar was clear that the Viceroy was in open alliance with Jinnah; according to him, if Congress gave in now the Sikhs would go out; the Congress itself would have to give it up; and position would again be that the minority would hold the veto. In response to personal appeals from the Prime Minister, Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Baldev Singh decided to go to London, along with the Viceroy. The discussions in London did not produce any results. Sardar has opened his heart to Stafford Cripps in a letter in which we find a very important reference to his "own contributions" to building a bridge between England and India (Serial No. 22).

In fact, however, the Congress did make some concessions. At a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held on 5th January 1947 the Congress declared itself willing, in its anxiety to ensure that the Constitution was framed with the goodwill of all the parties concerned, to advise action in accordance with the interpretation of the British Government in regard to the procedure to be followed in sections; with this essential reservation, that it would ensure that the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab were not jeopardised and that there was no compulsion on a Province. But by this time the attitude of Jinnah and the League had hardened beyond the possibilities of a compromise. The Muslim League now demanded a declaration from the British Government that the plan of 16th May had failed; it also asked that the Constituent Assembly be dissolved.

With this resolution the fat was in the fire. Nehru and all the non-League members of the Executive Council demanded the resignation of the League representatives. A week later Nehru wrote another letter reaffirming this and threatening himself to resign if the Muslim League members continued in office. Sardar reinforced this position at a press interview on 15th February. He said that either the Muslim League should agree to join the Constituent Assembly or resign from the Interim Government. If they did neither, Congress would leave the Government. By now it was clear that there was left no

hope of getting the Muslim League to co-operate in evolving a Constitution through the machinery of the Constituent Assembly. There were other complications too; the Muslim League members of the Executive Council were living up to their promise of functioning in an obstructive way and conflicts in the Central Government became the order of the day. The Muslim League was still committed to their Direct Action Programme, and the curious anomaly arose that the party which had a very considerable representation in the Central Government had embarked on a course of civil resistance in the Provinces. Communal violence had already caused havoc in Bengal, the Calcutta Killing being followed by violence in East Bengal, particularly in Noakhali. This had its reaction in Bihar where after an initial spurt of great violence the Provincial Government was able to bring the situation under control. Now the Muslim League concentrated on creating a similar situation in the Punjab, where a Unionist Ministry was in office and in the North-West Frontier Province where there was a Congress Government. Neither the Governor's special responsibilities, an important if unpopular feature of the 1935 Act, nor the Governor-General's powers were used to put down these activities; in fact firmness was totally lacking in dealing with the Muslim League stir; and the Central Government could do nothing because law and order was provincial responsibility.

Transfer of power became an irreversible process. It was no longer possible to reconstruct a care-taker Government of officials; and the British Government and the Viceroy decided that, in the prevailing atmosphere they had to give up the scheme so elaborately devised by the Cabinet Mission, and leave it to the Indians to find a settlement, if they could. This was really the crux of the statement of 20 February 1947. The main outlines of that statement were simple enough.

1. a clear and unequivocal declaration that power would be transferred to Indian hands by June 1948;
2. such transfer to be to an authority or authorities established by a Constitution approved by all parties in

India in accordance with the Cabinet Mission's Plan if possible; but the British Government was clearly pessimistic about such a constitution coming into being;

3. if it did not, power to be transferred according to the circumstances then prevailing, "whether as a whole to some form of central government for British India, or in some areas to the existing provincial Governments...."

A new Viceroy and Governor-General was also appointed to succeed Wavell; the person elected was Mountbatten of Burma.

Partition was clearly on the cards now. Gandhiji himself who had become the strongest opponent of Partition had in a note recorded in December 1946 foreshadowed it (Serial No. 24). He had recorded that if the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by the Muslim League became an established fact, the Assembly would have the right to frame a Constitution of Independence for all the provinces, States and units that may be represented in it.

The statement of 20th February was immediately followed by a resolution of the Congress Working Committee (5th March 1947) asking for a partition of Punjab, the dominantly Muslim portion being separated from the non-Muslim portion. Maulana Azad foreshadowed a similar demand for the partition of Bengal.

While all these discussions and arguments were taking place Sardar and a couple of his trusted officers were applying their minds to the Indian problem and trying to work out a solution. By December 1946, it had become clear to Sardar, as it had dawned on Gandhiji, that the likelihood was that the Muslim League could in no circumstances be persuaded to co-operate in the Constituent Assembly. It had also become clear that the three-tier set-up suggested by the Cabinet

Mission was so unwieldy as to be unworkable. These discussions had led to a conclusion that the best course would be to transfer power to Indian hands soon—as soon as possible—on a Dominion Status basis. The main features of this suggested solution could be summarised simply:

1. Concede to Jinnah his demand for Pakistan, in principle; but
2. Insist that the same principle would apply to the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, which would have to be partitioned.
3. Create two Dominions—India and Pakistan.
4. Transfer power at once to these Dominions.

V. P. Menon in his book *Transfer of Power in India* records that the outlines of a scheme on these lines had been recorded and sent to the Secretary of State through a special messenger; but no action was taken at the time.

Mountbatten took over the Governor-Generalship towards the end of March. He immediately plunged into discussions and was soon satisfied that there could be no meeting ground between the parties. And other circumstances, including the desire of British troops to go back home made it urgently necessary that power should be transferred early. Mountbatten then sent his own proposals to England on 2 May adding that he hoped to be able to persuade the Indian Political parties to accept them. The acceptance of the British Government came on 10th May 1947. The essential feature of this plan was to transfer power to the Provinces leaving a weak federal administration at the Centre. Any further formation of groups, etc. would be for the Provinces to decide, after the British had left.

This plan was known only to Mountbatten and the members of his staff and was at no stage communicated to the Indian party leaders. Mountbatten who had taken Nehru to Simla decided to take Nehru into his confidence before

publishing it. The result was explosive. Nehru would have nothing to do with it on the grounds that it was certain to balkanise India; it would add greatly to the current violence and disorder; it would result in the breakdown of central authority, demoralisation of the army, the police and the central services.

But after the initial explosion events took a dramatic turn, V. P. Menon explained to Mountbatten the scheme already previously considered and approved by Sardar and suggested that he might reveal it to Pandit Nehru. Both were impressed with the scheme. This scheme was then put into the form of a paper; and, after Sardar, Nehru and Mountbatten had approved it, Mountbatten took it to London and was able to persuade the British Government to accept it. This is the famous plan of 3 June 1947 on the basis of which the British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act, 1947. (See Serial Nos. 25 and 26).

The processes laid down in this statement were :

1. Power would be transferred to Indian hands much earlier than June 1948 (at a Press Conference Mountbatten announced that the date would be 15 August 1947).
2. It would be for Indians to decide according to a procedure laid down whether it should be transferred to one Dominion or whether there should be partition resulting in establishing a second Dominion (Pakistan) consisting of Muslim majority areas.
3. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab (excluding the European members) would each be asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and other the rest of the province.
4. The members of the two parts of each Assembly would vote on the issue whether the Province should

- be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decided in favour of partition, division would take place.
5. Before the issue of partition was decided, if any member of either Assembly so demanded, there would be held a meeting of all members of the Legislative Assembly (other than Europeans) at which a decision would be taken on the issue as to which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole would join if it were decided by the two parts to remain united.
  6. In the event of partition being decided upon, each part of the Legislative Assembly would, on behalf of the areas they represented, decide whether their Constitution was to be framed in the existing Constituent Assembly or in the new (Pakistani) Constituent Assembly.
  7. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the Muslim majority districts would be decided according to the census figures of 1941. For final partition the boundaries were to be settled by a Boundary Commission to be set up by the Governor-General.
  8. The decision in the case of Sind, whether to continue in the existing Indian Constituent Assembly, or join the Pakistan Assembly would be taken by the Sind Legislative Assembly.
  9. If the Muslim majority areas of the Punjab decided to join the new Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there would be a referendum in the North-West Frontier Province to decide its future; British Baluchistan would be also given an opportunity to reconsider its position.
  10. If it was decided that Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum would be held in the Sylhet District of Assam to decide whether that district should form

part of the Assam Province or should be amalgamated with East Bengal. If the referendum decided on such amalgamation, a Boundary Commission would demarcate the "Muslim majority areas of the Sylhet district and contiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts" which would then be transferred to East Bengal.

The procedure laid down in the 3 June statement was completed by the middle of July. There was some anxiety about Bengal before the announcement was made. Public opinion in the province, particularly among the non-Muslims had now become practically unanimous in favour of partition of that province, but there was some local agitation (in which Sarat Chandra Bose was involved) against that course; Sardar was definite that partition, the official policy of the Congress was in the best interests of Bengal. He had to write to Kiran Shankar Roy :

"These are undoubtedly critical times, and the issue of partition is of paramount importance. It is incumbent on all Congressmen to set aside personal predilections and to stand united on the official policy of the Congress."

Once the declaration of partition was published, there were no hesitations in Bengal; and there was a decisive majority among the West Bengal Legislators for partition, and an equally decisive majority in favour of joining the Indian Assembly. And, as generally expected, West Punjab, East Bengal, Sylhet, Sind, British Baluchistan decided to break away and form the new state of Pakistan. The case of the North-West Frontier Province was a particularly distressing one from the Congress point of view. There the patriotism and devotion of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib had led to the evolution of a national outlook and the Congress had won the elections of 1946. But the decision of West Punjab to separate had isolated the Frontier Province from India. In these circumstances, the Congress leaders there asked for an option to vote for independence, but this was not permissible under the 3 June Plan, and

the nationalists decided to boycott the referendum. The result was that the official voting record was in favour of Pakistan.

All these decisions were given Parliamentary approval by the Indian Independence Act, which received Royal assent on 18 July 1947.

Sardar played an important role in all the administrative arrangements for partition. He, along with Rajendra Prasad, were the Indian representatives in the Partition Committee, and later of the Partition Council which took its place. He took close personal interest in the administrative arrangements and guided the Steering Committee, especially H. M. Patel, in whom he had great confidence. He was in no small degree responsible for the smooth functioning of the Partition Council which was able to decide all the issues before it by consensus and agreement.

In regard to the division of the armed forces, Sardar took a firm stand. This was entrusted to a Joint Defence Council, of which Mountbatten was Chairman and Auchinleck the former Commander-in-Chief the principal administrative head. Sardar felt that Auchinleck's organisation was not as impartial as he should have been, and mainly through his insistence, the post of Supreme Commander was abolished on 1 December 1947.

There were two Boundary Commissions, both presided over by Sir Cyril (later Lord) Radcliffe to determine the exact boundaries between the two Dominions. The Commissions reported on 13 August 1947. The award created considerable heart-burning among the three principal communities concerned, namely, the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Muslims. The Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab were sore about the loss of Lahore and the canal area between the Ravi and the Chenab; the Sikhs were resentful of the loss of important religious shrines; the Qadiani sect among the Muslims grieved over the loss of the seat of their Prophet (Gurdaspur); the Hindus of Bengal were sorry about loss of half of Khulna district; the Muslims were disturbed over the loss of Calcutta; the Buddhist population of Chittagong hill areas were unhappy over the transfer of the

area to East Pakistan. Jinnah fulminated over the inclusion of Gurdaspur in the Indian Dominion, as it gave the latter access to Jammu. The announcement of the award precipitated the movement of the respective population of minorities on each side to the other Dominion. The numbers involved overwhelmed the security forces which were themselves affected and unsettled, and the divided administration of the two Punjab, particularly East Punjab, which had to find new habitation and a new name.

## *SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE*

### **1. NOTES BY JAWAHARLAL NEHRU ON THE IMPENDING CONVERSATIONS WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH CABINET MISSION TO INDIA, DATED 15 MARCH 1946**

1. It is essential that the basis of these conversations should be the independence of India. The proper course would be for the British Government to recognise this independence and then to proceed to discuss further steps to implement it. This recognition does not necessarily determine the form of relationship or alliance between free India and Britain. This question will have to be settled later between representatives of the two parties. If such a declaration or public recognition is not made to begin with by the British Government, even so it must be clearly understood that we can only talk on this basis and on no other.

2. Our talks are not a continuation of April 1942 nor are we going back in any way to the Cripps offer.

3. We do not accept the proposition that for the present we have Dominion Status with power to secede later. What our exact relationship may be later need not be settled now, but it must be clear that it is on the present basis of independence that we consider future problems.

4. While we are prepared to enter into friendly talks about future relations, we are not agreeable to any treaty or alliance which binds us to join a bloc or a nation for war or like purposes. Nor are we agreeable to India being made the base of war operations against any country. This matter must be left to be determined by the future government of free India. We do not want to inherit old feuds or to entangle ourselves in the power politics or imperialist adventures of the Great

Powers. We are prepared, however, to play our full part as a free and co-operating nation in the United Nations Organization.

5. It has also to be made perfectly clear that the Constituent Assembly should be the final authority to determine the constitution. It must not be a consultative or advisory body. What it finally decides may or may not be passed by the British Parliament (that is Britain's affair) but for us it should be the final decision. In effect the British Government should pass some kind of an Act of Abdication.

6. In present circumstances we cannot afford to delay matters by asking for a new electoral roll for the Constituent Assembly. We have to accept the newly-elected Provincial Assemblies as electoral colleges for the purpose. They can elect delegates by proportional representation. The number can be settled later but it is preferable to have a fairly large number.

7. The procedure etc. in regard to the Constituent Assembly should be determined by representatives of the Provincial Governments. If any Provincial Government refuses to participate, it can be bypassed and left out for the present. So also if any Provincial Assembly refuses to elect delegates, there should be no compulsion.

8. It should be made clear that the question of Pakistan (whatever precisely it might signify) will not be decided by a mere majority of votes in the Constituent Assembly. Questions of this kind will have to be settled either by the consent of parties or ultimately by plebiscite of all the inhabitants of an area on a precise and defined issue. The Constituent Assembly will, however, prepare a single constitution for India, with two lists of Central subjects, one minimum and compulsory, and the other optional.

9. The questions of defence and allied questions (foreign affairs, communications as well as currency) are obviously central and Common subjects which cannot be given up. Even

if some kind of separation is envisaged some common arrangements for these will be necessary.

10. There may be a demand or suggestion for new demarcation of provincial boundaries resulting in division of the Punjab and Bengal, so that parts of these provinces should be predominantly Muslim. We should agree to any demarcation which creates cultural and linguistic areas which satisfy the majority of the people concerned.

11. In regard to the States we should follow more or less the same policy, *mutatis mutandis*, as in regard to the provinces. That is, it should be open to the States to join the Constituent Assembly or not. There should be no compulsion. Provided of course that the States are represented predominantly by elected representatives (we may allow, in view of the special circumstances, the Ruler to have a representative or so) and provided also that the States agree to have the same or similar democratic forms of Government and administrative and judicial efficiency as the provinces. It should be a privilege to be admitted to the Constituent Assembly, a privilege which will not be extended to States which fall below the standard.

12. There will be some difficulty in arranging for the representation of the States as many of them have no proper democratic machinery. Also most of them are too small. But these matters can be considered more fully later. A full analysis of States, their elective assemblies where such exist, and other facts concerning them, is being prepared.

13. It is clear that only the big States (say from 15 to 20) can become units of the Federation. The others have either to be absorbed in provinces or can form a large enough group to form a unit.

14. Our claim must be that the new Central Government of India inherits the power and authority of the present Government of India or the Crown Representative in regard to the States. However, we need not settle this matter finally

at this stage, if some States object. We can allow matters to drift for a while, and allow the Constituent Assembly to begin functioning when it will inevitably draw the States. The new Government of India will of course be a joint affair of all constituent units—provinces and States. If any States are left out to begin with, we shall have to deal with them later.

15. We cannot, however, recognise the independence of the States though we may recognise their autonomy (if they are big enough) within the Federation. Nor can we accept the stationing of foreign troops there.

16. It is possible that the Muslim League may suggest Dominion Status, with defence in British hands, for their Pakistani areas. This might be considered an inducement to the British Government. Such a development is likely to be advantageous to us and is bound to weaken the League position.

17. These are brief notes very hurriedly written. The main points are:

- (1) Discussion on the basis of independence.
- (2) Constituent Assembly to have final authority.
- (3) No compulsion of a province or a State to join Constituent Assembly but if any wants to keep out in the beginning, it can be bypassed.
- (4) There should be no delay. Time is the essence of the matter and we must not get entangled in long discussions about details.
- (5) The main principles having been accepted, we go ahead with the Constituent Assembly and then representatives elected by the Constituent Assembly discuss with British representatives our future contacts, relations, etc.
- (6) No entanglements in war or joining of imperialist blocs against another group.

## (7) Co-operation in UNO.

18. The formation of a provisional Central Government is essential. This also should proceed on the basis of Provincial Governments as far as possible. This Government in practice act freely as a Cabinet with no obstruction from the Viceroy or any other outside authority. The India Office should not function.

(*Author's Note*: As an exercise in preparatory thinking, the note constitutes a very commendable effort and indicates a clear ideological position consistent with the Congress stand on all the major questions affecting the constitutional structure. But it does not seem to have been realised that freedom to a Province to join or not in itself contained the seed of Pakistan and suggested a procedure which could be made the basis of grouping. Similarly the note evades the burning question of safeguards for minorities and shows an absence of realism on many issues. It is not unlikely that the Cabinet Mission took into consideration this note as well as the Cripps proposals of 1942 in formulating their plan of 16 May 1946.)

2. SARDAR TO NIHCHALDAS VAZIRANI,  
DATED 2 JUNE 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...Regarding the clause of grouping, I feel certain that the Muslims of Sind as a whole will not like to be ruled by Punjab and have a capital in Delhi for the Union and one at Lahore for the Group. In my opinion, no province will be willing to sacrifice provincial autonomy. It is against human nature and this grouping is not going to help the Muslim League at all. But our objection to it is on principle. The Cabinet Delegation cannot and should not coerce any province to go into a group against its own will, although it has freedom to opt out later.

I have seen the Syed group's resolution. I dislike entirely their demand for equal representation in the Centre. The

Muslim League asked for parity but I opposed it stoutly. Parity in any shape or form is against the very principles of democracy and no amount of quibbling can justify it. Indeed Syed has got a very good opportunity to strike at Jinnah because Jinnah and the League have secured nothing for the Muslims after a struggle of five years against the Congress and after the spreading of so much communal bitterness. His main demand of Pakistan is buried forever. His demand for parity is not accepted. The Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces have lost weightage in the Constituent Assembly. They will be in a hopeless minority. The principle of representation on a population basis is accepted. The only thing that he got, as a face-saving device, is grouping which will be seriously opposed by his own people.

The Muslim Leaguers in their convention at Delhi took oath under which they are bound not to enter the Interim Government till the principle of Pakistan is accepted. All of them are now anxious to go in in spite of the pledge....

3. SARDAR TO NIHCHALDAS VAZIRANI,  
DATED 12 JUNE 1946  
(EXTRACT)

...There are certain points in the Cabinet Mission's proposals which bear different interpretations and there are some which require explanation. But it is unnecessary to go in to the details of these contradictions and omissions or ask for their explanations, as the document is final and the proper time for interpretation will come when the Constituent Assembly meets. I have no doubt in my mind that according to the legal interpretation of the document, the provinces are free to join or not to join, even in the first instance and after the group constitution is framed, they have a further right to opt out of the group. I have seen the point raised by you also. I do not think it is wise to open up these matters at this stage. If we find the proposals otherwise satisfactory and the interim arrangement is made to our satisfaction, it would be wise to accept

the proposals. But it is just likely that the whole thing may break on the question of composition of the Interim Government. This, in our opinion, is a vital matter and the result of our discussions will end one way or the other in a day or two. . . .

#### 4. GANDHIJI TO WAVELL, DATED 12 JUNE 1946

From you, almost straightaway, I went to the Working Committee which, owing to his illness, was held at Maulana Sahib's quarters. I gave them the gist of our conversation, told them that I gladly endorsed your suggestion about the parties meeting to fix up names subject to the proviso that no party should talk of parity, you should invite them simply to submit to you a joint list of the Cabinet of the provisional Interim Government which you would approve or, if you did not, you would invite them to submit a revised list bearing in mind your amendments, that the list should represent a coalition Government composed of persons of proved ability and incorruptibility. I suggested too that in the place of parity there should be active enforcement of the long-term provision in your joint statement that in all major communal issues there should be communal voting to decide them. I suggested also that in the event of absence of agreement between the parties in spite of all efforts, you should examine the merits of the respective list of the two parties and accept either the one or the other (not an amalgam) and announce the names of the Interim Government but that before that final step was taken you should closet yourselves until a joint list was prepared. I told the Working Committee that you had seemed to endorse my suggestions.

I told them further that, so far as I knew, it was a point of honour with Congressmen that there could be no joint consultations in which Maulana Sahib was not associated with the talks. You said it was a sore point with Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and I replied that the soreness was wholly unwarranted and that the Congress could not be expected to sacrifice its faithful

servant of twenty-five years' standing whose self-sacrifice and devotion to the national cause had never been in question. But I told you that your great experience and ability to handle delicate matters would show you the way out of the difficulty.

Finally, I told the Committee that I drew your attention to the fact that the European vote which was being talked of was unthinkable in connection with the Constituent Assembly and nothing but a public declaration by the European residents of India or one by you on their behalf could make possible the formation of the Constituent Assembly. I gathered from you that the question was already engaging your attention and that it should be satisfactorily solved.

Probably you have already moved in the matter of the joint talk. Nevertheless, I thought that I owed it to you and the Working Committee to put on record what I had reported about our talks. If I have in any way misunderstood you, will you please correct me?

I may say that the Working Committee had its draft letter ready, but at my suggestion it postponed consideration of it pending the final result of your effort adumbrated in this letter. The draft letter takes the same view that I placed before you yesterday on parity and the European vote and their election as members of the contemplated Constituent Assembly.

I close with the hope that your effort will bear the fruit to which all are looking forward.

5. WAVELL TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 22 JULY 1946

I declared my intention of replacing the present caretaker Government of officials by an Interim Coalition Government as soon as possible; and am now putting to you as President of the Congress and to the President of the Muslim League the proposals set out below.

2. I think you will probably agree with me that our negotiations both this summer and last year were hampered by the attendant publicity. I am therefore seeking your co-operation in conducting at any rate the preliminary stages of the negotiations on a strictly personal and secret basis between myself and the two Presidents (of the Congress and the Muslim League). I very much hope that you will prevent this correspondence being known to or discussed in the Press until we have seen whether we can find some basis of agreement. I realise of course that you will have at some stage to secure the approval of your Working Committee; but I believe it will be best to try and reach some basis of agreement between ourselves as a first step. I propose the following for your consideration :

- (a) The Interim Government will consist of 14 members;
- (b) Six members ( to include one Scheduled Castes representative ) will be nominated by the Congress. Five members will be nominated by the Muslim League. Three representatives of minorities will be nominated by the Viceroy. One of these places will be kept for a Sikh. It will not be open to either the Congress or the Muslim League to object to the names submitted by the other party, provided they are accepted by the Viceroy.
- (c) Distribution of portfolios will be decided after the parties have agreed to enter the Government and have submitted their names. The Congress and the Muslim League will each have an equitable share of the most important portfolios.
- (d) The assurances about the status of the Interim Government which I gave in my letter dated 30 May to Maulana Azad will stand.

3. I would welcome a convention, if freely offered by the Congress, that major communal issues can only be decided

by the assent of both the major parties, but I have never thought that it was essential to make this a formal condition since in fact a coalition government could work on no other basis.

4. I sincerely trust that your party will agree to co-operate in the administration of India on the above basis, while the work of constitution-making proceeds. I am confident that this will be of the greatest possible benefit to India. I suggest that we should not spend further time in negotiation, but should try out at once a Government on the basis proposed above. If it does not work, and you find the conditions unsatisfactory, it will be open to you to withdraw, but I am confident that you will not.

5. Would you be good enough to let me know very soon whether the Congress will enter the Interim Government on this basis? I have written in similar terms to Mr. Jinnah and enclose a copy of my letter to him.

6. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO WAVELL,  
DATED 23 JULY 1946

I have given careful consideration to your letter of 22 July which you gave me yesterday (Serial No. 5). I agree with you that publicity in the Press or otherwise does not do any good when delicate negotiations have to be carried on. So far as I am concerned, I shall see to it that Press has no knowledge of it. But it is not possible for me, even as Congress President, to function by myself in such matters without any reference to my colleagues. Inevitably I shall have to consult my colleagues.

This becomes even more necessary because the situation itself has changed in many ways since we discussed these matters and much has happened which has to be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision. You will remember our telling you at our last meeting that it would not be possible to pick up again the old threads where they had been left off.

That chapter had come to an end and an entirely new approach would have to be made. Since then a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee has been held and the whole subject reviewed. A new Working Committee (though it has many of the old members in it) has been formed.

Apart from this, our experience of the previous talks has demonstrated that there is little hope of a successful issue along the old line of approach. And even if there was some temporary arrangement, this could not last or be capable of dealing with the urgent problems of the day. The all-India strikes that are taking place are evidence of the tension in the country and the accumulation of many problems whose solution has been postponed for so long. Only a strong government with clear objectives can deal with this situation effectively. Such a government cannot be formed in the manner suggested.

You have referred to the letter you wrote to Maulana Azad on 30 May regarding the status of the Interim Government. The assurances you gave then were very far from satisfying us, but in our urgent desire to find a way out, we did not raise any further objections on this score. You will remember that we have all along attached the greatest importance to what we have called the "independence in action" of the provisional government. This meant that the Government should have perfect freedom and that the Governor-General should function as a constitutional head only. Anything else would be more or less a copy of the Executive Council with, of course, some obvious differences.

It is on the basis of this "independence in action", and on this basis only that a satisfactory approach to the problem can be made. Once this is acknowledged and admitted you will find, I think, that other relatively minor issues do not offer much difficulty. That acknowledgement would affect even the formation of the Government. It would not be proper then for the Governor-General to select representatives of the minorities, as you have suggested in your letter.

This question of the status and powers of the provisional Interim Government has, therefore, to be decided first in unambiguous language. That status does not mean some kind of vague international status but internally—the functioning at home as an independent Government though with certain inevitable drawbacks due to the existing circumstances.

I am not writing to you about the other matters mentioned in your letter as those can only be considered after the status and powers have been finally and satisfactorily decided. But I shall have much to say about other matters also at a later stage.

In view of what I have written above, I am wholly unable to co-operate in the formation of a government as suggested by you. So far as I know the mind of the Congress, they would want the political independence issue settled before they can enter any Government.

I am going to Kashmir tomorrow morning. On the 29th I shall be passing through Delhi on my way to Allahabad. On 8 August and subsequent days we are having a meeting of the Congress Working Committee at Wardha.

7. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 22 JULY 1946  
(EXTRACT)

... I saw the Viceroy today and we talked about a variety of subjects. About Sikhs,<sup>1</sup> he was perfectly prepared

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<sup>1</sup> The Sikhs were allotted 4 seats from the Punjab in the Constituent Assembly under the Cabinet Mission's Plan. In the elections held in July to the Assembly, however, all Sikhs nominations were withdrawn and no Sikh was elected to the Assembly. That is why Nehru had to approach the Viceroy. The Viceroy agreed to give them another chance. In response to the appeal of the Congress the Panthic Board met on 14 August 1946 and decided to accept the Cabinet Mission's statement of 16 May. Elections were held later.

to give them another chance of election, but somebody must approach him and ask him for it. I asked him as to who was to approach him. He wasn't quite clear as he said there were so many groups among the Sikhs. Anyway, he is quite willing to fix another election up and I believe he has written to the Governor about it. I am likely to see some people in Lahore on my way to Kashmir. I shall mention this fact to them. You can also take such steps as you consider proper.

I spoke to the Viceroy about Sind also. He agreed that many mistakes have been made, but he cast the blame more on the Speaker than on Sir Francis Mudie. However, he said that he would try to have an early session of the Sind Assembly arranged. His only difficulty was, he said, the month of Ramzan....

#### 8. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO CONGRESS PREMIERS, DATED 22 JULY 1946

In regard to the Constituent Assembly, it seems to me desirable that persons elected to it should bring their credentials with them for presentation before the Assembly or some proper authority appointed by the Constituent Assembly. These credentials can take the shape of letters of delegation issued by the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly. This is not a mere matter of form.

We want this Assembly to function as much as possible as an independent sovereign authority and the less it has to do with the Government of India apparatus the better. The bringing of the letters of delegation by the members of the Constituent Assembly and their proper presentation to the Chairman would add to the solemnity of the procedure and would emphasise the independence of the Constituent Assembly.

The Viceroy may, of course, issue a summons to the members. If this is done we can treat it as a mere formality,

attaching far more importance to our letters of delegation from the Speaker of our own Legislative Assembly.

I would request you to pass on this suggestion to the Speaker of your Legislative Assembly. Such letters of delegation should be issued not only to the members of the Provincial Assembly who have been elected but also to non-members who have been elected.

#### 9. RAJAJI TO SARDAR, DATED 29 JULY 1946

The violence of Mr. Jinnah's chagrin is the measure of wisdom of our decision at a critical moment. It is all due to your firm and thoughtful stand. I have been considering how best to conserve this victory. If we commit a mistake we may easily lose all this advantage.

What we have to secure is not any spectacular victory, but something to make the franchise regulations of the provincial constitutions in B & C groups subject to ratification of the province or of the whole Constituent Assembly. The section's decision on these fundamental points should not be binding on the provincial units unless it is agreed to by the latter or confirmed by a decision of the whole Constituent Assembly by a majority vote. This will prevent any mischief by way of reducing the province to incapacity to combat the group decision ultimately by gerrymandering the franchise. This can, I believe, be secured as a condition precedent to sections B & C being participated in initially by the NWFP and Assam.

I wonder if the League will stay out altogether. If they do that, we must be in the Central Interim Government in order to give any form of reality and substance to the Constituent Assembly. If they come into the Constituent Assembly we must keep them somehow until the task progresses substantially.

10. RAJAJI TO SARDAR, DATED 1 AUGUST 1946  
(EXTRACT)

... Now that Jinnah and the League are certain to create trouble it has become our unavoidable and bounden duty to accept the challenge. We cannot refuse any offer about the Interim Government now, without opening ourselves to the charge that we funk accepting responsibility under difficult conditions. We should take up government and carry on anyhow. It is more important now than even the Constituent Assembly. That too we must tackle. I shall be in Wardha on the 8th morning.

11. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO WAVELL,  
DATED 20 AUGUST 1946

In consultation with my colleagues I am suggesting the names given below for membership of the Interim Government. We should very much like to have fifteen members of this Government, both because we consider this number suitable and because this will enable us to include an Anglo-Indian representative. If the list is to contain fourteen names only, then I am afraid there will be no room in it at present for an Anglo-Indian. We have not decided yet in regard to one Muslim name for the list. I hope to supply this later. I might add that we have secured the consent of all those mentioned in the list except one, Mr. Asaf Ali, whom we have not been able to contact. He has been in Kashmir and is on his way back. Apparently he has been held up somewhere owing to a stoppage of the air service. We hope to be in touch with him soon.

I have decided to join the Provisional Government myself. In addition to my name, therefore, there will be the following :

1. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
2. Dr. Rajendra Prasad

3. Mr. M. Asaf Ali
4. Mr. C. Rajagopalachari
5. Mr. Fazlul Huq
6. Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose
7. Dr. John Matthai
8. Sardar Baldev Singh
9. **Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan**
10. Mr. Jagjivan Ram (President, All-India Depressed Class League)
11. Syed Ali Zaheer (President, All-India Shia Conference)
12. Mr. Cooverji Hormusji Bhabha
13. A Muslim name to be supplied later
14. Mr. Frank Anthony (President, Anglo - Indian Association)

12. SARDAR TO MOHAMAD ALAM,  
DATED 25 AUGUST 1946  
(EXTRACT)

... The Interim Government has been announced and we propose to take charge on 2 September. This is an event of unusual importance in the history of our country and we can all feel proud to have seen the day when an Indian National Government has been formed for the first time. Unfortunately the Muslim leadership of today has chosen to take a different course. We all feel ashamed of what has happened in Calcutta. No Indian can help feeling sorry about it. It has brought discredit to the country and has disgraced the League all over.

You must have heard about the dastardly attack on Sir Shafaqt Ahmad, who chose to differ from the League, and his place with us. Where the League leadership will lead the Muslims by this method one cannot say. The Muslims may well say that they may be saved from their so-called saviours.

### 13. GANDHIJI TO WAVELL, DATED 28 AUGUST 1946

I write this as a friend and after deep thought.

Several times last evening you repeated that you were a "plain man and a soldier" and that you did not know the law. We are all plain men though we may not all be soldiers and even though some of us may know the law. It is our purpose, I take it, to devise methods to prevent a repetition of the recent terrible happenings in Calcutta. The question before us is how best to do it.

Your language last evening was minatory. As representative of the King you cannot afford to be a military man only, nor to ignore the law, much less the law of your own making. You should be assisted, if necessary, by a legal mind enjoying your full confidence. You threatened not to convene the Constituent Assembly if the formula you placed before Pandit Nehru and me was not acted upon by the Congress. If such be really the case, then you should not have made the announcement you did on 12 August. But having made it you should recall the action and form another ministry enjoying your full confidence. If British arms are kept here for internal peace and order your Interim Government would be reduced to a farce. The Congress cannot afford to impose its will on warring elements in India through the use of British arms. Nor can the Congress be expected to bend itself and adopt what it considers a wrong course because of the brutal exhibition recently witnessed in Bengal. Such submission would itself lead to an encouragement and repetition of such tragedies. The vindictive spirit on either side would go deeper, biding for an opportunity to exhibit itself more fiercely and more disgracefully when occasion occurs. And all this will be chiefly due to the continued presence in India of a foreign power strong in and proud of its arms.

I say this neither as a Hindu nor as a Muslim. I write only as an Indian. In so far as I am aware, the Congress claims to know both the Hindu and Muslim mind more than you or any Britisher can do. Unless, therefore, you can wholly trust the Congress Government which you have announced, you should reconsider your decision, as I have already suggested.

You will please convey the whole of this letter to the British Cabinet.

*(Author's Note; Wavell had already issued a letter inviting Nehru to help him to form an Interim Government without the League and the latter in his letter of 25 August had accepted the invitation. In the meantime notorious Calcutta Killing had occurred and Wavell had returned from a visit to Calcutta fully convinced that it would not be possible to administer the country without the co-operation of the League. Wavell had been critical of the Congress interpretation of the grouping procedure and Jinnah had taken the stand that the Congress in effect had not accepted the plan if it had reservations on the subject of grouping. Wavell seemed to have seen the light in Calcutta, and insisted on the Congress accepting the Cabinet Mission's interpretation, and thereby facilitating the entry of League Members. He even wrote to the British Government for permission to scrap the Interim Government if it did not do so. The British Government refused to oblige. This appears to have angered Wavell. This would explain the angry interview which Wavell had with Gandhiji on 27 August 1946. It would be relevant here to give Wavell's account of the interview. It is as follows:*

“I determined to make an attempt to induce the Congress to state clearly their intentions about Grouping in the Constituent Assembly, since this was obviously one of the main obstacles to co-operation by the League. I therefore asked Gandhi and Nehru to come and see me in the evening.

“Later, at 5.0 p.m. I had a meeting with the Committee

on the breakdown plan. At the end I think we arrived at the outline of quite a reasonable plan, which will now be put into shape to go home.

“The meeting with Gandhi and Nehru was not a great success. The old man was in a legalistic and malevolent mood, and Nehru was full of hate against the League. I told them that I thought the only chance of a peaceful transfer of power in India was if the Congress made a categorical statement that they would accept the position that the Provinces must remain in their Sections, as intended by the Mission, until after the first elections under the new Constitution. I said that I could not undertake the responsibility of calling together the Constituent Assembly until this point was settled. I handed them the draft of a statement which I asked them to make.

“Gandhi went off into long legalistic arguments about the interpretation of the Mission's statement. I said that I was a plain man and not a lawyer, and that I knew perfectly well what the Mission meant, and that compulsory Grouping was the whole crux of the Plan.

“The argument went on for some time, and Nehru got very heated. Gandhi said that if a blood-bath was necessary, it would come about in spite of non-violence. I said that I was very shocked to hear such words from him. In the end they took away the formula, but I do not think there is much hope of their accepting it.”

This account apart Wavell's Journal makes it clear that he distrusted Gandhiji and thought he was the mischief-maker.)

14. POINTS MADE IN JINNAH'S LETTER TO WAVELL,  
DATED 3 OCTOBER 1946

1. The total number of the members of the Executive Council to be 14.
2. Six nominees of the Congress will include one Scheduled Caste representative, but it must not be taken that the Muslim League has agreed to, or approves of, the selection of the Scheduled Caste representative, the ultimate responsibility in that behalf being with the Governor-General and the Viceroy.
3. That the Congress should not include in the remaining five members of their quota a Muslim of their choice.
4. Safeguards : That there should be a convention that on major communal issues, if the majority of Hindu or Muslim members of the Executive Council are opposed, then no decision should be taken.
5. Alternative or rotational Vice-President should be appointed in fairness to both the major communities as it was adopted in the UNO Conference.
6. The Muslim League was not consulted in the selection of the three minority representatives, i.e. Sikh, Indian Christian and Parsi, and it should not be taken that the Muslim League approves of the selection that has been made. But in future, in the event of there being a vacancy owing to death, resignation or otherwise, representatives of these minorities should be chosen in consultation with the two major parties—the Muslim League and the Congress.
7. Portfolios : The most important portfolios should be equally distributed between the two major parties—the Muslim League and the Congress.
8. That the above arrangements should not be changed or

modified unless both the major parties—the Muslim League and the Congress—agree.

9. The question of the settlement of the long-term plan should stand over until a better and more conducive atmosphere is created and an agreement has been reached on the points stated above and after the Interim Government has been reformed and finally set up.

#### 15. WAVELL TO JINNAH, DATED 4 OCTOBER 1946

Thank you for your letter dated yesterday (Serial No. 14). My replies to your nine points are as follows:

1. This is agreed.
2. I note what you say and accept that the responsibility is mine.
3. I am unable to agree to this. Each party must be equally free to nominate its own representatives.
4. In a Coalition Government it is impossible to decide major matters of policy when one of the main parties to the coalition is strongly against a course of action proposed. My present colleagues and I are agreed that it would be fatal to allow major communal issues to be decided by vote in the Cabinet. The efficiency and prestige of the Interim Government will depend on ensuring that differences are resolved in advance of Cabinet meetings by friendly discussions. A Coalition Government either works by a process of mutual adjustments or does not work at all.
5. The arrangements of alternative or rotational Vice-President would present practical difficulty, and I do not consider it feasible. I will however arrange to nominate a Muslim League member to preside over the Cabinet in the event of the Governor-General and the Vice-President being absent.

I will also nominate a Muslim League member as Vice-Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee of Cabinet,

which is a most important post. I am Chairman of this Committee and in the past have presided almost invariably, but I shall probably do so only on special occasions in future.

6. I accept that both major parties would be consulted before filling a vacancy in any of these three seats.
7. In the present conditions all the portfolios in the Cabinet are of great importance and it is a matter of opinion which are the most important. The minority representatives cannot be excluded from a share of the major portfolios and it would also be suitable to continue Mr. Jagjivan Ram in the Labour portfolio. But subject to this, there can be equal distribution of the most important portfolios between the Congress and Muslim League. Details would be a matter for negotiation.
8. I agree.
9. Since the basis for participation in the Cabinet is of course acceptance of the Statement of 16 May, I assume that the League Council will meet at a very early date to reconsider its Bombay resolution.

16. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CONGRESS,  
MUSLIM LEAGUE AND NAWAB OF BHOPAL,  
DATED 4 OCTOBER 1946

1. The Congress does not challenge and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative of an over-whelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic principles they alone have to-day an unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that any restriction or limitation should be put upon the Congress to choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress as their representatives.

2. It is understood that all the ministers of the Interim Government will work as a team for the good of the whole of India and will never invoke the intervention of the Governor-General in any case.

I accept this formula.

( *Author's Note* : This Agreement is signed by Gandhiji, the Nawab of Bhopal and Shoaib Qureishi.)

17. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO M. A. JINNAH,  
DATED 6 OCTOBER 1946

I have consulted some of my colleagues about the matters discussed by us yesterday and over the possibility of a rapprochement between the Muslim League and the Congress. We are all agreed that nothing could be happier and better for the country than that these two organisations should meet again as before as friends having no mental reservations and bent on resolving all their differences by mutual consultation and never desiring or allowing the intervention of the British Government through the Viceroy or others or of any other foreign power. We would, therefore, welcome the decision of League to join the Interim Government for it to work as a united team on behalf of India as a whole.

The points put forward by you in our conversation yesterday were:

1. the formula suggested to you by Gandhiji,
2. the League not being responsible for the members at present representing the Scheduled Castes and the minorities,
3. what should be done in case any vacancy should arise among the members representing the minorities other than the Scheduled Castes,
4. the procedure to be adopted over what may be called major communal issues, and
5. alternating Vice-Presidency.

Regarding No. 1, we feel that the formula is not happily worded. We do not question the purpose underlying it. We are willing, as a result of the elections, to accept the Muslim League as the authoritative representative organisation of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India and that as such and in accordance with democratic principles they have today the unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India, provided that for identical reasons the League recognises the Congress as the authoritative organisation representing all non-Muslims and such Muslims as have thrown in their lot with the Congress. The Congress cannot agree to any restriction or limitations to be put upon it in choosing such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress. We would suggest, therefore, that no formula is necessary and each organisation may stand on its merits.

Regarding No. 2, I am to say that the question of the League being responsible does not arise and, as you do not raise any objections to the present constitution of the Government in this respect, there is no question to be solved.

Regarding No. 3, I am to say that if any such vacancy arises, the whole Cabinet will consider what should be done to replace the vacancy and advise the Viceroy accordingly. There can be no question of right in the matter of consultation with the League in regard to the representation of these minorities.

Regarding No. 4, your suggestion about the Federal Court is not feasible. Matters coming before the Cabinet cannot be made the subject matter of references to court. We should thrash out all such matters amongst ourselves and bring up agreed proposals before the Cabinet. In the event of failure to reach an agreed decision, we should seek the method of arbitration of our own choice. We hope, however, that we will act with such mutual trust, forbearance and friendliness that there will be no occasion to go to such arbitration.

Regarding No. 5, it is out of the question to have any rotation in the Vice-Presidentship. We have no objection if you desire to have an additional Vice-Chairman for the Co-ordination Committee of the Cabinet, who can also preside at such Committee meetings from time to time.

I am hoping that if your Committee finally decide upon the League joining the National Cabinet, they will also decide simultaneously to join the Constituent Assembly, or recommend to your Council to this effect.

I need hardly mention that when an agreement has been reached by us it can only be varied by mutual agreement and not otherwise.

18. M. A. JINNAH TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 7 OCTOBER 1946

I am in receipt of your letter of 6 October 1946 ( Serial No. 17 ) and I thank you for it; I appreciate and reciprocate your sentiments expressed in paragraph 1 of your letter.

With regard to the 2nd paragraph of your letter, point No. 1, the formula, it was accepted by Mr. Gandhi and me and the meeting between us was arranged on that basis in order to negotiate and settle a few other points remaining for the purpose of reconstituting the Interim Government. The formula runs as follows :

“The Congress does not challenge and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic principles, they alone have today an unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that any restriction or limitation should be put upon the Congress to choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress as their representatives.”

And now, in your letter under reply, not only you have made changes in it but you consider no formula is necessary! I regret I cannot agree to any change in the language or otherwise, as it was the agreed basis of our discussion on other points; nor can I agree with you that no formula is necessary. It was signed by Mr. Gandhi and accepted by me.

As the whole basis of our talk on other matters was the formula agreed to by Mr. Gandhi, I don't think we can make any further progress unless it is accepted by you as a basis upon which we can proceed to discuss other points we have already discussed orally in the course of our conversation, and now I am enclosing herewith a copy of the various points put by me before you, in writing.

Even the four points, excluding point No. 1 regarding the formula which I have already dealt with above, you don't agree with any one of them. I am still willing, on the basis of the formula being accepted by you, to further discuss the various points with a view to settle them in the spirit of the sentiments expressed by you in paragraph 1. I am anxious that we should come to our own settlement without undue delay.

*(Author's Note : Serial Nos. 14-18—As stated earlier, Wavell was desperately anxious that the Muslim League should join the Interim Government. His journal on the discussions with Gandhiji on 27 August makes it clear that he was not reconciled to the presence of only Congress nominees in the Interim Government. It is not unlikely that the intercession of the Nawab of Bhopal was inspired by the Governor-General, particularly since the points at issue in the tripartite negotiations namely, between Jinnah and Pandit Nehru, between Bhopal, Gandhiji and Jinnah and between Jinnah, Pandit Nehru and Wavell were more or less the same. Through Bhopal Jinnah managed to secure from Gandhiji the concession that "Muslim League was the authoritative representative of the overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India". Jinnah made capital of this concession though he failed in his attempt to get an*

assurance from Wavell that Congress nominees would not include a Muslim. In retort to this Jinnah included a Scheduled Caste candidate in his list. By this time Jinnah had probably realised his error in keeping out of the Interim Government and wanted to come in. He, therefore, swallowed the bitter pill of the Congress including a Muslim in its list. But he had his revenge by orally committing himself to a reconsideration of the Bombay resolution and after having entered the Interim Government refusing to do so. He knew full well—and for this prescience he deserves full credit—that once having come in, the League members could not be ousted. Although Sardar in his letters to Wavell made out an unanswerable case for their resignation, the British Government and Wavell turned a deaf ear. Their only solution was to call them all to London. The net result of it all was that the British Government came out with another declaration which meant that Mr. Jinnah had the veto of intransigence. The All-India Congress Committee which met in January 1947 accepted the British Government's interpretation but even that did not help the Congress and the declaration of 20 February followed. Thus the failure to insist on a withdrawal of the Muslim League Resolution rejecting the Plan, and on a written commitment to enter the Constituent Assembly was a decisive factor in the gradual and later the speedy march of events towards partition. Once the decision for the partition was taken, speed and expedition became mandatory. The previous six months had shown that Government on the basis of a coalition among the incompatibles could not be carried on and that if the country was to settle down to peaceful and efficient administration, the sooner the parting of ways came the better. While it was expected as Sardar's letters show that some violent repercussions would follow, the foretaste of which had already been provided, Lord Mountbatten's confidence in the Boundary Force seems, in retrospect, to have been over-optimistic, since the scale of disturbances was beyond expectation and even calculation. It is significant that when Jinnah wrote his letter of 7 October 1946, he had Wavell's letter of 4 October in his pocket. He

concluded the deal with him and also secured an important concession from Gandhiji. In the circumstances, Nehru's letter of 6 October and Jinnah's reply of 7 October had no significance. If Wavell's Journal is correct, Nehru had accepted on 4 October all his points except on the question of Vice-Presidency, without asking to consult his colleagues ! This is extraordinary since Sardar was throughout insisting on a written commitment. It also appears from that Journal that Bhopal put the blame for his failure on Nehru and the Working Committee. The fact of the matter was that Bhopal had put in his own words which Gandhiji signed trustingly without looking at the text. It was Sardar who drew his attention to Bhopal having gone beyond what Gandhiji had agreed.)

#### 19. SARDAR TO WAVELL, DATED 20 OCTOBER 1946

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan's speech (copy herewith—Serial No. 20) is disconcerting and bodes ill for the future. It should be noted that the speech was made before impressionable students on the 19th instant, i. e. after his name was sent by Mr. Jinnah as member of the Interim Government on behalf of the Muslim League.

Should he not withdraw the speech before he takes the oath of office ?

Is the Interim Government to be the arena of party politics and intrigues and for driving in the very partition wedge which the long-term arrangement has withdrawn once for all and replaced it by grouping, which in itself seems to be voluntary ? What it is and what is its scope is for the Federal Court to decide, unless the parties agree among themselves.

In any event, the forum for every discussion on the subject is not the Interim Government but the Constituent Assembly.

The Interim Government is to run the Government machinery smoothly during the interim period on purely nationalist, democratic lines. Removal of corruption, communi-

cations, scarcity of food and clothing, health of the millions, their education, removal of chronic poverty and crying social reforms, including removal of untouchability, are the immediate needs of the country. If wrangles over partition and fomenting of trouble are to take the place of the immediate work of the administration, it would be a question for the Congress to revise its attitude about shouldering the burden it has taken over in response to your invitation.

And probably the Raja is not the only League Member to think as he has spoken. Who can say that he does not voice the mind of the League?

It seems to be quite clear that before the coalition comes into being and portfolios are redistributed, besides the withdrawal of the speech in question, there should be a clear announcement by the Council of the League accepting the long-term arrangement, and the text of the resolution of the League Working Committee should be supplied to the present Members of the Cabinet. The date fixed for the meeting of the Council of the Muslim League for the cancellation of the resolution rejecting the long-term schemes by its Bombay meeting should also be announced by the Muslim League.

I am sure you will yourself recognise the necessity of the foregoing requirements if the Interim Government is to run well and the present trouble is to subside.

## 20. ENCLOSURE

Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Member-designate of the Interim Government, addressing Islamia College students in Lahore today said: "We are going in the Interim Government to get a foothold to fight for our cherished goal of Pakistan and I assure you that we shall achieve Pakistan. The disturbances which have occurred in many parts of the country after the installation of purely Congress Government at the Centre

have established the fact beyond the shadow of a doubt that the 10 crores of Indian Muslims will not submit to any government which does not include their true representatives. The earlier the Congress realises this the better—that no power can suppress the freedom upsurge among the Muslim Nation. We irrevocably stand for Pakistan as our ultimate goal, and I assure you that under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah we shall achieve our goal. In the Interim Government, all our activities should be guided by two considerations, that is to convince the Congress that no government in India can function smoothly without the co-operation of the Muslim League and the League is the sole representative organisation of the Indian Muslims. The Interim Government is one of the fronts of the direct action campaign and we shall most scrupulously carry out the orders of Mr. Jinnah on any front he orders us.”

21. SARDAR TO RAJKUMARI AMRIT KAUR,  
DATED 28 NOVEMBER 1946

I have received your letter of the 16th instant. There have been developments since then which you must have seen from the Press. The British Government invited the Viceroy and the Congress, the League and the Sikh representatives ( five in number, 2 : 2 : 1 ) to come to London for consultation. We have declined the invitation; so have the Sikhs. But the League and the Viceroy who are now in open alliance are proceeding to London. The Viceroy gave us an assurance, and so did Jinnah to the Viceroy at the time of the League's entry into the Interim Government. He has repudiated his assurance publicly and now they want to placate him. Every time the League takes a recalcitrant attitude, they try to placate him. The result is that the League gets stronger and stronger, and their attitude of violence gets encouragement. It is a misfortune that the British Government are unable to take a firm stand and call off the bluff. Perhaps they have

been misled into this by one-sided representations of the reactionary group here, but they should have known better before inviting us. The invitation, in spite of all denials to the contrary, means either the reopening of the question or putting pressure on the Congress to make some more concession to the League. It is clear from the pronouncements made by H.M.G.'s representatives that they want to settle a procedure for the Constituent Assembly amicably between the parties. This is not possible, nor is it the function of the British Government. The document is there and the procedure laid down in it will be followed by the Constituent Assembly. If any interpretation is in question, it will be referred to the Federal Court. Any effort to give an assurance to Jinnah at this stage as to what procedure will be followed by the Sections would lead to disastrous consequences. The Sikhs would go out; the Congress will also have to give it up; and it will again be reverting to the minority holding the veto.

I hope you are having a good time and keeping good health. Hope you will return soon.

Bapu is still in East Bengal and we hardly get any news from him.

22. SARDAR TO STAFFORD CRIPPS,  
DATED 15 DECEMBER 1946

In my last letter I gave you some idea of the amount of strain that was being put on us at this end. Since then events have happened one after another leading up to our being invited to London for discussion. The climax was reached when Jawaharlal returned almost heart-broken. I had no intention of writing to you, but I could not resist the gentle pressure of Lady Cripps who induced me to give you some idea of our feelings.

When the invitation came, our first instinct was to decline to accept it. But the Prime Minister's appeal and his assurance

in reply to our cable created a feeling in Pandit Nehru's mind that refusal to accept the invitation may be regarded as an act of discourtesy; and he left India full of hopes for a message of goodwill and sympathy, but he returned sadly disappointed. He now realises his mistake and the amount of harm that has been done to India by his having accepted the invitation.

We have full appreciation of your difficulties over there. But I must frankly confess that there is very little understanding over there of our difficulties here. You called the League delegation there at a time when there was some realisation that violence is a game at which both parties can play and the mild Hindu also, when driven to desperation, can retaliate as brutally as a fanatic Muslim. Just when the time for settlement was reached Jinnah got the invitation, and he was able to convince the Muslims once again that he has been able to get more concessions by creating trouble and violence.

Sudhir (Ghosh) has, I believe, after his return to (London), given you some idea of what has happened here and I need not bother you with details. But I will only say that if strong action had been taken, or had been allowed to be taken here, when "Direct Action Day" was fixed by the Muslim League and when 16 August was fixed as a day of demonstration in Calcutta, all this colossal loss of life and property and blood-curdling events would not have happened. The Viceroy here took the contrary view, and every action of his since the "Great Calcutta Killing" has been in the direction of encouraging the Muslim League and putting pressure on us towards appeasement.

In London the stage was set against us, and I do not know whether there is any realisation of the amount of mischief that has been done by the statement and by the subsequent debate. With great difficulty, we were able to build a bridge between England and India by our joint efforts--and you know my own contribution. I regret to say that the sense of faith and confidence about the sincerity of Britain that was created by our settlement is fast being dissipated and the bridge is about to crack or collapse.

Your interpretation means that Bengal Muslims can draft the constitution of Assam. It is amazing. Do you think that such a monstrous proposition can be accepted by the Hindus of Assam, particularly after the sad experience of wholesale forcible conversions, arson, looting, rape and forcible marriages? You can have no idea of the resentment and anger caused by your emphasis on this interpretation. If you think that Assam can be coerced to accept the domination of Bengal, the sooner you rid of that disillusion the better. What can we do to satisfy the Sikhs who have admittedly been unjustly treated? If they frame the constitution of Assam in such a way as to make Assam's opting out impossible, what is the remedy in your statement ?

You know that Gandhiji at the age of 77 is spending all his energy in the devastated Hindu homes in Eastern Bengal and trying to recover the lost girls and bring back those forcibly converted to their old faith. But he is working against heavy odds, and I have great apprehension that he will end his life there in this fruitless mission. He is surrounded by a very hostile atmosphere. In the event of his death there in these circumstances, what will happen no one can say. I shudder to think of the consequences. But the anger and resentment of the whole of India will be not only against the Muslims, but also against the British to a large extent.

You must have seen what Jinnah has said in London immediately after the debate. He swears by Pakistan, and everything conceded to him is to be used as a lever to work to that end. You wish that we should agree to help him in his mad dream. I am sorry to write to you in this strain, but I feel sad over the whole affair. You know when Gandhiji was strongly against our settlement I threw my weight in favour of it. You have created a very unpleasant situation for me. All of us here feel that there has been a betrayal.

The solution has now been made more difficult, nay, almost impossible. The settlement can only be made if there is no

outside interference and the parties left alone. The Viceroy would not give us peace and he and his advisers are all pro-League. We have to work through them. It is an impossible situation, but I do not know whether you will be able to do anything in the matter.

Hope you are doing well.

### 23. STAFFORD CRIPPS TO SARDAR, DATED 21 DECEMBER, 1946

Thank you very much indeed for writing me your frank letter (Serial No. 22) after your talk with Isobel (Lady Cripps). She was so thrilled by her visit to New Delhi and the great kindness that she received from you all and your daughter especially.

I know that you realise our difficulty in trying to struggle with this very complex situation and to do what it is best and what is right.

I am very much aware of the points that you stress in your letter and I have them fully in mind in the discussions which are now going forward on this side.

I know that you have done very much to help and I am conscious of how much we are indebted to you for your wisdom and guidance.

You need not have any doubt or hesitations about our determination to go through with our programme as quickly as possible. We may sometimes seem to you to wander off the path—but be patient with us!

I hope that in the next few weeks there may come a clarification of the situation, and in the meanwhile we shall be considering the whole matter here with the object of seeing how best we can help toward India's independence with the minimum of disturbance and suffering.

I send you and your daughter my warmest greetings for this New Year.

24. ASAF ALI TO SARDAR, DATED 20 DECEMBER 1946

I have just arrived and I send herewith a letter from Pyarelal with which I was entrusted. I have also a verbal and written message from Gandhiji which I shall communicate later on after I have finished the meeting of the Standing Finance Committee which may be after 5 o'clock. More when we meet.

MAHATMA GANDHI'S NOTE

In my opinion, it will be a grave mistake if the Constituent Assembly attempts, in the face of the boycott by the Muslim League, to frame a Constitution for the whole of India. If and when the Muslim League boycott becomes an established fact, the Constituent Assembly should have a right to frame a constitution of independence for all the provinces, States and units that may be represented at the Constituent Assembly. This will be an honourable and consistent position for the Constituent Assembly as it is at present constituted. There should be no fear of another or for that matter more constituent assemblies sitting, if the attitude advised by me is taken up. No other such constituent assembly can sit or function except under the aegis of the British Government whilst the latter functions in India. If the British Government wills it, such other constituent assemblies cannot be prevented except through a terrible struggle put up by the Congress, whether of a violent or non-violent nature.

I feel too that the Congress can subscribe to the contention of the British Government about grouping, if it allows Assam and the Frontier Province to secede from the Congress for the purposes of the Constituent Assembly. The Congress has no power save the moral to compel obedience by a province or group such as Sikhs.

25. V. P. MENON TO SARDAR, DATED 10 MAY 1947

I am sorry I could not write to you earlier. Ever since I came here on Wednesday last, I have been very busy, practically living in Viceregal Lodge. The immediate business was the amendments suggested in HMG's announcement. You are already aware of the substance of the announcement. There is no departure in the substance, only in the wording. The decision is that the legislatures of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, divided according to Muslim and non-Muslim districts, should choose whether they would desire partition. For this purpose, the number of representatives to be chosen will be 4 per million of population and not 1 per million. The intention is to get a larger number of elected representatives as otherwise, on the Cabinet Mission's Plan, two members out of three in Sylhet will decide the issue of separation from Assam.

The paragraph in which you are most interested is that relating to the position of the NWFP. I attempted a draft in private consultation (Serial No. 26) with Panditji (Nehru), though he made it quite clear that he was not in any way to be brought into it. The proposal I put forward was that the decision whether the NWFP should join the Indian Union or join the proposed Pakistan should be left to the last possible minute. After the provinces of Bengal, Punjab and Assam have decided on the issue of Pakistan, a referendum of the existing electors to the Provincial Legislative Assembly in the NWFP should be held. This referendum should be under the supervision of the Governor-General and after consultation with the provincial Government. It is very difficult to deny putting the issue to the electors and unless a decision is taken by the province, progress will be held up all along the line. The important consideration from your point of view is that it should not be related to the existing agitation. I know that

H. E. would be prepared to go to the farthest extent to meet the Congress point of view in this respect. I have this morning attempted another draft on the basis of my proposal which (Sir Eric) Mievile is taking to Panditji. It will be telegraphed to the Secretary of State today because the final approval of the Cabinet will be taken to the draft announcement tomorrow morning.

The plan was to call a meeting of the five, namely, Panditji, yourself, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali and Baldev Singh on the 22nd. This programme has now been advanced because Parliament is rising for the Whitsuntide recess on 22 May. The programme which has now been agreed is this. Ismay arrives on the 16th evening; on the 17th at 10-30 the conference meets; at that conference H. E. makes one or more efforts for the acceptance of the Cabinet Delegation's Plan. In all probability Jinnah will reject it. Then H. E. will give you five a copy of HMG's Plan. This you take with you for consultation with the Working Committee and a meeting will take place again the next day to ascertain your views on important points. H. E. will also meet on the 17th some representatives of the Indian States to tell them what is going on. On the 18th, H. E. will hold a further meeting and go through the Plan paragraph by paragraph and finally telegraph to the Secretary of State the views expressed at the conference. This will be considered by HMG on the 19th and a decision will be communicated to H. E. on the 20th. H. E. will again summon the leaders at 5 o'clock on Tuesday, 20 May, and tell them of any alterations which may have been made in the Plan. The announcement will be made in Parliament on Tuesday the 20th followed up by H. E.'s broadcast.

H. E. also asked me to discuss with Panditji the plan of parting with power early on the basis of a Dominion Status constitution. I attach a copy of a note which embodies the result of my conversation with Panditji (Serial No. 26). But when Panditji saw H. E. on the 8th, he gave H. E. the

impression that he went back on what he told me. I then suggested to H. E. that it would be better to have a further meeting with Panditji. Accordingly, Panditji, H. E., Mievill and myself had a discussion today. A detailed report is being prepared. I will show it to you when I come back to Delhi. The important points that were raised are as follows :

1. Dominion Status: Panditji agreed that it was essential that transfer of power should take place as early as possible. I mentioned at the conference the statement which you made on this question yesterday. There was some discussion as to how this period could be described. Ultimately it was decided that this interim constitution on a dominion basis should last till India was in a position to decide on the new Indo-British relationship after a Government under the new constitution was formed. This is quite satisfactory. In this connection Panditji raised the question whether it would not be possible to defer the question of partition till the existing Constituent Assembly had drafted a constitution so that, before any unwilling part of the country decided to remain separate, it would have an opportunity of seeing the new constitution. H. E. replied that this would mean delay and uncertainty. He stressed that we should not now delay the question of partition, which was in the best interest of India because he was sure that the truncated Pakistan, if conceded now, was bound to come back later. On the other hand, if there was delay, the uncertainty might lead to renewed agitation on the part of Jinnah and consequent deterioration in the political atmosphere. I agreed with H. E.'s observations because our slogan should now be "divide in order to unite".

H.E. once suggested to me that he should invite you to Simla. When the conference was over, he told me that he should discuss the Dominion Status issue with you immediately on his return to Delhi. But I told him that before Ismay left London we should put the matter to HMG and start them working on the plan. I further suggested that there would not be any difficulty, in the event of partition, in giving Hindustan

complete autonomy on a dominion basis, leaving Pakistan to take the same position when it was ready to do so. But, to tie both of them to the same yoke would create difficulties for all concerned. I am pressing as hard as I can for parting with power at the earliest possible date. H.E. is on my side but I am not quite sure about his other advisers. I hope I shall succeed if you also weigh in heavily on my side as Panditji did today.

Two things you have contributed have really anticipated the Muslim League moves. The first one was your agreement to the partition of the Punjab. This has put a stop to Jinnah's vague cry of Pakistan. Muslims have now started considering seriously whether Pakistan as such is practicable if it involves division of Punjab & Bengal. This may lead to sober judgement when the time comes. Secondly, the Muslim League thought that you would stand firm on your independence stand and therefore they tried to win over the British by professing readiness to accept Dominion Status for Pakistan. (Bhopal is behind this move.) By your statement yesterday and the Congress Working Committee's resolution, which you were responsible for passing, you have stopped this also. On the whole, I feel you are in a strong position now.

2. H. E. also raised the question of a Defence Council and the machinery to be employed to keep defence more or less on a unified basis for the time being and to divide it gradually in the event of division becoming inevitable.

3. You remember you wrote a letter to H. E. about getting an assurance from Jinnah that he would accept a truncated Pakistan. The same issue was raised by Panditji. H. E. was quite categorical; he said he knew how to deal with Jinnah if he repudiated the understanding which he gave H.E. that he would accept a truncated Pakistan. Panditji suggested that it would be better to get a written assurance from Jinnah. But H. E. made it quite clear that if Jinnah attempted to lead him up the garden path, Jinnah would find H. E. tough enough.

4. The next question Panditji raised was the possibility of civil commotion in case a truncated Pakistan was conceded to the Muslim League. H. E. told Panditji that he was going to write to the Governor of Bengal to suggest that whatever measures were required to cope with the situation should be taken even if the Ministry did not co-operate; and that his intention was to move two or three brigades to the Punjab and an equal number to Calcutta.

5. The paragraph in the announcement about the NWFP was then discussed, and, as I told you before, this paragraph is now being agreed with Panditji.

In his talks with H.E., Panditji raised the question of filling up certain embassies abroad as well as changing some Governors. H. E. told Panditji that this should be approached methodically and not in a haphazard manner. He told Panditji to prepare a list (a) of the embassies which he would like to fill, showing the names of persons whom he would recommend, and (b) of the Governors whom he would like to see replaced by Indians. H.E.'s intention is that we should go on Indianising the governorships as soon as practicable.

H.E. then asked Panditji to arrange for the (Congress) Working Committee to be in Delhi on the 17th and also that Khan Sahib should be summoned.

As I am most anxious that this letter should not go astray, I am sending my superintendent down with instructions to hand it over personally to you. If Maniben could kindly telephone to me that you have received this letter, it would be a great relief to me. I don't think I shall write to you again. I will be leaving on Tuesday evening and will see you on Wednesday. Panditji is leaving tomorrow.

The final version of HMG's statement is expected either this evening or tomorrow morning. I think I will show it to you on my return. I shall fully brief you before you go to the conference.

PS.

S. P. Mukherjee had sent a telegram to Panditji about the rumours prevailing in Calcutta that preparations were being made by Muslims for observing an "Anti-partition Day" on 10 May. I showed the telegram to H.E. and telegram was sent to the Governor of Bengal the day before yesterday. A reply from the Governor was received today, which was shown to Panditji, in which it was stated there was no foundation in the report and that there was no need to be anxious about the situation. In this connection, I may mention that it is H.E.'s intention on the second day of the conference to state in most categorical terms that he will not countenance violence in any form from any quarter and that he will put it down with all the power at his command.

*(Author's Note : The significant sentence is "You are already aware of the substance of the announcement". This refers to the fact that about the alternative plan, there had already been a detailed discussion between Sardar and V. P. Menon and it was that Plan which V. P. Menon revealed with such dramatic effect to Mountbatten and then to Pandit Nehru. Throughout the Simla discussion V. P. Menon was in constant touch with Sardar through the author and was in full possession of Sardar's views. He could, therefore, take a firm view on many problems knowing full well that he was virtually speaking out Sardar's mind.)*

## 26. V. P. MENON'S NOTE ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH NEHRU AT SIMLA

I had a discussion with Pandit Nehru this morning on a plan for the transfer of power as an interim arrangement on the basis of a Dominion constitution. The following are the main conclusions which have been accepted by him.

1. The starting point for the early transfer of power should be the Government of India Act, 1935, with modifications.

2. If the transfer of power could be brought about to a united India, it was certainly the best solution.
3. Pandit Nehru recognised that it might not be possible to have a united India at present. He was therefore agreeable to parting with power in Hindustan to an Executive Council elected by the Hindustan Constituent Assembly. The same procedure might be adopted in the separated area.
4. The Secretary of State, the India office and the special powers of the Governor and the Governor-General under the Government of India Act, 1935, should go.
5. The Indian Legislature should be replaced by the Constituent Assembly.
6. The Governor-General would be common to both Hindustan and Pakistan. Pandit Nehru himself suggested that the present Governor-General might be re-appointed by His Majesty.
7. The Governors of Hindustan provinces should be appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Central Executive Council for Hindustan.
8. For matters of common concern a Joint Council might be set up.
9. There should not be any interference by Pakistan in Hindustan except in so far as it affects Pakistan.

2. In addition to the above, Pandit Nehru made the following points.

(a) The preamble to the new Government of India Act should contain a reference to the Constituent Assembly and also an indication that the Act was an interim arrangement till a new constitution was framed by Indians.

(b) The position of India should be exactly the same as that of any other Dominion and therefore the title "Emperor of India" now held by the King should disappear.

(c) He was not very particular whether the term "Dominion" was used in the Act or not; but he agreed that a better term would be "Commonwealth of Free Nations."

(d) There should not be any provision either in the Act or in the Instrument of Instructions for the representation of minorities in the Executive Council. He asserted that it was not the intention of the Congress to do down any minority but they would not like any imposition in this respect and the matter should be left to the good sense of the Congress.

3. We had a long argument about the Indian States and the consequences resulting from the lapse of paramountcy. Pandit Nehru suggested that the powers now exercised by the Crown Representative in respect of the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications should be transferred to the new Dominion Government. I pointed out to him the difficulties in the way of such an arrangement. He was very particular that some sort of standstill agreement should be reached with the States, say, for a period of two years till it could be superseded by an agreed arrangement.

4. When we were discussing about the division of India into Hindustan and Pakistan, Pandit Nehru indicated that HMG should not give an award on this. The less HMG did in this direction the better for all concerned. He was of opinion that HMG should only indicate a procedure or set up machinery for decision in the event of people in any particular area desiring separation.

5. Pandit Nehru stressed that the psychological effect of power being transferred earlier than 1948 would be an invaluable factor in the long-term view of Indo-British relationship. He quite appreciated that it would take a considerable time before the details of partition could be worked out. Once complete transfer of power was made as an interim arrangement on Dominion Status lines, the parties would have time to think things over with leisure and sobriety and proceed meanwhile with the urgent problems of administration and development.

Further, arrangements for common matters and the part that the Governor-General played during the interim period would go very far in cementing the good relationship between Great Britain and India. He shared the hope that once the two Governments set together and started drafting agreements they might find that these agreements were required in respect of so many matters that they might ultimately come right round to the view that an impassable barrier could not be created between the two Indias and that after all a unified constitution was better for all concerned.

27. SYAMA PRASAD MOOKERJEE TO SARDAR,  
DATED 11 MAY 1947

We are naturally extremely anxious about the final developments. Sarat Babu is doing enormous mischief by trying to negotiate with Suhrawardy on the basis of sovereign Bengal. He has no support whatsoever from the Hindus and he dare not address one single public meeting. I hope you will not allow this idea of sovereign Bengal to be considered seriously by anybody.

I find a conference will meet in Delhi on the 17th when the final scheme will be communicated to the leaders. I hope there is no possibility of the Muslim League accepting the Cabinet Mission Scheme at the last stage. If Mr. Jinnah is compelled to do so by the force of events, please do not allow the question of partition of Bengal to be dished. Even if a loose Centre as contemplated under the Cabinet Mission Scheme is established, we shall have no safety whatsoever in Bengal. We demand the creation of two provinces out of the present boundaries of Bengal—Pakistan or no Pakistan.

I do not know whether the Viceroy will declare any provisional boundary. It should for the present include both Burdwan and Presidency Divisions and Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling. The Boundary Commission may meet later and settle the final boundaries which should be thana-wise.

It is of utmost importance that the new declaration should also include an announcement for the immediate dissolution of the Bengal Ministry. This must come forthwith otherwise grave consequences are bound to follow. If the ministry is allowed to function for a single day, it will play havoc with the province and particularly Calcutta. If there is delay in the formation of regional ministries, Section 93 with a representative council of advisers may be promulgated.

If you at any time feel that I should come to Delhi, please do not hesitate to let me know.

I am addressing a similar letter to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

28. SARDAR TO SYAMA PRASAD MOOKERJEE,  
DATED 17 MAY 1947

Many thanks for your letter of 11 May 1947.

2. I do not think you need have any worry at all. You can depend on us to deal with the situation effectively and befittingly. The future of Hindus in Bengal is quite safe so long as they stand firm and continue to give us such support as only they can.

29. SARDAR TO SARAT CHANDRA BOSE,  
DATED 22 MAY 1947  
(EXTRACT)

... I am sorry to find that you have isolated yourself so completely from all-India politics and even in provincial politics you have not kept in touch with us. In these critical times, we cannot afford to be standoffish and must pool our resources and take a united stand. Vital matters which will leave their mark on generations to come have to be settled, and in such settlement it behoves all of us to contribute our best to the combined strength of the Congress. I do hope that you will

take a broader share in all-India politics and will keep us in touch with your activities both in regard to all-India and in regard to provincial politics.

30. SARAT CHANDRA BOSE TO SARDAR,

DATED 27 MAY 1947

(EXTRACT)

... Isolation from all-India politics has not been of my seeking. Health and other circumstances have been conspiring against me since December last. During intervals, when I had a little respite from illness, I did some political work and also devoted some of my time and energy to curbing to some extent communal frenzy. Today the position is that communal frenzy is not the monopoly of the Muslim Leaguers; it has also overtaken large sections of Hindus, both Congressites and Mahasabhaites. The Congress stand regarding partition has been taken advantage of by the sections mentioned above to inflame communal passions further. It has also brought back the Hindu Mahasabha to life and considerably strengthened its position.

I have given the public from time to time a very clear indication of my views. I consider it most unfortunate that the Congress Working Committee conceded Pakistan and supported partition. It is true that I have not been able to address public meetings yet for reasons of health; but having been in close touch with public opinion both in West and East Bengal, I can say that it is not a fact that Bengali Hindus unanimously demand partition. As far as East Bengal is concerned, there is not the slightest doubt that the overwhelming majority of Hindus there are opposed to partition. As regards West Bengal, the agitation for partition has gained ground because the Congress came to the aid of the Hindu Mahasabha and also because communal passions have been roused among the Hindus on account of the happenings since August last. The demand for partition is more or less confined

to the middle classes. When the full implications of partition are realised and when people here find that all that they will get for Western Bengal province will be roughly one-third of the area of Bengal and only about half of the total Hindu population in Bengal, the agitation for partition will surely lose support. I entirely agree with you that we should take a united stand; but I shall say at the same time that the united stand should be for a united Bengal and a united India. Future generations will, I am afraid, condemn us for conceding division of India and supporting partition of Bengal and the Punjab....

31. BROADCAST BY MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 3 JUNE 1947

A statement will be read to you tonight giving the final decision of His Majesty's Government as to the method by which power will be transferred from British to Indian hands. But before this happens, I want to give a personal message to the people of India, as well as a short account of the discussions which I have held with the leaders of the political parties and which have led up to the advice I tendered to his Majesty's Government during my recent visit to London.

Since my arrival in India at the end of March I have spent almost every day in consultation with as many of the leaders and representatives of as many communities and interests as possible. I wish to say how grateful I am for all the information and helpful advice they have given me.

Nothing I have seen or heard in the past few weeks has shaken my firm opinion that with a reasonable measure of goodwill between the communities a unified India would be by far the best solution of the problem.

For more than a hundred years 400 millions of you have lived together and this country has been administered

as a single entity. This has resulted in unified communications, defence, postal services and currency; an absence of tariffs and customs barriers; and the basis for an integrated political economy. My great hope was that communal differences would not destroy all this.

My first course, in all my discussions, was therefore to urge the political leaders to accept unreservedly the Cabinet Mission plan of 16 May 1946. In my opinion, that plan provides the best arrangement that can be devised to meet the interests of all the communities of India. To my great regret it has been impossible to obtain agreement either on the Cabinet Mission plan, or on any other plan that would preserve the unity of India. But there can be no question of coercing any large areas, in which one community has a majority, to live against their will under a Government in which another community has a majority. And the only alternative to coercion is partition.

But when the Muslim League demanded the partition of India, the Congress used the same arguments for demanding in that event the partition of certain provinces. To my mind this argument is unassailable. In fact neither side proved willing to leave a substantial area in which their community have a majority under the Government of the other. I am, of course, just as much opposed to the partition of provinces as I am to the partition of India herself and for the same basic reasons.

For just as I feel there is an Indian consciousness which should transcend communal differences so I feel there is a Punjabi and Bengali consciousness which has evoked a loyalty to their province.

And so I felt it was essential that the people of India themselves should decide this question of partition.

The procedure for enabling them to decide for themselves whether they want the British to hand over power to one or two Governments is set out in the statement which will be read to you. But there are one or two points on which I should like to add a note of explanation.

It was necessary in order to ascertain the will of the people of the Punjab, Bengal and part of Assam to lay down boundaries between the Muslim majority areas and the remaining areas, but I want to make it clear that the ultimate boundaries will be settled by a Boundary Commission and will almost certainly not be identical with those which have been provisionally adopted.

We have given careful consideration to the position of the Sikhs. This valiant community forms about an eighth of the population of the Punjab, but they are so distributed that any partition of this province will inevitably divide them. All of us who have the good of the Sikh community at heart are very sorry to think that the partition of the Punjab, which they themselves desire, cannot avoid splitting them to a greater or lesser extent. The exact degree of the split will be left to the Boundary Commission on which they will of course be represented.

The whole plan may not be perfect; but like all plans, its success will depend on the spirit of good-will with which it is carried out. I have always felt that once it was decided in what way to transfer power the transfer should take place at the earliest possible moment, but the dilemma was that if we waited until a constitutional set-up for all India was agreed, we should have to wait a long time, particularly if partition were decided on. Whereas if we handed over power before the Constituent Assemblies had finished their work we should leave the country without a constitution. The solution to this dilemma, which I put forward, is that His Majesty's Government should transfer power now to one or two Governments of British India each having Dominion Status as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made. This I hope will be within the next few months. I am glad to announce that His Majesty's Government have accepted this proposal and are already having legislation prepared for introduction in Parliament this session. As a result of these decisions the special function of the India Office will no longer have to be carried out, and some other machinery

will be set up to conduct future relations between His Majesty's Government and India.

I wish to emphasise that this legislation will not impose any restriction on the power of India as a whole, or of the two States if there is partition, to decide in the future their relationship to each other and to other member-States of the British Commonwealth.

Thus the way is now open to an arrangement by which power can be transferred many months earlier than the most optimistic of us thought possible, and at the same time leave it to the people of British India to decide for themselves on their future, which is the declared policy of His Majesty's Government.

I have made no mention of the Indian States, since the new decisions of His Majesty's Government are concerned with the transfer of power in British India.

If the transfer of power is to be effected in a peaceful and orderly manner, every single one of us must bend all his efforts to the task. This is no time for bickering, much less for the continuation in any shape or form of the disorders and lawlessness of the past few months. Do not forget what a narrow margin of food we are all working on. We cannot afford any toleration of violence. All of us are agreed on that.

Whichever way the decision of the Indian people may go, I feel sure any British officials or officers who may be asked to remain for a while will do everything in their power to help implement that decision. His Majesty as well as his Government have asked me to convey to all of you in India their sincere good wishes for your future and the assurance of their continued goodwill.

I have faith in the future of India and am proud to be with you all at this momentous time. May your decision be wisely guided and may they be carried out in the peaceful and friendly spirit of the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal.

### 32. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 3 JUNE 1947

I am deeply distressed at the abuse by Mr. Jinnah of the hospitality extended to him by All India Radio and his breach of the rules of broadcast which, as you are aware, are almost as inviolable as the laws of nature. I had not seen the script before the broadcast but I noticed later that not only did he depart from the script but he has also committed a sacrilege by making a political, partisan and propagandist broadcast. (*Author's Note* : Mr. Jinnah had said : " It is clear that the verdict and the mandate of the people of the Frontier Province will be obtained as to whether they want to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly. In these circumstances, I request the provincial Muslim League of the Frontier Province to withdraw the movement of peaceful civil disobedience which they had perforce to resort to; and I call upon all the leaders of the Muslim League and Mussalmans generally to organise our people to face this referendum with hope and courage and I feel confident that the people of Frontier will give their verdict by a solid vote to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. I cannot but express my appreciation of the sufferings and sacrifices made by all classes of Mussalmans and particularly the great part the women of the Frontier played in the fight for our civil liberties. Without apportioning blame, and this is hardly the moment to do so, I deeply sympathise with all those who have suffered and those who died, or whose properties were subjected to destruction and I fervently hope that the Frontier will go through this referendum in a peaceful manner and it should be the anxiety of every one to obtain a fair, free and true verdict of the people of the Frontier....") Had I known it in time I would certainly have prevented him from turning All India Radio into a Muslim League platform by not only justifying a movement which has resulted in so much

bloodshed and destruction of property but also by appealing to Frontier voters to vote according to League persuasion.

I fully realise that you yourself did not expect, or had not sufficient notice to prevent it but I am really disappointed that he should have taken undue advantage of the courtesy and consideration extended to him by you, particularly on a solemn occasion when India and the whole world were watching us. I only hope that its consequences will not be equally mischievous and that he stood before the listeners self-condemned.

### 33. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 10 JUNE 1947

Perhaps you have already received a copy of the resolution passed by the All India Muslim League Council. In case you have not, I am sending a copy for your ready reference (Serial No. 34).

2. You will notice that the resolution is contradictory and there is studied evasion of straightforward acceptance. At one place, it says it cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such partition. At another place, it says it accepts the fundamental principles of the plan of 3 June as a compromise. You have to judge the resolution in the light of the speeches at the Council meeting. I have been able to obtain a copy of the proceedings through a source of the Intelligence Bureau. I am enclosing a copy of the same. From these proceedings it is quite clear that the Pakistan of the statement of 3 June would merely be a spring-board for action against Hindustan, and that there is no possibility of a settlement on this basis. The position is such as is bound to fill us with grave apprehension.

3. In these circumstances, unless Mr. Jinnah issues a clear statement accepting the Plan, there are bound to be difficulties at the AICC meeting.

34. RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE  
ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE AT ITS MEETING  
HELD AT DELHI ON MONDAY, 9 JUNE 1947

The Council of the All India Muslim League after full deliberation and consideration of the statement of His Majesty's Government dated 3 June 1947 laying down the plan of transfer of power to the peoples of India, notes with satisfaction that the Cabinet Mission's Plan of 16 May 1946 will not be proceeded with and has been abandoned. The only course open is the partition of India as now proposed in HMG's statement of 3 June.

The Council of the All India Muslim League is of the opinion that the only solution of India's problem is to divide India into two—Pakistan and Hindustan. On that basis, the Council has given its most earnest attention and consideration to HMG's statement. The Council is of the opinion that although it cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such partition, it has to consider HMG's plan for the transfer of power as a whole.

The Council, therefore, hereby resolves to give full authority to the President of the All India Muslim League, Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah, to accept the fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise and to leave it to him with full authority to work out all the details of the plan in an equitable and just manner with regard to carrying out the complete division of India on the basis and fundamental principles embodied in HMG's Plan, including Defence, Finance, Communications.

The Council further empowers the President, Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah, to take all steps and decisions which may be necessary in connection with and relating to the plan.

### 35. CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT MEETING OF SEVEN INDIAN LEADERS HELD ON 13 JUNE 1947

(Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar, J. B. Kripalani, M. A. Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdul Rab Nishtar, Baldev Singh)

It was agreed—

I. that legal opinion, if possible that of the Chief Justice, should be obtained on the issue whether it was the Governor-General or the Governor-General-in-Council who was the responsible authority for making the necessary arrangements and issuing the various orders with regard to partition;

II. that a committee should be set up forthwith consisting of two representatives of the Congress and two of the Muslim League, all of whom should be members of the Interim Government, and with His Excellency as Chairman; that Pandit Nehru and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan should send in to His Excellency, as soon as possible, the names of the representatives of the Congress and of the Muslim League, respectively, to be appointed to this committee; that the duty of this committee should be to make an examination of the steps to be taken to set up machinery, including the formation of sub-committees, for carrying out partition; and that this should be a fact-finding body, whose duty it will be to make proposals and not to reach final decisions;

III. that the present Cabinet Secretariat should undertake the immediate action which was necessary in regard to the provision of secretariat accommodation; the securing of clerical staff, typewriters, stationery etc.; and consultation with Departments so that personnel for expert committees were put on special duty and given facilities at once;

IV. that, as soon as a decision on partition was known (i. e. immediately any one province had declared in favour of

joining a new and separate Constituent Assembly), a partition Council should be set up; that it should consist of two of the top-ranking leaders of the Congress and two of Muslim League; that His Excellency should be Chairman of it, with no arbitral functions; and that the recommendations of the Committee in (ii) above should be subject to acceptance by the Partition Council;

V. that an Arbitral Tribunal should be set up at the same time as the Partition Council; that it should consist of three members, all men of great judicial experience; that the composition of it should be settled by the Partition Committee; that Sardar Baldev Singh should consult the other Sikh leaders about the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and inform the Partition Committee of their views; and that the services of the Arbitral Tribunal should be offered to the provinces which were to be partitioned;

VI. that Pandit Nehru and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan should inform the Viceroy as soon as possible to whom he should address himself in calling for names for the two Governments which would be set up (if there was partition) when Dominion Status was granted;

VII. that there was no objection to the Governor of the Punjab issuing preliminary invitations now to the members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly to meet to decide the issue of the partition of that province.

### 36. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 17 JUNE 1947

You will recall our previous correspondence regarding the omission to accept the announcement of 3 June in a straightforward manner on the part of the League. The promised statement by Mr. Jinnah has not yet come out. In the meantime, the Dawn has been indulging in editorials which are hardly indicative of the peaceful intentions of which we have heard so much in private, or consistent with the impression

gained by you that the League has accepted the announcement as a settlement and has no further claims to make. The articles which it has been publishing are similarly open to objection. As a sample, I would invite your attention to two news-items which have appeared in today's Dawn. One relates to Moplahs' demand for a separate homeland (Serial No. 37) and the other demands the dissolution of the Assam Ministry and the recall of the Governor (not printed). You will note that both the news-items have been sent by Dawn's own reporter.

### 37. MOPLAHS' DEMAND FOR SEPARATE HOMELAND IS BASED ON FACTS—MR. ISMAIL

*By Dawn Staff Reporter*

New Delhi, Monday—"The Moplahs are racially different from the Hindus of Madras, being mostly the descendants of Arabs," said Mr. Mohd. Ismail, MLA, President, Madras Provincial Muslim League, explaining the resolution passed by the Madras Provincial Muslim League about Moplastan on 27 May.

"Their religion, culture, civilisation, aspirations and outlook of life," he continued, "are different from those of the other inhabitants of the west coast of Madras. The Moplahs form the majority of the population in a considerable area of the west coast. The islands lying off the coast are populated exclusively by Moplahs.

"The area in question is about 3,000 square miles in extent with a total population of 15 lakhs of whom about 9 lakhs are Moplahs.

"In the matter of population and area Moplastan is bigger than Cochin, a neighbouring Indian State, and larger than many other Indian States; and is considerably larger than European States like Albania.

"In the new orientation of the country and the province, the Muslims want that Moplastan must be treated as a

separate entity. The Moplahs have been demanding it for some time now. There is no doubt that they are on a firm and just ground in this demand of theirs and the Muslims of the province unequivocally support the demand."

A Moplastan convention is going to be held at Manjeri which is in the heart of Moplastan and necessary arrangements are afoot for making the convention a success.

### 38. BALDEV SINGH TO SARDAR, DATED 26 JUNE 1947

I am not very happy at the way discussions are going on about the reconstitution of the Armed Forces; there appears to me to be an organised attempt to delay matters as much as possible and also a move to throw the blame for it on Members of the Indian Union. The time has come when we must be prepared to take definite decisions.

Reconstitution of the Armed Forces cannot make any progress unless the basis on which the division can proceed is known. I find a decision on this point being unnecessarily postponed. At this morning's meeting, I raised it several times and was anxious to get clear instructions issued to the Commander-in-Chief but the matter was not finally decided. In the last meeting of the C-in-C's Committee Mr. Mohammed Ali, Military Financial Adviser, raised objection to the issue of a questionnaire to Army personnel to ascertain which Dominion Forces they desire to join. I cannot understand why he should object to the questionnaire. The present officers and men in the Armed Forces were recruited on a voluntary basis. The leaders have agreed in principle that they cannot coerce anyone to serve in one Union or the other against his will. Therefore it is of the utmost importance that the questionnaire is issued without delay. A fortnight's time might be allowed for the reply.

The Commander-in-Chief has been talking of making up an efficient army for both the Dominions. If, as I am sure,

a sufficient number of officers and men do not want to serve in the Pakistan Dominion, why should we suffer and delay the progress on our side? As we will be getting a large number of officers and men, it will perhaps not be necessary for us to employ more than a few British Officers. Replies to the questionnaire, when received, will solve one of our greatest difficulties as we will then know what personnel we are going to get and what officers and men will go to the Pakistan side. It will then be also easy to decide the division of arms and equipment, assets and liabilities. In the next meeting of the partition committee, therefore, instructions should be given to the Commander-in-Chief for the issue of such a questionnaire and it should also be made clear that a date must be fixed by which the reply should come in.

This morning I also raised the question of enquiring from the British Officers which Dominion they would like to serve. Both the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief were against the proposal and their opinion seemed to be that British Officers are absolutely neutral. I know for certain that some of the British Officers are definitely League-minded. There may be a number who are fair-minded, but I have yet to come across any who has sympathy with the Indian Union. There is a large number of British Officers, about 9,000 scattered all over the country, and the only way to find out which way their mind is working is to send them also the above questionnaire. It is in our interests to keep only such people as bear no prejudice against us. I do not therefore agree with the views of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief that the division of these British Officers should be left entirely to them.

I would be glad if you will kindly give your serious consideration to the points raised above.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Dr. Rajendra Prasad.

### 39. NOTE BY MOUNTBATTEN ON WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES

1. HMG have announced that the withdrawal of the British Army from India will commence immediately after the transfer of power, will be carried out as quickly as shipping permits and is expected to be completed by about the end of 1947.
2. HMG have also agreed with the conception that British Forces in India, after 15 August, should have no operational function whatever, and that they will therefore not be available to be called upon for such purposes as internal security, use on the North-West Frontier or, of course, use in the States. They would be regarded as continuing their training here until transport arrives to take them away.
3. HMG have, however, represented that it may be of advantage to all parties concerned to retain, for the time being, the RAF transport squadrons and their maintenance organisation at present in the Karachi Mauripur area. These squadrons might, it is suggested, be of great use to both Dominions in maintaining internal military communications, and assisting in the training of Pakistan and India Dakota squadrons. They could also be available in a non-operational role in the event of serious internal unrest, bearing in mind that both Dominions will themselves only be able to provide similar facilities to a limited degree for some time to come. The presence of these RAF units would also assist both Governments in providing air transport facilities and maintenance of essential routes in and through India. One of these squadrons could be moved from Karachi to Dominion of India territory.
4. The question of whether or not these transport squadrons should stay on for a period will be considered at the next Partition Council meeting. If they do remain, they would be under the general control of the Supreme Commander through the Air Officer Commanding in Chief.

#### 40. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 9 JULY 1947

As a consequence of partition, numerous administrative arrangements will be necessary on or about 15 August 1947 if we are to avoid confusion in or breakdown of administrative machinery. For instance, in lieu of those going away to Pakistan, personnel will have to be in position for operating and running telegraph services, railway services, civil aviation services etc. Similarly officers and staff will have to be in position for the supervision of despatch of stores, equipment etc. going to Pakistan, and taking custody of those retained for India or vice-versa. Again, in view of certain radio stations being transferred to Pakistan, the P & T and the Civil Aviation Departments may have to alter their present arrangements for communications; the Meteorological Department may need some change in the machinery for communicating weather information to the Civil Aviation Department and other departments. The Finance Department would have to arrange for verification of the cash and other balances of treasuries and of branches of the Imperial Bank performing treasury functions in Pakistan as on 14 August. These are only some obvious instances but there will be a large number of matters in which detailed action will have to be taken by various executive organisations such as the Income-tax, Customs and Central Excise Departments. In regard to some of these matters action will have been decided upon already; in regard to others, decisions cannot be taken finally until the Partition Council has itself come to a decision, and in such cases alternative schemes will have to be kept ready which can be put into operation as soon as a decision has been taken. It is clear thus that over a very wide field, certain administrative arrangements will have to be made as a result of the very act of separation and in order that the necessary preliminary action is taken in good time, it is essential that all the important positions in every department and attached and

subordinate offices are held well before the 15th of August by officers who have decided to remain in India.

2. Moreover, it is obvious that those who have elected for Pakistan will no longer be interested in safeguarding the interests of India, but will be more concerned in doing everything they can to promote the interests of Pakistan even by prejudicing those of India. We cannot look for any co-operation from them even in the day-to-day administration, let alone in matters of importance. The possibility cannot be ignored of the enthusiasm of some of these persons outrunning their discretion, and we must provide against the danger of sabotage, etc. in certain key departments, as for example telephones. These circumstances, in my view, make it essential that we take these persons off their regular administrative duties and replace them as soon as possible by those who have elected to serve India. The former can be placed, for the time being until they leave for Pakistan, on special duty, or can be given special joining time.

3. I suggest that this change should take place with immediate effect.

#### 41. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR, DATED 12 JULY 1947

V. P. Menon pointed out to me this morning that there was a typist's omission in the text of the draft communique which he had shown you. I enclose a copy of the latest text which I have sent to Pandit Nehru (Serial No. 42) and shall show to Mr. Jinnah this evening. The differences from the text which V. P. Menon showed you are, first, that the sentence in the second paragraph about there being nine members of each group is omitted, and, secondly, a sentence is put in showing that the existing departments will be in the charge of the Members for India.

## 42. DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ON THE RECONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT

In order to facilitate the setting up of the new administration of Pakistan His Excellency the Viceroy has decided with the concurrence of the party leaders that the Interim Government should be reconstituted on the following lines.

The Government will consist of two groups representing the two successor Governments of India and Pakistan.

The two groups will meet separately to consider matters concerning their own territories, and jointly under the chairmanship of the Governor-General to consider matters of common concern.

The existing departments will be in charge of the Members representing India. The personnel who have chosen to serve in Pakistan will be withdrawn from the existing departments, and will staff Pakistan Departments which will be organised at once in Delhi and will serve the Pakistan members of the Cabinet.

There will thus be what amounts to two provisional Governments, one for India and one for Pakistan, each dealing with its own business and consulting the other on matters of common concern.

## 43. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR, DATED 14 JULY 1947

I enclose an official letter (not printed) which I have sent to Pandit Nehru as Vice-president of the Interim Government, since I feel that you as Home Member are equally concerned.

As you know, we agreed that in the first instance I should only remain on for the transition period which I feel will end by mid-April, for the Governor-General's special powers

terminate on 31 March, and the Joint Defence Council will probably wind up them.

We can discuss in the New Year whether you wish to replace me by an Indian, but personally I believe you will be well advised to do so.

May I point out that part of the staff which I am suggesting I shall keep, will continue to be paid for by His Majesty's Government, since I feel it is only right that they should help with seeing the job through for which they were originally engaged ?

44. ATTLEE TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 17 JULY 1947  
(EXTRACT)

... I discussed with him (V. K. Krishna Menon) a suggested amendment to the clause in the Bill about the States, but with the best of goodwill could not accept what was proposed, as it would not in fact have affected what was desired and might have created a false impression. The Bill passed both Houses this week without any division. All speakers in the Commons, and all but two unimportant Peers gave it warm support and expressed most cordial good wishes for the success of the new Governments.

I have admired the statesmanship and courage of yourself and Patel. Our warm good wishes go with you in your heavy responsibilities, the weight of which I am in a position to appreciate. . . .

## 45. EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE PARTITION COUNCIL MEETING HELD ON 17 JULY 1947

### WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES

The Council considered the note by His Excellency circulated to all members. (Serial No 39)

Points in discussion were :

- (a) Paragraph 1 of note. The first detachment of British troops, Army and RAF, approximately 1,500 strong, to leave India, would sail in S. S. Georgic from Bombay on 17 August. His Excellency announced his intention of going down to say goodbye particularly to emphasise to the public that the withdrawal of British troops had begun.
- (b) Paragraph 2 of note. In order that there should be no embarrassment to either of the Dominions, it should be made perfectly clear that British troops temporarily remaining in India after 15 August will have no operational responsibility whatever. They could usefully employ their time in training for war, which was their proper role.
- (c) Paragraph 3 of note. The value of these squadrons in their normal peace-time duties, and particularly for assisting in the training of RAF squadrons now converting to a medium transport role, was emphasised.

As regards their employment in the event of serious internal unrest, it was stressed that they could not be used in any sort of operational role. Suitable tasks would be the maintenance of communications, flying out refugees, transport of doctors and nurses, and so forth. The Commander-in-Chief

undertook to draft instructions governing their use, which would have to be referred to His Majesty's Government as the note circulated was in the exact terms of the offer made by them. His Excellency, commenting on the immense value of transport aircraft hoped that the appropriate Service Sub-Committee would recommend a proportion of transport aircraft in the Air Forces of both the two new Dominions.

The Council agreed

1. to accept HMG's offer to retain two RAF transport Squadrons, provisionally up to 31 March 1948;
2. that they should operate under the control of the Joint Defence Council;
3. that the Squadrons would be located at Palam and Mauripur.

#### 46. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 15 JULY 1947

I have received a telegraphic reply from the Governor of Assam in regard to the Sylhet referendum. He has given full particulars. There was undoubtedly intimidation, false impersonation and incursion of Muslim National Guards from Bengal. But it seems clear both from the number of people who voted and the result of the voting that any irregularities that took place could not materially affect the result of the referendum.

There is one important matter to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Gopinath Bardoloi, Prime Minister of Assam. From the 3 June Statement it appeared that such parts of Sylhet district as might be determined by the Boundary Commission would be transferred to East Bengal, this, of course, after the referendum had taken place and the major issue decided. The Parliamentary Bill is not quite clear on this point and it might be said that in case the boundary has not been demarcated by the Commission by 15 August, the

whole of Sylhet district will be transferred. Subsequently it might be necessary and indeed it is highly probable that certain parts of Sylhet district will have to go back to Assam after the report of the Boundary Commission. Obviously, this business of transfer and retransfer of territory will produce very great confusion and difficulty and will completely upset the life of the district and surrounding areas. The process of transfer must be a single one after final determination of the area to be transferred. The easiest way to arrange this is to get the report of the Boundary Commission before 15 August.

This question of course arises in a more or less similar form in regard to the notional division of Bengal and the Punjab.

It is not quite clear as to whether the Bengal Boundary Commission will also deal with Sylhet. Presumably, this will be so. The Assam Prime Minister has pointed out that this procedure will not be a happy one, as people from Bengal will not be fully acquainted with, or interested in, Assam. There is, as a matter of fact, long-standing difference of opinion between the Bengalis and the Assamese, quite apart from any of them being Hindus or Muslims. The Boundary Commission, as nominated, consists of eminent Calcutta High Court Judges who naturally will be inclined to view the question more than from the point of view of Bengal than of Assam.

I do not know what can be done about this matter. Because of the shortness of time available it might be desirable to have a third Boundary Commission for the Sylhet area, one person representing the Congress and the other the Muslim League, with a chairman. This commission might work in collaboration with Bengal Commission.

Or else, it might be possible to attach to assessors, representing Assam, to the present Boundary Commission for Bengal. They would only function in so far as the Sylhet area is concerned.

These are just ideas which occurred (to me) and I have not consulted any one about them yet. If you wish, however, you could consult Mr. Gopinath Bardoloi, the Assam Prime Minister, in regard to this matter.

I am attaching a brief note by Sir B. N. Rau (not printed) pointing out the slight discrepancy between the 3 June Statement and the draft Parliamentary Bill in regard to Sylhet.

(*Author's Note* : The whole of Sylhet was under the Act included in East Bengal to start with : whereas the 3 June Statement envisaged only the transfer of *Muslim Majority areas* of Sylhet District and contiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining Districts, as settled by the Boundary Commission.)

47. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 1 AUGUST 1947

As formalities have to be observed to some extent, I am writing to invite you to join the new Cabinet. This writing is somewhat superfluous because you are the strongest pillar of the Cabinet.

48. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 2 AUGUST 1947

The composition of the Joint Defence Council, in our opinion, requires some consideration. Originally when it was decided that it should consist of a Governor-General or Governors-General, two Defence Members and the Supreme Commander, the general impression was that there would be only one Governor-General and, therefore, there was no question of unequal representation of India and Pakistan. Now, if the original composition is adhered to, you would be its independent Chairman while Pakistan would be represented both by its Governor-General and its Defence Member. As against this,

India would be represented only by the Defence Member. This difference is further accentuated by the attitude recently displayed by the Commander-in-Chief about which Jawaharlal has already written to you.

We feel, therefore, that the representation of India on the Joint Defence Council should be further strengthened by the addition of another Minister. We fully realised that it would be possible for the Defence Minister to bring with another colleagues to assist him in the deliberations of the Joint Defence Council. You will doubtless concede that this is not the same thing as having another Minister with full membership rights. On the other hand, the addition of one representative will restore the balance between the two Dominions and should not matter to the Pakistan Government since there is no question of majority decision.

We should be grateful if you would give this matter early consideration so that it could be put before the Partition Council either today or at its next meeting.

49. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 3 AUGUST 1947

Many thanks for your letter of the 1st instant. Our attachment and affection for each other and our comradeship for an unbroken period of nearly 30 years admit of no formalities. My services will be at your disposal, I hope, for the rest of my life and you will have unquestioned loyalty and devotion from me in the cause for which no man in India has sacrificed as much as you have done. Our combination is unbreakable and therein lies our strength. I thank you for the sentiments expressed in your letter.

*(Author's Note : Nehru's letter of 1 August (Serial No. 47) and Sardar's reply show the prevailing state of feelings between the two leaders. Pandit Nehru's description of Sardar as "the strongest pillar" of the Cabinet was not a mere formality or*

a lip service. Similarly Sardar lived up to his words. The phrase "Our combination is unbreakable" was not empty sentiment. His statement:

"My services will be at your disposal, I hope, for the rest of my life and you will have unquestioned loyalty and devotion from me in the cause for which no man in India has sacrificed as much as you have done."

How one wishes in retrospect that the last few months of their life together had been without the shadow cast upon them !)

50. SARDAR TO JOHN MATTHAI,  
DATED 3 AUGUST 1947

I understand that out of the locomotives which will fall to the share of Pakistan under the scheme of partition, 121 are at present at Sealdah (Calcutta) and will have to move out. This was an agreed recommendation of the Railway Sub-committee on Assets and Liabilities, but the General Manager of the B. & A. Railway, who himself has opted for Pakistan, has so far made no effort to implement this decision. This also means retention at Sealdah of about 1,800 men. We cannot clearly allow this because the safety of an important junction like Sealdah cannot be endangered. It has generally been agreed that the staff which has elected for Pakistan should leave for Pakistan as soon as possible before 15 August. I cannot understand, therefore, why this staff and the locomotives cannot move to the Pakistan area. It is for the Pakistan Government to make arrangements for the reception of this staff and the locomotives. We are not bound to keep them merely because they cannot be accommodated in Pakistan, and when their continuance in India is likely to prejudice our interests it is our duty to send them away.

2. I understand that an offer was made to the Pakistan (Government) on our behalf that so long as the Pakistan Railway has not made arrangements for accommodating these

locomotives in its own shed, trains might be worked beyond Kanchrapara by our locomotives and our engine-crews, so that there was no idea whatsoever of our doing anything which would dislocate traffic. It is for the Pakistan Government either to remove their locomotives from Sealdah or to accept our offer of assistance. If they fail to accept either of the two alternatives, they must face the consequences.

3. It is essential that our railways should, before 15 August, be completely manned by staff who have opted for India; we cannot afford to face any risk of sabotage, and this is particularly true of key posts like general manager, superintendent of work-shops, officer-in-charge of store depots, etc.

4. I understand that three key posts on the B & A Railway, viz., General Manager, Controller of Stores and Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, Kanchrapara Workshops, are at present held by officers who have opted for Pakistan. This is clearly unsatisfactory and we should make immediate attempts to effect the change.

5. I would be grateful if you would kindly look into these matters with the least possible delay and let me know what action you have taken, so that, if necessary, I can take up the matter in the Partition Council.

#### 51. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, AUGUST 1947

I write this because I feel that at present today's meeting of the Partition Council it was not fully appreciated what the consequences of the failure to agree to issue the Properties, Rights and Liabilities Order would be.

In so far as lands and buildings and other property are concerned, it would be open to India to issue an order on the 15th making it clear that all property within its territories would be their absolute property. Pakistan would presumably do the same in respect of property situated in its territories.

This would of course have the effect of abrogating all the various agreements that have been reached for the division of assets between the two dominions, and since the agreements cover almost the entire field, such abrogation would obviously be most unfortunate.

In regard, however, to the vesting of the responsibility for the Public Debt, the consequences would not merely be unfortunate but extremely grave and would put in jeopardy the possibility of a peaceful implementation of partition. India would again be compelled to issue an order on the 15th assuming full responsibility for payment of interest and principal on the outstanding Public Debt. It would do so, however, without having any assurance from Pakistan that it would assume responsibility for its share of the Public Debt. Pakistan, on the other hand, may decide to say that it is prepared to accept joint responsibility for the present Government of India's Public Debt, or it may decide to repudiate liability for the Public Debt altogether, or it may decide just to keep quiet. If it takes the first step, nothing very much would happen except perhaps a little confusion. In the case, however, of a forthright repudiation, India would be constrained immediately to take counteraction. That would take the shape of refusal to refer any matter to the Arbitration Tribunal or to part with any assets (including any share in the cash balances) until Pakistan agreed to accept a proportionate share of the liability. If Pakistan chooses to keep silent, again India would be compelled to ask for a definite statement from Pakistan regarding its attitude towards the public Debt and if a satisfactory reply was not forthcoming, the position would be much the same as if there had been a repudiation.

These developments would be unfortunate, the more so as I feel convinced that Mr. Jinnah has not fully appreciated (a) the consequences of not reaching an agreement, and (b) the fact that Pakistan's interests were fully safeguarded under the proposed Order. Were I not convinced of the fact that no harm whatsoever would come to Pakistan under these

proposals, I would not have been so firm in my attitude towards this order. I may add that I have just consulted again the Governor of the Reserve Bank on the question of assumption of joint financial liability and his reaction is decidedly against such a course on purely financial grounds.

Until 15 August, it is, I suggest, your duty to take whatever steps are necessary in the interests of the country as a whole, irrespective of what one party or the other may think. If either party is dissatisfied with the order you issue, it will of course be open to either party to override it in so far as its own territory is concerned. May I suggest that this is a matter of sufficient importance for you to come to an independent decision with whatever advice you can obtain from your own advisers and to issue an order immediately? This is an avoidable conflict and in my view the issue of the order in the terms proposed would safeguard the interests of both the dominions.

52. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 13 AUGUST 1947

A deputation of the Chittagong Hill Tribes saw me this morning and expressed to me their grave apprehension that their area was going to be included in East Bengal under the Boundary Commission award. I am unaware of the source of their information, but they seemed to be well convinced that this was going to happen. I have told them that the proposition was so monstrous that if it should happen they would be justified in resisting to the utmost of their power and count on our maximum support in such resistance.

2. Personally, I feel it is inconceivable that such a blatant and patent breach of terms of reference should be perpetrated by the Chairman of the Boundary Commission. We have all along felt that the future of this area was not at all in doubt. No fair reading of the terms of reference or appreciation of the factual position could make a 97 per cent non-Muslim

area a part of the award relating to the boundary of East Bengal. Such a decision would also jeopardise the position of the adjoining Tripura State which is a Hindu State with predominantly Hindu population, which has acceded to the Indian Dominion and has joined the Union Constituent Assembly.

3. I, therefore, feel bound to draw your attention to the serious consequences which would follow such a manifestly unjust award. There is no doubt from the report of the Tribal Areas Committee who collected unimpeachable evidence on the spot and whose views I represented to the Chairman of the Commission in a letter which I sent to him as Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly, that the entire population of this area is in favour of remaining in the Indian Union.

4. Any award against the weight of local opinion and of the terms of reference, or without any referendum to ascertain the will of the people concerned must, therefore, be construed a collusive or partisan award and will have, therefore, to be repudiated by us. I make this statement with a full sense of responsibility as one who was party to the setting up of the Commission. But you cannot clearly expect us to submit to a proceeding which would be in violation of the basic conception underlying the Commission's terms of reference.

5. I must also point out that public reaction would wholly and overwhelmingly support us in such repudiation. Already there is considerable doubt whether they would get an impartial award under the novel and strange procedure adopted by the Chairman of not even hearing the arguments. Many persons have come and complained to me that he has rendered himself liable, by this means, to being influenced by circles in your secretariat whose antipathies to India and sympathies with the League are well known. The selection, as Secretary of the Commission, of one of the European officers of the Punjab, who are generally associated in the public

mind with pro-League sympathies, has not mended matters. I have generally adopted an indifferent attitude to these complaints, but if the award confirms the worst fears entertained by the public, it is impossible for me to predict the volume of bitterness and rancour which would be let loose and I am certain that this will create a situation which both you and I may have to regret.

53. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 14 AUGUST 1947

I cannot leave my active participation in Cabinet work without writing a line to express my sincere appreciation of the loyal support you have given me as a Member of the Interim Government during my short period of Viceroyalty. No one could pretend that the Coalition Ministry was an easy partnership, particularly with the partition looming so large in the background; but you and your colleagues made my task easy and thus proved yourselves true statesmen of whom your country can well be proud.

It was indeed fortunate that a statesman of your vision and realism should have been associated with all the discussions on the 3 June Plan and with all the subsequent vital and delicate negotiations with the States. After our first "tussle" I always felt that we should become friends, and I believe history will prove that that friendship played a very vital part in obtaining a peaceful solution and a speedy transfer of power to a Dominion of India which, with the States, will be greater than "British India" was by itself.

Thank you also for your trust and support in the problem of the Indian States—future generations will appreciate the full effect of the wise policy you have followed.

With this letter I am sending you a small informal photograph of myself, in the hope that you will accept it as a souvenir of the historic time when we were colleagues together in the Cabinet.

54. ISMAY TO SARDAR, DATED 13 AUGUST 1947

Just as he was leaving the House for Karachi, the Viceroy received a letter from you (Serial No. 52) on the subject of the Boundary Commission. He just glanced at it, exclaimed 'O God', put it in his pocket and said to me: "Please tell Mr. Patel that I will study his letter in the aeroplane, and, at the same time, please send him a copy of the letter which I wrote to Mr. Nehru this morning about the Boundary Commission Award (Serial No. 55).

55. MOUNTBATTEN TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU  
DATED 13 AUGUST 1947

I am advised that Sir Cyril Radcliffe is sending me the award of the Boundary Commission in the course of today, but that it cannot arrive before I leave for Karachi. At present, therefore, I have no idea of its contents.

It had been my intention to publish the award in a Gazette Extraordinary as soon as it was received and the maps reproduced; but, to judge from reports I have heard and the messages I have received from leaders in both India and Pakistan, there is such apprehension about the nature of findings that I do not feel that it should be published without an opportunity being given for a discussion of them between duly authorised representatives of India and Pakistan. The object of such a discussion would be:

- (a) to decide upon the timing and method of publication and
- (b) to decide the method of implementing the undertaking of the Partition Council to accept the award and to enforce the decisions contained in it.

The meeting would also, if both parties wished, provide an opportunity for discussing any mutual adjustments in the boundaries by agreement.

I am therefore proposing to Mr. Jinnah that he should send a representative or representatives to Delhi, with a view to a meeting as early as possible on the morning of Saturday, 16 August. By that time, copies of the award and of the maps will have been reproduced. These will be tabled at the meeting. I will let you know if Mr. Jinnah agrees on my return from Karachi tomorrow.

I am very ready to place Government House at your disposal for the meeting. It would, of course, be impossible for me to preside, and, I think, undesirable for me to be even present at the meeting; but if both parties should wish to consult me, I shall be available.

I have undertaken to go to Bombay on the 17th for 24 hours to bid farewell to the first contingent of British troops, and will have to leave in the early morning.

I ought to add that the Governors of Bengal and the Punjab have been informed that the Governments of the two halves of each province will be responsible for all territory up to the national boundaries from 15 August until the award is published and implemented.

#### 56. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN DATED 16 AUGUST 1947

Many thanks for your very kind letter of 14 August. (Serial No 53). I am overwhelmed by the personal references to me and by the generous terms in which you have referred to such assistance to you as I have been able to render in the very difficult and complicated task which was entrusted to you by His Majesty's Government.

You were good enough to call me a stern realist and it is as such as that I make bold to say that, when the history

of the six months of your Viceroyalty comes to be written, it cannot but accord to you the major share of the credit for the manner in which the manifold difficult tasks have been accomplished and for the transformation which has been made in Indo-British relationship during these fateful months. India and Indians have always been quick to respond to understanding and sympathy. Both Britain and India must congratulate each other that in you they at last found one so abounding in these virtues, essentially man of speed and action, frank and painstaking and genuinely sincere and anxious to deliver the goods. The only regret of ours is, and of the future historian will be, that we should have had the benefit of your wise counsel and the privilege of your able guidance at a much earlier date.

I personally have a great deal to thank you for. It is possible I have taxed your patience and consideration severely during the last few months of great mental stress and strain, but I have always found in you a ready response which has often dispelled the clouds of anxiety and concern. In fact, what you have achieved in the way of friendship and goodwill merely emphasises what the long line of your predecessors have missed as a result of studied aloofness and failure to take into confidence leaders of public opinion.

I am also grateful to you for the kind thought which prompted you to send me your photograph as a souvenir of our collaboration during these historic times. I shall always prize it as such.

May I add a word of gratefulness to Her Excellency for the humanitarian service which she has rendered to India at a time when it was sorely needed? Her keen insight into human psychology and vigilant interest in the removal of human suffering and misery have touched the hearts of thousands with whom she has come in contact.

57. LADY MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 22 AUGUST 1947

I am most grateful as well as deeply touched at the kind and generous references you have made to me in your letter to my husband. It has been a great privilege as well as a real joy to work for India and with Indians in the past months. My heart has gone out to them in their suffering and needs and in the great sacrifices they have made, and my admiration at the fine courage they have shown at all times.

No words can express the gratitude I feel to you, your daughter and to the people of India for the warm sympathy and understanding as well as generosity of spirit you have shown me since my arrival here. We are honoured that you should have invited us to stay and work with you a little longer and pray that we may be worthy of the trust that you have placed in us.

58. JOHN MATTHAI TO BALDEV SINGH,  
DATED 15 OCTOBER 1947

I enclose a note (Serial No. 59) prepared by the Chief Commissioner of railways regarding certain movements of military stores and personnel. The whole position, to my mind, is disturbing and calls for your personal attention. We are doing what we can to counter movements of a doubtful character, but there is obviously a limit to what we can do to prevent them.

## 59. MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS

(RAILWAY BOARD)

FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM  
THE CHIEF TRANSPORTATION SUPERINTENDENT,  
GIP RAILWAY

A British officer of the name of Brig. Lickman is in command at Jubbulpore. A number of British officers under his command have recently been leaving Jubbulpore either on transfer to Pakistan or on leave to stations in Pakistan, and there are reasons to believe that some of these officers carry in their baggage arms and ordnance stores. Information in a private manner is being given to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, CP. That officer's name is Mr. Saxena, and it will be left to him to take such action as the civil police choose to examine whether any arms are being smuggled out of Jubbulpore.

2. Plans of Brig. Lickman were under way to order four special goods trains to carry ordnance stores towards Bombay. It was his intention that these specials should terminate at Kalyan and that the ordnance stores would be taken to Bombay by road in military motor transport for shipment ex that port.

3. The special trains contemplated would have been ordered by MILRAIL, which is under the Supreme Command. Recently at a meeting over which the Defence Secretary (Mr. Bhalja) presided, the QMG (India) expressed his inability to take over movement control owing to paucity of officers; that branch of the military transportation side is therefore not under the C-in-C, India, but under the Supreme Commander.

4. The Chief Transportation Superintendent, GIP Railway, has so arranged his train operation as to make it possible to

resist MILRAIL's demand for these special trains, should such a demand be made.

5. It has also been reported that a large number of Muslims from the Agra and Gwalior side were making use of the GIP Railway's Express train (198 UP) to take them to Bhopal and for the South. Owing to the GIP Railway having been called upon to produce coaching stock for refugee trains in East Punjab, the Chief Transportation Superintendent, GIP Railway, has arranged for the Expresses (197 Down and 198 Up) to terminate and start from Jhansi.

6. A number of Muslims have recently reached Bhopal and Bhopal State are very keen in getting these men out of their territory and into the Nizam's territory. A request was made to the GIP Railway for a special train from Bhopal to Hyderabad. This has been refused on the grounds that movements of refugees are controlled by Delhi and orders of the Railway Board are necessary before any such trains can be run.

7. The CP Government do not wish to encourage migration from the Central Provinces to Hyderabad, but even so, many Muslims from the CP find their way to Manmad, which is the metre gauge terminal station of the NS Railway. From Manmad, the NS Railway has been running a number of special trains into the Nizam's territory, which is only two stations away from Manmad.

60. SARDAR TO JOHN MATTHAI,  
DATED 15 OCTOBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of the 15th instant (Serial No. 58).

I need hardly say how much I appreciate the action taken by the Ministry of Railways, and fully realise that the Railways can only delay and obstruct indirectly, but cannot altogether prevent ramps of this kind.

I wonder if it will be possible somehow to convey to the officers concerned our appreciation of the action taken by them. This will encourage them in the discharge of their duties to the country.

61. SARDAR TO R. K. SHANMUKHAM CHETTY,  
DATED 12 DECEMBER 1947

I am going to Cuttack tomorrow morning and will not be back until the 16th morning. I shall then be going to Jaipur on the 17th and returning probably on the 19th morning. During this period, it is probable that you will receive a request for payment of a part, or the whole, of the amount of cash balances which we have agreed to allot to Pakistan. You could put off this payment on the ground that adjustment of other expenditure has yet to be made before the total amount which is now payable to Pakistan can be determined, or on the ground that I am away from Delhi and that you would like to consult me before taking any further action. In any case, I hope you will ensure that no payment is made until, after my return from tour, we have had a discussion.

62. SARDAR TO ISMAY, DATED 19 DECEMBER 1947

I am most grateful to you for your letter (not printed) sent from Bombay and much appreciate the kind thought which prompted you to send it.

As you know, our country has been the victim of misrepresentation for years in the past. We thought that after India attained her independence, past controversies would cease and men prominent in public life in England would forget their past opposition to India's freedom and reconcile themselves to an attitude of friendship and goodwill, but I regret to find that our former opponents, including your old Chief, still harp upon the same old tune wherever they get an opportunity to fling

mud at us. This is all the more regrettable since, I make bold to say, no other people and no other country in the world could have forgotten and forgiven the bitterness of years so easily as we have done. It was as if overnight we buried the past and entered upon an entirely new relationship with your people. You have yourself seen how that friendship and good will burst forth when the psychological opportunity came on 15 August. It is now for your statesmen and your country to capitalise that friendship and that goodwill and not to let these be smothered by old controversies in their new form.

You have been singularly fortunate (and I somehow feel in that circumstance India has also been lucky) that you came to India with Lord Mountbatten and thereby were enabled to see at close quarters how India reacted to the final gesture which your people made to us. You have also seen how we faced perhaps the most difficult task that was ever set to any country's government. You have also witnessed the manner in which the country as a whole and the administration have accustomed themselves to the great and vital change from foreign rule to self-government. It is now for you to convince your old Chief whether you have had to deal here with men of straw or with men of substance. I am sure, if you could succeed in doing something to remove such misapprehensions as exist among the Conservative Party, and particularly its gifted leader, about men and affairs in India, you would be rendering a signal service not only to this country but also to your own; for I genuinely feel that in the continued friendship and goodwill between our two countries lie the interests of both.

I should also like to say how much I have enjoyed the occasions whenever social or official engagements have brought both of us together. Your frank and straightforward manner of presenting views which you sincerely held was always welcome to us and we felt that your advice had the weight of experience of men and things which is a rare asset, particularly in the critical times through which we have passed. I, therefore,

send my best wishes to you with all my heart and hope that whenever you feel like having a holiday you would not forget that a warm welcome awaits you.

63. SARDAR TO A. E. PORTER,  
DATED 19 DECEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 13 December 1947 (not printed) and for the good wishes for Christmas and New Year which I very warmly reciprocate.

Yes, many things, some almost cataclysmic, have happened since you left India but thank God we have survived the storm and have turned the corner. At one time it seemed that we would be completely overwhelmed but the people stood firm and four-square and we managed to hold them together. We are now settling down and hope shortly to take up the threads of rehabilitation and reconstruction which seemed almost to have snapped.

The disturbances in the Punjab did not come as a surprise to me. The poison of hate spread by the League had its inevitable reaction. The cleavage between the two communities had become wider and wider ever since the policy of the Conservative Government had put a premium on intransigence and obstinacy. We had hoped that the shock of freedom would evoke a healthy reaction. It was a risk and a grave risk, but we felt—and I think rightly so—that that risk was worth taking, since the stakes were freedom and domination.

I had also hoped that the partition would be throughout regarded as a friendly and brotherly arrangement giving scope for all communities in both the dominions to seek their own salvation and their own prosperity, but, unfortunately, elements which meant differently -asserted themselves almost all over Western Pakistan and lawlessness overtook Eastern Punjab. This engendered suspicions, bitterness and ill-will with the result that the relation between the two dominions became strained almost to a breaking point. Junagadh and Kashmir provided

further bones of contention which increased estrangement. Events in Junagadh fortunately followed a different course from those in Kashmir, but the Kashmir sore is still running. Unless the Pakistan Government have the courage to disown the elements who have replaced the rule of law by the rule of brute force and are bent upon forcing a decision to their way of thinking, I feel that the situation is full of dangerous possibilities. I have no doubt myself that if the requisite spirit of accommodation and boldness to face facts were forthcoming, this outstanding point between the two dominions would be satisfactorily resolved and both of us would be enabled to settle down in peace to the many tasks of reconstruction which await us. I have never spared myself in explaining to the people here and abroad that we genuinely mean friendship and prosperity for the new State of Pakistan and that we ourselves do not wish to force a union, though true to our convictions we feel that a union is inevitable. On the other hand, we would welcome a friendly reunion whenever there is a genuine desire amongst our brethren in Pakistan to return to us.

I am glad to know that you have settled down to a real family life after years of separation. For a civil servant, public service becomes his dharma almost to the exclusion of his other duties and it is in this self-sacrifice and discharge of his solemn obligation lies his merit. Through centuries of colonial administration the British have acquired the knack of discharging this dharma and actually in your case you have settled down earlier than most of your predecessors ever did or hoped to do.

I am glad to know that there is a great fund of goodwill for us in the United Kingdom. I feel that such friendship and goodwill is necessary in the common interests of both India and Great Britain. I only hope that the former opponents of India's freedom would now forget past controversies and react to India's freedom in the same spirit in which India replaced as though overnight the bitterness of years of struggle with genuine feelings of cordiality and friendliness.

With every good wish from Maniben and myself to you and your family for the New Year.

64. R. K. SHANMUKHAM CHETTY TO SARDAR,  
DATED 20 DECEMBER 1947

I enclose a copy of Dr. Gopichand Bhargava's letter to me dated 16 December 1947 (Serial No. 65). Zahid Husain also made enquiries from me regarding the payment of their share of cash balances that still remains to be given to them. I have told him that the decision of the Partition Council had not yet been communicated to the Government of India for implementation.

65. GOPICHAND BHARGAVA TO R. K. SHANMUKHAM  
CHETTY, DATED 16 DECEMBER 1947

I understand that the Dominion Government of India have agreed to pay Rs. 50 crores to the Pakistan Dominion on account of the partition of assets.

According to our claims against the West Punjab Government and division of the securities the West Punjab Government will be debtor to the East Punjab Government and they will owe several crores to us. I would, therefore, suggest that the payment of this amount be withheld till our claims are decided and the amount is paid to us.

If the Dominion Government pays them now we do not know when will our dues be paid by them. Hon'ble Mr. Zahid Husain, High Commissioner for Pakistan in India, is trying for the payment of money to Pakistan.

66. SARDAR TO R. K. SHANMUKHAM CHETTY,  
DATED 22 DECEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 20 December 1947 (Serial No. 64). As you know, the Cabinet has decided that no payment should be made until the Kashmir question has been settled. I shall let you know when, in accordance with this decision, payment can be made to the Pakistan Government.

## CHAPTER 3

# JAMMU AND KASHMIR

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

In the course of its long struggle with the British Power, the Indian National Congress was concerned with securing political freedom for British India, and did not take any direct interest on the establishment of responsible government in the Indian States; nor did the Congress establish local Committees in Indian States as it did in the various regions of British India. It was not till the Haripura session of the Congress in 1938 that the Congress formally defined its objective as embracing the Indian States as well as British India and declared that it stood for the same political, economic and social freedom in the Indian States as in the rest of India; and that the Poorna Swaraj (or complete independence) which was the objective of the Congress would embrace the whole of India including the States for the integrity and unity of India must be maintained in freedom as it has been maintained in subjection.

The political structure envisaged by the Congress for India as a whole was a Federation in which the Indian States participated as free units enjoying the same measure of democratic freedom as the rest of India. But, even though the Congress defined at Haripura its objective of democratic freedom for the people of the Indian States also, it declared that the organisation as such would not directly participate in freedom movements in Indian States, and that such movements would have to be left to the people of the States themselves to organise and develop. At the same time, the Congress could not but take note of, and encourage, the rising tide of popular feeling in several States. The All India

Congress Committee had, thus, sharply criticized in 1937 and 1938 the Governments of several States—including the progressive State of Mysore—for their policy of repression of popular movements; and the Haripura resolution itself declared that individual Congressmen could support and help the subjects of Indian States in their struggle for responsible Government. This only meant the formal endorsement of an existing situation. Mahatma Gandhi himself belonged to an Indian State, and had taken interest in the problems of the States in his area; and he had been helped by Sardar. The fact remained however that Congress as such was without any institutional bases in the Indian States.

The All-India States Peoples' Conference had been organised as a separate organisation, though it had always been regarded as an adjunct of the Congress, and was guided by leaders who had established their positions in the Congress; but it also does not appear to have established local units in all the Indian States. Individual Congressmen from time to time had assisted the movements in Indian States for democratising their administration. It was, therefore, inevitable that Sardar should be looked up to by the people of the States for leadership and guidance; and he had maintained his contacts with the people and leaders of the States in their endeavours for securing democratic and responsible administration. (See Chapter on "Indian States".)

Sardar's attitude in regard to the States was clear and pragmatic. He would accept no compromise to the principle of democratisation, though he was prepared to regulate the pace. At the same time he visualised the major problem before the Congress as the attainment of freedom from the alien power, viz. Great Britain. Once the British quit India, the problem of the States would be automatically solved. Sardar considered that the Rulers of the States were also patriots interested in the welfare of their people. Once the shackles of Paramountcy were removed, the Rulers would not be found unwilling to cooperate with the fellow Indians in building a

democratic Indian polity. Once India was free, Sardar was confident that problem of the States would adjust itself—a confidence which was justified by the subsequent course of events.

“Hopes and aspirations,” wrote the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, “may overlap frontier lines like sparks across a street.” The institution of parliamentary organs in British India and their progressive development through the years 1909 to 1937, and in particular the introduction of provincial autonomy and the great electoral victory of the Congress in 1937 inevitably had their reaction in the Indian States. These developments stimulated agitation in many of them for the establishment of Governments responsible to elected Legislatures. These movements were particularly strong and popular in the enlightened and well administered States like Mysore and Travancore and, even in these States, with their progressive Rulers, they were put down with a somewhat heavy hand.

Jammu and Kashmir had a record of good administration during the reign of Maharaja Hari Singh, first under officers selected by the Political Department and thereafter under Indian administrators like N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Maharaj Singh and B. N. Rau. The Maharaja himself was a competent and hardworking Ruler, very well informed and conversant with the needs of his State and its people, but temperamentally there was a big streak of indecision in his character. So far as the introduction of responsible government was concerned, he was tardy, like other Rulers, and what he gave would not compare with the position in British India. However, he relied on his Dewans to administer the State efficiently and the doses of reforms that he gave, he thought, would help the Dewans in doing so. Thus it was an enlightened autocratic, if efficient administration, manned by persons of eminence and talent chosen by the Maharaja; and the backward Muslim element of the population had little involvement in the government of the State. The first step towards liberalisation was taken as a result of the popular movement by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1932. To start with, it was a communal

movement built up to fight the cause of the Muslims, and was known as the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. By 1939 the communal complexion of the movement had been dropped and it became the National Conference; later it was affiliated to the All India States Peoples' Conference. It continued to wage a campaign against the Maharaja; and in 1946, borrowing a leaf from the Congress book, Sheikh Abdullah launched a "Quit Kashmir" campaign against the Maharaja, for which he was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

Sardar and Jawaharlal Nehru were both taking interest in the affairs of the State at this time. Jawaharlal Nehru was himself a Kashmiri, though his ancestors had left the State several generations back, and was in addition emotional in his approach to problems. A struggle for liberation wherever it might be or whoever conducted it had his instinctive strong support. He was greatly roused by Abdullah's campaign and was quick to condemn the Maharaja for what he termed the barbarous and inhuman way in which the movement was put down. His innate sense of fairness made him realise that the movement, directed as it was against the Ruler as the Head of the State, was wrong. It was against the accepted policy both of the All India States Peoples' Conference (of which Nehru was at the time President) and of the National Conference. Both these were committed to the establishment of popular rule in the State under the aegis of the Ruler, and Nehru did not hesitate to say so publicly. At the same time, he opposed the way in which the Government of the State had acted. He wished to pay a visit to the State, to encourage his friends, in June 1946; but, apprehending political agitation, the Government of the State imposed a ban on his entry; and, when he tried to break the ban, he was arrested. The Working Committee of the Congress, and Sardar himself, do not appear to have been in favour of Nehru breaking the law and getting arrested there. Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress President, directed him to return, and Sardar himself has

referred in disparaging terms to his action in a letter he wrote on 11 July 1946 to D. P. Misra.

“He has done many things recently which have caused us great embarrassment. His action in Kashmir, his interference in the Sikh election to the Constituent Assembly, his Press Conference immediately after the A. I. C. C. are all acts of emotional insanity and it puts tremendous strain on us to set matters right. But in spite of all his innocent indiscretions he has unparalleled enthusiasm and a burning passion for freedom....”

Nehru was later permitted to pay a brief visit in his professional capacity as lawyer of Sheikh Abdullah. On this occasion he agreed to confine his activities to his professional work. He wrote to Sardar (Serial No. 1):

“It is not my intention to raise any major issues in Kashmir at this stage. I shall also see Sheikh Abdullah and join in consultation about his defence. I shall also visit parts of the city and meet some people. I do not propose to hold public meetings and the like, though it may happen, of course that crowds gather occasionally where I go.”

While Nehru thus sought open confrontation with the State Government and the Maharaja, Sardar was in correspondence with the Prime Minister of the State, Ram Chandra Kak. Sardar's approach was different. In consonance with his own views about the role of the Congress in relation to the Indian States, he was content to advise the State Government and the Prime Minister of the State to come to an amicable settlement with Sheikh Abdullah, a settlement which would not bring down the prestige of the State and its Government, but would at the same time result in restoring normal cordial relations between the Ruler and his subjects. (See *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. I, Serial No. 18.) The replies he received were cordial but not satisfactory; the Prime Minister of the State would not give in to the popular movement, and he

made the usual points about loyalty to the Ruler, the necessity to put down disaffection, etc. There was however no indication of the Ruler being willing to establish representative institutions, with power to the people effectively to participate in the processes of Government. Sardar apparently did not think it politic to force the issue at that stage. The situation thus remained in a flux.

Things took a dramatic turn with the announcement of the partition plan of June 1947. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar, the two outstanding leaders of the Indian freedom movement, who had already assumed the reins of Government, freely availed themselves of the good offices of the Governor-General and Viceroy, Mountbatten to support their own efforts in getting the accession of the Indian States on the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications. The position of Jammu and Kashmir as a frontier State was somewhat complicated. In regard to this State, the view of Sardar seems to have been somewhat different from that of Mountbatten, though Sardar did not wish to interfere with the talks Mountbatten was carrying on with the Ruler of the State. Mountbatten professed not to take any sides as to the Dominion to which the State should accede. All that he told the Maharaja was that before 15 August 1947, the date fixed for the transfer of power, the latter should make up his mind one way or another in the light of relevant factors, in the exposition of which, according to the Maharaja there was a tilt towards Pakistan. Mountbatten went to the length of assuring the Maharaja that, if he chose to accede to Pakistan, India would not create any trouble for him. Sardar permitted Mountbatten to convey this assurance more for tactical than for political reasons, but in his own mind he seems to have been clear about his personal preference that the State should accede to India and democratise its administration. Sardar categorically told the Maharaja that the interest of the Jammu and Kashmir State lay in joining the Indian Dominion without delay (Serial Nos. 2 and 3). But again he did not press this view overmuch.

He appreciated the Maharaja's difficulty. On the one hand, accession to Pakistan would have meant linking up with a professedly communal State, and an immediate threat not only to the Ruler and his dynasty, but also to the minorities among his subjects. These were several—the Hindus in the Jammu area, the Hindus in the Kashmir valley, the Buddhists of Ladakh. Further, the Muslims of the Kashmir valley, constituting the majority of the population, were both racially and linguistically different from their fellow religionists of the Punjab and the rest of Pakistan. On the other hand, there was a possibility that accession to India would create complications of a different kind. The boundary between the two Dominions had not at that stage been determined. Pending the Radcliffe award, the whole of Gurdaspur District, which contained the common boundary between the future Indian Dominion and the State, had been "notionally" included in Pakistan, and if this were to be confirmed it would mean that, except through the high Himalayan mountainous terrain there would be no common frontier between the Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Dominion. Eventually under the Radcliffe award, the Pathankot area was given to India, but the award itself was published only a couple of days after the transfer of power. So the Maharaja hesitated; and Sardar understood his hesitation, though others including Mountbatten misunderstood him.

Things moved rapidly after independence. Even though the Radcliffe award gave a common frontier between India and the Jammu and Kashmir State, the road communication between them was still very unsatisfactory, as compared with the excellent road between Rawalpindi and Srinagar and the railway between Jammu and Sialkot. Pakistan under Jinnah's rule became aggressively anti-Kashmir. It did not hesitate to conclude a standstill agreement with the State; but, in spite of the agreement, Pakistan imposed a virtual blockade on the State by stopping free movement of essential supplies. There now seems no doubt that Jinnah's squeeze was aimed at

bringing about the removal of the Maharaja and the absorption of the State in Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan had already made preparations to infiltrate and take over the northern territories of the State, including Gilgit, and in a couple of months after independence the Maharaja's writ ceased to run in that portion of the State.

Real and more extensive trouble for the State was not long in coming. The State administration had been carrying on with a stopgap Prime Minister after Ram Chandra Kak was dismissed from office by the Maharaja practically on the eve of Independence. With Sardar's help the Maharaja secured the services of Mehrchand Mahajan, at the time a judge of the Punjab High Court. Meanwhile, in an effort to force the issue and get what they thought would be an easy gain, Pakistan had been inciting and encouraging the tribes from the North-West Frontier to invade the State in large numbers. These tribesmen were led by regular officers of the Pakistan Army and were afforded liberal use of weapons and transport provided by the Pakistan Government. Counting on the comparative isolation of the State from India and the comparative weakness of the Maharaja and his forces, they probably reckoned that the over-throw of the State would be effected without any difficulty and that the State would fall to them like a ripe apple.

At this time Sheikh Abdullah also played his part. He wrote a letter to the Maharaja promising steadfast loyalty (Serial No. 4) and the Maharaja on his side reciprocated by declaring a general amnesty for political prisoners and releasing Abdullah and his associates (Serial No. 6).

The tide of invasion through Pakistan gained momentum in October 1947. The scattered forces of the Maharaja, depleted by heavy desertions from among the Muslim ranks, was, perhaps inevitably, unable to halt this tide and by 22 October the invaders were making a serious bid to march into Srinagar. A considerable portion of the State, including the frontier area formerly known as Gilgit agency, was already in enemy

hands, and the threat to the capital and with it to the valley of Kashmir was grave and imminent. It was at this critical desperate moment that the Maharaja appealed to the Dominion of India for help, especially military assistance, offering accession on defence, external affairs and communications on the same terms as other Indian States (Serial No. 16). The Government of India realised that the fate of the State could not be left to be decided by force and violence, and that they themselves had a responsibility in the matter. The Government of India accordingly accepted the accession and thereby Jammu and Kashmir State became an integral part of the Indian Dominion (Serial No. 17). The Indian Government also rushed their armed forces by air to Srinagar to clear the valley of the invader. The decision to undertake this operation was taken at the political level, in spite of the warning of Mountbatten and the military authorities that it was a hazardous proceeding. Nevertheless, India decided to face the odds, to come to the rescue of a harassed State and to resist avarice and cupidity on the part of a neighbour; the operation turned out to be a success, and Jammu and Kashmir was saved.

Interesting light on Sardar's role in making this decision is thrown by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, at the time the principal lieutenant of Sheikh Abdullah. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was present at the crucial meeting in Delhi. He records :

“Lord Mountbatten presided over the meeting. Among those who attended the meeting were Panditji (Jawaharlal Nehru), [Sardar], Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh, General Bucher, the Commander-in-Chief, General Russell, Army Commander, and myself. Military situation in our State and possibility and manner of rushing assistance were under discussion. General Bucher asserted that resources available to him were so meagre that military assistance to the State would not be possible. Lord Mountbatten exhibited studied diffidence. Panditji presented a picture of acute anxiety and deep concern. Sardar listened, did

not utter a word. He was a picture of calm equipoise. His silence was a strange contrast to a picture of defeatism and helplessness that otherwise pervaded in the meeting. Suddenly Sardar moved in his seat and immediately after his gruff and resolute voice attracted everybody. He conveyed the following : 'Look here, Generals, Kashmir must be defended at all costs and come what may, resources or no resources. You must do it and all assistance will be rendered by Government. This must, must and must be done. Do whatever you like, but do it....' The Generals wore a grim look. A ray of hope shot through me. The Generals might have wished to demur, but Sardar quietly got up and saying that arrangements for 'operation airlift' would be ready by the next morning.... Defence of Kashmir thus was the result of Sardar's decisiveness and determined will to implement the decision, whatever the odds."

The accession of the State and the involvement of the Indian army in its defence was followed by a sincere effort on the part of the Indian Dominion Government to put an end to the conflict with Pakistan, and Mountbatten himself personally took a hand in these negotiations. The offer made by Mountbatten to Jinnah was the adoption of a formula providing that, where the Ruler of a State did not belong to the community of the majority of his subjects, and where the State had not acceded to the Dominion whose majority community was the same as that of the State, the question of which Dominion the State would accede should be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people. With reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in particular, there was a specific commitment that in accordance with this policy the Government of India would, as soon as law and order had been established in the State and its soil cleared of the invaders agree to the question of its accession to be settled by a reference to the people (Serial No. 17). In the discussion with Pakistan, the proposal was also made that the

plebiscite in the State should be held under UN auspices. These proposals were however not acceptable to Jinnah, who was angry at the failure of his plan to grab the State; and the talks between him and Mountbatten clearly showed the impossibility of getting the Pakistan Government to agree to a reasonable settlement of the dispute (Serial Nos. 21 and 22).

Having failed to get Pakistan to agree to reasonable principles in regard to the accession of States where the Ruler did not belong to the community of the majority of its subjects, the Government of India had to deal with what was blatant military aggression by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. It was decided, largely at the instance of Mountbatten, to invoke the good offices of the United Nations, and a formal complaint was made on 1 January 1948. Sardar himself, though he had acquiesced in the decision, was not present in Delhi when the complaint was made, and he was personally sceptical of the outcome of the reference to the United Nations. He feared that the United Nations discussions would get bogged down in the game of power politics, and that the comparatively simple issue referred to it would be lost sight of. He also thought that if the matter was to go to the UN, it was better India figured as a defendant than as a complainant. The issue was thereafter dealt with in the Ministry of External Affairs under the personal supervision of Nehru, who was advised by N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. Sardar, out of deference to Nehru in this, as in other matters, did not press his views, and was content to advise when suitable occasions arose. One such occasion may be recalled. Pakistan had in the discussions in the United Nations totally denied its direct involvement in Kashmir. This involvement could no longer be concealed when the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan actually came to the sub-continent. In its resolution of 13 August 1948 the Commission referred to the presence of Pakistan troops as constituting a "material change" in the situation as it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council and its proposal was that the Government of Pakistan

“agrees to withdraw its troops” from the State. Sardar’s firm advice was that Pakistan should accept the Resolution (and the clear fact of its military aggression) before India agreed to further discussions. But the discussions went on, until India had to agree to cease fire and a consequential line and the further resolution of 5 January 1949 which was biased in **favour of Pakistan’s views and placed India and Pakistan** virtually on a plane of equality. These discussions diluted the UN Security Commission’s resolution of August 1948, blurred the fact of Pakistan aggression, left large areas of the State in Pakistani control and laid more emphasis on the plebiscite than on the basic issue of aggression.

One other matter affecting Indo-Pakistan relations arising out of the Kashmir dispute may be mentioned here. The Union Cabinet had decided that the payment of the Pakistan’s share of the cash balances on partition, amounting to 550 million rupees, should be postponed until other outstanding agreements had been honoured by Pakistan. This was a decision taken by the Cabinet as a whole, without any dissentient voice. Sardar was specially strong in his views on this question as he felt that the payment would amount to handing over the sinews of war to it. But under Mountbatten’s persuasion in January 1948, Gandhiji, shortly after commencing his fast, took a high moral stand and insisted that payment should be made, whatever Pakistan had done or had not done. An emergency meeting of the Cabinet was held and it was decided that the amount should be paid immediately. Sardar was touched to the quick and felt the blow greatly but had no alternative but to give in.

The immediate problems to be attended to in the State can be briefly summarised:

- (i) Consistent with the stand taken by Sardar and the Government of India that the accession of Indian States should be followed by democratisation of their administrations. Sheikh Abdullah, the undoubted leader of the majority population of the State, was made the

Head of the Emergency Administration of the State. For the time being in fact he was virtually in entire charge of the State Government, the Prime Minister and the Maharaja having had to go into the background. It was agreed at the time between Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar on the one hand and Abdullah himself on the other that there would be established a constitutional set-up on the Mysore pattern under which the main tasks of government would be entrusted to a Council of Ministers headed by Sheikh Abdullah, while some subjects would be reserved to the Maharaja who would have the assistance of a Dewan appointed by him. The matters so reserved were mainly matters personal to the Ruler, the relations of the State with the Dominion Government, the control over the State Forces, appointment of High Court Judges, etc. The mode of giving effect to this decision and working out its details were still to be finalised.

- (ii) The prosecution of the military operations against the tribesmen and the Pakistan Forces, which had now openly entered the fray. This was a matter more or less exclusively for the Indian Army, but the co-operation of the State Government and people was obviously very necessary, especially in the construction of roads, transport of supplies and other similar matters.
- (iii) At the instance of Mountbatten and Prime Minister Nehru, the Government of India had made a public declaration (this has already been referred to) that the acceptance of the accession of the State was subject to the proviso that, when the State had been cleared of the raiders and normal conditions were restored, the wishes of the people would be ascertained on the issue of accession under UN auspices. Both Sardar and Nehru were anxious that the State should stay acceded to India, and that the people of the State

should be made to feel that their future lay in remaining with India. In this effort Sheikh Abdullah was at the time in full agreement and was expected to play the pivotal role.

Sardar had already done a great deal for the State even before it acceded; he had taken in hand the question of sending in supplies so essentially needed, in order to counteract the Pakistan "blockade". In addition, he had taken the initiative in the rapid construction of good road communication between Pathankot and Jammu, and the rapid construction of this road was directly due to his initiative. Now that the State had acceded, and had become a part of India, it became Sardar's responsibility as Minister for States to give financial assistance to the State, and to organise all manner of assistance to it by the transport of all essential goods required by its people. His standing in the Cabinet and his influence with the Ministers and civil servants, coupled with his single-mindedness of purpose, ensured that there was no let-up in these activities.

He had now to devote his energies to the working out of administrative arrangements which, while introducing the democratic principle, would also safeguard the dignity of the Ruler. With Sheikh Abdullah's antipathy to the Ruler, which was fully reciprocated, this was a difficult task. As head of the emergency administration, Sheikh Abdullah was virtually in full charge. In a letter dated 22 November 1947, Mehrchand Mahajan complained (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 1. Serial No. 81):

"There should not be any further delay in the formation of an Interim Government. Sheikh Sahib, I suppose is in no hurry about it, having got dictatorial powers which are exercised in a dictatorial manner, regardless of all rules and forms of law. There is no reason why an Interim Government on the Mysore model should not be formed. I will, however, act as advised."

He also gave some instances of the "dictatorial manner" (Serial Nos. 34 and 35). The situation had to be tactfully handled because—

- (i) in law, the Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler was the sole and only basis on which the Government of India had any *locus standi* in the State; and the maintenance of the status and dignity of the Ruler, consistent of course with the establishment of the democratic principle, was vital for maintaining this legal basis;
- (2) politically, Sardar was at the time negotiating with all the Rulers, and any move to eliminate the Ruler or unduly affect his status and dignity would have reacted adversely on the implementation of his policies, in relation to the Indian States; the Rulers were now fully co-operating with him in all his policies, and extending their assistance in all India, as well as local matters;
- (3) in the global movement towards freedom and with the issue pending in the United Nations, the devolution of power to a popular Government became a matter of urgent necessity.

The personal antipathy of Sheikh Abdullah to the Maharaja despite the earlier letter of submission became increasingly manifest after accession and his installation in the office of Head of the Emergency Administration. Through the years Sheikh Abdullah had always been antagonistic to the Ruler. It has already been mentioned that the "Quit Kashmir" movement was personally spearheaded by Sheikh Abdullah though it had not been approved either by the All-India States Peoples' Conference or even the National Conference, the policy of All-India States Peoples' Conference being responsible Government under the aegis of the Rulers. Subsequent events had only made these personal feelings more bitter. Sheikh Abdullah's efforts were clearly designed to enlarge his own powers vis-a-vis both the Maharaja and Mehrchand Mahajan. What is more, he was determined to chalk out an independent line in his relations with the Government of India. Even Pandit Nehru failed to check him in his course. Sheikh Abdullah started

insisting that the "Mysore plan" to which he himself was a party should be given up, Mahajan sent away and entire authority concentrated in the Council of Ministers, of which he was the head. He based the need for this on the argument that he had to work among the people and win them over to his side if there was the possibility of a plebiscite. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Minister in the Central Government, was entrusted with the negotiations to reach a settlement acceptable to the Maharaja and Abdullah, but he found it impossible to get Abdullah to agree to a Dewan presiding over the meetings of the Council of Ministers on the lines of the arrangements in force in Mysore and therefore concentrated on the Maharaja to give in to Sheikh Abdullah. In a letter to the Maharaja on 9 December 1947 (Serial No. 30) he referred to the obvious impossibility of continuing the arrangements introduced when the State was faced by an imminent threat of invasion, and an Emergency Administration was set up with Sheikh Abdullah at its head and with honorary heads of Departments chosen by and working under him; he referred to the fact that this arrangement to meet the emergency and the ordinary civil administration which nominally continued a Council of Ministers with a Prime Minister as its chief was not functioning at all with any effectiveness and was not only unworkable and was fraught with both danger and disaster. The solution he suggested was that there should be a unified interim Government with Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister and the other Ministers chosen on his advice. He also proposed virtual transfer of all power and authority to the Council of Ministers, even though they would not be members of the State Praja Sabha, but would be representative of the national-minded elements in the population of the State. He told the Maharaja—

. . . from every point of view it is imperative that towards the interim Government you should function as the constitutional Head of a State and on its advice. . . .

In this set-up Gopalaswami Ayyangar found that Sheikh Abdullah would not reconcile himself to the interposition of a

person like Mahajan as the Maharaja's Chief Constitutional Adviser; and the solution he offered was that Mahajan should leave. The Maharaja protested. He pointed out (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 1. Enclosure to Serial No. 94) that Mysore model was not his own idea, but was a suggestion from the Government of India put to him by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru; and that Sheikh Abdullah himself not only had accepted the Mysore model, but had in his public speeches publicly announced his acceptance of it. The Maharaja was anxious to retain Mahajan in whom he had confidence as Dewan presiding as the Mysore Dewan did, over meetings of the Cabinet and advising the Maharaja on the "reserved" subjects. Sardar was in a difficult situation. He had negotiated for accession with all the Indian States, and all of them except Hyderabad and Junagadh had accepted his assurances given at the time and acceded to India. Sardar was therefore anxious to honour the assurances given to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, especially because he knew that substantial power in the governance of the State would now vest in Sheikh Abdullah and his Ministry. Sardar had already brought it to the notice of Gopalaswami Ayyangar that, unless the Maharaja could be persuaded to alter it, the Government of India could not insist on him to accept any change and had obtained an assurance from Gopalaswami Ayyangar that there was no question of the Government of India "imposing anything on the Maharaja" and that he was only trying to "persuade him to accept what we consider to be the proper thing to do in the existing circumstances". Sardar therefore felt obliged to point out that the Government of India could not put much more pressure on the Maharaja in regard to these arrangements, or compel him to send away Mahajan. For his part Mahajan himself was perfectly willing to abide by the decision of the Government of India. At the same time Sardar did not wish to force the issue, especially because Nehru was supporting Abdullah. There was at this stage some further lengthy correspondence between N Gopalaswami Ayyangar and the Maharaja on the

arrangements to be made. In a letter dated 24 December 1947, Gopalaswami Ayyangar made two points—

- (1) He agreed that, following the Mysore arrangements, some subjects should be 'reserved' for the Ruler.
- (2) He conceded that there should be a Dewan, appointed by the Maharaja, who would have the right to attend Cabinet meetings and who would be closely associated with the work of the Cabinet and would function as an effective liaison officer between the Cabinet and the Ruler, interpreting the one to the other and aiding and advising the Ruler in the transaction of business connected with reserved subjects.

At this point the main difference was on the Maharaja's insistence, which was in consonance with earlier assurances given to him that the Dewan should preside over the meetings of the Cabinet and that Mehrchand Mahajan should continue in the State, as the Ruler had confidence in him and valued his integrity and there was a commitment to Mahajan and the Ruler was not willing to go back upon it. But Gopalaswami Ayyangar found it impossible to persuade Sheikh Abdullah to accept the Maharaja's views; and Gopalaswami Ayyangar felt that both the immediate situation in the State, as well as the future demanded that Sheikh Abdullah's hands should be strengthened.

Both Prime Minister Nehru and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar having been unable to convince the Maharaja, they turned to Sardar for help. Sardar undertook the task of persuading the Maharaja and sent the author, his Private Secretary, V. Shankar, to Jammu. He was able to persuade the Maharaja to accept the suggestions of Gopalaswami Ayyangar and allow Mehrchand Mahajan to go.

By the proclamation of 5 March 1948 the Abdullah Ministry was recognised as the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and Mahajan had to leave the service of the State.

Sheikh Abdullah was, however, not content with this. He soon mounted a campaign against the Maharaja personally, even making public statements against him. He accused the Maharaja of the fantastic charge of encouraging the killing of Muslims in Jammu. So deep-seated was Abdullah's feeling against the Maharaja that he initiated an enquiry, and this had to be called off at the instance of the Government of India. But the persistence of Abdullah in his anti-Ruler campaign had its effect. Both Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar appear to have become convinced that, in the critical and delicate situation prevailing in the State, the presence of the Maharaja in the State could be dispensed with whereas the Sheikh was indispensable. Sardar, however, could not place complete trust either in the Sheikh or his influence; he felt that it would be morally wrong to displace the Maharaja whose signature here was responsible for our presence in the State; he also felt aggrieved that the Sheikh having won one point was then insisting on another and was virtually black-mailing India into accepting all his demands. Nevertheless, as a matter of compromise he was anxious not to embarrass Prime Minister Nehru, and, whatever his differences, he not only did not force any issue to the point of a showdown, but on the other hand helped Nehru as much as he could. He therefore undertook the unpleasant task of persuading the Maharaja but the mission was so distasteful to him that he again entrusted the task of negotiation to his Private Secretary; the latter was again able to settle these issues with the Maharaja, who agreed to leave the State and settle down in Bombay, his son Yuvraj Karan Singh taking his place as Regent.

One of Sardar's notable achievements in relation to Jammu and Kashmir was the addition of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, which defines the relation of the State to India. This matter was handled by Gopalaswami Ayyangar in consultation with Sheikh Abdullah and his Ministry and with the approval of Pandit Nehru. Although Nehru was himself away in the United States, at the time, his approval had been taken in advance to the draft formula. But Sardar had not been

consulted. The Congress party in the Constituent Assembly was strongly, even violently, opposed to the draft article which gave a special position to the State. On principle, opinion in the party was that Kashmir should accept the Constitution on the same terms as other States; and in particular the provision that basic articles, e. g. Fundamental Rights as enshrined in the Constitution would not apply to the State was greatly resented. Gopalaswami Ayyanger failed to carry conviction and sought Sardar's intervention. Sardar was anxious, in the absence of Nehru, that nothing should be done which would appear as letting him down. In the absence of Nehru Sardar, therefore, undertook the task of persuading the party to change its stand. He carried out this task with such success that in the Assembly there was not much discussion, and no opposition to the article (Serial No. 96). How much against his conviction he did it is clear from this fact that at one stage, when Gopalaswami Ayyanger had made some changes in the draft article as approved by the party, Sardar made the following typical observation (Serial No. 93):

"I do not at all like any change after our party has approved of the whole arrangement in the presence of the Sheikh Sahib himself. Whenever Sheikh Sahib wishes to back out, he always confronts us with his duty to the people. Of course he owes no duty to India or to the Indian Government, or even on a personal basis to you and the Prime Minister who have gone all out to accommodate him.

In these circumstances, any question of my approval does not arise. If you feel it is the right thing to do you can go ahead with it."

Even in 1949 Abdullah had started his dreams of an independent Kashmir, not aligned either to India or to Pakistan. We find in this correspondence both Sardar and Gopalaswami Ayyanger "ticking him off" for an interview with a foreign Press correspondent in the course of which he advocated

an independent Kashmir, not politically aligned with either India or Pakistan, but guaranteed by India, Pakistan, Great Britain, the United States and also the United Nations, and deriving economic aid from India and Pakistan (Serial Nos. 79, 80, 81).

The correspondence some times reveals a confused state of affairs. This was because Prime Minister Nehru had at times a peculiar method of working. Howsoever intellectually superior he might have been, he looked upon Sardar as superior to himself in the art of managing men and affairs. He had great respect for Sardar's massive commonsense, pragmatism, patriotism and organising capacity. Nevertheless, in the event of a conflict of views on some issue on which he felt strongly, he would always like to buttress himself with the support of others. It was for this reason principally that he brought in Gopalaswami Ayyangar to help him on matters relating to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, External Affairs, and Pakistan. When Gopalaswami Ayyangar was no more, he leaned on Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. After him he leaned on Govind Ballabh Pant. Consequently, Kashmir affairs were handled by Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar principally, with Sardar coming in occasionally to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. This overlapping of responsibility became even more marked when the question was referred to the United Nations; then every domestic issue of importance relating to the State became involved with external relations. Another fact must be borne in mind in this context. Kashmir was an emotional issue with the Prime Minister. Gopalaswami Ayyangar had a Kashmir past of his own; only Sardar could bring to bear on the problem an outside view, to some extent, however, conditioned by his own views on Muslim politics.

The problem of Jammu and Kashmir both nationally and internationally is still with us. Internationally, because it continues to be on the agenda of the United Nations and Pakistan keeps on raising it now and again in varying degrees of violence and intensity. The United Nations observers are

still there in pursuance of the resolutions which have been accepted by India and Pakistan. The Jammu and Kashmir issue figured both in the Tashkent agreement and in the Simla Pact. **Howsoever much we may delude ourselves into thinking** that it does not exist on the international register, we cannot unilaterally efface it. Nationally, it exists because not only does the State occupy at present a special position in the Constitution in distinction with the other units of the Indian Union but also because certain elements within the State keep on raising the question of accession and the form of relationship with India.

There is a general belief that if the question of Jammu and Kashmir had been left to Sardar it would have been settled once for all. It is reported that at one time both Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad approached him with the request that he should take the problem in his own hands, but that he declined, saying that the problem was the special preserve of the Prime Minister Nehru and consequently he must deal with it.

It is for the reader to judge in the light of the correspondence extracted in this chapter and of the background material whether this belief has any basis in fact.

## *SELECT CORRESPONDENCE*

### 1. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR, DATED 20 JULY 1946 (EXTRACT)

... On arrival here this morning I received a letter from the Viceroy which was in answer to one I had written to him about my proposed visit to Kashmir. He mentioned that the Maharaja had written to me. ...

The Viceroy wrote that if I was anxious to go to Kashmir I could go there and there would be no ban. He hoped that I would observe the laws of the State, etc. On receipt of this letter I finally decided to go to Kashmir on 24th. I informed the Viceroy accordingly and have written and telegraphed to the Maharaja.

After making these arrangements I got a long telegram from the Nawab of Bhopal this evening pressing me not to go to Kashmir at present. I have sent him an equally long reply appreciating his sentiments but pointing out that in view of what the Viceroy had written to me and the arrangements had been made it was difficult for me to cancel my trip; further that I was going there on a peaceful mission and not for trouble. So I propose to go on the 24th morning. I expect to be there about four days. Then I shall hurry back to Allahabad where I have some important work.

It is not my intention to raise any major issues in Kashmir at this stage. I shall also see Sheikh Abdullah and join in consultation about his defence. I shall also visit parts of the city and meet some people. I do not propose to hold public meetings and the like, though it may happen, of course, that crowds gather occasionally where I go. ...

There is no question of Maulana (Azad) going to Kashmir at present. I know nothing about it.

## 2. SARDAR TO R. C. KAK, DATED 3 JULY 1947

I am addressing this letter to you after a long time with a heavy sense of responsibility. I invite your attention to the second paragraph of my last letter of 11 April 1947, after which I have not written to you, as you did not choose to send any reply. Conditions in India have since changed considerably, and I do not know how your mind is working at present.

You are aware that on 15 August, India, though divided, will be completely free, and you also know that by this time a vast majority of States have joined the Constituent Assembly of India. I realise the peculiar difficulties of Kashmir, but looking to its history and its traditions, it has, in my opinion, no other choice.

Do you still think that Sheikh Abdullah should continue to remain in jail ? I am asking this question purely in the interest of Kashmir State. You know my attitude all along and my sympathy towards the State. I am once again advising you as a friend of the State to reconsider the matter without any delay.

His Excellency's visit was the proper time when this should have been done, but if it is not done now, perhaps it may be too late. I do not wish to write anything more.

## 3. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, DATED 3 JULY 1947

Rai Bahadur Gopaldas (a prominent Hindu of Lahore) saw me today and conveyed to me the substance of your conversation with him. I am sorry to find that there is considerable misapprehension in your mind about the Congress. Allow me to assure Your Highness that the Congress is not

only not your enemy, as you happen to believe, but there are in the Congress many strong supporters of your State. As an organisation, the Congress is not opposed to any Prince in India. It has no quarrel with the States. It is true that recent events resulting in the arrest of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and the continued detention of Sheikh Abdullah have created a feeling of great dissatisfaction amongst many Congressmen who wish well of your State. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru belongs to Kashmir. He is proud of it, and rest assured he can never be your enemy.

It is unfortunate that none of the Congress leaders has got any contact with Your Highness. Personal contact would have removed much of the misunderstanding, which probably is based largely on misinformation gathered through sources not quite disinterested.

Having had no personal contact, my correspondence has been with your Prime Minister since the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, and my efforts have been to persuade him to have a different approach to the problem, which in the long run would be in the interest of the State.

Is it necessary to assure you that in your domestic affairs the Congress has no intention whatever of interfering ? If it had not been so, the Constituent Assembly would not have been able to attract a vast majority of Princes who have joined it and I have no doubt that the rest will also join with very few exceptions who have no choice owing to peculiar circumstances, for instance Bahawalpur, Kalat, etc. In the Negotiating Committee, your Prime Minister was present, and our decisions were unanimous in the four meetings that he attended. In these meetings, all the Princes got complete satisfaction from us about their special rights, privileges, etc. which they enjoyed.

I fully appreciate the difficult and delicate situation in which your State has been placed, but as a sincere friend and well-wisher of the State, I wish to assure you that the interest

of Kashmir lies in joining the Indian Union and its Constituent Assembly without any delay. Its past history and traditions demand it, and all India looks up to you and expects you to take that decision. Eighty per cent of India is on this side. The States that have cast their lot with the Constituent Assembly have been convinced that their safety lies in standing together with India.

I was greatly disappointed when His Excellency the Viceroy returned without having a full and frank discussion with you on the fateful Sunday when you had given an appointment which could not be kept because of your sudden attack of colic pain. He had invited you to be his guest at Delhi, and in that also he was disappointed. I had hopes that we would meet here, but I was greatly disappointed when His Excellency told me that you did not avail of the invitation.

May I take the liberty of suggesting that it would be better if you even now come to Delhi, when you will certainly be his guest ? We want an opportunity of having a frank and free discussion with you in an atmosphere of freedom, and I have no doubt that all your doubts and suspicions, of which I have heard from Gopaldas, will completely disappear. In Free India, you cannot isolate yourself, and you must make friends with the leaders of Free India who want to be friends with you.

#### 4. SHEIKH ABDULLAH TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, DATED 26 SEPTEMBER 1947

It is after about one and a half years' incarceration, as long wished, I had an opportunity of having detailed talks with Thakur Nichantchandji (brother of the Maharani). What unfortunate things happened during this period in the State I need not mention. But this is now realised by every well-wisher of the State that many of the regrettable happenings of the past have mainly been due to the misunderstandings

which appear now to have deliberately been created by interested people in order to achieve their own ends. R. B. Ramchandra Kak, the ex-Prime Minister, through his mischievous methods and masterly manoeuvrings, brought these misunderstandings to a climax and succeeded in his attempt, though temporarily, to a certain extent. He painted me and my organisation in the darkest colours and in everything that we did or attempted to do to bring Your Highness and your people closer, base and selfish motives were attributed to me. But God be thanked that all these enemies of Your Highness and State stand exposed today.

In spite of what has happened in the past, I assure Your Highness that myself and my party have never harboured any sentiment of disloyalty towards Your Highness' person, throne or dynasty. The development of this beautiful country and the betterment of its people is our common aim and interest and I assure Your Highness the fullest and loyal support of myself and my organisation. Not only this but I assure Your Highness that any party, within or without the State which may attempt to create any impediments in our efforts to gain our goal will be treated as our enemy and will be treated as such.

In order to achieve the common aim set forth above, mutual trust and confidence must be the mainstay. Without this it would not be possible to face successfully the great difficulties that beset our State on all sides at present.

Before I close this letter I beg to assure Your Highness once again of my steadfast loyalty and pray that God may grant me opportunity enough to let this country attain under Your Highness' aegis such an era of peace, prosperity and good government that it may be second to none and be an ideal for others to copy.

5. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1947

I am writing to you about Kashmir. I met Mahajan before he went there and had a talk with him. I felt that his approach might not be wholly successful.

2. It is obvious to me from the many reports I have received that the situation there is a dangerous and deteriorating one. The Muslim League in the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. are making preparations to enter Kashmir in considerable numbers. The approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India. The only normal route then is via the Jhelum valley. The Jammu route can hardly be used during winter and air traffic is also suspended. Therefore it is important that something should be done before these winter conditions set in. This means practically by the end of October or, at the latest, the beginning of November. Indeed, air traffic will be difficult even before that.

3. I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of the coming winter.

4. Whether this strategy succeeds or not depends upon the forces opposed to it. I rather doubt if the Maharaja and his State forces can meet the situation by themselves and without some popular help. They will be isolated from the rest of India and if their own people go against them, it will be very difficult to meet the situation. Obviously the only major group that can side with them is the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership. If by any chance that is hostile or even passive, then the Maharaja and his Government become isolated and the Pakistani people will have a relatively free field.

5. It becomes important, therefore, that the Maharaja should make friends with the National Conference so that there might be this popular support against Pakistan. Indeed, it seems to me that there is no other course open to the Maharaja but this : to release Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference Leaders, to make a friendly approach to them, seek their co-operation and make them feel that this is really meant and then to declare adhesion to the Indian Union. Once the State accedes to India, it will become very difficult for Pakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union. If, however, there is delay in this accession, then Pakistan will go ahead without much fear of consequences, specially when the winter isolates Kashmir.

6. It seems to me urgently necessary, therefore, that the accession to the Indian Union should take place early. It is equally clear to me that this can only take place with some measure of success after there is peace between the Maharaja and the National Conference and they co-operate together to meet the situation. This is not an easy task; but it can be done chiefly because Abdullah is very anxious to keep out of Pakistan and relies upon us a great deal for advice. At the same time, he cannot carry his people with him unless he has something definite to place before them. What this can be in the circumstances I cannot define precisely at the present moment. But the main thing is that the Maharaja should try to gain the goodwill and co-operation of Abdullah. This is the belief also of various minorities in Kashmir who have no other support to lean upon. I do not think it is possible for the Maharaja to function for long if no major section of the population supports him. It would be a tragedy if the National Conference remains passive owing to frustration and lack of opportunity.

7. Nobody can guarantee what will happen in this complicated situation. But the course I have suggested seems to me

the wisest one and the most likely to produce results. But it is important that there should be no delay. The time element cannot be forgotten and delay itself may cut us off completely from Kashmir owing to the approach of winter.

8. I tried to explain much of this to Mahajan. But I fear he only partly appreciated what I said. I do not know what advice you gave to him. Your advice will naturally go a long way either to the Maharaja or to Mahajan.

9. At the present moment Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues are still in prison. It seems to me very injurious to future developments. Unfortunately the Maharaja cannot make up his mind easily.

10. I hope you will be able to take some action in this matter to force the pace and to turn events in the right direction. We have definitely a great asset in the National Conference provided it is properly handled. It would be a pity to lose this. Sheikh Abdullah has repeatedly given assurances of wishing to co-operate and of being opposed to Pakistan; also to abide by my advice.

11. I would again add that time is of the essence of the business and things must be done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible with the co-operation of Sheikh Abdullah.

6. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU & KASHMIR,  
DATED 2 OCTOBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 26 September 1947. I went to Amritsar on 30 September and delivered to Justice Mahajan the letters which Thakur Harnam Singh had brought from Your Highness. I had also a further talk with Justice Mahajan and understand that he is joining your service very shortly.

I need hardly say how pleased we all are at the general amnesty which Your Highness has proclaimed. I have no doubt

that this would rally round you the men who might otherwise have been a thorn in your side. I can assure Your Highness of my abiding sympathy with you in your difficulties; nor need I disguise the instinctive responsibility I feel for ensuring the safety and integrity of your State. I can, therefore, assure you that in everything that we do we shall pay the highest regard to the interests of your State. Sheikh Abdullah will be coming to Delhi shortly and we shall endeavour to reach a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which you have from that quarter. I shall then suggest to Your Highness how best we can proceed further.

In the meantime, I am expediting as much as possible the linking up of the State with the Indian Dominion by means of telegraph, telephones, wireless and roads. We fully realize the need for despatch and urgency and I can assure you that we shall do our best.

7. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 5 OCTOBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

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I enclose also a brief statement by Dewan Shiv Saran Lal, (Serial No. 8) who has been Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan in the Frontier. He is on leave and is in Delhi at present. He is a very straight and reliable man and knows the Frontier thoroughly. What he says must be based on knowledge. I am going to see him tomorrow to discuss the matter with him.

Shiv Saran Lal's statement demonstrates the immediate danger to Kashmir State. What we can do about it, I do not know. Anyhow, we should think about it jointly and devise some plan. I think you should also inform the Maharaja of Kashmir. The Maharaja has some knowledge of it already. These further details might help him to get a true view of the situation.

8. STATEMENT BY DEWAN SHIV SARAN LAL, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DERA ISMAIL KHAN (On Leave)

( RECORDED ON 5 OCTOBER 1947 BY V. H. COELHO,  
PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER )

1. About a fortnight back a scheme had been started to send armed tribal people to the Pakistan Kashmir border from Malakand to Sialkot.

About five lakhs have moved—more are moving in large numbers.

Transported by lorries (civilian as well as military) provided by Pakistan Government.

Arms confiscated and seized from non-Muslims in these areas are being supplied to the tribal people.

Factories in Frontier are producing more arms and ammunition.

2. States of Dir, Swat and Chitral are also preparing for an attack on Kashmir from the north-west.

The Wali of Swat has been promised Kashmir.

3. Intense propaganda is being carried out in the Frontier

4. Mr. Shiv Saran Lal thinks that it is possible to create internal tribal dissensions which would keep the tribes occupied and divert their attention from projects planned by the Pakistan Government.

9. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 8 OCTOBER 1947

I am returning herewith Kachru's letter to you, which you so kindly sent to me for perusal (Serial No. 10). After you received this letter, Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir State, was here. He told me that Sheikh and Begum Abdullah were to meet His Highness the Maharaja that day, i. e. 6 October. He also told me that about half the political prisoners had already been released and the other half were to be released within the next two or three days.

2. We all realise that the position is full of dangerous potentialities. We are giving the Kashmir Government as much assistance as possible within the limited resources available. There are all sorts of difficulties in our going all out to assist the State. But I am sure things would improve when Justice Mahajan takes over the Prime Ministership. He is at least keenly alive to the dangers which surround Kashmir and knows his own mind. I hope there would be an end to the almost fatal indecisiveness which has so far been the bane of the Kashmir Government. In the meantime, all that we can and should do is to assist the State to the best of our capacity. I have also impressed upon Batra the need for mobilising popular opinion on the side of the Government. I am sure they themselves realize it.

3. Para 19 of Kachru's letter has a fling which is obviously aimed at me. I do not think that anything which would have been done to Kashmir has been left undone by me; nor am I aware of any difference between you and me on matters of policy relating to Kashmir. Still it is most unfortunate that persons down below should think that there is a gulf between us. It is also distressing to me.

10. DWARKANATH KACHRU TO JAWAHARLAL  
NEHRU, DATED 4 OCTOBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

I am now here for the last four days. Probably I will fly back on Monday. The position here can briefly be summarised thus:

1. Sheikh Sahib and his close associates have decided for the Indian Union.
2. But this decision has not been announced yet and the impression is being given that so far the National Conference have taken no decision.

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6. Speeches are delivered to show that killings of Hindus and Muslims are un-Hindu and un-Islamic; that the issue of accession cannot be decided by a religious sentiment and that the friends and sympathisers of Kashmiris during these years of struggle or sufferings have been Gandhiji, Jawaharlalji and the Congress and not the Muslims or the League or Mr. Jinnah. Attempts are being made to show that Jinnah and the League have done great harm to the popular movement in Kashmir and that the objective of the League and Mr. Jinnah is the preservation of the Princely Order and feudal oppression.

7. It is also emphasised that the objective of the Kashmir National Conference is the attainment of people's sovereignty with the Maharaja enjoying a constitutional position and that this would be the main factor determining the decision of the Conference in the matter of accession. In short, they would join the Dominion which enables them to achieve these objects or helps them in the achievement of their objective.

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11. Sheikh Sahib feels that unless there is a transfer of power to a substantial degree the National Conference may find itself

in a difficult position. To fight the League, to maintain law & order inside the State and to carry the masses with them it is highly essential that a settlement with the National Conference should be brought about simultaneously with the accession to the Union.

12. Alternative to the National Conference is undiluted Muslim Communalism of the most militant type and the National Conference urges that it be taken into confidence and be closely associated with the governance of the country.

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18. I hope you will realise the urgency of the situation here and bear it in mind while talking with the representatives of the Maharaja.

19. I need hardly repeat that you realise the whole position much better than most of us but I hope your colleagues will also take a similar view of the situation here.

11. SARDAR TO MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN,  
DATED 21 OCTOBER 1947  
( EXTRACT )

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. . . I have had further discussions with him (Sheikh Abdullah). He seems to me genuinely anxious to co-operate and sincerely desirous of assisting the State in dealing with the external dangers and internal troubles with which it is threatened. But, at the same time, as is natural, he feels that unless something is done and is done immediately to strengthen his hands both in popular eyes and in dealings with those dangers, it would be impossible for him to do anything substantial.

I myself feel that the position which Sheikh Abdullah takes up is understandable and reasonable. In the mounting demands for the introduction of responsible government in States, such as you have recently witnessed in Travancore and Mysore, it is impossible for you to isolate yourself.

It is obvious that in your dealings with the external dangers and internal commotion with which you are faced, mere brute force is not enough. We, on our part, have pledged to give you the maximum support and we will do so. But I am afraid, without some measure of popular backing, particularly from amongst the community which represents such an overwhelming majority in Kashmir, it would be difficult to make such support go to the farthest limit that is necessary if we are to crush the disruptive forces which are being raised and organised. Nor do I think it would be possible for you to maintain for long the exclusive or the predominant monopoly of any particular community in your security services. It is as necessary for you to treat those who are willing to cooperate with trust and confidence in respect of these services as in respect of others which are generally termed nation building departments.

In all these circumstances, it is my sincere and earnest advice to you to make a substantial gesture to win Sheikh Abdullah's support. I have no desire to suggest that you should do so in a manner which would be completely revolutionary in character. Such a step may undermine the loyal and willing support of the body politic. I fully realise that His Highness would like to safeguard his position and that of the State in certain matters. I have no doubt that human ingenuity, statesmanship and conciliation can find a solution in which Sheikh Sahib's position can be safeguarded without in any way jeopardising that of His Highness.

I feel that it would be in our mutual interests for you to reflect calmly and dispassionately on what I have said above. It would, in my opinion, be best if you could come here for consultation and, if possible, His Highness could be persuaded to come here as well. We could then hammer out something which would rally popular support in defence of the State both from without and from within....

12. MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 23 OCTOBER 1947  
( EXTRACT )

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I note your views about the constitutional position in the State (Serial No. 11) but the situation in the State at the present moment is such that one cannot get a single moment to think of politics. We are practically working on a war basis and every minute of our time is taken up with the border situation which is worsening everyday. Practically the whole of our Muslim military and police has either deserted or has not behaved in the proper manner. The help that you kindly promised has not arrived and we are surrounded on all sides. You will agree with me that it is hardly the time to think of any constitutional issues. As soon as I get breathing time I will come to you and discuss these matters. All I pray is that kindly implement the promise you made for sending equipment to us but which has not so far arrived.

13. MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 23 OCTOBER 1947

I am enclosing herewith a draft of a Press Note that I propose to issue (Serial No. 14). I seek your advice in the matter. A reply by the earliest airmail will be appreciated. I may mention that we have not yet received the assistance that was promised and the situation is worsening everyday. I am sure that on receipt of this letter you will kindly see that the equipment required by us is flown to Srinagar immediately.

#### 14. DRAFT PRESS NOTE

His Highness and the Premier visited the border of the State with Pakistan from Kathua to Bhimbar. The whole border was in smoke and flames. It was a story of burnt houses, loot, abducted women and mass massacres. Over 75 per cent houses of Hindus and Sikhs within four miles of the border have been looted, burnt; men, women and children have been killed, 303 rifles and ammunition have been recovered from some of the raiders. There is evidence of the use of mortar as well. Pathans with passports have been found raiding the State. Photographs of some persons killed have been taken. Leaflets printed on cloth have been dropped from the air and they are from a band who threatens to invade Jammu and Kashmir. Several Muslim military personnel and police have deserted under communal pressure from outside and some are under arrest at Sialkot with the Pakistan Army as deserters. Clearest evidence of an invasion from outside and an attempt to create an internal revolution on a well-thought-out plan is available. Kotli and Poonch are being similarly invaded and there are signs that Mirpur and Bhimbar may be the next objective. Kotli has been besieged. There is a similar story of villages being looted and burnt. Hindus and Sikhs have been massacred and converted and women being abducted. A Minister of Government is on the spot at Poonch. The result of these raids and attempt to create disturbances and disorder and communal frenzy within the State, which was free from it, has been that retaliation and revenge have started from the local Hindu and Sikh population. Some houses of Muslims have been burnt and looted and there have been a few casualties. Bands of Muslims going to Pakistan en route have attacked Hindus and Sikhs and have killed some persons and some have themselves been killed in this attempt.

The Government of Jammu and Kashmir and its officers are doing their best to protect Muslim houses and give free and safe passages to those who do not owe allegiance and loyalty to His Highness. His Highness' Government wishes to make it plain that if these raids from the Pakistan side do not stop, it will become very difficult to further control the local population which is in a great rage. Hindus and Sikhs cannot stand dishonour and abduction of their womenfolk and killing of their women and children and scenes that have been witnessed in the Punjab may be witnessed in the State in spite of the best efforts of the Jammu and Kashmir Government to protect life, property and honour of women. His Highness' Government again appeals to the rulers of Pakistan to avert this crisis. This is not the time of charges and counter-charges. The Ruler and his Prime Minister have themselves seen all this with their eyes. Let the Governor-General and the Premier of Pakistan come and visit our border and see for themselves whether the reports on which they repudiate our allegations are true or not. It seems local Pakistan officials are not giving correct information and are encouraging these raids. It is not credible that the West Punjab Government is so incompetent as not to be able to allow passage of petrol, cloth, etc. to reach the State border. The Government has enough material to prove that all their actions are well planned. The Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot, the Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi, have both been told all these facts. The Sialkot Brigadier met the State Brigadier at the border and he was given all details. State officials are meeting the Pakistan officials and informing them of all that is happening but with no effect. The result is that raids increase in intensity. No raids could take place if the Pakistan authorities wished to stop them. The Pakistan military was informed by the police that 3,000 refugees had been killed inside the State in a refugee camp. They came and were shown by the State authorities the camp and they discovered the information was a myth. The refugees were being well cared for in the camp.

The telegram of the Pakistan Premier threatens the Jammu & Kashmir Government with serious consequences. The Government of His Highness is not used to such threats and these threats, if repeated, will result in a complete deadlock between Pakistan and the State. It is for His Highness to decide whether he will remain independent or will join any Dominion. He has at present assumed an attitude of neutrality. Is it consistent with the assertions of the rulers of Pakistan to coerce and threaten His Highness not to join the Indian Dominion if he so decides ? It has been asserted quite often by the Pakistan rulers that it is for the rulers of States to decide as they like without external pressure as to the course of action to be adopted and this is in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Independence Act.

The assertion of free communications between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan is denied. No Hindu or Sikh can pass on these roads. Even Kashmiri Muslims who went to Rawalpindi for trade came back empty handed and deprived of the sale proceeds of their goods. There have been a number of casualties of Hindus and Sikhs who attempted to use these roads. Both these roads are completely blocked for use as ordinary trade routes and communication channels.

The Government appeals to the Governor-General, Pakistan, to intervene and order restoration of friendly relations. It also assures the people of the State not to get panicky. There is no cause for it. The situation is well in hand.

15. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 25 OCTOBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

General Rees has managed to obtain some further information about Kashmir confidentially. It appears that Kohala has not been attacked so far. Tribesmen advancing at Uri were intercepted by Kashmir State troops, and a heavy battle appears to be in progress there.

There are now rumours that tribesmen from Dir and Chitral may be advancing on Srinagar.

There are reports that villages in Jammu have been attacked by non-Muslims, and there are rumours that Muslim villages across the border have now been attacked by non-Muslim crowds who are said to have been supported by State troops and police. As General Rees obtained this information on a confidential basis, I would be glad if you would keep this to yourself. . . .

16. MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR TO  
MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 26 OCTOBER 1947

I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate assistance of Your Government. As Your Excellency is aware, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and of my state to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into a standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan Government under the standstill agreement is operating the post and telegraph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, that Government permitted a steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area, then from Sialkot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining Hazara District on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and the looting of Mahura power house, which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a first step to overrunning the whole State. The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from distant areas of the North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in motor trucks, using the Manshera-Mazaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated appeals made by my Government, no attempt has been made to check these raiders or to stop them from coming into my State. In fact, both the radio and the Press of Pakistan have reported these occurrences. The Pakistan radio even put out the story that a provisional government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so, and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and the people to free-booters. On this

basis no civilised Government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.

I may also inform Your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. V. P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the situation and will explain it to you, if further explanation is needed.

#### 17. MOUNTBATTEN TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU & KASHMIR, DATED 27 OCTOBER 1947

Your Highness' letter dated 26 October 1947 has been delivered to me by Mr. V. P. Menon (Serial No. 16). In the circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.

Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness' appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir, to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an Interim Government to work with your Prime Minister.

18. MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 OCTOBER 1947

His Highness and myself are deeply grateful to you for what you did for Kashmir yesterday. H. H. asks to me to convey to you personally his sense of deep obligations for this timely help which was so quickly given. I only depend on your valuable advice and guidance. I apologise for any foolish words I may have said. Now the whole matter is in your hands. Kindly send me the Mysore model and I will send my views how far it can be adopted to a backward State like Kashmir. You can yourself with Bakshiji (Bakshi Tek Chand) finalise it and I will come when called for discussions.

With kindest regards and my thanks once again. It was a most momentous and quick decision ever taken by politicians in India.

19. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 OCTOBER 1947

I have just heard from General Rees that our troops landed successfully at Srinagar and are advancing to meet the tribesmen who are approaching from Baramulla.

There is no doubt that if we could have sent our forces a fortnight ago to Srinagar or could have relieved the State Forces in Jammu to go to Srinagar, the position could have been held with comparative ease. Now I must remind you that the risk is great and that the chances of keeping the raiders out of Srinagar are not too good.

Fortunately the tribesmen are presumably out for loot, and since the Valley has a very small proportion of non-Muslims, they are bound to loot and massacre their own

co-religionists whilst the forces of India support Sheikh Abdullah against them. This, I feel, will gain us a political advantage, and, if Sheikh Abdullah's forces can be rallied in this way, the tribesmen can probably be repulsed before they have done too much looting.

The supply by air or road at this time of year is a hazardous proceeding, as was pointed out by the Chiefs of Staff at the Defence Committee.

General Rees today spoke to a demobilised British Officer who three days ago motored from Srinagar to Abbottabad.

He was held up and robbed by an advancing lashkar (band) of tribesmen who robbed him and also robbed and shot a retired British Officer travelling with him. A Muslim ex-INA Officer then intervened and helped to have these two British Officers motored safely through to Abbtotabad, together with the wife and daughter of the badly wounded officer to look after him.

The British Officer gained the impression that the movement was very definitely organized; that there were ex-INA Officers involved; that a staff for controlling Srinagar (e. g. Deputy Commissioner designate, etc.) was en route to Srinagar; that the Muslim League is involved.

The Mechanical transport used were civilian buses and petrol is very short. Heavy casualties had been inflicted on Kashmir State troops from whom there had probably been a number of desertions.

There was no indication anywhere of Pakistan Army Officers taking part.

The tribesmen included Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds; and it was clearly impossible to prevent them looting.

20. MOUNTBATTEN TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1947

Ismay and I have been working most of the day trying to reconstitute as fairly as we possibly can the burden of our joint conversations with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr Jinnah; and we both think that the enclosed accounts (Serial Nos. 21 & 22) are as fair as can be produced considering that no notes were taken at the time and the conversation with Mr. Jinnah alone lasted over 3 hours. I should be delighted for you to show these to the Deputy Prime Minister but would be grateful if you would not show them to anyone else without consulting me, because the whole basis of our talk was unauthorised and unofficial.

When we arrived there is no doubt that both Liaquat and Jinnah felt that from beginning to end this was a deliberate, long worked out, deep laid plot to secure Kashmir's permanent accession. We worked hard to dispel this illusion but do not guarantee we were successful.

I enclose a very rough note (Serial No. 23) as a possible basis for discussion after which I would suggest that you should draft a telegram to Liaquat sending your proposals for stopping this fighting.

Perhaps you and the Deputy Prime Minister would stay back after the Defence Committee tomorrow morning to discuss it.

May I congratulate you on your broadcast which I have just read and which is admirable and in striking contrast to Mr. Jinnah's statement ?

## 21. MOUNTBATTEN'S TALK WITH LIAQUAT ALI KHAN DATED 1 NOVEMBER 1947

Having made the excuse of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's illness to enable me to take Pandit Nehru to Lahore for a joint Defence Council meeting, I felt it was essential that part of the J. D. C. meeting should take place in Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's presence. On arrival at Lahore, however, I discovered that he was still too ill to come to Government House. I, therefore, got rid of 24 of the 26 items on the agenda with Mr. Nishtar as the Pakistan Government's representative, and then the whole J. D. C. moved down to the Pakistan Prime Minister's House and continued the meeting in his bedroom. Liaquat was sitting up with a rug round his knees still looking very ill.

After the two controversial items had been disposed of everyone left the room excepting Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Lord Ismay and myself.

I began by giving him the statement by the Indian Chiefs of Staff on the sequence of events in Kashmir (Serial No. 24) which I took back from him after he had read it.

I then proceeded to explain the position as I saw it, beginning with the accession of Junagadh and going on through the whole history of the Kashmir situation.

As so much of this is the same as I was later to repeat to Mr. Jinnah, it is not recorded at length.

The burden of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's contention was that the Maharaja had categorically refused any form of negotiations or even discussions with Pakistan and that he had brought about a serious situation by allowing his Hindus, and in particular his State forces, to massacre Muslims in the Poonch and Mirpur areas and across the border of Jammu.

This had been more than the tribes could stand and this was the origin of their raid on Srinagar.

I asked him whether he expected us to believe that Afridis and Mahsuds could have come from beyond Peshawar in motor transport without the Government of Pakistan being at least aware of this. He did not deny knowledge of the movement but defended himself by saying that if they had made any attempt to interfere with the movement of tribes in their own buses, this would have precipitated trouble with the rest of the tribes on the Frontier.

I told him that my Government were quite sincere in their offer of a plebiscite, and showed him the draft formula which would also cover Junagadh (Serial No. 23).

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan appeared to be very depressed and almost disinclined to make any further effort to avoid war. Lord Ismay and I did our best to cheer him up, the former pointing out that, if the leaders on either side abandoned hope of peace, all was indeed lost.

As time was getting on and as Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan looked very tired, we said we would go back to lunch with Mr. Jinnah at Government House and after discussion with him, we would, if he wished, come back and continue our conversation with the Prime Minister. This he gladly accepted and bade us a very friendly *au revoir*.

## 22. MOUNTBATTEN'S DISCUSSION WITH MR. JINNAH, DATED 1 NOVEMBER 1947

### INTRODUCTION

In the course of 3½ hours of the most arduous and concentrated conversation, Kashmir took up most of the time; Junagadh took next place and Hyderabad the least. We darted about between these three subjects as well as talking about the over-all policy affecting States. I have divided this note into

four parts, although this was not necessarily the order in which the subjects were discussed nor of course were all the remarks made consecutively.

#### PART I : INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS STATES WHOSE ACCESSION WAS IN DISPUTE

I pointed out the similarity between the cases of Junagadh and Kashmir and suggested that plebiscites should be held under UNO as soon as conditions permitted. I told Mr. Jinnah that I had drafted out in the aeroplane a formula which I had not yet shown to my Government but to which I thought they might agree. This was the formula:-

“The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.”

Mr. Jinnah's first observation was that it was redundant and undesirable to have a plebiscite when it was quite clear that States should go according to their majority population, and if we would give him the accession of Kashmir he would offer to urge the accession of Junagadh direct to India.

I told him that my Government would never agree to changing the accession of a state against the wishes of the ruler or the Government that made the accession unless a plebiscite showed that the particular accession was not favoured by the people.

Mr. Jinnah then went on to say that he could not accept a formula if it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that Hyderabad did not wish to accede to either Dominion and he could not be a party to coercing them to accession.

I offered to put in some reference to States whose accession was in dispute "to try and get round the Hyderabad difficulty" and he said that he would give that his careful consideration if it was put to him.

I then pointed out that he really could not expect a principle to be applied in the case of Kashmir if it was not applied in the case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, but that we naturally would not expect him to be a party to compulsory accession against the wishes of the Nizam.

#### PART II : HYDERABAD

I told Mr. Jinnah how much I regretted that at this serious moment he should have been compromised by the behaviour of the Ittehad-ul-Muslmin's delegation to Karachi.

He asked me what I meant. I told him that the two delegates, Yamin Zuberi and his companion, who had been reported by the Press as having seen him in Karachi had returned to Hyderabad and were alleged to have influenced the Nizam into going back on his word to accept the stand-still agreement which his Executive Council had passed by six votes to three. The inference had been drawn that they had carried a message to H. E. H. from Mr. Jinnah, and that this was the case of the latter's reversal of his decision.

Mr. Jinnah assured me categorically that he had merely seen these two men out of courtesy, for a matter of five or perhaps seven minutes. They had told him that H.E. H. was about to sign an Instrument of Accession to India and they begged Mr. Jinnah to intervene. Mr. Jinnah had replied that it was outside his power to intervene and that it was only a question for the Nizam and his own Government to decide.

I then recounted to Mr. Jinnah briefly the events which Sir Sultan Ahmed had related to me on 31 October, and Lord Ismay substantiated this account from a letter he had received from Sir Walter Monckton.

Mr. Jinnah once more affirmed most solemnly that he had nothing whatever to do with the recent reversal of the Nizam's

decision. He had sent no verbal message whatsoever to Hyderabad. The advice he had tendered to H. E. H. in writing some time ago was that he was between the devil and the deep blue sea. If he acceded to India, there would be bloodshed in Hyderabad; and if he did not accede, there would equally be bloodshed. Thus an agreement, but not accession, seemed to be the only hope.

I told him that the Nizam had sent me a letter through Sir Sultan Ahmed, dated 30 October, in which he implied that if negotiations now broke down with a new negotiating committee he might have to consider entering into an agreement with Pakistan.

Mr. Jinnah laughed and said, "That looks to me as though he is threatening you. It has nothing to do with me. I have never discussed any form of agreement with the Nizam."

I asked him straight out whether he would be prepared to sign a standstill agreement with Hyderabad if he were asked to by the Nizam. He replied that a standstill agreement implied that there were relations or intertwining factors which formed the basis for a standstill agreement. He could not think of any such factors between Pakistan and Hyderabad, and whereas he did not envisage wishing to sign such an agreement, he would have to examine the matter carefully if it were put to him, before refusing.

I drew his attention to the unfortunate effect it would have if in fact he were to start negotiations with the Nizam after they had been broken off with the Dominion to which he was irretrievably linked geographically and by majority of population.

Mr. Jinnah said he would bear this in mind.

### PART III : JUNAGADH

I read out to Mr. Jinnah the following extract from a statement made by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, which had been published in the Statesman of Friday, 21 September:

“The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has left all Indian States completely free to join either one Dominion or the other or to enter into treaty relations with either. Legally and constitutionally there can be no question of putting limitations on this right of the States. Muslim League leaders before 15 August and the official spokesmen of the Pakistan Government thereafter have publicly declared their agreement with this view; and have since rigorously stood by it. No objection has been raised by Pakistan to any State acceding to the Dominion of India.”

I asked Mr. Jinnah if he still stood rigorously by his Prime Minister's statement. He looked somewhat uneasy but admitted that it represented the legal position. I told him I would revert to this when talking about Kashmir, but in the meanwhile wanted to know what he proposed to do about Junagadh.

He admitted that there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan, and said that he had been most averse from accepting this accession. He had in fact demurred for a long time, but had finally given way to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan.

I told him that in the case of Babariawad and Mangrol, it was clearly the wish of the people that they would be in the Dominion of India, and that they had in fact signed Instruments of Accession to that effect. How then could he refuse them the right of accession? He said that Mangrol's accession had been forced on him, and withdrawn almost before the ink was dry. In any event, he had persuaded the Nawab of Junagadh to accept legal arbitration.

I told him that the Government of India would not have minded the position so much if Junagadh had played the game and not interfered internally in these small States; but that they were oppressing the people, imposing fines and removing their grain. I pointed out that repeated telegrams had been

sent protesting at this. Mr. Jinnah denied this, and stated categorically that neither Pakistan nor Junagadh had sent any soldiers or armed police into these States.

I told him that we had definite information that Junagadh had sent armed police into both of them, and that they were oppressing the people. Pandit Nehru had telegraphed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan about this, and the latter had undertaken to ask Junagadh to withdraw their forces.

When they had failed to do so, the Government of India had telegraphed, a few days back, saying that we would have to protect the interests of these States if the Junagadh forces were not withdrawn. Since they had not been withdrawn, India were going to put in forces to protect their interests, subject to a plebiscite being subsequently held in these States about final accession. They would go in under a flag of truce, with loud-hailers and inviting the cooperation of Junagadh authorities.

Mr. Jinnah lamented that the Government of India had not invited the cooperation of Pakistan beforehand. I pointed out that they had in fact been unable to enforce their own orders and that so far as I was aware, Indian Forces had been sent into these two States that very day.

#### PART IV : KASHMIR

I handed Mr. Jinnah a copy of the statement of events signed by the Indian Chiefs of Staff, which I had shown to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan (Serial No. 24). He asked if he could keep it, but I made him return the original and gave him an unsigned copy. Although he expressed surprise at the remarkable speed at which we had been able to organise sending troops into Srinagar plain, he did not question the document or my statement.

Mr. Jinnah's principal complaint was that the Government of India had failed to give timely information to the Government of Pakistan about the action that they proposed to take in Kashmir.

I pointed out the speed at which events had moved. It was not until evening of the 24th that reliable reports had been received of the tribal incursion, and it was not until the 25th that observers had been sent up to confirm these reports. Thus the decision to send in troops had not been taken until the 26th, by which date the Maharaja had announced his intention of acceding to India. There had not been a moment to lose. I added that I could not recall the exact time, but that it was my impression that Pandit Nehru had telegraphed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on the 26th, immediately the decision to send in troops had been taken.

Mr. Jinnah complained that this information should have been sent much earlier—in fact on 24 October. “If,” he said, “they had on that date telegraphed saying that a critical situation was reported to be developing in Kashmir and they had sent in observers to confirm these reports and suggested that Pakistan should cooperate in dealing with the situation, all the trouble would have been ended by now.”

Lord Ismay agreed that the Government of Pakistan should have had the earliest possible notification. This was the first thing that had occurred to him on his return to Delhi from the United Kingdom, and, indeed, he was under the impression that it had been done. To the best of his recollection, Pandit Nehru had told him on the 28th that he had kept Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan in touch with what was happening all the time. If this had not been done, the oversight must have been due to the pressure of events, and not because the Government of India had anything to hide.

Mr. Jinnah looked up his files and said that the telegram had arrived after the troops had landed, and that it did not contain any form of an appeal for cooperation between the two Dominions in this matter; it merely informed him of the accession and the landing of troops. Continuing he said that the accession was not a bonafide one since it rested on “fraud and violence” and would never be accepted by Pakistan.

I asked him to explain why he used the term "fraud", since the Maharaja was fully entitled in accordance with Pakistan's own official statement, which I had just read over to him, to make such accession. It was therefore perfectly legal and valid.

Mr. Jinnah said that this accession was the end of a long intrigue and that it had been brought about by violence. I countered this by saying that I entirely agreed that the accession had been brought about by violence; I knew the Maharaja was most anxious to remain independent, and nothing but the terror of violence could have made him accede to either Dominion; since the violence had come from tribes for whom Pakistan was responsible, it was clear that he would have to accede India to obtain help against the invader. Mr. Jinnah repeatedly made it clear that in his opinion it was India who had committed this violence by sending her troops into Srinagar; I countered as often with the above argument, thereby greatly enraging Mr. Jinnah at my apparent denseness.

From this point, he went on to say that the Government of India authorities had encouraged the Kashmir Government to massacre Muslims in the Poonch and Mirpur areas. I repudiated this as obvious nonsense. He then said, "Very well, it was the Congress party that did it." I pointed out that if there had been any such massacre by Hindus in the Poonch area (which I did not deny) this had been done entirely by Kashmir Hindus and could hardly have been done with object of inciting the tribes to invade Kashmir and come so close to capturing Srinagar, merely to afford the Maharaja an excuse for acceding to India for the purpose of obtaining help.

I then explained to Mr. Jinnah, at some length, the policy which I had consistently pursued in regard to Kashmir, namely—trying to persuade the Maharaja to institute progressive government, ascertain the will of the people and then accede to the Dominion of the people's choice before 15 August. I recounted how I had tried to persuade H. H. to do this during my visit to Kashmir in July, and how I had

told them my views privately whilst driving in the car with him; but that when I had wished to have a formal meeting with him in the presence of his Prime Minister and my Private Secretary on the last day of my visit, he had pleaded illness and gone to bed to avoid the meeting. On leaving Srinagar, I had instructed the Resident to give the Maharaja this advice officially; and finally Lord Ismay had gone up at the end of August with instructions to advise the Maharaja to hurry up and ascertain the will of the people. But the Maharaja had invariably avoided the issue, and had always turned the conversation to lighter topics.

Mr. Jinnah paid a handsome tribute to the correctness of my policy and admitted that it was I who had put the ex-Premier of Kashmir (Pandit Kak) in touch with him when he came to Delhi.

Mr. Jinnah next referred to the statement which he had issued to the Press that day and enlarged on his difficulties in not being able to have any reasonable conversation, either personally or through representatives, with the Maharaja or even with his Prime Minister; and that, not only had the Maharaja brought his troubles upon himself by this attitude, but had greatly aggravated them by the massacres to which he had incited his Dogras against innocent Muslims. He said that even today at Jammu 90,000 Muslims were in danger of being massacred.

I told Mr. Jinnah that Pandit Nehru had expressed horror at the massacres that had taken place and had issued stringent orders that everything possible was to be done to stop them. Only the night before I had supplemented those instructions myself through an Indian Brigadier who had just returned from Kashmir and who fully agreed with the necessity for stopping any further killing of Muslims.

I informed Mr. Jinnah that we already had a Brigade Group of 2,000 men in Srinagar; that a 4th Battalion would be flown in that day and a 5th Battalion within the next

two days. I said that we should have no difficulty in holding Srinagar and that the prospect of the tribes entering the city in any force was now considered remote.

Lord Ismay suggested that the main thing was to stop the fighting; and he asked Mr. Jinnah how he proposed that this should be done. Mr. Jinnah said that both sides should withdraw at once. He emphasised that the withdrawal must be simultaneous. When I asked him how the tribesmen were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was to give them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not comply, he would send large forces along their lines of communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within 24 hours.

I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control that he appeared to exercise over the raiders.

I asked him how he proposed that we should withdraw our forces, observing that India's forces were on the outskirts of Srinagar in a defensive role; all that the tribes had to do was to stop attacking. I also pointed out that we could not possibly afford aeroplanes to fly the Indian troops back. Lord Ismay suggested that they should march back via Banihal Pass.

I asked Mr. Jinnah why he objected so strongly to a plebiscite, and he said he did so because with the troops of the Indian Dominion in military occupation of Kashmir and with the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah in power, such propaganda and pressure could be brought to bear that the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan.

I suggested that we might invite UNO to undertake the plebiscite and send observers and organisers in advance to ensure that the necessary atmosphere was created for a free and impartial plebiscite. I reiterated that the last thing my

Government wished was to obtain a false result by a fraudulent plebiscite.

Mr. Jinnah repeated that he and I were the only two who could organise a plebiscite and said that we should do it together. Lord Ismay and I went to great trouble to explain that I was a constitutional Governor-General and a Britisher, and that even if my Government would trust me sufficiently to see this through, I was sure that Mr. Attlee would not give his consent.

Mr. Jinnah complained bitterly that after the extremely generous gesture on the part of the Government of India in accepting his invitation to come to discussions at Lahore, the illness of one man should have prevented some other Minister from coming to conduct the negotiations; why for example, could Sardar Patel not have come? It was a matter of the greatest urgency to get together on this problem, and he asked me how soon Pandit Nehru could come to Lahore.

I countered by saying that it was now his turn to come to Delhi since I had come to Lahore, and I invited him cordially to stay as my guest, when I would take him to see Pandit Nehru in his bedroom.

He said that this was impossible. I pointed out that I had been to see Pandit Nehru personally in his bedroom and that I failed to see what was improper in this suggestion. He assured me that it was not a question of going to anybody's bedroom, but that he was so busy he simply had no time to leave Lahore while his Prime Minister was on the sick list.

I asked him afterwards if there was any single problem more serious or urgent than Kashmir. I pointed out that when one was so busy one had to arrange work in order of priority. If he admitted that Kashmir was top priority, then all other work should stand aside for it and he should come to Delhi at once. He said he regretted that this was impossible, for the whole burden of events was on his shoulders at

Lahore. I explained that he need only be gone for the inside of a day and that I was anxious to return his hospitality. He said, "I would gladly come a hundred times to visit you; I just cannot manage it while my Prime Minister is ill." I asked him to come as soon as his Prime Minister was well enough to travel, and he said, "We shall have to see."

Lord Ismay pointed out that the best way to stand well in world opinion was for him now to come and return my visit and discuss Kashmir with Pandit Nehru. Mr. Jinnah said that he had lost interest in what the world thought of him since the British Commonwealth had let him down when he had asked them to come to the rescue of Pakistan.

I ended the meeting, as I had started it, by making it quite clear that I had come unbriefed and unauthorised to discuss Kashmir, since I had not had a chance of seeing Pandit Nehru after he had informed me he would be unable to accompany me. I told him I was speaking not as Governor-General of India but as the ex-Viceroy who had been responsible for partition and was anxious to see that it did not result in any harm coming to the two Dominions. He said he quite saw this but hoped that I would be able to discuss the various proposals which we had been talking about with Pandit Nehru and send him a firm telegram. I undertook to convey this message to Pandit Nehru.

Round about 5.00 p.m. it was obvious that we were going to be too late to go and see Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan again, so Lord Ismay left the room to telephone our apologies to him. I took the opportunity of Lord Ismay's absence to 'tell off' Mr. Jinnah. I told him that I considered it was unstatesman-like, inept and bad mannered for him to issue a statement which directly accused the Government of India of "fraud and violence" in Kashmir a few hours before he expected the Prime Minister of India to come and discuss this very question in a friendly manner; and that had he been feeling well enough to come, such a studied and ill-timed insult would have been

enough to send his temperature up again. I finally pointed out that Pakistan was in my opinion in a much weaker position than India, not only from the obvious military point of view, but I was sure, the world would think they were in the wrong; and that this form of abuse before a discussion commenced could only put Pakistan even deeper in the wrong.

At the end Mr. Jinnah became extremely pessimistic and said it was quite clear that the Dominion of India was out to throttle and choke the Dominion of Pakistan at birth, and that if they continued with their oppression there would be nothing for it but to face the consequences. However depressing the prospect might be, he was not afraid, for the situation was already so bad that there was little that could happen to make it worse.

I pointed out that war, whilst admittedly very harmful for India, would be completely disastrous for Pakistan and himself.

Lord Ismay tried to cheer him up out of his depression but I fear was not very successful. However, we parted on good terms.

### 23. SUGGESTED PROPOSALS TO PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT TO FORM THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION

1. It is of paramount importance, not only to the Government of India, Pakistan and Kashmir, but also to the cause of world peace, that the fighting in Kashmir should cease at the earliest possible moment.
2. The best, if not the only, hope of achieving this object is a very early meeting between accredited representatives of the two countries.
3. The Government of India, for their part, have no desire to maintain troops in Kashmir, once the valley is safe from attack and law and order have been restored. They are, therefore,

prepared to give an undertaking to withdraw their troops immediately the raiders have left the country and returned to their homes.

4. It is the sincere desire of the Government of India that a plebiscite should be held in Kashmir at the earliest possible date and in the fairest possible way. They suggest that UNO might be asked to provide supervisors for this plebiscite, and they are prepared to agree that a joint India-Pakistan force should hold the ring while the plebiscite is being held.

5. The Government of India suggest that both Governments should agree on the form of the public announcement to be made in regard to the procedure for accession of those States in which this matter is in dispute. A draft is attached as a basis of discussion (Serial No. 22).

6. They suggest that the above proposals should be the subject of a round-table discussion at the earliest possible date.

#### 24. NOTE SIGNED BY THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY, AIR FORCE AND NAVY ( ALL BRITISH OFFICERS ) OF INDIA RE.: SENDING OF INDIAN TROOPS INTO JAMMU & KASHMIR

It has been alleged that plans were made for sending Indian forces to Kashmir at some date before 22nd October, on which day the raid on that State from the direction of Abbottabad began.

2. The following is a true time-table of events, as regard decisions taken, plans made, orders given and movements started in this matter:

- (1) On 24th October the C-in-C, Indian Army, received information that tribesmen had seized Muzaffarabad. This was the first indication of the raid.

- (2) Prior to this date, no plans of any sort for sending Indian forces into Kashmir had been formulated or even considered.
- (3) On the morning of 25th October, we were directed to examine and prepare plans for sending troops to Kashmir by air and road, in case this should be necessary to stop tribal incursions. This was the first direction which we received on this subject. No steps had been taken, prior to the meeting, to examine or prepare such plans.
- (4) On the afternoon of 25th October we sent one staff officer of each, the Indian Army and the R. I. A. F., by air to Srinagar. There they saw officers of the Kashmir State forces. This was the first contact between officers of our Headquarters and officers of the Kashmir State forces on the subject of sending Indian troops to Kashmir.
- (5) On the afternoon of the 25th October, we also issued orders to an infantry battalion to prepare itself to be flown at short notice to Srinagar, in the event of the Government of India deciding to accept the accession of Kashmir and send help.
- (6) On the morning of 26th October the staff officers mentioned in Sub-paragraph (4) above, returned from Srinagar and reported on their meetings with officers of the Kashmir State forces.
- (7) On the afternoon of 26th October we finalised our Plans for the despatch by air troops to Kashmir.
- (8) At the first light on the morning of 27th October, with Kashmir's Instrument of Accession signed, the movement by air of Indian forces to Kashmir began.

3. No plans were made for sending these forces, nor were such plans even considered, before 25th October, three days after the tribal incursions began.

25. DALIP SINGH TO SARDAR,

DATED 7 NOVEMBER 1947

(EXTRACT)

I wish to explain the psychology of the people I am now supposed to deal with. His Highness is extremely bitter. I neither praise nor condemn his attitude, which is easily understood. The Prime Minister is a man of ability and straightforwardness. He is however an Arya Samajist with all the mentality and fanaticism of that body. The Inspector-General of Police is talkative and intelligent, but he does not impress me as reliable. The Governor of Jammu Province, Mr. C. R. Chopra, is an intelligent man and I find him the most reasonable and unbiassed of officials here. The State's Brigadier Rawat is a good man according to Brig. Paranjpe under whose orders he is working. I have not had any occasion to test his mentality.

The refugees from West Punjab and of the local villages are extremely bitter. It is impossible to control their lust for vengeance and retaliation whenever possible. I arranged a scheme with the approval of the Governor for the evacuation of refugees from West Punjab to East Punjab. They have made the scheme unworkable by collecting opposite the Indian Brigade Headquarters causing confusion and trouble and endeavouring to board the military lorries en masse, with the result that the evacuation has been delayed. . . .

I have formed a high opinion of Brig. Paranjpe's abilities and straightforwardness. Even he, however, told me that his experience showed that a Muslim could not be trusted where the cry for religion was raised. He told me of two Muslim Officers who worked admirably under him in what is now Pakistan and saved many Hindus and Sikhs, but when they came to Ferozepur and saw what had happened to their co-religionists,

they went completely "haywire" and forgot all duty as officers. I can fully appreciate this Muslim attitude. It is not altogether blameworthy though again I neither praise nor condemn.

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The Muslim police have largely deserted and hence only Hindu police are functioning. I am glad to say that these police have dealt humanely with the evacuees. I have this from an evacuee, who does not inspire me with any confidence and who privately admitted that he was a Leaguer and a Pakistani. All this however is probably due to the personal influence of one or two officials and does not disturb the general picture which I have sketched above.

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26. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 9 NOVEMBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

Thank you for sending me the note on Kashmir (Serial No. 27). It is interesting and shows insight. I entirely agree that the problem is very much a political one and an economic one. It is because of this that I have been anxious to send proper people there.

On the economic side we must send essential supplies, namely, salt, sugar, kerosene oil and tea. I might mention that tea can easily be arranged from Kangra where the special kind of tea, i.e. green tea, which has a market in Kashmir, is grown. We have also to help in getting out the produce of Kashmir, which includes textiles, fruits, etc. I propose to look into this matter when I go to Srinagar. It might be desirable to station a representative of ours in Srinagar to control this traffic, both ways.

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## 27. NOTE BY RAMADHAR OF THE ALL INDIA SPINNERS' ASSOCIATION

..... Along with military action some political action is also necessary to wean the Muslim masses out of the League influence. As things are at present, one finds that there is a vicious circle at work in Kashmir, which will ultimately undermine all our efforts in the Happy Valley. The raiders, with the help of local Muslims, are harassing Hindus and Sikhs as also some National Conference men and this has its repercussions on the soldiers of our army who are Hindus and Sikhs. They in turn would be inclined to deal sternly with local Muslims where they are operating and this again will affect the attitude of Muslims who are at present supporting the National Conference. This process will be repeated to the limits of absurdity and no one can foretell the results that will follow in the event of a free and fair plebiscite. That is why a very careful consideration of the situation and some kind of political and economic measures are called for.

We all know that Kashmir is facing an economic crisis of unparalleled magnitude. For the last two years there has been almost no tourist traffic and therefore no trade; the Punjab disturbances and subsequent partition of the province and the inevitable results thereof have hampered the timber trade of the State which depended on the Western Punjab. Ever since the establishment of Pakistan, Kashmir has been practically cut off from the Indian Union and therefore there has been no exchange of commercial commodities between the two. This has brought about a virtual collapse of the economic structure of the State. No trader has any money to enter into even very minor transactions. Whatever he had has been locked up in goods. Besides, the essential supplies of the State of salt, sugar, cloth, kerosene oil and tea, etc. have also been suspended

which has brought the people of Kashmir to the brink of misery and ruin. If nothing is done to relieve the situation immediately the discontent and disaffection will spread and the party in power will begin to lose its ground all the more. Along with the defence of the territory, this also must have the topmost priority. Both should go hand in hand. Our Association wanted to help the new Government in organising this and we submitted a scheme for this. But they too seem to be suffering from the traditional suspicion complex of the old regime. The result was that whenever we approached them in the matter the reply was: "We have not taken any decision in the matter yet." I made it clear to them that we merely wanted to be helpful and had no idea of sharing the power they had acquired. Even so they neither set up their own organisation nor availed of our offer to help them. From the 4th instant onwards all the planes are returning empty but no effort has been made to send the merchandise of the State. This is in spite of the fact that we offered to load the planes within 20 minutes of their landing. They could have at least given it a trial. This is the only way one can function in revolutionary times. But I have probably deviated from the main point.

I personally feel that the Government of India should guide these affairs there for it is a tremendous undertaking that they have taken up in Kashmir. . . .

## 28. MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1947

On my arrival here, I found that there was great panic in the town owing to the Indian troops abandoning Kotli after relieving the garrison and evacuating the population and also owing to Mirpur having been abandoned and destroyed by the enemy. These were two important stations in the State. It will not be very easy to re-occupy them unless strong action is taken.

On this side of Mirpur, the whole border from Bhimber to Rajouri has been occupied by the enemy who is pushing forward towards Akhnur. This has again created panic. The whole area has been evacuated and thousands of refugees are pouring into Jammu town where itself there is great panic and people are leaving the town as well.

The position now is this. Gilgit is in enemy hands. Muzafferabad district is in their possession. The Poonch area, excepting the town of Poonch, is also in their occupation and the district of Mirpur and part of Jammu district have been taken by them. This is rather a very unsatisfactory state of affairs and it is only by a directive from you that these positions can be regained. It is felt here that with this vast area of the State in enemy hands, even negotiations on our side with Pakistan will not be very successful. It appears that unless we have a whiphand these negotiations may not be satisfactory.

The tentative reactions to the proposal which you gave me are like this:

“We are in the hands of the Indian Dominion and are bound with whatever decision they take. We have acceded to them and wish to remain with them. If the plebiscite goes against us, there is no other alternative but abdication. We shall never remain with Pakistan. The Hindu and Sikh population will be annihilated and as that eventuality is anticipated, Indian troops should not leave the State till that population is evacuated. There is pessimism about the result of the plebiscite here. Even if the plebiscite goes against Pakistan, it is felt that trouble will still not end and the fighting will go on.”

I intend to come to Delhi on 5 December for discussion with the Prime Ministers and the rulers of other States on the question of privileges of rulers. I will then personally explain to you the whole situation.

29. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU  
AND KASHMIR, DATED 1 DECEMBER 1947

(EXTRACT)

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... I feel that the time is propitious for a settlement about Kashmir also. The pressure of events is all in favour of such a settlement and I feel sure that we should try our utmost to achieve it. The alternative is no settlement and carrying on this little war indefinitely and at the same time tension and conflict all over India with consequent misery to numberless persons. In Kashmir State itself these military operations against the raiders will mean, as they have meant, grave difficulties and suffering for the people of the State. Mr. Horace Alexander, (noted British pacifist who took keen interest in India) who has just come from Jammu, informed me that the raiders are burning many villages and, no doubt, killing people. The terrain is such that it is not easy for large scale armies to function satisfactorily. The land is all in favour of the raiders' tactics. With the approach of winter our difficulties increase. The only policy we can adopt is to protect the Kashmir Valley and the Jhelum Valley route on the one side and Jammu and the neighbourhood on the other, holding in check the raiders in the Poonch area. It is difficult for our troops to drive out the raiders from the whole of the Poonch area during this winter season. They may be hit occasionally and repulsed. Air action will also be difficult during winter.

5. All this is not through lack of troops but rather because of the terrain and the climate. In spring, we could drive out the raiders from the Poonch area also. But that means another four months; and meanwhile the raiders and the Poonch rebels will remain in possession of that area and harass the people of the State. Pakistan troops will be stationed

on the Sialkot and other borders and will thus constitute a menace to the State. That is the military appreciation. Purely in a military sense we are not frightened of this position; but as I have said above, we cannot undertake to deal with the whole Poonch area during winter. Meanwhile the stress and strain of conflict will fall on the State and the economic conditions of the State, already bad, will rapidly deteriorate. It is important that we remember this economic background, for even military persistence depends largely on economic conditions and the morale of the people.

6. While a settlement is good and must be sought after, obviously we cannot do so to the injury of Kashmir or India. We have thus to balance various factors. Even if a settlement comes, there is no surety of the good behaviour on the Pakistan side and even less on the part of the tribes. We have thus to be wary and vigilant.

7. You must have seen the draft proposals which were discussed by us with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. These involve a plebiscite under UNO. I know that you do not like the idea of a plebiscite but we cannot do away with it without harming our cause all over the world. We are bound down to that proposal provided, of course, there is a settlement.

8. If there is going to be a plebiscite, then obviously we have to work in such a way as to gain the goodwill of the majority of the population of the State, which means chiefly the Muslims. The policy recently pursued in Jammu Province has alienated the Muslims there very greatly and has created a great deal of ill-feeling in certain parts of the country. The only person who can effectively deal with the situation is Sheikh Abdullah. I do not suppose he can convert the confirmed Muslim Leaguers and the like. But there is always middle mass of opinion which is influenced by events and experiences.

9. From our point of view, that is India's, it is of the most vital importance that Kashmir should remain within the Indian Union. I need not go into the reasons for this as they are

obvious, quite apart from personal desires in the matter which are strong enough. But, however much we may want this, it cannot be done ultimately except through the goodwill of the mass of the population. Even if military forces held Kashmir for a while, a later consequence might be a strong reaction against this. Essentially, therefore, this is a problem of psychological approach to the mass of the people and of making them feel that they will be benefited by being within the Indian Union. If the average Muslim feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union, then obviously he will look elsewhere. Our basic policy must keep this in view, or else we fail. We have to take a long view of the situation and not be carried away by momentary urges nor by personal considerations.

10. The present position is that in Kashmir proper the mass of the population, Muslim and Hindu, is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In the Jammu area, all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in favour of the Union. In the Poonch area, however, there is little doubt that the mass of the population is likely to be against the Indian Union. In the balance probably an overall majority will be in favour of the Union. But this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months. I repeat this because this is of the highest importance and we must face facts as they are.

11. The military situation is not too good, though I have no doubt that we can hold it in check. But we cannot expect to do much more during the winter. Meanwhile all manner of developments are likely to take place all over India and Pakistan and they are likely to govern the situation. Whatever these developments may be, we have to be prepared for them and at the same time take a realistic view of the situation.

12. In discussing a possible settlement with Pakistan, these are the proposals which have already been considered and which Mr. Mahajan took with him. Some people have suggested that Kashmir and Jammu provinces must be split up, one

going to Pakistan and the other to India. I do not at all like this for many reasons, among them being that it is Kashmir that is of essential value to India. Then it has been suggested that the Poonch area might be cut off and go to Pakistan. There is something in this as that area is linguistically allied to the Punjab. It has also been suggested that Kashmir State as a whole might be more or less an independent entity with its integrity and defence guaranteed by India and Pakistan. This is likely to give trouble in the future and the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir might well continue.

13. As I was dictating this letter I received Mr. Mahajan's letter of 30 November. In this he mentions that your reactions to various proposals are that you are prepared to leave the future in the hands of the Indian Dominion, but if the plebiscite goes against the Union, you will have no alternative but to abdicate. In no event do you wish to remain with Pakistan. I appreciate this attitude.

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### 30. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU & KASHMIR, DATED 9 DECEMBER 1947

As desired by Your Highness when Pandit Nehru and I were in Jammu last Saturday, I indicate below for your consideration my views on the changes which, in the present critical situation of the State, are immediately called for in the existing constitutional and administrative set-up there.

2. For the reasons which we explained to you in person, the present arrangement under which the organisation and control of the administration to meet the emergency are in the hands of a separate head of Emergency Administration with honorary heads of departments chosen by and working under him, and the ordinary civil administration, which nominally continues with a Council of Ministers with a Prime Minister as its Chief, but does not in reality function at all

with any effectiveness, is not only unworkable any longer but is fraught with both danger and disaster. Emergency administration and ordinary administration cannot be segregated from each other. They are so inextricably intertwined that it is imperative that there should be the maximum unity of policy and control over both, if the emergency is at all to be successfully handled. To keep them segregated is to invite friction and the consequent confusion and chaos. I do not wish to elaborate this point further especially as you entirely agree in this view yourself.

3. The obvious solution is the formation without further loss of time of an Interim Government, a step to which again you have already agreed. The Mysore pattern was mentioned when you, Sheikh Abdullah and Mahajan agreed to the setting up of an Interim Government. I have given much thought to this and, after examining all its aspects, have come to the conclusion that while the broad outlines of the Mysore pattern should be adhered to, it is necessary that some adjustments and modifications should be made in it, in order to adapt it to the situation as it has developed in Kashmir. The events that have compelled the transfer of power to Sheikh Abdullah, the facilities he needs for exercising that power for the maximum good of the State, the alignment of communal and political opinion in the State, the unrepresentative character of the present membership of the Praja Sabha and above all, the supreme need of encouraging and expediting the triumph of the elements which stand for a national, non-communal, secular State over those which seek to establish a communal, theocratic Muslim State in Kashmir, demand a slight reorientation of the Mysore pattern. I have no hesitation in saying that realising, as you no doubt will, the full implications of all that I have condensed in the previous sentence, you will not only be doing the right thing but acting with wisdom in agreeing to such reorientation.

4. I would indicate briefly the steps that seem to be immediately needed :

- (1) In place of the present Emergency Administration and the continuing Ministry, a unified Interim Government should be set up in the shape of Council of Ministers under the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act.
  - (2) Sheikh Abdullah should be appointed Prime Minister and the other Ministers should be chosen on his advice.
  - (3) I believe that under the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act—unless it has been substantially amended since I left Kashmir—the entire civil administration of the State is vested in the Council subject only to rules of business and allocations of portfolios approved by the Ruler on the Prime Minister's advice. The Ruler may also, I think, place restrictions on the power of the Council by special direction in respect of certain subjects.
  - (4) The New Council of Ministers will have to include an Army Minister but conventions should be established and understandings arrived at with Sheikh Abdullah as to the manner in which the Army Minister is to function vis-a-vis the Ruler who, by virtue of his position, is the Commandar-in-Chief of the State Forces. It will not be possible in the present circumstances in Kashmir to contemplate a Cabinet of the State having nothing to do with the Army; that will incapacitate it altogether in dealing with the emergency, in expelling the invader and in putting down internal rebellion.
5. I am not going into further details; these will be best tackled in personal discussion.
6. The Interim Government will be responsible for the time being to the Ruler. Though its personnel need not be derived from the existing Praja Sabha, it should be representative of the national minded elements in the population of the State

and will presumably have, among political parties, the largest volume of public support.

7. Your Highness has already recognised the inevitability of the establishment of responsible government in the State. The steps necessary for fashioning a constitution are perhaps not so immediately urgent; but from every point of view it is imperative that towards the Interim Government you should from its inception function as the constitutional Head of the State and act on its advice, though like other such Heads, you will place your knowledge and experience at the disposal of the Ministers and influence their advice, if you felt that they required guidance. In such matters trust on either side begets trust in the other and opportunities for friction are effectively avoided.

8. The position of Mr. Mahajan in this new set up requires to be squarely faced. I am satisfied after my talks with Sheikh Abdullah in Jammu and Mr. Mahajan in Delhi--

- a. that Sheikh Abdullah cannot reconcile himself to the interposition of any person between Your Highness and himself as your Chief Constitutional Adviser; and
- b. that Mr. Mahajan would hardly appreciate being a member of Abdullah's Cabinet or functioning outside the Cabinet without power or responsibility as a mere personal adviser to you.

9. The only solution of this difficulty is for Mr. Mahajan to terminate his connection with the State. I have reason to think that Mr. Mahajan will probably feel relieved if he is saved from the embarrassment of being pressed to carry on as he is doing now.

10. I would like to mention that I have had the advantage of discussing the whole matter with Pandit Jawaharlal, Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev Singh and all of them agree in the views I have indicated above as regards the immediate establishment of the Interim Government and also as regards Mr. Mahajan

11. Pandit Jawaharlal, Sardar Baldev Singh and I were yesterday in Lahore and along with Lord Mountbatten had a five hours talk with Messrs. Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad of the Pakistan Cabinet about the Kashmir situation. We are convinced the Pakistan authorities are thick as thieves with the rebels and raiders in Kashmir and are actively encouraging and assisting them. In spite of all that we could say by way of fact and argument, they would not agree even to the issue of a statement asking the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir, to prohibit them even on paper from using Pakistan territories as a base of operations for their campaign in Kashmir. On the other hand, they pretended that the whole of the North-West Frontier was aflame with hatred against Kashmir, and that the tribesmen had gone out to Kashmir to support fellow Muslims who, they honestly believed, were being oppressed by a cruel and tyrannical Maharaja. They added that, even if they by a public statement asked the raiders to desist from passing through Pakistan territories to Kashmir, the tribesmen would probably not listen to them and that they themselves were powerless to implement any assurances in that regard made to us or effectively to prevent Pakistan areas being used as bases for concentration of invaders and rebels. They made it plain that they wanted the Maharaja's rule to end, the Indian troops who are now in Kashmir to be entirely withdrawn from there, and Sheikh Abdullah's administration to be replaced by what they called a colourless regime under the headship of neutral administrators before they could agree to a plebiscite even under UNO auspices. They are out to upset all that has been achieved in Kashmir during the recent weeks and to create conditions there which would ensure the vote of the people being in favour of accession to Pakistan when the plebiscite comes to be held. I feel that Kashmir's only chance to be saved from what I consider to be a calamity of this description is for Your Highness to act courageously and generously toward those elements amongst your subjects, both Muslim and Hindu, who are nationally minded and whose objective is the establish-

ment of a responsible government in combination with constitutional monarchy. If the designs of Pakistan are not to be effectively countered by mobilising within the State the strength of the national forces now operating therein, the all out effort that the Dominion of India is now making will lose all its justification, the safety and integrity of the State will be gravely endangered and the monster of communal hatred will rear its head with its inevitable aftermath of massacres and unspeakable outrage. It is my visualisation of this grim prospect that is responsible for my giving this considered advice to you. I need hardly mention that I would not give any advice to you in respect of Kashmir State unless I sincerely felt that that advice was in the best interests of the population of the State and its Ruler.

12. I can arrange to come over to Jammu next Saturday, prepared to stay there on that day and the following day so as to enable me to return here on Sunday evening. I request you will please send me a telegram on receipt of this letter if this will be convenient to you. I shall, on receipt of the telegram, communicate with Sheikh Abdullah and ask him to be in Jammu during my stay there so that he may be available for consultations.

31. SARDAR TO N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR,  
DATED 10 DECEMBER 1947

I have seen your letter dated 9 December 1947 addressed to H. H. the Maharaja of Kashmir (Serial No. 30).

I am afraid you have probably misunderstood me on these matters. The proposals which you have made may ease matters from the point of view of Sheikh Abdullah, but whether they would ease matters from the point of view of the Maharaja is difficult for me to say. We have to bear in mind that it was we who suggested to the Maharaja to agree to the Mysore model and unless the Maharaja can be persuaded to

agree to alter it, I feel that we cannot insist on him to accept any change. We have also to take into account that it is the Maharaja who has entered into a commitment with Mr. Mahajan and, therefore, it is for him to decide whether or not he could release himself from that commitment. All we can do is to persuade him to agree to this position.

32. SARDAR TO MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN,  
DATED 10 DECEMBER 1947

With reference to the letter which Gopalaswami has written to His Highness (Serial No. 30), I am sending herewith a copy of the letter which I have written to Gopalaswami (Serial No. 31). You might show it to His Highness. If your presence is an obstacle, I am sure you will not hesitate to accommodate them.

33. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 12 DECEMBER 1947

Thank you very much for your letter regarding Kashmir dated 10 December (Serial No. 31) which I saw only late in the evening yesterday.

There is no question of our imposing anything on the Maharaja. As you must have noticed and as I explained at the informal meeting of the Cabinet, the whole tenor of my letter to the Maharaja was calculated only to persuade him to accept what we consider to be the proper thing to do in the existing circumstances.

34 MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 11 DECEMBER 1947

I hope you had a good trip to Cuttack. Mr. Gopalaswami came here and had discussion with H. H. He is writing a reply to him in a day or so. As I wrote to you, I am under your command. I came here with your advise and I will quit as and when you advise. The difficulty is H. H.'s attitude. He insists on my staying, while, in the situation that has arisen, I do not wish to stay. I seek your advice and, if you advise I should go, kindly do get me released nicely and honourably. I do not wish to remain in a state of suspense.

The administration here is on Hitlerian methods and is getting a bad name and the sooner I am out the better, as I do not in the least wish to be associated with gangster rule. There is no rule of law at all. Take a few instances out of a large number:

1. The High Court is not being allowed to function. The Chief Justice asked that the High Court should open in Jammu. The order is not being carried out. For over a month and a half there is no High Court. One Judge is but idling away, the other is at Srinagar and the Chief Justice is in Calcutta. The Head of the Administration has no power to interfere in the High Court's business, yet he is doing all this.
2. Governor of Jammu was transferred to Srinagar and then suspended and interned. Large number of officers are in jail. I suggested a Commission to enquire into charges but the order was not yet carried out. People and high officials cannot be kept in jail indefinitely, and without trial and enquiry and even a remand.
3. Large number of other persons are confined in jail. No enquiry or trial or orders. It is worse rule than in any autocratic country.

4. H. H. ordered offices should come to Jammu. No heed is paid to his orders. A month has passed.
5. Abdullah discussed with H. H. about certain officials whom H. H. suspected as Pakistanis and he retained them. They have been returned to office and one appointed Governor against H. H.'s wishes and express direction.
6. Laws are being made by Abdullah himself.

These are a few instances of misrule. They can be multiplied. Threats are held out of arrest to everyone including myself. How long will this misrule last ?

### 35. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU & KASHMIR, DATED 21 DECEMBER 1947

Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar has shown me the correspondence he has had with you during the last few days. I am very sorry to find that it has not been possible so far for the parties concerned to agree in regard to the next steps to be taken. Meanwhile the situation changes from day to day and what is said today becomes rather out of date tomorrow.

We have to face an exceedingly dynamic and changing situation both in the military and the political sense. Decisions are governed far more by what is happening than by what we may desire to happen. In recent weeks there has been some deterioration in the military situation. There is no danger of any major event happening to our disadvantage. But it is true that all manner of small events happen which increase the morale of the invaders and correspondingly affect the morale of our people. The problem is a military one and political one. On the political side it is both internal to Kashmir and external, that is, as between the Dominion of India and Pakistan. We have been giving a great deal of thought to it, more especially in so far as inter-Dominion relationships are concerned.

It is patent that the present position in which the Pakistan Government and army, though remaining officially in the background, play a dominant role in the invasion of Kashmir, is most disadvantageous to us. We are justified in considering the acts and omissions of the Pakistan Government as hostile acts and omissions which we are entitled to counter by military or other means. We have thus far avoided doing so for various political reasons, among them being that both India and Pakistan are members of the United Nation Organisation. It is *prima facie* improper for two members to come into direct conflict with each other without reference to the UNO. The fact that Pakistan has acted as an aggressor country is well known to us, but the manner of its doing so has been such as not to be known by the outside world.

The Government of India are now thinking of taking early steps to inform the Security Council of the UNO that the Pakistan Government have been directly or indirectly encouraging and aiding aggression on Indian Dominion territory, that is, Kashmir State. Pakistan territory is used for transport, as a base of operations against Kashmir and in many other ways, for this purpose. We propose to ask the Security Council of the UNO to call upon Pakistan to desist from doing so. Further we propose to say that in view of what Pakistan has been doing we consider ourselves entitled to take such other and further action to stop this invasion which is bringing ruin and desolation to Kashmir State. This action may involve our entering Pakistan territory.

Our present intention is to make this limited reference to the UNO without committing ourselves in any way. Meanwhile, of course, we shall continue to fight the invader and to drive him back. The reference will not stop us from our present activities in any way. But once reference is made it is possible that other developments might take place for which we have to be prepared.

Although our Government is clear on the line of action to be taken now, we shall finalise our decisions in two or

three days' time after our talks with the Pakistan Ministers who are due to reach here tonight in connection with the Joint Defence Council. We have to proceed correctly from a national and international point of view so that any action that we might take in future might not only be effective but above-board and in conformity with international procedure.

Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad arrived here last night and I have informed them of the proposed action of ours. I am writing this letter to you to keep you fully informed of this matter also. As soon as any final decision is taken, I shall, of course, communicate it to you.

36. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO MAHARAJA OF  
JAMMU & KASHMIR, DATED 23 DECEMBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

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Our Cabinet came to the conclusion that the best course for us to adopt in the circumstances was to draw the attention of the United Nations Organisation to the aggression on Indian Dominion territory by people coming from or through Pakistan with the aid and encouragement of the Pakistan Government. The UNO would be asked by us to call upon the Pakistan Government to stop this aggression as in the alternative we will have to take such steps as we might think fit and proper to do so. Prior to our approaching the UNO it was considered desirable to send a formal request to the Pakistan Government asking them to stop giving any aid or encouragement to the invaders.

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We shall now wait for a few days, which are not likely to exceed four or five, for Pakistan's reply. We shall then refer the matter to the Security Council of UNO. All this procedure need not take very long. The Security Council will probably have an early hearing of our representative and may

then call upon Pakistan to reply to the charges made against them. They may thereupon send a commission to India.

Meanwhile, of course, we shall carry on our military operations as we are doing. Indeed, we hope to carry them on more vigorously. Future action will depend on other developments.

This matter has to be kept perfectly secret at this stage.

37. MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 24 DECEMBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

I sent you a copy of Sheikh Abdullah's letter to H. H. before his release on the 20th September (Serial No. 4). . . .

This humble subject who promised steadfast loyalty now wants to prosecute H.H. before the people's tribunal and demands his abdication. His latest offer is that H.H. can have the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur and leave the rest of the territory to a Muslim republic like Pakistan. He is actively canvassing support of Muslim Conference leader Abbas who is in jail and with whom he is having interviews.

Practically in all matters he is ignoring and bypassing H. H. and is daily showing increased communal tendencies.

If you permit I will send you specimens of his administrative skill and knowledge and communal tendencies and where he has ignored H.H. with the help of National Guards in Srinagar. He thinks he can do what he likes. On hearing from you I will send you some instances of complete misrule and maladministration on fascist lines. (Serial No. 38)

I am in a most embarrassing position. I wish you could somehow get me out. I have tried but without success. H. H. will not let me out.

### 38. SOME INSTANCES OF ABDULLAH ADMINISTRATION

1. President of the Praja Sabha has been removed without reference to H.H. though under law only H.H. can remove him.
2. High Court is not functioning. H.H. or Chief Justice are the only authorities above High Court, but under his orders the High Court is not allowed to come to Jammu as it ought to under H.H.'s order. One Judge is a Muslim and as he does not wish to come here we have no High Court for over 2 months. His attention was drawn by H.H. to this but he ignored the order. The Chief Justice is in Calcutta, one jury here and one in Srinagar.
3. Governor Jammu was transferred to Srinagar and suspended and kept under restraint there without any specific charge or any enquiry and, without previous reference to H. H. Once H. H. was consulted and certain decision was made but this was ignored.
4. (J. N.) Zutshi, dismissed for corruption after enquiry has been allotted to a responsible post.
5. An accounts officer has been appointed Chief Secretary though the office of the Chief Secretary is reserved for the executive and judicial branch of Service. Considerable number of officers will be superseded.
6. Court Chief Inspector has been appointed Tahsildar without any executive training. Sub-Inspector Police made A.S.P. without being even an inspector, on communal consideration. Income-tax Officer appointed Wazir. Parties of one profession appointed in different branches of services on communal grounds.
7. Large number of officers and men are in custody without charges and trial.

8. Corruption in National Conference workers is rampant in selling transport and giving trade concessions.
9. Gazetted and non-gazetted officers are made to obey orders of volunteers on threats of dismissal or arrest.
10. Emergency officers are appointed who are not public servants with no powers and duties. They are said to be advising men but wield real power. The whole administration is thus in chaos.
11. Shomiri, Adalatkhan, Dar were retired by H.H. before I came, on grounds of disloyalty. Against express direction of H. H. they have been reinstated.

39. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 29 DECEMBER 1947

I send herewith a copy of the letter dated 28 December (not printed: asks that Government of India should stand by its promise Re: Mysore Model) received by me today from the Maharaja of Kashmir, together with a copy of the telegram which I have just sent him (Serial No. 40).

2. I have the greatest personal regard for Mr. Mahajan, but I am convinced that the interests of Kashmir in the present situation make it impossible for him to continue there in the capacity of Dewan with the right of presiding over a Cabinet of Ministers appointed on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister and entrusted with the conduct of the entire civil administration of the State. I have failed to persuade Sheikh Abdullah to (accept) the Maharaja's views on this matter. The situation in the State, both in the immediate present and in the near future demands that we should strengthen Sheikh Abdullah's hands.

3. I hope that, after he receives my telegram, the Maharaja will agree to act on the advice that I gave him in my letter

dated 24 December (not printed: suggests changes in the application of the Mysore pattern).

[*Author's Note* : A brief account of the dispute on this issue is given in the Introductory Note.]

40. TELEGRAM FROM N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR  
TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR,  
DATED 29 DECEMBER 1947

THANKS VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER OF YESTERDAY'S DATE DELIVERED TO ME THIS MORNING. HAVE MADE AN ATTEMPT AS SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH EIGHT OF YOUR LETTER AND THE ATTEMPT HAS FAILED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTY CONCERNED TO ACCEPT YOUR VIEWS ON THE TWO MATTERS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPHS SIX AND SEVEN OF YOUR LETTER. THE RECOMMENDATIONS I MADE TO YOU ON THOSE TWO MATTERS ARE OUR UNITED CONSIDERED ADVICE AND YOU WILL I HOPE BELIEVE ME WHEN I SAY THAT THEY WERE DELIBERATELY MADE TO YOU IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF YOURSELF, STATE AND PEOPLE. I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT HESITATION OR DELAY IN ACTING ON THE ADVICE I HAVE TENDERED TO YOU IN RESPECT OF THESE TWO MATTERS MIGHT PRODUCE UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENTS AND IS BOUND TO WEAKEN OUR HANDS IN THE GREAT EFFORT WHICH THE DOMINION YOURSELF AND YOUR PEOPLE ARE JOINTLY AND UNITEDLY ENGAGED IN NOW. I WOULD AS A SINCERE FRIEND OF THE STATE MAKE A FINAL APPEAL TO YOU TO ACCEPT WHAT I HAVE ADVISED YOU ALREADY. I AM COMMUNICATING COPIES OF YOUR LETTER TO BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF THIS TELEGRAM.

41. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947

Herewith copy of the telegram I have just received (Serial No. 42) from the Maharaja of Kashmir in reply to mine of yesterday.

2. I cannot proceed further with this foolish man, not having any powers for putting pressure on him. I thought I could persuade him, but I have not succeeded.

3. It is for you to take the matter up now and solve the inconvenient and gratuitous riddle that the Maharaja has created for himself and that he expects us to solve for his benefit.

42. TELEGRAM FROM MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND  
KASHMIR TO N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGER,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947

YOUR MESSAGE OF 29TH (Serial No. 40) RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON. SINCE MY LAST LETTER, MATTTTR DISCUSSED WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WHO IS IN FULL POSSESSION OF MY VIEWS. SORRY CANNOT AGREE.

43. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

Gopalaswami Ayyangar showed me the Maharaja of Kashmir's reply to him (Serial No. 42). I was surprised to read this as the Maharaja had practically told us that he would agree to Mahajan going away. Mahajan himself had told us that he would no longer stay there. Apart from this I have received

very disturbing news from Bakshi\* though the telephone about the way the arms that we have sent for him have been kept back and distributed to RSS people. While Jammu was in imminent danger a large part of the consignment of arms was just held back and Bakshi's Home Guards were fighting often without rifles and always with too little ammunition and dying in the process.

It seems from a number of reports that have reached me that the RSS is being supported and armed at the cost of Bakshi's Home Guards and that propaganda is being openly carried on by posters and otherwise against Sheikh Abdullah. In some distant parts of the State where there are no invaders the RSS is creating trouble by sending their emissaries. I am inclined to think that Mahajan sympathises with this activities and perhaps helps them.

The situation is a serious one and obviously cannot continue as it is. It will lead to internal conflict which will be disastrous from every point of view. The Maharaja unfortunately is terribly shortsighted and has a way of doing the wrong thing. He has suffered sufficiently in the past by his own errors and yet he has not benefited by that lesson. I fear he will get into great trouble if he does not appreciate the present situation and act accordingly. I am sending a letter to the Maharaja, a copy of which I enclose.

44. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947

I have just received your letter of today (Serial No. 43) and I hasten to send you a reply as I am going away tomorrow early morning to Assam. When I saw the Maharaja yesterday, the Maharaja showed me the letter he had received from Gopalaswami and a copy of his reply. I told the Maharaja that he had given an impression to Gopalaswami that he was willing

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\* This complaint was baseless. *Vide* Serial No. 51.

to release Mahajan but he said that he had not done so and if Gopalaswami carried any such impression it was wrong. The Maharaja's position is that it was not a question of personality but of principle. I argued with him that it would be in the interest of all to replace Mahajan by some other acceptable man, who can be found but he seemed to be very unwilling. Mahajan himself is in an embarrassing position, but if the Maharaja could be persuaded he would certainly be willing to leave. Last night when I met Gopalaswami at your place, I communicated all that had passed between me and the Maharaja to him and I thought he must have talked to you about it.

2. In brief, the Maharaja's position is that he is prepared to fulfil entirely his part of the agreement that he has made with us, and expects us on our part to stand by it. We know his nature and we must handle him tactfully.

3. Bakshi (Ghulam Mohammad) was practically the whole day with me yesterday. He took me to a public meeting and also to receive two or three deputations of Hindus and Muslims, but he never mentioned to me that he had any difficulty about his getting arms from the State authorities or that they were held back by them. I did not know that the consignment of arms was in charge of the State authorities.

4. Neither Bakshi nor anybody in Jammu informed me about the RSS activities there. Whatever may have been done by the RSS in the begining, there seemed to be no evidence of their activities now.

5. The situation is undoubtedly serious. Both Menon and myself tried to argue with him (the Maharaja), as far as possible, but he had a catalogue of grievances against Sheikh Abdullah for several orders that he had passed ignoring him altogether, including the High Court being completely side-tracked. It is a very difficult situation but you can send Gopalaswami again and let him have one more go at it.

45. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947

I have just received your letter of today's date (Serial No. 44) about Kashmir. I have also received a note from Gopalaswami Ayyangar (Serial No. 41) enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Maharaja of Kashmir, in which he says that he cannot agree to Gopalaswami's suggestion. There is thus a complete deadlock and I just do not see what we are to do about it.

I quite agree with you that the matter has to be dealt with tactfully with the Maharaja as with others. I have used up all the tact at my disposal in this matter without achieving substantial results. Considering everything, I think that Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi have taken a very sensible view of the situation and they have tried to appreciate the position of the Maharaja. But it must be remembered that they cannot function without popular backing, both Muslim and Hindu. They have tried hard to gain this popular backing of the Hindus and succeeded wholly in Kashmir and partly in Jammu. There is evidence of this by the fact that the leaders of the Hindu Yuvak Sabha movement which in the past were opposed to Sheikh Sahib are supporting him completely. That is to say that the local Hindus are with him to a large extent. But the RSS and the (Hindus) from the Punjab are of a different type and between them and Sheikh Abdullah there is a big gulf. I do not see how that gulf can possibly be bridged, especially as the RSS is accused with reason of having organised killing of the Muslims in Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah has to keep the goodwill of the Muslims to some extent at least even in Jammu. He has succeeded in a measure and the latest evidence of this is that the local Muslim Conference is coming into conflict with the Azad Kashmir movement. Today's Civil & Military Gazette contains a full report of this.

All these developments are taking place because of a belief that there has been a change in the administration and Sheikh Abdullah is really in charge. Mahajan's presence is a constant irritant to these various elements as well as to Sheikh Abdullah's party. I have no doubt that even if we patch up something for the moment and Mahajan remained, there will be constant trouble and friction. That will be no solution to any problem. I repeat therefore that I see no way out of this impasse except something drastic happening. I propose to do nothing for the present till you return from Assam. But events are moving fast and I do not know what might happen.

The trouble about the distribution of arms is a fairly old one and has been discussed with the Military authorities here several times. Bucher is very annoyed that the arms specially sent for Bakshi were not given to him. He has asked Kulwant Singh for an explanation.

46. SARDAR TO N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947

I got your letter just now (Serial No. 41) and I had got one from Panditji also (Serial No. 43), on the same subject. Panditji is very much distressed about this affair. I do not know how to solve this riddle. The utmost that can perhaps be done is to get Mahajan out of the way if we can find an acceptable man in his place; but even after that, the problem will not be solved because the Maharaja will insist on the Mysore agreement being fulfilled in all other respects. Sheikh Abdullah is not prepared for it.

I am going away tomorrow to Assam. I have asked Menon to come and see you. I propose to send him to Jammu to speak to the Maharaja once again, but I am not sure whether he will be successful. But the Maharaja has a feeling that he is not being fairly treated.

47. SARDAR TO MEHRCHAND MAHAJAN,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947

Since your telephone talk this evening, I had two letters one from Gopalaswami (Serial No. 41) and the other from Panditji (Serial.No. 43). Both are very distressing. They had a complaint from Bakshi that his Home Guards are not getting the firearms. I do not know how far this complaint is true. It would not be wise to give them any cause for complaint in such matters. It seems he has also complained that RSS people are being armed. You did not mention anything about it when I met you at Jammu. But you must make sure that no such thing happens.

Both the Maharaja and you must once more think over the question of the Interim Government. (V. P.) Menon will explain to you more fully what I have got in my mind. There is no doubt that a solution must be found. I am going to Assam tomorrow and will be returning on 6 January. Menon will come with this letter as soon as he is able to do so.

48. MAHARAJA OF JAMMU & KASHMIR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 1 JANUARY 1948

I enclose herewith a copy of Panditji's telegram dated 31 December (not published) received this morning. I have given no reply to the first part of the telegram. -

According to rumours, I hear the supply of modern arms to the Home Guards is dangerous. I also hear the raiders snatch them away and they are wholly unfit to handle arms. But obviously a great effort to create a rival army in the State is being made. I am not of course in confidence about

these matters. I am not even told what arms are ordered and by whom and for what purpose, who is to receive them and distribute them and what the policy in such matters is.

About mosques etc. I have no knowledge. Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi are virtual dictators and they have complete power. I wonder what we are expected to do and what the suggestion is. Even when Mr. Mahajan and I have stepped aside, are we to be blamed or coerced? This seems to me to be only deep propaganda in disguise to drive me to desperation by being bullied right and left. Already there is no rule of law here and if the present policy continues it will be worse.

Sheikh Abdullah or Bakshi has to explain these matters and not myself. You as head of the States Department know my views and I need not waste your time dilating further on these matters.

49. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 7 JANUARY 1948

(EXTRACT)

During your absence the Kashmir situation, more especially in regard to the reference to the UNO, had developed and we have had to take a number of decisions. We have missed you here because your advice would have been valuable but we could not afford to postpone our decisions owing to the urgency of the matter....

We do not yet know what the Security Council might do and how long these preliminary hearings will last. Today's news announces that the first hearing might be on the 11th or 12th or latest 13th. Our first batch will reach there on the 10th.

You will remember that it was our first intention to send (M. C.) Setalvad (Attorney General, India) plus one or two assistants. Then we thought that Gopalaswami Ayyangar

should also go and if possible Sheikh Abdullah. Gopalaswami is going today; Sheikh Abdullah is expected to arrive here today. He cannot proceed immediately and therefore he can only go (with) the second batch which probably will leave on the 10th from Bombay.

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50. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 7 JANUARY 1948  
(EXTRACT)

Thank you for your letter dated 7th January 1948 (Serial No. 49). Perhaps any comment from me at this stage, when part of the delegation has already left and arrangements for others have already been made, is unnecessary; but I agree with you that the delegation has grown unwieldy and I feel that the inclusion of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah in the delegation might lead to some complication. For instance, the Pakistan Government might press for an invitation to issue to the Head of the Azad Kashmir.

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51. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 8 JANUARY 1947

Before I left on tour for Assam, you wrote to me about a complaint from Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad that the Home Guards were not getting firearms sent by us, and that the latter were being directed to the RSS. There was a suggestion that His Highness and Mahajan were to blame for it.

I have now had enquiries made of Mahajan, and the position seems to be as follows. Neither His Highness nor Mahajan nor the Military Adviser of the State was told about the supply of these arms, and they had no information as to who got and distributed them. Subsequently, Mahajan ascertained that the arms were supplied to Major-General Kulwant Singh,

and he has been giving them to Bakshi. Apparently, he has not complied with Bakshi's request for light machine-guns and mortars on the ground that there were no Home Guards fit to use these arms. It also appears that Bakshi ordered these arms for the Home Guards without any reference to His Highness or Mahajan.

As regards the complaint that the RSS were being armed, both His Highness and Mahajan have not ordered directly or indirectly any arms to be supplied to these people. There were complaints against some of the RSS people that they were creating mischief against the Muslims in the State. Mahajan called all the leaders and told them that this could not be tolerated. No arms were supplied whatsoever; actually there were not even sufficient arms to supply to the State forces. Some RSS men joined the militia which was raised by the State, but they were under military discipline and fought certain battles on the border. Sheikh Abdullah had taken charge. Mahajan says he has virtually had no connection whatsoever with this aspect of the State Administration.

As regards the relief committee appointed by His Highness it appears that His Highness gave donation of Rs. 30,000/- for the benefit of refugees from Mirpur and other places, and had appointed a committee to administer this fund. The committee consists of the Chief Emergency Officer, Jammu (Chairman), Colonel Baldev Singh Pathania, Lala Dina Nath Mahajan (a member of the Praja Sabha) and another member who is a local resident of great eminence and also president of the RSS. Mahajan contends that His Highness is entitled to appoint a committee of his own for distribution of his private funds.

52. V. SHANKAR TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND  
KASHMIR, DATED 11 MARCH 1948  
(EXTRACT)

I have been wanting to write to Your Highness since my return from Jammu, but something or the other has always stood in my way. I had the most busy two days immediately on my return because so many things about the proclamation etc. were required to be tied up and there were also heavy accumulations; then Sardar's illness took practically all my time until yesterday.

2. I am glad to say that he is much better, but he has been advised complete rest. We had one or two most anxious days on account of his illness.

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4. I hope Sheikh Sahib has by now reached Jammu and has had a discussion with Your Highness in regard to the formation of the Ministry and the terms and conditions of their service as well as of the Dewan. Menon told me that he has had a talk with him and that he was quite reasonable.

5. I am sending herewith a cutting from the Statesman which I hope you have already seen. The item appeared in all the leading newspapers and indicates how progressive Your Highness' attitude has been on the question of reforms in the State. I spoke to Her Highness in some detail about the lack of publicity for what she and Your Highness have done and have been doing for the State. This is the first result of enlightening people here about one aspect of the previous history of Kashmir. I hope very soon it will be possible to do something more.

53. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO V. SHANKAR,  
DATED 3 APRIL 1948

I have given (Dwarkanath) Kachru a letter for the Maharaja, a letter for Sheikh Abdullah and a brief note for Bakshi. I should like you to read these letters and then deliver yourself the letter addresssed to the Maharaja.

From these letters you will see what my general approach is. In the course of your talks with him you should speak firmly, but of course politely, about this general approach and about the dangers of anything being done which leads to conflict between the Maharaja and his Cabinet. Nothing can be more dangerous than the possibility of such a conflict. It may lead either to a resignation of the Cabinet and a complete deadlock or to a defiance of the Maharaja by the Cabinet which will not be good for the Maharaja and which may lead to unfortunate consequences for him and others. That is the basic situation and I wish the Maharaja would realise it. Any impression which the people or the security Council may get that the Maharaja is still strong enough to obstruct and oppose the people's representatives will weaken our case very greatly and come in the way of our winning the people of Kashmir to our side.

54. SHEIKH ABDULLAH TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 APRIL 1948  
(EXTRACT)

Responsible Government in Jammu and Kashmir State has been secured after a bitter struggle extending over seventeen years by the people of this State. Although we are fighting a war against an unscrupulous and savage enemy intent upon depriving us of our newly won freedom, we have to decide to

hold freedom celebration during the week beginning from 7 May 1948. Our object is to show to the world the fine morale which the ordinary man and woman in Kashmir is possessed of and the tenacity with which the people of Kashmir are holding fast to their freedom.

You have all along supported us in our endeavours to free Kashmir and today when the country has been invaded, you are in no small measure helping us to win victory. Consequently when we are celebrating our freedom we would very much appreciate if you make it convenient to be present at and participate in the various functions during the celebrations. The bonds of comradeship in struggle which have held us together so far would be considerably strengthened and cemented by your presence at the celebrations.

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55. SARDAR TO SHEIKH ABDULLAH,  
DATED 4 MAY 1948  
(EXTRACT)

... I should have been very delighted to attend, but medical advice is against it and I have, therefore, to content myself with following the report of your celebrations with deep interest from such a distance. At this juncture, when not only are we facing a determined and unscrupulous enemy, the success of whose efforts would put in peril everything that is decent and precious in life, but when we have also been able to arrange by a spirit of mutual accommodation and a display of statesmanship on the part of His Highness the grant of responsible government, we need not reflect on the bitterness of the past but on the happy and cordial relations of present and on the glory and prosperity of the future. This thought is prompted by a reference to the bitter struggle which you have made, and I thought I might as well emphasise this, particularly in the light of our own history. After all, few

struggles could have been so prolonged and so bitter as ours, but eventually the British Government did the right thing by us and almost overnight the bitterness and hatred of the past were converted into mutual respect and friendship.

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56. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 12 MAY 1948

I returned from Kashmir today after a very tiring but stimulating visit. On the whole the celebrations there were successful and impressive. There can be no doubt that Sheikh Abdullah's popularity in Srinagar and the Valley is very great. I paid a visit to our Uri front also and found our soldiers full of spirit and in great mettle. The general situation, both political and military, appeared to me on the whole satisfactory though the machine moves more slowly than I would like. We may have some substantial results by the end of the month.

On the political side there is a great deal of confusion. Obviously the most efficient person is Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad who gets things done, though in doing this he does not always follow rules and regulations. A great deal of stress has been paid to what might be called psychological preparation of the people. This is of course very necessary and the effort has succeeded in the Valley at least. But the administrative side is probably weak though I had no occasion to examine it or go into it in any way. The strain on the administration because of lack of funds is very great and the refugee problem is a great drain. Indeed, the Government is at its wit's end how to meet the expenses on the refugees. Sardar Budh Singh, a very fine and upright man, is the Relief Minister and he was almost in tears when he spoke to me of his difficulties.

The transport problem is also a very great difficulty. Transport is practically monopolised for military purposes. I

passed hundreds of lorries on the Jammu-Banihal road carrying military equipment and supplies. Civil transport suffers accordingly both to send salt and other necessities and to take away Kashmir products which are accumulating there.

There continues to be an undercurrent of tension between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah. There was no incident while I was there and Sheikh Abdullah was courteous throughout to the Maharaja, who participated in some of the functions. But the fact remains that there is this tension. The Maharaja means well but cannot easily get out of the habits of a lifetime. His reluctance to meet people helps in creating misunderstandings. I do not think he will deliberately do anything to create trouble. The difficulty is that he is frightfully unpopular not only with the common people but with almost everyone he meets, including foreigners. I have advised Sheikh Abdullah to treat him with all tact and courtesy.

You must have seen Ghulam Abbas Statement which indicates that Azad Kashmir is in a pretty bad way. All our own accounts confirm this.

57. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 MAY 1948  
(EXTRACT)

The military situation, except for Ladakh, appears to be progressing fairly satisfactorily. I hope that within a week we might capture Domel and Muzaffarabad. That will be a major gain and it may be followed by our advance to Kohala. In Ladakh we have for the moment lost ground and the raiders are on the doorsteps of Leh (capital of Ladakh province). This has no great military significance, and we can recapture all the lost ground. But it is irritating that on the map a huge province may be shown as under the enemy. This province of course is very sparsely inhabited. Another unfortunate feature may be the loot of Leh, for Leh is a big and fairly rich centre.

We have taken steps to send troops by two routes. I fear however that it will take us a month to clear Ladakh of the enemy. The state troops in Ladakh and Skardu had behaved in a most cowardly and disgraceful manner. They had not only run away at the slightest provocation, but have handed over our weapons and ammunition to the enemy. Indeed without this ammunition the enemy could hardly have functioned for long.

The Security Council Commission may reach India about the end of June. It may also be delayed longer.

I am worried about the internal political situation in Kashmir. Owing to lack of supplies and trade and continuous radio and other propaganda from Pakistan, morale of the civil population is rather low. Pakistan's radio from Murree carries on vicious and intensive propaganda and there is nothing to meet it on our side. I regret to say that many of the older generation of Kashmir Pandits are not behaving well. They are grouching all the time and talking almost as if they were agents of Pakistan. They seem to have convinced themselves that ultimately Pakistan will come in. If so, then why fight Pakistan. All this is largely due to our lack of propaganda approach.

It is urgently necessary that we should install a good transmitter in Srinagar with technical personnel. Further that the broadcasts both from Srinagar and Jammu should be carefully planned so as to appeal to the people and strengthen the present Government. Other steps indicated by Azim Hussain in his report on Kashmir are also needed. Some of them should be given effect to immediately.

I feel that it is very necessary to have a real first class man to represent us in Kashmir. No person other than a first class man with knowledge of Kashmir and of both the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah can fit in. I cannot think of a suitable person and on no account would I send a second rater. Gopalaswami Ayyangar is obviously the right person.

But we cannot spare him for this purpose and I do not think he would care to go. But at any rate he might go there for a week or so and try to help in straightening out matters. I am suggesting this to him. If you could also make this suggestion, perhaps he might agree.

The Maharaja continues to remain in Jammu. This is very unfortunate. It creates a bad impression on the people and it comes in the way of consultation between him and Abdullah's Government. Urgent decisions have to be taken and these have to be delayed because the Maharaja cannot be reached, or they are taken without consulting the Maharaja and then a complaint follows. Even the long distance telephone does not help, as the Maharaja says that he cannot use it properly. I feel that the Maharaja should be pressed to go to Srinagar, which is the centre both of military operations and the Government. I suggest that you might write to the Maharaja to shift to Srinagar.

58. V. SHANKAR TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND  
KASHMIR, DATED 1 JUNE 1948

(EXTRACT)

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Regarding your letters, I should like to explain the position as follows:

(a) *Rules of Business*: These were sent to Sheikh Sahib long ago. Actually, they were taken by Bakshi Sahib (Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad), as I told Your Highness. But up to date, in spite of reminders, one or two from Sardar himself, there has been no reply. I understand from V. P. Menon, however, that he is also pressing for a reply. As soon as we get it, we can go ahead. You will be interested to know that the Rules of Business have evoked support from quarters from which Your Highness would least expect it.

Apart from this, in two or three letters, Sardar has reiterated the position that was settled in the correspondence between Your Highness and himself, and in so far as we are concerned there can hardly be any possibility of going back upon those arrangements.

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(e) *Army* : Sheikh Sahib has sent a memorandum on which no action has been taken so far, because Sardar has yet to consider it. It is quite possible, however, that this point may be raised during the visit of Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Menon. I know full well that, out of sheer kindness and consideration for me, Your Highness would like me to be there and I myself would wish to be present, but I am sure Your Highness will appreciate the difficulty of my coming away from Dehra Dun. Even then, I shall cautiously mention it to Sardar and see if he can let me go.

There is one matter on which I have expressed myself at length to your Assistant Private Secretary and that is about Your Highness' going to Srinagar. I feel that that is essential. Your stay in Jammu is bound to give rise to difficulties and all sorts of conjectures and surmises. It is also likely to give a handle to the Ministry to ignore you even where consultation was enjoined in accordance with the constitutional arrangements. If you are on the spot, no such excuse would be open to them. At Srinagar, you would be in touch with the military authorities there as well. Actually, you could easily make out a case for a fortnight's stay in Srinagar and another fortnight in Jammu in a month on the ground that both places are equally important from the point of view of military operations. I hope it will be possible for Your Highness to accept my advice.

We are sending a Special Correspondent of All India Radio to cover Jammu & Kashmir. His name is Mr. K. L. Sharma, whom I called here this morning to give instructions.

I have told him to see Your Highness at Jammu on his way to Srinagar. I hope your Highness will find it possible to meet him for a short while. During his stay in your State, he will be contacting Your Highness on occasions. He will be visiting Jammu, though he would be stationed at Srinagar. If Your Highness would wish anything of interest to be broadcast about the activities of Your Highness or Her Highness, he would do the needful. As soon as a telephone is installed at Srinagar, he would get in touch with Your Highness' ADC whenever necessary.

Lastly about the Dewan. We are very sorry indeed that we have not been able to make much progress. Unfortunately, men of the type who would be suitable as Dewan for Your Highness are few and far between. In the present manpower shortage, they are all holding key jobs here and no Ministry is prepared to spare any of them. However, V. P. Menon has been able to get two or three good men whom he would want me to interview. I am waiting for them to come to Dehradun, and as soon as they do come and if I find them satisfactory, I shall send whoever is suitable on to Your Highness.

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59. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 6 JUNE 1948

Our experience in Kashmir has shown us that it is easier to begin military operations than to end them. I think on the whole our army in Kashmir, officers and men, have not done badly. I have gone fairly deeply into this question and balanced the enormous difficulties they have had to face. They have erred and made mistakes, they have also shown sometimes an unnecessary caution. Nevertheless on the whole they have done well. I do not think most people realise the tremendous difficulties of the undertaking. At the present moment there is

little doubt that the Pakistan army, or a part of it, is functioning against us in Kashmir territory. They have a tremendous geographical advantage over us. Kashmir is a very big area and possesses most difficult terrain from the point of view of military operations. Also the climate in winter is a very hard one and large areas like the Ladakh Valley are completely unapproachable in winter. The first lesson that a military commander is taught is that of concentration. Nothing is more dangerous in war than a dispersal of forces. This concentration leads to large areas being left unguarded, unless the forces we use are tremendous in numbers. Even so it is practically impossible to guard every mountain valley or cave. We fight to win and to break the enemy. They fight to harass and annoy and cause us injury. The latter method does not need concentration. In any event we have to think of our army as it is and not as it might be. We have, in technical matters, to take advantage of our military experts. Our policy, specially when it involves military operations or the possibility of them, cannot ignore the hard facts of the situation, as judged by the military experts. I have little doubt that our officers are exceedingly anxious to produce results in Kashmir. Their own reputation depends upon that. We cannot bring them about by expressing our dissatisfaction of the army, which can only do what it is capable of doing and no more. The fight that is going on near Domel-Muzaffarabad is of great significance and that is the reason why Pakistan has thrown its forces and some armour into it. Our victory there will no doubt make a great difference to our campaign. Because of this Pakistan will try its utmost to prevent that victory.

I have written to you about Kashmir already. I found there that quite a good effort in the shape of propaganda has been made by the Kashmir Government. They have published attractive pamphlets and have very effective popular plays about the struggle which are performed in large number of urban and rural areas. Their difficulty is lack of paper and lack of broadcasting equipment. Pakistan Radio repeats the

most infernal lies by leaflets etc. The only way to check it is to have our own broadcasting. Therefore the urgency of this.

Propaganda in Kashmir must obviously take into consideration the psychology of the Kashmir people, both Muslim and non-Muslim. It must be largely addressed to large masses of people who can make a difference this way or that way. I am told that Kashmiri broadcasting from AIR is rather colourless and does not appeal to the listeners in Kashmir. It seems necessary to associate a competent Kashmiri to give the background to our broadcasts.

My study of the Kashmir situation has led me to believe that the Maharaja cannot play. He just does not know how to. When there is an obvious possibility of his losing everything he still wants to hold on to relatively simple things, not realising that this has a bad effect both internally among the people as well as on external observers. His mere absence from Srinagar is bitterly resented because everybody of any consequence functions from Srinagar now. Even the military situation requires this.

This leads me to the State Forces which have become not only not helpful but a tremendous nuisance. By their passivity and sheer funk, they have done injury to our cause. The only way to pull them up is for the Indian Army to take complete control over these forces. This of course will not mean that the State army will lose its identity or will become absorbed in the Indian Army. The State army will be kept distinct and will certainly stay on in Kashmir even when our troops decide to withdraw. Our own officers feel this strongly and they cannot make full use of existing State troops in present circumstances. It has thus become an urgent necessity, from the point of view of military operations as well as the possibility of a plebiscite, that quick action be taken in such matters. It is equally important that the Maharaja should live in Srinagar for the greater part of the summer months, as Srinagar is the place now where important decisions have to be taken both by civil

authorities and our military commanders. Unless he lives in Srinagar he cannot keep in touch. From some other points of view too it is not desirable for him to live long in Jammu during summer. This would be entirely opposed to the old policy when the Maharaja spent the whole summer in Srinagar.

60. SARADAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 4 JUNE 1948  
(EXTRACT)

3. As regards Kashmir, I must confess I am not happy about the military position at all. We do not seem to make much headway in spite of pouring men and material. Like Oliver Twist, the military commanders always ask for more and their estimates of requirements are constantly changing. What held good in December 1947 changed only four or five weeks later when I went there in the middle of January. What held good then was probably changed two months later. At last the offensive was taken, but we do not seem to have achieved as much and as soon as we expected. Now comes the threat to Leh and the capture of Kargil and Dras; both I believe are strategic points.

4. You speak of the desertion of the State troops in Ladakh and Skardu. This is not surprising as it is in keeping with the traditions of the State troops since the struggle commenced.

5. As regards the internal situation in Kashmir, you have rightly laid stress on the utility of propaganda and the attitude of Kashmiri Pandits. The latter makes me particularly distressed. If these people have lost faith in the efficacy of our arms or the ability of the local administration to survive, what must be the attitude of less sophisticated persons in the villages. Unfortunately nothing much in the matter of internal propaganda could be done by us as the Jammu and Kashmir Government were in sole charge of the propaganda media. They issued pamphlets and used both the radio and the platform.

I did not think it fit to intervene though I was feeling very dubious about the ability of the administration to do any effective propaganda. I felt that the agency of Sheikh Sahib and his Conference would be the best medium and that he knew best how, when and where to approach his men. I have now asked (P. C.) Chaudhuri (Director General, AIR), with whom I discussed this question yesterday when he came for his weekly interview, to convene a conference of the Ministries concerned, so that they can consider suggestions made by Azim Hussain in his report. I have asked for their recommendations at a very early date, so that we can devise a suitable scheme for the purpose. I hope I shall get it some time next week.

6. I entirely agree with you that we should have a real first class man to act as a sort of bridge between His Highness and Sheikh Sahib. In fact, this problem of differences and tension between the two has been worrying me very much. I have written several letters to Sheikh Sahib about easing this tension and improving relations, but I regret to say that I have had no reply. From all accounts it appears that the arrangements regarding reserved and non-reserved subjects to which Sheikh Sahib had agreed in March last are now being treated as a nullity and that the presence of the Maharaja and the existence of the reserved subjects are both being ignored. Even the Private Department of the Maharaja is being interfered with and action is being taken which, while it might bring back a few stragglers, would alienate the sympathies of non-Muslims who, whatever reasons there may be, still seem to regard the Maharaja as a symbol of their safety. I have impressed upon Sheikh Sahib as well as Bakshi the necessity of maintaining the prestige, the rights and privileges of the Maharaja, but the manner in which the questions of his privy purse, jagirdars and commandeering of office accommodation of his Private Department have been dealt with has left on my mind a most painful impression. Then there is the question of the Jammu &

Kashmir Army. I am inclining to think that it would be by far the best arrangement to let the State Forces remain an autonomous unit, so that if and when any question of withdrawal of these Indian forces comes about, this autonomous existence would enable us to maintain friendly forces on the spot. If, however, we merge their identity with the Indian Dominion forces, even though it might continue as a separate wing, we run the risk of their being treated more or less as Dominion-trained forces and, therefore, deserving of being sent in order to ensure a free impartial plebiscite. It is partly for this and other reasons that Sheikh Sahib wishes to keep the identity of his Home Guards separate, but somehow or the other he does not seem to see the validity of those very points when the question of the Army is raised.

7. I fully recognise the essential difference between the two, one is under popular control and the other is still under the exclusive control of the Maharaja, but I would be prepared to use my influence on the Maharaja to agree to consult his Ministry or if Sheikh Sahib would prefer it, an individual Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, in all important matters concerning the Army and while I should not ask the Maharaja to commit himself to it in writing, I think I would be able to persuade him generally to agree to accept the advice tendered, unless in any particular case there is a serious difference of opinion, when matters could be referred to me for final decision.

8. On the whole, I feel it would be best if discussions could be held in Srinagar or Jammu itself and we could bridge the difference between the Maharaja and Sheikh Sahib. For this purpose, I suggest that both Gopalaswami and Menon might visit Srinagar or/and Jammu and try to effect a settlement on the various outstanding matters. It might interest you to know that we sent a draft Rules of Business which had been accepted by the Maharaja some time in April, but despite reminders we have not yet had Sheikh Sahib's reactions on

them. I am writing to Gopalaswami to ask him to go there and help in straightening matters.

9. As regards the Maharaja remaining in Jammu, I entirely agree with you that he should frequently visit Srinagar. It would not be possible for him to spend all his time in Srinagar, because Jammu is equally important from the point of view of military operations. Shankar has already written to the Maharaja suggesting that he might stay for a fortnight in Jammu and for a fortnight in Srinagar. I hope the Maharaja will heed this advice. If this fails, I shall of course be writing to him personally.

61. SARDAR TO N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR,  
DATED 4 JUNE 1948

We have not met since you left for the UNO, and after your return I was told that you would some day run up to Mussoorie. But you were all very busy, and hence we had no opportunity to meet.

2. I have followed the Kashmir proceedings of the UNO, with considerable surprise and pain. I thought things were straightened before you left, but it seems we are almost where we were before you left. It is difficult to follow British diplomacy in this affair. However, for good or evil, we are in it and we must do our best.

3. The military position is none too good, and I am afraid our military resources are strained to the uttermost. How long we are to carry on this unfortunate affair, it is difficult to foresee.

4. On the civil side, the relations between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah have not improved in spite of several efforts on my part. Perhaps (V. P.) Menon will be able to acquaint you with all that has happened during your absence. The Maharaja has been asking for an adviser, and we must find

out a good man for him, who could carry the confidence of both and could be able to ease the situation. In the meanwhile, it would be desirable if you and Menon would go there for a couple of days and try to bring about agreement between the two. It is difficult to deal with this situation by correspondence. I had a mind to talk to you about this, but as you could not come, I am writing this now to you, as it is not possible to continue the present state of tension without serious detriment to the Kashmir cause.

62. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 5 JUNE 1948

I am so grateful to you for your letter of the 4th (Serial No. 61).

2. Nothing has caused me greater disappointment than my inability to proceed to where you are, spend a little time with you and talk over many matters. I programmed a visit to Mussoorie more than twice since my return from New York, but at the last moment something or other stood in the way and I was obliged to postpone it. I cannot find time to get away tomorrow and go over and see you at Dehra Dun, but I trust I shall be able to do so the following week-end.

3. The ways of the Security Council have been extraordinary and in dealing with the Kashmir question it has behaved in a manner which has surprised even a person like me with three months' day-to-day contact and experience with its members. Its last resolution giving the Commission the discretion to make enquiries about Junagadh, genocide and implementation of inter-Dominion agreement is a dishonest surrender to Pakistan intrigue.

4. As you say, we have entangled ourselves with a set of persons who will not see things straight and we have to do our best under the circumstances in which we find ourselves today. We are today informing the Security Council that in view

of our previous clear indications to it, its Commission cannot, on arrival here, proceed to take steps to implement the tasks cast upon it by a resolution which we have declined to accept in essentials. But we have only intimated our willingness to confer with it if it comes over in spite of our objections. We are asking it further to let us know in advance the point or points on which it proposes to confer with us. The Council apparently wants to push its Commission out, to plant it in India and slowly to hustle us into agreeing to all things recommended in its resolution. I am not sure even the telegram we are sending today will have the intended effect of making it hesitate to carry out the programme of the Commission coming out to this country.

5. Since my returning from New York and especially after my visit to Srinagar during the freedom celebrations, I have not been feeling too happy about the internal affairs of the State. I have had more than one talk with V. P. (Menon) about Kashmir. There are a number of matters to be straightened out and I shall be only too glad to carry out your wishes. I am arranging to proceed to Jammu and Srinagar on the 8th and am asking V. P. to accompany me. I hope his Hyderabad pre-occupations will permit of his doing so. We shall jointly try to do our best and hope that at the end of our visit things there would be look more satisfactory than they do now.

6. I am daily getting myself posted with the state of your health and am glad to learn that it has much improved. I trust this improvement will be even more rapid in the future than in the past and that you will be able to resume your normal activities here to the full at the earliest possible date.

63. MAHARAJA OF JAMMU & KASHMIR TO  
V. SHANKAR, DATED 10 JUNE 1948  
(EXTRACT)

Thanks very much for your letter of 1 June (Serial No. 58).

I am pleased to know that the Rules of Business have evoked support from quarters we least expected, but I am sorry to say that they are not being followed yet. I do wish that these rules are agreed to and acted upon without further delay.

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Regarding the State Army I might mention again that in no case am I prepared to part with the administrative control. I have given sufficient reasons for the stand I am taking in the matter. The Army is a reserved subject and the position in regard to the reserved subjects has already been clarified.

I realise that it is necessary for me to go to Srinagar in order to be available to my Cabinet for consultations and advice. But so far, as you are aware, I have been completely ignored even in most important matters. I don't know what guarantee there is in future that I will not be similarly ignored. Anyway I have decided to stay at Srinagar and Jammu alternately as both the places are important from the point of view of military operations and Her Highness' activities.

It is nice of you to send Mr. Sharma with instructions that he should see me. I shall be glad to see him when he calls and will utilise his services whenever considered necessary.

I have told both Sardarji and you that work is badly suffering in the absence of a competent man as Dewan. The present Dewan is unwell and I think realises that he is not suited to this post.

In these circumstances may I ask you again to please remind Sardarji to very kindly suggest some names as early as possible so that I may select one of them as my Dewan. Please treat it as most urgent and do your best in the matter.

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64. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 AUGUST 1948

Some days ago I received a personal and confidential letter from Lord Mountbatten (Serial No. 65). I showed it to the Governor-General today. He was of opinion that as this letter dealt with important and grave matters, all the Members of the Cabinet should see it. I am, therefore, sending a copy of it to you.

*(Author's Note :* Mountbatten's position in dealing with the issue of Jammu & Kashmir as constitutional Governor-General was a very difficult one. He combined more than one capacity and more than one position in his person. He was a Britisher bound in view of the office he occupied to look after and safeguard India's interests. At the same time, he had to preserve an approach based on impartiality, objectivity and fairness. There were British officers both in India and in Pakistan and he had to ensure that the two countries did not come to a state of open war at least during the time he was Governor-General. Even afterwards it was more or less obligatory on him to prevent the two countries from going to war. From a cable (Serial No. 74) and letter (Serial No. 75) from Pandit Nehru to Sardar Patel sent from London, it is clear that the Labour Cabinet, in particular the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Philip Noel Baker, definitely had their sympathies with Pakistan. We can excuse Mountbatten for thinking on the lines of the Maharaja's allegations, that he was inclined in favour of accession to Pakistan on a consideration of relevant factors. The mind of most Britishers on this subject was dominated by the communal character of the population, geographical contiguity and access to Pakistan. In their prejudice for Pakistan's point of view they did not allow for the fact that it was not India which forced the accession

of the State to India but that it was virtually Pakistan who did it. The author in his discussions with Pakistani "top brasses" on the question of Jammu & Kashmir had pointed out more than once that, but for the manner in which Pakistan forced the issue, the future of the State would have been decided most probably by the people themselves without reference either to India or to Pakistan.

Mountbatten had also his affiliations with the leaders of the Conservative Party, and his personal friendship with Winston Churchill; and the presence of Ismay, who was so close to Winston Churchill on his staff could not but make him think of his own position vis-a-vis the Conservative Party in general and Winston Churchill in particular. In fact, one of his most important assets was his acceptability to all the political parties in the United Kingdom. From Campbell Johnson's account in his book 'Mission with Mountbatten' it is clear that Mountbatten was against sending troops in response to a request from Kashmir for aid. We have, therefore, to assess Mountbatten's position in the light of all these complicated factors. It is a tribute to him that he could take a line in which he did not tread on too many corns and, even where he did so, the parties concerned bore the consequential pain in silent acquiescence: only seldom did it lead to a cry of protest.

His handling of the situation in India when he was shuttling between Delhi and Lahore in the vain pursuit of Jinnah was designed to promote a compromise. In the process he avoided as far as he could falling foul of Jinnah. In his original proposals to the Pakistan Government (S. No. 23) he committed the Government of India to withdrawal of troops immediately after the raiders had left the country and returned to their homes and also to the holding of a plebiscite under United Nations auspices. He was prepared to commit them to an agreement that a joint Indo-Pakistan force should hold the ring while the plebiscite was being held. He had not mentioned these to his Prime Minister and Sardar before he

showed this draft to Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan on 1-11-47, nor did he seem to have mentioned that this would cover Junagadh as well. This shows to what extent he was prepared to go in search of a compromise. S. No.20 makes it clear that he had prepared these proposals and communicated them to Liaquat Ali Khan without reference to Nehru and Sardar. It also shows how far he thought he would be able to persuade the leaders of his Government to climb down in that search. Nevertheless, the author is very doubtful if either Nehru or Sardar would have agreed to these proposals if they had been consulted beforehand. They went far beyond the positions both of them had taken up in regard to Kashmir or Junagadh.

It is clear from Campbell Johnson's account of his meeting with Lord Mountbatten on his return from the conference in Lahore on 1-11-47 that Mountbatten was very optimistic though frank. His handling of the Hyderabad situation was similar. In search for a compromise he was prepared to dilute or advise dilution of Government of India's basic position thinking wishfully that he would be able to deliver the goods. He relied for this on his influence over Gandhiji and Pandit Nehru in particular and even on Sardar. In fact, both of them often yielded to him against their better judgment.

Mountbatten strove, as has been said earlier, to prevent an open conflict although the situation had developed in such a way that an open conflict was already in progress and that Indian forces were suffering considerable damage in men and equipment. During this period Pakistan was operating through tribals and members of its forces lent to the tribals under the guise of volunteers. Afterwards, before Mountbatten left India, regular troops of Pakistan had already entered the fray. What is worse is that the corridor which had been left out of bombing by the Indian Air Force under Mountbatten's advice was the area in which Pakistan regular forces established themselves and formed their base. Bloody battles followed in which we lost a valuable officer of the calibre of Brigadier Osman; nevertheless we failed to drive the Pakistanis out of the State by the time the cease-fire caught us in January 1949.

On 15th August 1948 Mountbatten sent his special note to Nehru from London pleading for the avoidance of a declaration of war; in that he assured him of sincere friendship which the British Government felt towards India. In general perhaps the remark is true but it is wide of the mark in regard to the Kashmir issue. He gives his opinion on the unwisdom of launching an actual warfare and pleads for some patience with the United Nations Organisation. He also indicates a pathetic faith, as subsequent developments have confirmed, that U. N. observers, with qualification, competent and honest, could prevent consolidation by Pakistan and report infringements and that this would put Pakistan out of court before the United Nations Organisation and the world. It is not unlikely that it was this appreciation which led Nehru to ignore Sardar's advice that the U.N.C.I.P. Resolution of 13th August 1948 which had been accepted by India but rejected by Pakistan should be taken as the final word and no discussions should take place until Pakistan had accepted that Resolution. If we had followed that advice, it is not unlikely that under pressure of the military situation which took a favourable turn towards the end of 1948 we would have made substantial progress in pushing Pakistan forces out of the State. It is possible that it would have eventually led to an open war between the two Dominions. In that eventuality, there would have been intervention by the foreign powers to stop fighting. At that stage, with our superior forces it is probable that we would have commanded a larger area and would have been in a better bargaining position vis-a-vis Pakistan. However, this is now only in the field of speculation. The fact of the matter is that India was pushed into a position in which the dividing line of the State between India and Pakistan is much less strategic than it could and should have been and very probably the solution of the problem could have been reached even in 1949 and the problem would not have lingered until today.)

65. MOUNTBATTEN TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 15 AUGUST 1948

We have just come back from a great meeting at the Albert Hall where over 4,000 people joined together to celebrate the first anniversary of India's Independence. No doubt you will see the full report in the Press, but I thought you would like to know that every time your name was mentioned it brought all proceedings to standstill; so long and so genuine was the applause.

Edwina and I are off tomorrow morning to Ireland and after that to Canada, and will not be back until the end of the month, and I know that you will have in the meanwhile to take some very vital decisions. How I wish I could still be with you in Delhi and help you to make them by giving you a chance to discuss all the points with me as you used to in the old days.

Although I have no right whatever to make any comments, let alone give you any advice now, I feel in a way a continuing responsibility for the situation you are now faced with, for it was I who encouraged you to take the Kashmir case to UNO.

Since I have been over here, I have had an opportunity of discussing this problem with every sort of person and all shades of opinion. I have been struck by the unanimity of thought ever here that India was absolutely right to go to UNO. I know that you (and I) have been criticised in India for having gone to UNO because UNO handled the matter in a way that caused disappointment in India. But in the comparatively detached atmosphere of London it is more than ever clear that the alternatives before India were and still are open war or a decision by UNO. There are really no

other alternatives except perhaps a continuation of undeclared war with all the risks that entail of eventually turning into a declared war.

I think you will agree with (me that) Pakistan is in no position even to declare war, since I happen to know that their military commanders have put it to them in writing that a declaration of war with India can only end in the inevitable and ultimate defeat of Pakistan.

Therefore a declared war can only come about by India making the declaration.

I know that you will instinctively shrink from taking such a course but I also know that there are some of your colleagues in the Cabinet and the more noisy and unthinking elements in the country who will press you to declare war. I therefore feel it may be of some use if I enumerate again the disastrous consequences of such an act on the part of India.

After all that the leaders of free India have said and stand for, after having won your long battle against Imperial rule, can we honestly contemplate that India's first major international act should be a declaration of war, and the final and open abandonment of all other methods of settling an international dispute? This will inevitably be of the gravest possible prejudice to India's future international position; indeed UNO might well outlaw her, in my opinion, naming her as the aggressor. What a paradoxical tragedy that would be!

I am certain I do not need to reassure you as to the sincere friendship which HMG feel towards India. The decisive voices in the British Cabinet are extremely sympathetic and well disposed towards India. If there was any doubt, surely Attlee's remarks in the recent debate in the House on Hyderabad and Stafford's remark at the Albert Hall today would reassure you. But whatever their feelings would be, they would have no option, in my opinion but to conform with UNO's decision if they were to name India as the aggressor.

The converse seems equally true to me; if the United Kingdom were named an aggressor by UNO, the Government of India would be bound to conform to UNO unless indeed they were to abandon UNO.

I need not remind that you have four crores of Muslims spread all over India to whom communal peace was given by Gandhiji's teaching and finally by his death. Can anyone doubt that all Gandhiji's teaching would be thrown by the board, and that communal massacres which would make the Punjab look mild by comparison would follow open warfare with a Muslim State. A declaration of war would be signing of the death warrant of a great number of innocent women and children within India and not merely within the war zone. In this respect I submit that India is in an almost unique position.

This would be a most inglorious end to the whole conception of the secular State for which you and Gandhiji and your followers have devoted your whole life's work.

Have you asked your Chiefs of Staff Committee to give you the advantages and disadvantages of declaring war? If you had a thousand heavy bombers, or a hundred, or even fifty, which could completely flatten out the Pakistan bases, then I could understand the military temptation to declare war. But what have you got? A few old Dakotas with a somewhat doubtful Harry Tate contraption to drop bombs which I have seen for myself at the Hindustan Aircraft Factory. To hit the target with this arrangement would entail flying at so low a height that the Pakistan anti-aircraft gunners could not miss. And we know from our own experience in England how ineffective even a first class bombing force can be until after years of training and war experience.

If therefore you will agree that no sane man could subscribe to a declaration of war, what is the alternative? Apart from going on with an undeclared war, which is so likely to lead to ultimate disaster, the alternative must be UNO.

I think that India should show some patience with UNO, for after all it is the first time humanity has got together to try and find an alternative to war. All my discussions here have convinced me that it was not malice, power politics or any sinister motive which brought about the unsatisfactory treatment of our case. I admit that they took a long while to send the Delegation, that they failed to deal with India's complaint against Pakistan as you would have wished them to, and that things have dragged on interminably; but now you have the Delegation with you, and now is your opportunity to bring all possible legitimate pressure to bear to make them understand your position. I know that you, unfortunately, did not share my view that the last resolution of UNO was not unfavourable for India, but if you will look at it again, I think you will find that if UNO were to implement it, it can provide a reasonable solution for India. Certainly an infinitely better solution than plunging all the rest of India into the consequences of war.

If UNO, as Krishna (Menon) seems to think likely, order a cease fire, with all forces in their present positions, you might feel that this was giving an unfair advantage to Pakistan. But is it? If there are enough competent and honest observers, they can prevent the forward movement of troops and ammunition, and they can prevent any form of consolidation by Pakistan, or at least report any infringement which would finally put Pakistan out of court before UNO and the world.

The only satisfactory conclusion that I can see would be for UNO to condemn Pakistan publicly for sending their army into Kashmir on the ground that this is Indian territory. I do not myself see how such a condemnation could precede the acceptance of the order to cease fire. As I said just now, the act of complying with the cease-fire order could in no way prejudice India's military position, as your military advisers will tell you, but the condemnation of Pakistan by UNO which can then follow would be the justification of the policy

which you have pursued from January and the beginning of peace in Kashmir. In effect this would enormously strengthen your position with your followers, and public opinion would certainly establish India's rightful position in the world.

For God's sake don't get yourself plunged in 'war' however great the internal pressure, for once in you cannot get out of the consequences.

66. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1948

I was surprised to read this morning an account of the Press Conference which Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah is reported to have held here yesterday. He said he would be seeing me today and I was waiting for him, but since he did not turn up, I am writing to you as well as to him about it (Serial No. 67).

It is rather odd that he should have found the venue of a Press Conference to ventilate his alleged grievance against the Maharaja. No one should know better than he that the Maharaja is not in a position to resist the demands of the popular Ministry. We, the Maharaja and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah himself came to a settlement last March. That settlement has not only been faithfully adhered to by the Maharaja but, in certain respects, he has acquiesced in departures from that settlement to the advantage of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his Ministry. I refer in particular to the position regarding the reserved subjects of which the jagirdars form one. I am not aware of any single instance, at least Sheikh Sahib has not brought it to my notice, in which the Maharaja has obstructed or resisted any of the popular reforms. As a constitutional head, he may have asked for reconsideration in one or two matters, but this could hardly be treated as the subject of a grievance. It is undignified and constitutionally improper for a Prime Minister to attack the constitutional head of the administration, knowing full well that the latter is not in a

position to defend himself or to retaliate. On top of it, to insinuate that he is trying to retain power, or that he has strong friends in India or that he could buy friends is, in my opinion, say the least, most unfortunate.

Sheikh Sahib has also referred to certain people in India who believe in surrendering Kashmir to Pakistan. I should like to be enlightened who they are. As far as my information goes, there are many more of such people in Jammu and Kashmir State than in the whole of India put together.

Sheikh Sahib also refers to the Hindu fanaticism of the East Punjab. This again is a generalisation which, I hope, Sheikh Sahib in calmer moments will regret. It certainly is a most unfortunate attack on a neighbouring province of the Dominion to which his State has acceded.

I hope Sheikh Sahib realises that nobody has been more accommodating to him than the Government of India and none has extended to him greater understanding and sympathy in his struggle than the people of India. In spite of the fact that he has departed from an accepted position from time to time, we have tried our best to put pressure on the Maharaja and make him concede the position which he has taken up. I thought that, having made the Maharaja accept the position regarding the Army, he would now accommodate himself to the Maharaja and would not at least carry controversy in public. He has, however, thought it fit to do so, without having any regard for the fact that he is, after all, constitutionally the Maharaja's Prime Minister. I think it would be difficult to find a parallel in constitutional history to the sort of attack which he has made on the Maharaja. I hope you will succeed in impressing upon him the mistake he has made. We shall have gained something if at least it is not repeated. I thought I would let you have my reactions so that if an opportunity arises you might speak to him some time. I am sending herewith a copy of my letter to Sheikh Sahib.

67. SARDAR TO SHEIKH ABDULLAH,  
DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1948

I have seen a report of your yesterday's Press Conference which has appeared in today's Statesman. You made no reference to it when you saw me yesterday nor did you give me any indication that you were going to deal with certain controversial matters with which we, in the States Ministry, are undoubtedly concerned. Indeed in respect of some matters we are seized already. I thought, as you told me yesterday, you would be coming to see me, but since you did not come, I am writing this to you.

I had hoped that with the Army question now out of the way and with practically no resistance or obstruction from Maharaja in regard to the many schemes of reforms which you have introduced and are introducing, you would now accommodate yourself to your new constitutional relationship with him. I had never imagined that you would ventilate your grievance in public and I had thought that at least in fairness to ourselves, and, having regard to the agreed arrangement between ourselves, if you had any grievance, you would first come to the States Ministry and seek a satisfactory solution through our medium. In fact, so far whenever you have had any difficulty we have not hesitated to put pressure on the Maharaja to accept a position, even though in certain matters it went against the arrangements agreed to last March.

No one knows better than you that today the Maharaja is powerless to resist your wishes. Even if he feels inclined differently, on merits he has to endorse your wishes if you pressed them. It is within my knowledge that he has deferred to your wishes in matters which concerned him intimately, such as allowances to the family of the Raja of Poonch, or to the handing over of guest houses or in regard to tenancy reforms. I am, therefore, unable to comprehend your reference to his trying to retain power.

I am also rather mystified at your reference to his having strong friends in India, or his being in a position to buy friends. During the three or four weeks that he was in Delhi he was quite inaccessible to interviews and to the Press because he felt that, constitutionally it was improper for him to deal in public with any matters affecting his State. If you have any particular information about these strong friends, I would be glad if you could communicate it to me. You have also referred to certain people who believe in surrendering Kashmir to Pakistan. I should like to be enlightened on this point as well. You will agree that we should know who these traitors are. You have also referred to the Muslim fanaticism of Pakistan and the Hindu fanaticism of East Punjab. As far as I know none of the Hindus or even Sikhs of East Punjab would like Kashmir to go to Pakistan. There has undoubtedly been some dissatisfaction in India with certain measures which have been put into force, but such dissatisfaction is by no means so general as to justify your dubbing a whole province as having succumbed to any kind of fanaticism, particularly when that province happens to be your neighbour and one whose goodwill and assistance would be of some help to you. You have also referred to the view that "we deserted the Frontier." This is probably a criticism of our attitude to the referendum in the Frontier. Jawaharlal would know best how to deal with this criticism of yours which, I can only say, is based on complete ignorance of facts. I don't blame you for it because you were in jail at the time.

I hope you will not mind my speaking to you frankly about your interview because I do feel that now when we are engaged in a common struggle against a foreign foe this sort of interview or thinking aloud does no one any good. On the other hand, it merely gives a loophole to our enemies to harp on dissensions and dissatisfactions and to pick out phrases here and there which could be magnified into more serious proportions on which a great deal of hostile propaganda can be built. It is much better our trying to solve our difficulties

round a table in an atmosphere of friendliness and cordiality than to try to discuss them in public in an attempt to collect popular support for it. You know very well that our relations are such that any propaganda or publicity for your views in India is unnecessary. You also know that whenever you have had any difficulties we have tried our best to help you to overcome them and have mostly succeeded. Either the difficulties which you experience in India are formidable or they are not. If they are formidable, we have the right to be told what they are before you take the public into confidence. If they are not, they are hardly worthy of public notice.

68. SARDAR TO N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR,  
DATED 1 OCTOBER 1948

I wonder if you have seen the report of Sheikh Abdullah's Press Conference which appeared in yesterday's Statesman. If you have not, I shall be glad if you will kindly see and let me have your reactions to it. I myself feel bitterly that, after all that we have done for him and the sympathy and understanding which we have extended to him, he should have indulged in such direct and unbecoming attacks on the Maharaja who, he knew, would be unable to hit back and who has, to the best of my information, done nothing to obstruct or to resist the many reforms which he is reported to be introducing in the State administration and should also have made unwarranted insinuations about 'his strong friends' in Delhi, about 'his being able to buy friends,' about 'Hindu fanaticism of East Punjab' etc. After we settled the army question on the basis to which he had agreed, I thought that the controversy between him and the Maharaja would end, at least in so far as its serious aspects were concerned. But it seems that he gets a position of vantage merely to fight for another and his latest attempt is intended to mobilise public opinion in India. I have myself written to him separately (Serial No. 67), but I thought it would help me if you could let me know how you feel about it.

69. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 2 OCTOBER 1948

I have received your letter of the 1st (Serial No. 68), regarding the Press Conference which Sheikh Abdullah addressed on 29 September. Before I saw an account of it in the newspapers, I had been told orally by persons who had been present there of a good deal that he had said but had not appeared in the newspapers. What was not reported in the papers, I gathered, was even more unjustifiable than what did appear.

Sheikh Abdullah came to see me the next morning and I asked him myself whether he had not said worse things than what had been reported. He replied that there were some things which he had said but which had not been reported, but they were not worse, in his opinion, than what had been reported. I told him that he might have avoided certain things which some of the audience he addressed might have welcomed but which obviously in the circumstances it was unwise for him to have given expression to. I added that I had one consolation in reading that morning's newspapers, for they reported that Begum Abdullah had publicly committed herself to the proposition that Kashmir should permanently accede to India and that any other course would be ruinous to that State. I reminded him that, as he himself knew, the general opinion was that Begum Abdullah was actively pro-Pakistani and I therefore welcomed a statement of that sort from her. It was strange, I added, that this piece of news was obscured by his own Press Conference which was displayed under bold headlines. I do not think I need say anything more as to my reactions to Sheikh Abdullah's part in that Press Conference.

70. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 3 OCTOBER 1948

In continuation of my letter of 30 September regarding Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's Press Conference (Serial No. 66), I send herewith a copy of the letter which I have received from Gopalaswami (Serial No. 69), whom I had invited to give his reactions on the report.

71. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 4 OCTOBER 1948

Thank you for your letter of 3 October (Serial No. 70) about Sheikh Abdullah's Press Conference. I did not reply to your previous letter as I was leaving for Kashmir. I entirely agree with you that some of the statements that Sheikh Abdullah made in regard to the Maharaja were very indiscreet and should not have been made.

In Srinagar I had a long talk with Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad about a large number of matters, more specially the whole background of our approach to these problems. I hope this did some good. Sheikh Abdullah is, I am convinced, a very straight and frank man. He is not a very clear thinker and he goes astray in his speech as many of our politicians do. He is of course obsessed with the idea of meeting the challenge of Pakistan and keeping his own people from being influenced by Pakistan's propaganda. I made it clear to him that while I entirely agree with this, the approach should be different.

72. SHEIKH ABDULLAH TO SARDAR,  
DATED 7 OCTOBER 1948

I thank you for your letter dated 30 September 1948 (Serial No. 67).

1. While I fully appreciate your anxiety to seek clarification on certain aspects of my address to the Press Conference referred to in your letter, I may hasten to assure you that there was in my mind absolutely no idea of withholding my views from you or bypassing the States Ministry. When I met you, the talk chiefly centred on affairs connected with the UN Commission and my attention was wholly taken up with them. I was myself very keen to discuss other matters also with you and it was therefore that I asked for another interview with you the next day. On the day following I expected to get some notice from your Secretary as to the time that would be convenient to you to meet me at your residence. I got no intimation and concluded that owing perhaps to pressing engagements and also your indifferent health it was not possible to spare time for another meeting.

2. I am sorry to have to say that my stand upon the various points dealt with by me in the Press Conference has been, in a great measure, misunderstood and there has been little appreciation of the peculiar position in which I and my colleagues are placed in the present critical situation in the State. I shall try to give here as full a picture of the present state of affairs here as possible, particularly in its relation to the points raised in your d. o.

3. It will not be quite the whole truth to say that the question of the administration of the Army has been settled. Even such settlement as has been arrived at, which took full six months to materialise, has not so far been implemented in its entirety. With the taking over of the State forces

by the Indian Government it was agreed that steps would be taken to reorganise and rebuild our Army so that when the present emergency is over and the Indian Forces are withdrawn, the State will be left with a properly organised army of its own to fall back upon. This request was made as early as March last and has been repeated several times since. During my discussion of the matter with Shri Gopalswami Ayyangar and Mr. (V. P.) Menon at New Delhi on 20 and 21 June last it was agreed between us that an Indian Army Officer will be appointed to reorganise the State forces. Nothing, however, has been done in that direction so far to my knowledge.

4. It need not be reiterated here that the J. & K Army has virtually been a close preserve of a very small coterie of the favourites of the ruling family namely, the Hindu Rajputs. All other classes and communities of people inhabiting the country have been eliminated for this purpose. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Army has not been able to inspire any confidence in the people of the country either as a fighting force against outside aggression or as a protective arm within. In fact, the Army question has been the main grievance of all the various communities of the State and there has been persistent agitation against its class composition. It was after a careful consideration of the whole matter that I had urged a complete transfer of the Army administration to a popular Minister of my Cabinet. To my mind that alone was the real and effective solution of this thorny problem. To my great regret this was not agreed to and it was only as a compromise that I accepted the transfer of the State forces to the Government of India on the condition that the forces will be soon reorganised on a broader and more liberal basis. As I have stated above, even this compromise decision has not been implemented and it is therefore futile to say that the Army question is solved and is "out of the way".

5. I am astonished to have it from you that there is "practically no restriction or obstruction from the Maharaja

in regard to the many schemes of reforms" which I have introduced or am introducing. Nor did I expect from you the remark that "today the Maharaja is powerless" and that he has shown deference to my wishes in matters "such as allowance to the Raja of Poonch or to the handing over of guest houses or in regard to tenancy reforms." Nothing is indeed farther from the facts than the complacency contained in this assertion and I may be pardoned if I have to say that it has really grieved me to know that the States Ministry should be so ignorant of the real position.

Just a few instances will illustrate my meaning. As early as April last my Cabinet formed the resolution that rakhs (government land used as common pasture) and military farms should be handed over to the "Grow More Food Department" to be utilised for cultivation of the much needed foodgrains. This was with a view to relieve, in some measure, the virtual famine conditions prevailing in the State. You cannot be unaware of the fact that we had to import large quantities of foodstuffs from India at a price nearly five times more than that prevailing in the State. This has obviously involved us in huge financial commitments. And it should not be lost sight of that the Kashmir valley faced a series of serious crop disasters, owing to repeated floods. In spite, however, of the dire necessity to find space where we could grow our own food, His Highness' Military Farms Department did not transfer the rakhs and farms nor has he to this day confirmed our resolution. It would not be difficult to imagine that our food difficulties in the forthcoming year will be considerably enhanced by this attitude of non possumus.

The Cabinet recommendation regarding assumption of jagirs and mukarraries has not been confirmed by His Highness even though several months have passed since the case was submitted to him. This matter was subsequently referred to the States Ministry of the Government of India, but in spite of certain agreements arrived at in our discussion at

New Delhi on 20 and 21 June last, no orders have so far been communicated.

With regard to our new tenancy reforms, a new Bill was submitted to His Highness some time ago. He wanted some elucidations which were supplied by me immediately. His assent to this measure, however, has not been received so far and I am really at a loss to know on what basis you say that he has agreed to our tenancy reforms.

The matter of allownces to the family of the Raja of Poonch is in the same situation. Excepting the allowance to the Raja himself, the case of the other members (of his family) is still hanging fire.

The Kashmir Alienation of land Act, a matter of great importance locally, was to expire on the 2nd of October. We sent a draft ordinance to His Highness by the middle of September proposing prohibition of alienation for a period of six months to enable us to examine the whole question and prepare suitable legislation. His Highness has not given his assent to this ordinance also and the existing law of alienation has now expired. I do not desire to trouble you with other instances of a glaring nature in which cooperation has been withheld from us or even obstructions placed in our way. I would earnestly request you to consider the position to see for yourself if the Maharaja is really "powerless".

6. I have done my utmost during the past 7 months to explain the whole position to you and to Panditji. It will be recalled that in June last in one of my communications to you in reply to certain queries made by you, I dealt at length with the position of the Maharaja and the feeling that the public here entertains for him. I regret that in spite of my repeated attempts in this behalf the sentiments of the people of this State with regard to the unmistakable part which the Maharaja and his satellites took in the general massacre of Muslims at Jammu are but insufficiently appreciated. Even at the risk of adding

to the volume of this letter, I would reproduce here some portions from my note of 1 June. I then said:

“I have made no secret of it so far and I repeat it that the Maharaja has generally lost the confidence of the people of the State and Kashmiris in particular entertain bitterness against him. The reasons for this are not far to seek. In a moment of supreme crisis when Kashmir was actually facing annihilation in October 1947, His Highness left the Kashmiris at the mercy of raiders without giving a moment's thought to the question of protection of their lives. At that moment a fairly large portion of the State had fallen into the hands of the enemy and thousands of men, women and children, of his “beloved subjects” were being butchered every day. In this testing hour his only anxiety was to collect his belongings, commandeer transport and bolt off stealthily with his kith and kin and a few chosen favourites. The Indian Army had not yet arrived and he was then feeling that Kashmir had gone out of his hands and he had better run away with his own life. He did not thus throw (to the enemy) only his Muslim subjects . . . about whom, it was patent, he never had any soft corner, but he completely betrayed the Kashmir people as a whole. The rude shock it gave the people can better be imagined than described. And what happened in Jammu after his arrival there is an unutterable tale. As early as December 1947 I referred to this in some detail in my communications to Panditji and Gandhiji. As he moved down from the tunnel (on the road from Srinagar to Jammu) there was enacted in every village and town through which he passed an orgy of arson and loot and murder of Muslims. In Jammu, the killing of Muslims all over the province continued unabated for weeks under his very nose, the town having been converted into a veritable hell. Innocent children and girls were not spared and the display of sadism to which they were subjected would render insignificant anything that happened on the two sides of the divided Punjab in its hour of madness. All this

staggering tragedy on such a vast scale is alleged to have been accomplished by the participation of high-ranking Hindu officials and Dogra military in Jammu as well as His Highness' own trusted relations and his then Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. A widespread belief certainly not without basis, was that the killing was carried on in pursuance of an organised plan of genocide under which free distribution of arms and ammunition was made to communalist organisations like RSS through Hindu officials, high and low. Thousands of Muslims besieged in the town of Jammu were asked to march in convoys to death under the very escort of State forces who themselves actively participated in the shooting and killing. This was done only at a distance of a few miles from His Highness' Palace. As against this I and every worker of the National Conference in Kashmir Province at that moment of grave peril were fighting the raiders and protecting the life and honour of the microscopic minority here. The general belief that this large-scale tragedy could not take place without active participation or connivance of the authorities that mattered in Jammu receives support from these facts. I made earnest appeals to His Highness then that the Rashtriya Seva Sangh, whose creed was based on violence and which had executed its plan of genocide far and wide, could be declared unlawful and ruthlessly suppressed. He pointblank refused to do it. This is the cooperation and support that I have been receiving from him and under these circumstances I am expected to restore the people's confidence in him and carry the people with me in the successful prosecution of the war that we are fighting. The sober-minded Gandhiji was so moved by this tragedy that he several times in his prayer meetings referred to the carnage perpetrated in Jammu. After inquiry through impartial agencies he located the responsibility for this killing in unmistakable terms."

And here the point of distinction must not be lost sight of. I do not for a moment deny that our Hindu brethren have

been victims of regrettable slaughter, arson and loot in those parts of the State which have been overrun by our enemies. Whereas there this miserable carnage was perpetrated by the raiders with whom we are fighting, in the State these unspeakable crimes on the Muslims were committed by those who stood charged with the duty of defending the people, i. e., the Dogra Army and the high officials of the Maharaja's Government. I rounded up by saying:

“I am, therefore, constrained to aver once again that the choice is finally between the Maharaja and the people and if the choice is not soon made, it might lend us into very serious trouble both militarily and politically. The only alternative is that His Highness should abdicate in favour of his son and that there should be no reservation whatsoever in the administration of various subjects under the Ministers. This is my considered opinion after taking stock of the whole situation in the last seven months. I have on a number of occasions apprised Panditji, Mr. Gopala-swami Ayyangar and other high-ranking officials of the Government of India of this. Recently I had a frank talk about this with Rajkumari Amrit Kaur. I am, therefore, giving here my considered, decisive and final opinion in this behalf. It is now up to the States Ministry and Panditji to decide how this object is to be achieved.”

This is the view to which I still adhere. On getting inadequate response from the States Ministry in this matter and thinking that they are perhaps right in not forcing this issue at the present moment, I conceived the idea of starting an inquiry into the happenings at Jammu with a view that the very fact of my taking such a step would assuage in some measure the outraged feelings of the people of the State. Indeed, I was always of the opinion that if the Maharaja was innocent, it was for him to institute an inquiry and even face a public trial to defend his honour and set at rest the serious allegations made against him. Instead of doing so the only course that he thought fit to adopt was to withdraw

himself in his own shell, snapping all possibility of contact with the public, and engage himself in torpedoing the Government below the waters. The enquiry was instituted but had to be stopped at the pressure brought to bear upon me that it would be inopportune and would adversely affect other interests. I am still of the opinion that the baulking of this matter in this fashion is to keep the public mind on the tenterhooks and forfeit their wholehearted cooperation with my Government in its attempt to rehabilitate the shaking structure of the State. I cannot refrain from reiterating that as long as something is not done by way of an enquiry in this behalf, we shall continue to be treading on slippery ground.

7. Our economic programme is only too well known. It is my firm conviction that it was our rigid adherence to that programme that has saved us from the orgy of communalism during the last crisis. That programme hits feudalism and lays the axe at the root of vested interests. It was only to be expected that the elements affected by that programme will try to resist it both from inside and outside the State. It will be conceded that these nefarious vested interests so inimical to the larger welfare of the poor people, are still stalking the land and have not been liquidated either in the State or in India. They have strong sympathisers both here and in India. Nor is it to be surprised at that these vested interests would prefer Pakistan to India in the hope that they can flourish there at least for the time being. I see unmistakable signs that these vested interests have combined and are engaged in an attempt to so manipulate the position that Kashmir be surrendered to Pakistan. You may have recently read an article in the Eastern Economist of 15 August under the caption "Kashmir and Hyderabad". On the Kashmir question the suggestion is that a gift of a part of our territory should be made to Pakistan. The article says that the prospects are very dark and advocates a friendly settlement with the organisers of the raiders because, according to the author, large areas in

Kashmir may opt for Pakistan. And I may quote yet another instance of a similar nature. A certain Mr. A. M. Thakur writing in the Times of India, Bombay says, "As India's right over Hyderabad is unquestionable so is Pakistan's over Kashmir . . . the example of the NWF Province is sufficient for our guidance. Let us not be misled by wishful thoughts and mere hopes."

I cannot imagine a more glaring example of creating a sense of frustration than this. I had persons like this in view when I said that there are people in India who are trying to bring about a surrender of Kashmir to Pakistan. Is it wrong to conclude that pseudo-journalists like Mr. Thakur mere play the piper and the tune is called by someone else who pays ?

8. The story of the communal disturbances of March and August 1947 and the misery of the millions of Hindu and Muslim refugees in the two parts of the Punjab is still green. A large number of these refugees, passed through the State territory in their awful plight. These unfortunate victims repeated their tales of woe and misery in the province of Jammu, thus radiating bitterness which is taking root, and what is happening in the East and West Punjab today as a result of this bitterness is known to everybody. Whoever perpetrated these nefarious crimes, whether they are of the one or the other part of the Punjab, are fanatics of the worst type and we have to fight them wherever they are. My reference was to such elements and in my opinion it was both opportune and necessary. We have, all of us, to hold aloft Gandhiji's banner of love and truth. It is only with this noble ideal uppermost in our hearts that we can make India a truly secular State.

9. Last of all you have made reference to the case of the NWF Province. I did say that "We deserted the Frontier." The facts that we know are such that to my mind the Congress stand vis-a-vis NWFP cannot be justified. Every Province decided to opt for either Dominion on the basis of the majority vote of her legislature. Why was this not done in the case of

the NWFP and why was a decision taken on the basis of a referendum in this case alone? Why did Congress agree to this discriminatory treatment? Again, since West Punjab had opted for Pakistan and the NWFP had no access left to India, why was not Badshah Khan's (Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan) demand for Azad Pathanistan supported by Congress? I see no answer to these questions and therefore I said that "we deserted the Frontier."

10. This is the background of my Press Conference. In this perspective you will see that I said nothing which was new or was not fully within your knowledge or that of the States Ministry. I feel intensely on these matters. We are engaged in a life and death struggle. This is not the time to mince matters. You can not expect me to watch unmistakable attempts to sabotage us and remain quiet. To my mind a policy of *laissez faire* would not suit the temper of the time. You have yourself been all your life a political worker among the masses and can easily appreciate the difficult position in which I am placed. The public have a right to know from me that power has now finally passed into the hands of the people; that the subterfuge of "reserved" and "non-reserved" subjects, the crippling encumbrances of the privy purse and royal family allowances, and a **host of other unconscionable burdens doubling to breaking point** the backs of the poor, starving famine stricken people, are now lifted for once and all and that I am in a position to deliver the goods. That alone can give the lie direct to Pakistan propaganda, linking my name with all the misdeeds of the previous regime and out to show that His Highness has parted with the shadow and not the substance of power. We have to carry the people with us and I have always appealed to you and the Government of India to back us without stint and without reserve. Kashmir can be saved only in this way, and this is the only way to vindicate the noble ideals for which the war of Kashmir is being fought.

11. I would beg to be pardoned for this somewhat lengthy letter which has grown out of proportion only because of my

anxiety that there may be no misunderstanding in your mind and my ever-present desire that my point of view may be fully appreciated and its implications completely implemented.

73. SARDAR TO SHEIKH ABDULLA, DATED NIL  
(DRAFT)

Thank you for your letter of 7 October 1948 (Serial No. 72) which was received here on the 10th.

2. You seem to have misunderstood the point of my reference. My grievance was and still remains that before apprising us of your intention you sought a public forum for ventilating your so-called grievances against the Maharaja and gave expression to certain views which were bound to embarrass us. My impression was that you would yourself come or ask for some time the next day. Had I known that you expected me to fix a time, I would have had it conveyed to you.

3. You seem to be in the peculiar position of having been misunderstood, apart from many others, by all the three of us, Jawaharlal, Gopalaswami and myself. Jawaharlal has written to me and I believe has spoken to you also, taking exception to your attitude at the Press Conference. Similarly Gopalaswami has done the same and spoke to you at the very next day. From his letter to me it appears that even when he spoke to you the next day, you did not appreciate the reasons why he considered the report of your Press Conference as particularly embarrassing. Your letter seems to show that, even now, you do not appreciate the entire position. I put several pointed questions in my letter. You have avoided answering them and even where you have answered a few, it is a repetition of the old, old story. There is no disposition on your part either to understand our point of view or to strike a new line as demanded by the changed situation. I am quite convinced that the grossly prejudiced view which you have taken of the matters referred to is not likely to mend matters; instead it is likely to make them worse and more complicated.

4. You take exception to my remark that the question of the administration of the Army had been settled. Obviously my remark referred to a settlement in so far as the outstanding point between you and the Maharaja was concerned. The problem of reorganisation remains and you can hardly expect us to produce miracles in that line within the short period of three weeks that the Army has been formally transferred to us; nor do you seem to be aware of the extent of our Army's preoccupations with the military operations. If you were, you would not have found fault with them for failure to secure a reorganisation of these forces. I also notice that both on this question and on other outstanding matters you have scant appreciation of our difficulties and preoccupations. Otherwise you could hardly have referred to delays in these matters in the manner you have done.

5. It is surprising that you should charge us with ignorance of the real position. The fact is that, while you see only one side of the picture, we see both the sides, and that, while you are content to regulate your conduct and your views according to that one-sided appreciation of facts, we have to weigh matters on a balance of both sides. You have omitted many matters in which you have taken actions which were contrary to the arrangements of last March yet to which the Maharaja has taken no objection and has made no opposition. In the case of the Ruler of Poonch the Maharaja has already agreed to the reduction in the allowances of the Raja of Poonch and has also agreed to the non-payment of any allowance to two or three relations of the Raja. It is only in 2 or 3 cases that he asked you to reconsider the matter in view of the fact that their circumstances are indigent and they would be thrown on the streets. If this is obstruction, I am afraid we shall have to define the word quite differently.

6. In regard to the tenancy reforms also, there has been no obstruction, but if you feel that seeking clarification or considering this important matter for some time with a view to placing His Highness' own views before the Cabinet for consideration

is "obstruction," I am afraid I am not prepared to agree. Apart from this, you met no obstruction from him, at least not that I am aware of, in regard to earlier measures which you introduced for the amelioration of the tenancy. The Cabinet recommendations regarding resumption of jagirs and mukarraries cannot be held against the Maharaja. The question was referred to the States Ministry by the Maharaja. It was discussed with (V. P.) Menon and Gopalaswami Ayyangar in July, but unfortunately it has not been possible to finalise the views of the States Ministry because obviously it has certain all-India considerations from which you may be immune but by which we are bound.

7. You seem to doubt my statement that the Maharaja is powerless. Nothing is more symptomatic of his being powerless than the fact that his Prime Minister can openly make repeated charges against him; yet he cannot reply. Apart from this, I am sure you will not be able to recall a single instance, within your own sphere, in which the Maharaja has, in any way, interfered or has gone against your wishes. As a constitutional head, he is entitled to advise and warn you but if you insist, he has to submit to it. As far as I am aware, so far he has complied with these requirements.

8. You have again harped upon incidents which, I thought you had discreetly avoided persisting in, viz. the allegations against His Highness about atrocities. You do not seem to realise that both you and we ourselves owe the technical correctness of our position in regard to Kashmir to the Maharaja's signing the Accession and his calling upon you to form the Ministry. Without that, neither we nor you would have been where we are. It is possible he might not be there too but that does not affect the issue. In one's political life or career, one has to face allegations of many kinds from one side or the other. If an open enquiry were the only means of settling these allegations, one's lifetime would be spent in facing enquiries and answering charges or counter-charges which would at worst be found either without any foundation or

with a small substratum of truth. You have charged the Maharaja with withdrawing into his shell and snapping all possibility of contact with the people. What else could he do if every time he came out he has to face rumours and allegations that he was intriguing against his own Government. We have throughout succeeded in securing from the Maharaja almost everything that you wanted. Even the arrangements embodied in the proclamation and correspondence of March last were secured by us in order to help you on your political front. You accepted those arrangements. We thought that those arrangements would at least make you reconcile yourself to the constitutional position of the Maharaja. The Army was the only question that remained potentially a bone of contention. For reasons which we have explained to you several times, but which you do not seem to appreciate, a decision was delayed. But finally a decision which was ultimately accepted by you was taken. We again thought that this would keep matters quiet; but within less than a month we find you again expressing your discontent, not to us, as would have been correct, but openly in public, knowing full well that neither the Maharaja nor we were really in a position to enter the arena of controversy.

9. I am surprised that a political leader of your experience should have attached so much importance to an infinitesimal section of the people in your State or here and to the article in the Eastern Economist or the contribution in the Times of India as to prompt you to make such sweeping and general remarks to which I had called pointed attention in my previous letter. I am also surprised that you should have been compelled to recall events, and participants in these events of March to August 1947 to add some interest to your Press Conference. It is patent and well known that the elements which indulged in those disturbances are very much weaker today than a year ago. There was hardly any occasion for you or for us to dig them out from comparative insignificance.

10. As regards the NWFP, I am afraid you are completely ignorant of what took place and what the reasons were for

our agreeing to a referendum in the NWFP. Before rushing to the Press with your views based on such ignorance, I wish you had discussed this matter with Jawaharlal or myself. I am also surprised that you should refer to the "subterfuge" of "reserved" and "non-reserved" subjects. Unfortunately this distinction forms part of the correspondence of March last and of the arrangements to which you then agreed. If you had any objections... you should have pushed those objections to a logical conclusion then instead of making a grievance of them now. Nor do you seem to appreciate that any persistent harping on the so called "deeds of omission and commission of the past regimes" merely gives the Pakistan propagandists further material for calling the activities of the Azad Kashmir Govt. as aimed at Dogra tyranny and to that extent supplying them with a justification for their existence and for their claims to sympathy from abroad. I am also surprised that you, who had a different attitude towards HH, when you were in jail, as is typified in your letter to him, a copy of which is with me (Serial No. 4) should now speak in such terms of him.

11. I hope you will not misunderstand my frankness. I have only tried to put before you that there is another side to the picture and that it would be well for you to bear in mind that other side as well. In politics a one track mind does not ultimately gain. It is only when we have the generosity to forgive and the virtue to forget that we can achieve our objectives. Attacking one who is not in a position to defend himself or repeatedly dwelling upon the past which had better be buried is, in my judgement, unlikely ultimately to succeed. I would, therefore, once again appeal to you to change your mind in an effort to secure that balance and accommodation which are the essential requirements of the situation in Kashmir today. I have every confidence that you will not find His Highness wanting in reciprocity and that you will find that that would also go a long way towards ensuring a really integrated and unified people in Jammu and Kashmir. You know very well that we have nothing but friendship and cooperation

for you and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. My earnest endeavour is to ensure that everything moves towards a happy conclusion, efficiently and smoothly, without a trace of bitterness from the past or regrets in the future. I am quite convinced that until you can see your way, as suggested by Jawaharlal, to a different approach, such an object will not be achieved.

74. CABLE FROM JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, FROM  
LONDON, TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,  
DATED 19 OCTOBER 1948

FROM JAWAHARLAL NEHRU FOR GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR. SO FAR NO TALKS ABOUT KASHMIR EXCEPTING THE VAGUE HOPES EXPRESSED BY BRITISH MINISTERS IN FAVOUR OF SETTLEMENT. HAVE NOT MET LIAQUAT ALI KHAN EXCEPTING AT CONFERENCE.

2. DURING LUNCH TODAY WITH BEVIN AND CRIPPS FORMER BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF KASHMIR. NOEL BAKER WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT TOOK UP HIS USUAL LINE OF SOMETHING BEING DONE WHICH IS AGREEABLE TO BOTH PARTIES CONCERNED. I COMMENTED THAT I WAS THOROUGHLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM WITHOUT REGARD TO ETHICS OR DECENCY. WE HAD NO DOUBT ACCEPTED IDEA OF PLEBISCITE BUT SUCH PLEBISCITE WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE GREATLY DELAYED. MORAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM MUST BE CONSIDERED AND WE WERE NOT GOING TO PUT UP WITH AGGRESSION AND GANGSTERISM. PAKISTAN'S AGGRESSION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND YET WE WERE BEING ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION ON SOME VAGUE BASIS OF GENEROSITY. WE HAD ACCEPTED COMMISSION'S CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION WHILE PAKISTAN HAD REJECTED IT. THERE WAS NOTHING MORE TO BE DONE ON OUR SIDE IN THIS RESPECT. BEVIN SAID HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE FACTS. HE CAME INTO THIS BUSINESS BECAUSE MATTER WAS BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SETTLEMENT. CRIPPS SAID THAT PRIMARY EFFORT MUST BE TO GET PAKISTAN TO

ACCEPT U.N. COMMISSION'S RESOLUTION ON CEASEFIRE AND TRUCE. NOEL BAKER SAID THAT SINCE COMMISSION WOULD SOON BE REPORTING WE MIGHT AWAIT THEIR REPORT. FINALLY I WAS ASKED WHETHER I COULD MEET LIAQUAT ALI KHAN. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT SEE MUCH GOOD COMING OUT OF SUCH A MEETING. WHEN ASKED WHETHER MEETING COULD DO ANY HARM I SAID PROBABLY NOT AND I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO IT. IT IS PROBABLE THEREFORE THAT MEETING MIGHT BE ARRANGED BETWEEN ATTLEE, BEVIN, LIAQUAT ALI KHAN AND ME. I DO NOT EXPECT ANYTHING TO COME OF THIS AND YOU NEED NOT POSTPONE ANY ACTION BECAUSE OF IT. SUCH ACTION SHOULD BE JUDGED ENTIRELY BY LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES.

3. PLEASE PASS COPY TO SARDAR PATEL AND DEFENCE MINISTER.

75. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 OCTOBER 1948  
(EXTRACT)

Both Hyderabad and Kashmir have troubled people a lot here and in London. It is recognised, of course, that the Hyderabad affair is over from the international point of view. It was very fortunate that we could dispose of it rapidly. Otherwise reactions would have been very much adverse to us as it is difficult to explain everything and the simple fact of a large country attacking a small one impressed people unfavourably. So far as Kashmir is concerned, I think it is generally recognised that our case is a good one; nevertheless this business of a plebiscite and the conditions governing it fills people's minds. Of course people cannot get rid of the idea that Kashmir is predominantly Muslim and therefore likely to side with Muslim Pakistan. They say that if it is agreed that there should be a plebiscite, why is there any difficulty in having a ceasefire and truce? Liaquat Ali has laid stress on one fact only, i. e. that the conditions of the plebiscite should be fixed now and then he will gladly agree to the ceasefire,

etc. in accordance with the U.N. Commission's resolution. He says those conditions should be according to the Security Council's resolution. I have made it clear that we cannot accept this for obvious reasons. The next suggestion is to come to some other agreement about the conditions. I do not think all this will lead to any thing at present at least. We cannot possibly agree to any outside intervention in the Government of Kashmir:

I am mentioning all this to you just to keep you in touch with the developments here. I might mention also that the position I have taken up about Kashmir is either a full acceptance of the UN Commission's resolution on ceasefire, or a partition on the lines we have previously talked about, i. e. Western Poonch, etc. Gilgit, Chitral, most of Baltistan, etc. to go to Pakistan. Neither of these is acceptable to Liaquat Ali.

The whole point I should like to impress upon you and my colleagues is that the Kashmir affair as well as Hyderabad developments are being very closely followed in other countries, though they may not say much about them. They follow them in order to judge of what India stands for and is going to be. We have therefore to keep this fact in mind in regard to any steps that we take in both these places.

76. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 17 APRIL 1949

Two days ago, H. V. R. Iengar (Home Secretary) sent me a copy of a report of one of our Intelligence Officers who had been sent to Kashmir. This report was a very interesting and revealing document. There was nothing very new in it, in the sense that we did not know, but still it brought out certain important points. I sent this report to Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who will return it to H. V. R. Iengar.

In this report, among other things, a reference was made to a growing Hindu agitation in Jammu province for what is

called a zonal plebiscite. This idea is based on the belief that a plebiscite for the whole of Kashmir is bound to be lost and therefore let us save Jammu at least. You will perhaps remember that some proposal of this kind was put forward by the Maharaja some months back. It seems to me that this kind of propaganda is very harmful indeed for us. Whatever may happen in the future, I do not think Jammu province is running away from us. If we want Jammu province by itself and are prepared to make a present of the rest of the State to Pakistan, I have no doubt we could clinch the issue in a few days. The prize we are fighting for is the valley of Kashmir.

This propaganda for a zonal plebiscite is going on in Jammu, in Delhi and elsewhere. It is carried on by what is known as the Jammu Praja Parishad. Our Intelligence Officer reported that this Praja Parishad is financed by the Maharaja. Further, that the large sums collected for the Dharamarth Fund, which are controlled by the Maharaja, are being spent in propaganda for him. All this is resulting in producing a most peculiar and unfortunate situation.

We know that Sheikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues have been very unwise in their public remarks and they have improperly criticised the Maharaja and asked for his removal. I had a long talk with Abdullah last night and again pointed out to him very forcefully how unfortunate and wrong his attitude was in this particular matter and how it was creating difficulties not only for us but for himself. He repeated his old complaints, which included the very facts that our Intelligence Officer has stated. He promised that he would say nothing about the Maharaja in future, but he was very unhappy about it.

This morning Cariappa came to see me. He has recently been to Jammu and Kashmir and he gave me his report. He said that this tussle between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah was having a very bad effect not only in the State but in the Army. He said that the Maharaja's brother-in-law was openly

carrying on a campaign against Sheikh Abdullah and his Government and issuing pamphlets of this kind. It was not for him to judge, he added, who was to blame in this matter, but the consequences were bad.

The consequences are undoubtedly bad and I feel that it is no longer safe for us to allow matters to drift. You will remember that we discussed this matter fully some time ago in your house. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and others were present. Ultimately we came to the conclusion that the proper course to adopt was for us to take the attitude that it was for the people of Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly to decide about the future of the Maharaja. But even now it was highly desirable that the Maharaja should take some kind of leave and not remain in Kashmir. It was proposed to put this matter to the Maharaja and to ask him to come to Delhi for the purpose. As he has not been here since then I suppose nothing has been done. Meanwhile, the situation deteriorates and an open conflict is going on in the State between the adherents of the Maharaja and the adherents of Sheikh Abdullah.

This conflict gets mixed up with relief work, which is conducted on communal lines. In the intelligence report mention was made of the Yuvraj getting mixed up with this business. This will be unfortunate as the Yuvraj is fairly popular at present. If he gets tied up with these conflicts, he will also become unpopular.

The next two or three months are going to be rather critical in regard to Kashmir and many possible developments may take place. We have to be ready for all of them in so far as we can. But that readiness for developments will be powerfully affected by this growing and open conflict between the Maharaja and Abdullah. I think that we should seize ourselves of this matter, in the manner suggested previously, and take steps accordingly. As I am going away day after tomorrow, I wanted to put this to you so that you might

consider it. I am rather anxious about it and feel very much that something should be done.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

77. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 18 APRIL 1949

Thank you for your letter of 17 April 1949 (Serial No. 76).

I think, as we all realise, the problem of the Maharaja and Sheikh Sahib is bristling with difficulties and we cannot say that only one side is to be blamed. As the report makes clear, Sheikh Sahib's administration has adversely affected so many interests that it is impossible to lay the entire blame for the feeling of discontent and restiveness on one individual. The report which the Intelligence Officer has made, contains more than one disquieting feature. Of these, the problem of the Maharaja is one of most important, and I agree that it requires to be tackled urgently. I am glad you have found the report interesting and revealing and have passed it on to Gopalaswami Ayyangar. None of the problems raised in that report is new, nor is the information given anything exclusive. We have to tackle all of them in a short time and the sooner we do it the better.

You seem to be under the impression that nothing has been done to follow up the discussion we had last time about the Maharaja. I have already sent three or four messages to him to come here. About four or five days ago, his Assistant Private Secretary (Captain Kanwal Singh) was here. Shankar impressed upon him the urgent necessity of his (the Maharaja) coming here as quickly as possible, but there has been no response so far. Shankar was told that the Maharaja had commitments and that he would come here in the second week of May. A message was then sent to His Highness that he should come here sometime this week at the latest. I have

a feeling that His Highness has got scent some how of what is impending and is averse to facing the ordeal. This is quite in keeping with his characteristics as we know them. I am sending him a rather peremptory telegram which, I hope, will help him to come to a decision about coming here soon.

As regards relief work, I believe Thimayya has told you about the plight of non-Muslim refugees in Srinagar. You will recall that we had to intervene at your instance in regard to non-Muslim refugees in Jammu province and to set up a separate camp at Nagrota. It seems no one cares or looks after Srinagar refugees; in that case, somebody must look after them. Why should they then complain that relief work is being conducted on communal lines?

78. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF  
JAMMU AND KASHMIR, DATED 18 APRIL 1949

I HOPE YOUR HIGHNESS RECEIVED MESSAGES SENT BY SHANKAR ON MY BEHALF BY TELEGRAM AND THROUGH YOUR ASSISTANT PRIVATE SECRETARY ABOUT NECESSITY OF YOUR COMING AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. I AM SORRY TO NOTE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE FROM YOUR HIGHNESS SO FAR. MATTERS WHICH I PROPOSE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU ADMIT OF NO DELAY AND I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COME HERE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THIS WEEK.

79. SARDAR TO N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGER,  
DATED 1 MAY 1949

You have probably seen the interview by Sheikh Sahib to Michael Davidson which was published in the Scotsman of 14 April 1949 (Serial No. 80). A vehement exponent of accession to India seems to have been converted to an "independent Kashmir". He wants absentee landlords, most of whom have gone to Pakistan, to be expropriated. At the same time, he has got, according to the information brought here by Sethi

of the Agriculture Ministry, large tracts of valuable irrigated lands vacant lest non-Muslims should settle down on them, and this is at a time when elsewhere we are asking for every inch of land to be cultivated.

80. EXTRACT FROM A REPORT OF AN INTERVIEW  
WITH SHEIKH ABDULLAH, BY MICHAEL DAVIDSON

“Accession to either side cannot bring peace,” he (Sheikh Abdullah) declared. “We want to live in friendship with both Dominions. Perhaps a middle path between them, with economic cooperation with each, will be the only way of doing it. But an independent Kashmir must be guaranteed not only by India and Pakistan but also by Britain, the United States and other members of the United Nations. . . .”

“Yes, independence guaranteed by the United Nations may be the only solution. But why do you talk of partition ? . . . .”

“During the communal riots in the Punjab after partition, we tried in our humble way to stem the wave of fanaticism. That is why I urged we should wait before deciding our affiliation. I pleaded with both Dominions to help us first to win internal emancipation before asking us to choose ! India replied by refusing to make a standstill agreement with the Maharaja; Pakistan did so. When, during the crisis India accepted the Maharaja’s accession, Pandit Nehru insisted that it was only provisional and that the people must decide later . . . .”

81. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 1 MAY 1949

I have just received your letter (Serial No. 79) about the interview given by Sheikh Abdullah to Michael Davidson of the Scotsman. My attention was drawn to the contents of this interview earlier in the day. It is a most astonishing performance. Kachru, who is going to Kashmir tomorrow, has just

been to see me, and I am sending a message through him to Sheikh Abdullah. I have asked him to tell the latter that I condemn the Sheikh's action and that I feel that what he has told Michael Davidson and what the latter has published will have the most serious and mischievous consequences both in India and abroad. I have asked him to inform the Sheikh that, reading between the lines, I suspect a plan, the first step of which is this blessing by the Premier of Kashmir of the idea of an independent Kashmir, and this public expression of his conviction that accession to India will not bring peace, and the final step of which may well be perhaps one of the greatest betrayals in history. He will also be told that India will expect him publicly to repudiate some of the things attributed to him by Michael Davidson. It is all so distressing.

82. MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR  
TO SARDAR, DATED 6 MAY 1949

With reference to the discussions I had with you on 29 April and 1 May 1949, I have been revolving the matter in my mind and am now in a position to let you have my settled reactions to the proposal in regard to my temporary absence from the State which you put to me.

I should like to say at the outset that I was completely taken aback by this proposal, but coming as it did from you, in whom I have since the very beginning placed implicit trust and confidence and whose advice I have throughout followed on the many questions affecting me personally and my State both in the present and in future, I have been able somehow to adjust myself to it. I would not, however, be human if I did not express my sense of keen disappointment and bewilderment at having been called upon to make such a sacrifice of personal prestige, honour and position when all along I have been content to follow, sometimes even against my own judgement and conscience, the advice in regard to the constitutional position in the State which I have been receiving from the

Prime Minister of India or yourself, sometimes even against arrangements which were agreed to only a few months before. Nor would it be fair on my part to conceal from you my own feeling that while Sheikh Abdullah has been allowed to depart, from time to time as suited his inclinations, from the pledged and written word, to act consistently in breach of the loyalty which he professed to me prior to his release from jail and the oath of allegiance which he took when he assumed office, and to indulge openly along with his colleagues in a campaign of vilification and foul calumny against me, both inside the State and outside, I should have had to be driven from position to position—each of which I thought I held on the advice of the States Ministry.

The contrast naturally fills me with poignant feelings. However, once again putting my complete trust in your judgement and benevolent intentions towards us, I might be prepared to fall in with your wishes and to absent myself from the State for a period of three or four months in consideration of the fact as emphasised by you, namely, complications created by the reference to UNO and the plebiscite issue.

There are, however, certain questions arising out of this proposal on which I would venture to make my position clear to you and on which I would be grateful to have your assurance. I hope you will kindly appreciate the necessity of my seeking these assurances. I have to think of the immediate future in the light of my bitter experiences of the last several months and I owe it to myself, my family and dynasty to procure a clear declaration in respect of these matters:

1. I should like to be assured that this step is not a prelude to any idea of abdication. I should like to make it clear now that I cannot entertain the latter idea even for a moment and am fully prepared to take the consequences. I regard such a demand from my Prime Minister and his colleagues as a clear breach of the many understandings on which constitutional

arrangements have been based from time to time and a positive act of his disloyalty, treachery and deception.

2. Sheikh Abdullah should be clearly told to stop the campaign of vilification against me and to abandon all activities, both on his part and that of his followers, aimed at securing my abdication. I feel that the sacrifice which I am being called upon to make would be in vain if I continued to be the target of their public and private attacks.

3. There should be a clear assurance of protection of myself and my adherents against any victimisation. In this connection I should like especially to draw your attention to the facts that have been reported to me about persons having been detained in jail for their failure to sign for my abdication.

4. The question that I should remain out of the State for three or four months for reasons of health, will, I am afraid, not be believed by anybody and is likely to give rise to many misgiving and speculations within and outside the State as:-

(i) everybody knows that I am not in such a state of health as would necessitate a long rest outside the State. I have, on your advice, been recently touring parts of Jammu Province in the heat of April;

(ii) for everybody in bad health Kashmir is considered to be the best health resort and it will certainly look strange if I went outside the State giving out that I am doing so for reasons of health;

(iii) wherever I take up my temporary residence I cannot confine myself to the four walls of the house. I am bound to meet people who, when they meet me will never believe that I am staying there for reasons of health;

(iv) some other reason which may be plausible and may also at the same time not compromise my dignity and position should be given out. The best thing would

be that the Government of India should find a suitable position for me in Delhi where my services may be utilised in a fitting manner during the above period of 3 to 4 months.

5. It is a matter of paramount necessity that Her Highness should remain with the Yuvraj in the State during the period of my absence. He is young and impressionable and requires paternal guidance and personal supervision of at least one of his parents. I can see no reason either of political expediency or justice in insisting on the separation of a mother from her only child, whom she is seeing after thirteen months of absence abroad. Considerations of humanity alone should suffice to rule out this altogether.

6. My Private estates, houses and other property should be protected against the aggressive acts of Sheikh Abdullah's party. They will attempt to take possession of my houses, gardens, lands and other property. The Indian Dominion should guarantee against that act of aggression. While I am there they dare not do these things, but in my absence they will attempt this. I have received information that even during the last few days, after I left Jammu for Delhi, encroachments have been made on my lands at Srinagar.

7. No change should be made without my consent in the present arrangements regarding the State forces or the constitutional position, prerogatives, etc. of the Ruler as now subsisting. Arrangements will continue for me to draw my staff (both State and Private Depts.) from amongst officers of my forces, guards mounted by my forces at my palaces will also continue as at present as per agreement reached, vide my letter of 30 August and Mr. (V. P.) Menon's reply of 3 September thereto. I shall also take whatever staff etc, I require with me outside.

8. I should be entitled during my stay in India to suitable strength of military guards wherever I stay.

9. Yuvraj's safety and protection should be the concern of the Indian Dominion. State and Indian Military should guard his person.

10. Outstanding matters with the State Ministry, Civil Lists, Hazur Departments, etc. should be decided with me immediately.

In conclusion I wish to say that I shall take the final decision on getting assurances from you on the points above mentioned.

83. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 11 MAY 1949

You will recall that, just before you left for the UK, you wrote to me regarding His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir. I sent for His Highness who has been here since 28 April. I had a talk with him on 29 April and 1 May, when I explained to him the whole position and commended to him my view that, in the circumstances of his relations with Ministry and the situation created by the reference to UNO and the plebiscite issue, it would be best for him to absent himself from the State for some time and to make the Yuvraj Regent. Both of them (Her Highness was also present) were visibly taken aback by this proposal, and I could notice that there was a sense of shock and bewilderment at the end of my discussion with them on 29 April. However, I asked him to reflect over the matter. I asked Shankar also to have a talk with him, and he had two or three long discussions both with His Highness the Maharaja and Her Highness separately. They now seem to be reconciled to the proposal, and I send herewith a copy of the letter (Serial No. 82) which I have received from His Highness and which would require our very careful and urgent consideration. I suggest that we meet some time tomorrow to discuss our final attitude in this matter. I am, therefore, sending copies of His Highness' letter and of my letter to you and to Gopalaswami.

84. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 17 MAY 1949

Herewith the draft (Serial No. 86). Jawaharlalji has seen and approved of it.

2. Will you kindly let Jawaharlalji know direct as to your approval of it? He will issue the letter to Sheikh Abdullah only after receiving your approval.

85. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 18 MAY 1949

V. P. Menon showed me your suggestions for correcting Gopalaswami's draft about Kashmir. Those suggestions have been incorporated. I have, however, changed the phraseology somewhat, simply with a view to better drafting. I enclose a copy of the letter which I am sending to Sheikh Abdullah (Serial No. 86).

I hope that this will be an end to the squabbles that have been going on in public. This has been impressed upon Sheikh Abdullah and I am pointing this out to him again in a separate letter.

I take it that the Maharaja and the Maharani will keep out of the State, as agreed upon, for some months. The Bombay house will be at their disposal. It would have been better if they had gone out of the country for a period, say two or three months, but that is a matter for them to decide. I do not think any period should be fixed for the Maharaja's absence from Kashmir. The matter had better be left vague.

The Maharani naturally dislikes intensely the idea of being away from her son. I do not think it is necessary for

her to be kept absolutely away and she can certainly visit her son later from time to time. But for the present, I think, it would be to the advantage of all concerned, including the Maharaja and Maharani, for both of them to stay away for a while.

I hope you will explain to the Maharaja and Maharani as well as the Yuvraj the agreements arrived at between us and Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues. The written agreement rightly does not say anything about the Maharaja going out of the State. But this was a private assurance given by us and we have naturally to stand by it.

I am thinking of going to Srinagar for two days on Saturday, 28 May.

I shall see you of course next Friday evening at about 7.30.

86. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SHEIKH ABDULLAH,  
DATED 18 MAY 1949

In the course of the talks at Sardar Patel's residence on 15 and 16 May 1949 between some of my colleagues and me and you and your colleagues, important issues raised by you in regard to the future of Jammu and Kashmir State were discussed.

2. Among the subjects that were discussed were : (i) the framing of a Constitution for the State; (ii) the subjects in respect of which the State should accede to the Union of India; (iii) the monarchical form of government in the State; (iv) the control of the State Forces, and (v) the rights of the citizens of the State to equality of opportunity for service in the Indian Army.

3. As regards (i) and (iii), it has been the settled policy of the Government of India, which on many occasions has been stated both by Sardar Patel and me, that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir State is a matter for determination

by the people of the State represented in a Constituent Assembly convened for the purpose. In the special circumstances of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India have no objection to the Constituent Assembly of the State considering the question of the continuance of the association of the State with a constitutional monarchy.

4. In regard to (ii), Jammu and Kashmir State now stands acceded to the Indian Union in respect of three subjects, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. It will be for the Constituent Assembly of the State, when convened, to determine in respect of what other subjects the State may accede.

5. Regarding (iv), both the operational and administrative control over the State Forces has already, with the consent of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State, been taken over by the Indian Army. The final arrangements in this connection, for the duration of present emergency, including financial responsibility for the expenditure involved, were agreed to between us on the 16th instant.

6. As regards (v), the citizens of the State will have equality of opportunity for service in the Indian Army. Under Article 10 of the draft of the new Constitution, as passed by the Constituent Assembly of India, equality of opportunity for employment under the State, including employment in this Indian Army, is declared to be amongst the fundamental rights of all Indian citizens.

7. I trust that the Government of India's position, as stated above, will give you the clarification that you have asked for.

87. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 23 MAY 1949

Please refer to your letter of 18 May 1949 (Serial No. 85) and the subsequent discussions we had about Kashmir. I am sending herewith a copy of the letter which I have sent to His Highness the Maharaja (Serial no. 88) in reply to his letter of 6 May (Serial No. 82), a copy of which I sent to you on 11 May 1949. My letter covers all the points to which you have referred relating to the Maharaja and the Maharani.

As regards the Yuvraj, we have had a very detailed talk with him and I have impressed upon him the significance and importance of the agreements reached and the consequences which flow therefrom. He is a sensible lad and I think he appreciated the situation fairly well and realises his responsibilities. He is, of course, still in his teens and would require some guidance. I am looking out for a suitable adviser for him on whose advice he can lean. We shall have to be very careful in the choice of a suitable person.

88. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF JAMMU & KASHMIR,  
DATED 23 MAY 1949

Thank you for your letter dated 6 May 1949 (Serial No. 82).

2. I am very glad to know that your Highness has reconciled yourself to the proposal which I put forward at my discussion with you. It was with no light heart that I did so. None can be more cognisant than myself of the attitude which your Highness has adopted ever since you signed the Instrument of Accession. I am grateful to Your Highness for the spirit of cooperation and understanding which you have always extended to me and also for the kind sentiments which you have expressed. I can assure Your Highness that, before

putting forward my proposal, I had, after careful consideration, come to the conclusion that the interests alike of Your Highness, the dynasty, and the country demanded the step which you have now agreed to take. I know full well the personal sacrifice involved in it, but I am sure, alongwith so many other changes to which Your Highness has accustomed yourself, you will undertake this step also with a sense of duty to your country and in a spirit of calm resignation to the superior dictates of events.

3. Regarding the points which Your Highness has referred to me, I should like to state that the question of Your Highness' abdication does not arise. We have made the position quite plain to Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, and we hope there will be an end to the public controversies centring round this matter as well as to the derogatory references to Your Highness in the Press and on the platform in the State. Your Highness will, of course, appreciate that the future Constitution of the State would be determined by the duly elected Constituent Assembly. I am afraid, in the absence of any specific instances of victimisation to which Your Highness refers in paragraph 4, it may not be possible for me to give any assurance, but I can tell Your Highness that if any such instances are brought to our notice, we shall look into them and try to see that justice is done.

4. I appreciate what Your Highness says in regard to the reasons for your remaining outside the State, but I feel that it would be best just to say that Your Highness has decided, after the strain of the last so many months and continued ill-health, to stay out of the State for a few months. The actual period need not be stated.

5. We have carefully considered the question of Her Highness staying with the Yuvraj during your absence, but for a variety of reasons we feel that it would be best, for the present, for her also to stay away for a while. Later, she can certainly visit the Yuvraj from time to time and the Yuvraj can also visit Your Highness and Her Highness occasionally.

6. We would be grateful if Your Highness would let me have a list of the private estates, houses and other property belonging to Your Highness and referred to in para 6 of your letter. On receipt of the list we shall take up the matter with your Ministry. In the meantime I hope that with the understanding that has been reached with Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah on the various controversial issues, he will himself take steps to safeguard Your Highness' property against encroachments. In particular, I hope that the feelings which entertains for the Yuvraj will succeed in closing the chapter of the past several months and in introducing a healthy change in the approach of both the Government and the National Conference workers to these and other problems affecting Your Highness and the family personally and the dynasty in general. I hope that no need for a change in the arrangements to which Your Highness has referred in paragraph 7 would arise, but should any such need arise, we would, of course, consult Your Highness. We would also make necessary arrangements for guarding you and for the Yuvraj's safety and protection.

7. As regards outstanding matters, we have already informed Your Highness separately that your Civil List has been fixed at Rs. 15 Lakhs. Out of which Rs. 6 Lakhs would be paid by the State and 9 Lakhs by the Government of India during the period of emergency. Out of this sum, your Highness will have to make allotment to Her Highness and the Yuvraj. The latter's expenses would, of course, be larger than before on account of his being Regent. I hope Your Highness will agree to make a suitable allowance for him, bearing in mind his needs. I should be glad to know your suggestion in this respect. Similarly, I should welcome Your Highness' proposal regarding Her Highness' allowance. As regards Huzur Departments, Sheikh Sahib has already agreed to our suggestion that an allowance of Rs. 5 lakhs should be made to Your Highness for this purpose. A list of items, which will be controlled by Your Highness and during your absence, by the Yuvraj as

Regent, has been furnished to Sheikh Sahib, and he has promised to let us have his comments as soon as possible. After his comments are received, we shall finalise the whole matter, but in the meantime Your Highness can make suitable allocations to major and other heads of the expenditure on State Departments from out of the allotment of Rs. 5 lakhs.

89. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 MAY 1949  
(EXTRACT)

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Gopalaswami spoke to Sheikh Abdullah about the four representatives for the Constituent Assembly. In a day or two Vishnu Sahay (Secretary for Kashmir Affairs) will bring Sheikh Abdullah's recommendation of these four names and will then take them or send them to Dehradun for the Maharaja's formal endorsement. I hope this will be done soon so that some Kashmir representatives might begin to take part in the Constituent Assembly.

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90. VISHNU SAHAY TO V. SHANKAR,  
DATED 14 OCTOBER 1949

I saw H. M. Transport (N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar), who told me that Sheikh Abdullah had written to him that the draft Art. 306-A (to which Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues had agreed) had not met with the approval of the Working Committee of the National Conference. Sheikh Abdullah has sent an alternative draft which merely says that the provisions of the Constitution shall apply to Kashmir only in regard to the acceded subjects and that the Dominion Parliament shall be entitled to legislate in regard to Kashmir only in respect of the acceded subjects. A further proviso is made that the Government of Kashmir shall mean His Highness

the Maharaja acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers as at present constituted and not on his individual judgment or discretion.

2. Parts II, III and IV of the Constitution would apply automatically to Kashmir unless the position is expressly saved. These refer to Fundamental Rights, Citizenship and Directive Principles. What is worrying Sheikh Abdullah and the Working Committee of the National Conference is that if these general provisions become applicable to Kashmir also, their legislation against other citizens of India in respect of acquisition etc. of property will become invalid. The Kashmiris are perhaps worried about the occupation of their country by Punjabis ! H. M. Transport told Mr. Beg that Kashmir's accession to India would imply its acceptance of at least these general conditions.

3. The Sheikh's argument regarding the present draft of Art. 306-A is more involved. He says that the preamble says that it will be short-lived and the Constituent Assembly of the State can terminate the Article and thereupon all the provisions of the Constitution would apply. H. M. Transport has told Mr. Beg that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir can be expected to act reasonably. (I do not follow the intricacies of Sheikh Sahib's arguments on this point.)

4. The position at present is that H. M. Transport has sent for Sheikh Abdullah and will persuade him not to go back on the draft which was agreed to in the presence of the Prime Minister. As I understand it, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is of the view that if the Sheikh persists in moving amendments, on his head be it—we cannot do anything more in the matter.

5. I mentioned the above to V. P. Menon, who asked me to convey this to you.

91. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 OCTOBER 1949

Sheikh Abdullah and two colleagues of his had a talk with me for about an hour and a half this morning. It was a long drawn out argument, and as I told you, this morning, there was no substance at all in the objections that they put forward to our draft. At the end of it all, I told them that I had not expected that, after having agreed to the substance of our draft both at your house and at the party meeting, they would let me and Panditji down in the manner they were attempting to do. In answer, Sheikh Abdullah said that he felt very grieved that I should think so but that in the discharge of his duty to his own people he found it impossible to accept our draft as it was. I told him thereafter to go back and think over all that I had told them and hoped that he would come back to me in a better frame of mind in the course of the day or tomorrow.

I have since thought over the matter further and dictated a draft which, without giving up the essential stand we have taken in our original draft, readjusts it in minor particulars in a way which I am hoping Sheikh Abdullah would agree to (Serial No. 92).

I discussed this draft with the Drafting Committee in the evening and one or two small suggestions which they made have been incorporated in it. I enclose a copy of this redraft as also of my letter to Sheikh Abdullah for your information.

I trust that this will meet with your approval.

## 92. REDRAFT OF ARTICLE 306-A

306-A.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution :

- (a) the provisions of Article 211-A of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu & Kashmir;
- (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to —
  - (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of that State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State, and
  - (ii) such other matters in the said lists as with the concurrence of the Government of that State the President may, by order, specify;
- (c) the provisions of Article I and Part II of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State;
- (d) the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may, by order, specify
  - (i) after consultation with the Government of that State, in cases where such exceptions or modifications are necessary by reason of, or, are incidental to, or are consequential upon, the provisions of clause (a) or clause (b) of this article; and

(ii) with the concurrence of that Government, in other cases;

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the preceding clause of this Article, from such date as he may specify, the President may, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly, constituted for the purpose of framing the Constitution for the State, direct that this article shall cease to be operative, or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications as may be agreed on.

Sd/- N. Gopalaswami

15-10-49

93. SARDAR TO N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR,  
DATED 16 OCTOBER 1949

Thank you for your letter of 15 October (Serial No. 91), which I received only this afternoon, on my return from the Constituent Assembly.

I find there are some substantial changes over the original draft, particularly in regard to the applicability of fundamental rights, and directive principles of State policy. You can yourself realise the anomaly of the State becoming part of India and at the same time not recognising any of these provisions.

I do not at all like any change after our party has approved of the whole arrangement in the presence of Sheikh Sahib himself. Whenever Sheikh Sahib wishes to back out, he always confronts us with his duty to the people. Of course, he owes no duty to India or to the Indian Government, or even on a personal basis, to you and the Prime Minister who have gone all out to accommodate him.

In these circumstances, any question of my approval does not arise. If you feel it is the right thing to do, you can go ahead with it.

94. SHEIKH ABDULLAH TO N. GOPALASWAMI  
AYYANGAR, DATED 17 OCTOBER 1949

The events that took place this morning in the Constituent Assembly have deeply distressed me and my three colleagues, representing Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly.

2. In my letter of 12 October 1949 I had told you that the draft Article 306A handed over by you to Mr. Beg (Mirza Afzal Beg) was not acceptable to us, as it failed to implement the pledges given to us by Panditji on behalf of the Government of India and was totally opposed to the stand taken up by the National Conference in this matter right from the beginning and approved by Panditji and Sardar Patel in a number of public speeches, and we submitted our alternative draft, which restricted the power of Parliament to make laws for the State and the application of the provisions of the Constitution in relation to the State in matters which directly related to the three subjects specified in the Instrument of Accession in accordance with the assurances given to us by Panditji. After that, the position was discussed several times with you by my representatives, and during the night of 15 October, I received another draft from you alongwith the letter of that date. In reply on the 16th morning, I informed you that it was not possible to accept your revised draft, and in order to accommodate your viewpoint to the maximum extent possible, I submitted another draft to you, which, as I stated in my letter dated 15 October, went far beyond the sphere in respect of which we had acceded to India. I clearly told you in that letter that it was not possible for me to go beyond this draft and requested you to accept it. You further discussed the matter with my representatives, and another draft, prepared by you in consultation with them, was sent to me by you through them. Yesterday afternoon this draft was

finalised, and, on the assurance given by you to Mr. Beg that this finally revised draft will be put up before the Constituent Assembly on behalf of the Drafting Committee, he withdrew his amendment, about the moving of which in the Constituent Assembly he had given notice to the Secretary of the Assembly. I also wrote to you a letter expressing my gratefulness to you for the pains you had taken in the matter and for the final draft, which had been accepted by you on behalf of the Government and I informed you therein that Mr. Beg had written to the Secretary of the Constituent Assembly for withdrawing his amendment.

3. This morning when we expected the final draft, which had appeared in the List of Amendments circulated by the Secretary of the Constituent Assembly, to come up before the Assembly, you and Maulana (Azad) Sahib came to me and asked me if I could accept an important change in the Explanation to sub-clause (b) of Clause (I) of the draft Article 306-A, as appearing in the List of Amendments. After careful consideration of the proposed amendment in Explanation, my colleagues and I told you both in the lobby that it was not possible for us to accept this change in the final draft and you and Maulana Sahib left us. While we were still discussing the matter in the lobby amongst ourselves, the draft Article 306-A, was moved by you in the Constituent Assembly, and, when part of your speech was over, we were told by someone that the draft Article had been taken up by the Assembly and, therefore, we took our seats in the Assembly Hall. We could not conceive that any amendment in the final draft, as circulated in the List of Amendment, would be made by you without conveying your final decision in the matter to us, and so we took it for granted that the final draft Article 306-A was presented before the Assembly in the form in which it had our consent; and, therefore, when it was passed by the Assembly, we did not take part in the debate. While Maulana Sahib and you came to us to discuss the matter with us in the lobby, I clearly told you that, in the event of any change

in the finalised draft Article 306-A, we should be at liberty to move the amendment, of which notice had been given by Mr. Beg and his two other colleagues and which had been withdrawn on the express assurance given by you yesterday. In these circumstances it was not possible for us to move any amendment and we did not get an occasion to express our views on the matter before the open House.

4. As I have told you before, I and my colleagues have been extremely pained by the manner in which the thing has been done, and, after careful consideration of the matter, we have (arrived) at the conclusion that it is not possible for us to let the matter rest here. As I am genuinely anxious that no unpleasant situation should arise, I would request you to see if even now something could be done to rectify the position. In case I fail to hear from you within a reasonable time, I regret to say that no course is left open for us but to tender our resignation from the Constituent Assembly.

95. N. GOPALASWAMI AYYANGAR TO SHEIKH  
ABDULLAH, DATED 18 OCTOBER 1949

I opened and read your letter dated 17 October 1949 (Serial No. 94) when I returned home after the close of the prolonged sitting of the Constituent Assembly yesterday.

2. It would be too mild a description of my first reaction to your letter if I said that it was a painful surprise to me that you should have chosen to write to me in the terms you have done. It is clear that behind all that you have said in the letter there is an undercurrent of feeling that the only person that has, and could have, a sense of grievance in connection with this matter is yourself. Nothing could be farther away from a correct, balanced appreciation of the facts.

3. You have ended up your letter with a sentence which reads like an ultimatum. I am sure that, after you had slept

over what you had written to me yesterday evening, you have yourself come to realise that you should not have written to me in that way.

4. I do not propose to deal with the history of the drafting of Article 306-A which, (now article 370—Serial No. 97) in its final form the Assembly adopted unanimously and without a single dissentient voice and without a speech from anybody raising any note of criticism. It is true that after having unsuccessfully attempted, along with Maulana Azad, to persuade you to agree willingly to the substitution of the words “for the time being in office” for the word “appointed”, I did move the Article with that amendment after obtaining the permission of the President to do so. The whole House accepted this. I am sorry that you could not move any amendment of your own as against the one I moved. There was, however, nothing to prevent you or any of your colleagues from opposing the amendment that I did move, and as a matter of fact, we were looking forward to your making a speech on the whole of the Article, and believe the President waited for a minute or two for Members to rise for making speeches before he put the draft article to the House.

5. Article 306-A, as finalised in the argument between us, was given notice of on the evening of the 16th after I got your letter of that date and it was immediately circulated to the Members of the House. The attempt made by me and Maulana Azad the next morning, when the House was sitting, to persuade you to accept a trivial change was due to the desire expressed by a large number of the leading Members of the House. All of us, including myself, Maulana Azad and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, were of the opinion that it was necessary from many points of view that the change suggested should be accepted. Personally, having agreed with you to the language of the original draft, I felt a special responsibility in agreeing to this change. And I may tell you at once that I agreed to it because I was, and am, convinced that the change in the

actual words used in that particular connection did not alter the meaning of the draft agreed to between us.

6. I should think that it is impossible to escape the correctness of what I have just now said. The words in the Explanation as agreed to between us are "Council of Ministers appointed under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated 5 March 1948". The words appearing in the Article as passed yesterday are "the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated 5 March 1948". Under the Article, the Council of Ministers has to be consulted on certain matters and its concurrence has to be obtained in other matters. It is obvious that members of this Council appointed under the Maharaja's Proclamation cannot give their advice or concurrence unless they happen to be functioning, that is, in office, at the time when such advice or concurrence has to be given. Nor can there be any members of the Council competent to give their advice or concurrence unless they were persons appointed under the Maharaja's Proclamation. I hope you will, on reflection, realise that the change of words does not constitute the slightest change in sense or substance.

7. In the circumstances, I am unable on the merits to appreciate your suggestion that something should be done "to rectify the position". There is nothing, so far as I can see which needs rectification. But if you think otherwise, you and your colleagues, who are Members of the Assembly, might take such steps as the rules of the House may allow for carrying out any rectification that you may desire and, if any concrete proposal is made, I can assure you, on behalf of the Government of which I am a Member, that your proposal would receive our best consideration on its merits. I am bound to add, however, that there was nothing in the manner in which the Article was moved and passed which laid itself open to any criticism. It was both politically and parliamentarily unexceptionable.

8. I do not consider, therefore, that there is any justification for your entertaining any idea of resignation from the Constituent Assembly. The step, if taken, would produce the most unwelcome and serious repercussions in Kashmir, India and the world, and I must ask you to communicate with the Prime Minister before you decide on anything like it. For myself, I shall pass on to him your letter and this reply of mine to it.

96. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1949

There was some difficulty about the provision relating to Kashmir. Sheikh Sahib went back on the agreement which he had reached with you in regard to the provision relating to Kashmir. He insisted on certain changes of a fundamental character which would exclude in their application to Kashmir the provisions relating to citizenship and fundamental rights and make it necessary in all these matters as well as others not covered by the accession to three subjects to seek the concurrence of the State Government which he sought to define as the Maharaja acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers appointed under the proclamation of 8 March 1948. After a great deal of discussion, I could persuade the party to accept all the changes except the last one, which was modified so as to cover not merely the first Ministry so appointed but any subsequent Ministries which may be appointed under that proclamation. Sheikh Sahib has not reconciled himself to this change, but we could not accommodate him in this matter and the provision was passed through the House as we had modified. After this he wrote a letter to Gopalaswami Ayyangar threatening to resign from the membership of the Constituent Assembly. Gopalaswami has replied asking him to defer his decision until you returned.

97. ARTICLE 370 AS ADOPTED BY THE  
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

370. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution:—

- (a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
- (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to—
  - (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and
  - (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.

Explanation—For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated the fifth day of March 1948;

- (c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;
- (d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exception and modification as the President may by order specify:

Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State:

Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.

2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (i) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.

3. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify :

Provided that the recommendations of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.

98. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 3 JULY 1950

I am getting rather worried about Kashmir, particularly the attitude of Sheikh Sahib, his failure to deal with the Communist infiltration in the State, and the dissensions in the National Conference. I have had a talk with P. C. Chaudhuri. From what he tells me it appears that both the National Conference and Sheikh Sahib are losing their hold on the people of the Valley and are becoming somewhat unpopular. At the

same time, it appears that there is a marked appreciation of what we have done for the Valley though they naturally feel that they deserve more. In such circumstances and in the world situation today, I agree with you that a plebiscite is unreal. Not only that, it would be positively dangerous because my own feeling is that once the talk starts, the non-Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir would start feeling uneasy and we might be faced with an exodus to India. This would be an additional point to emphasise in respect of our stand that the conditions preliminary to plebiscite should be fully and effectively fulfilled before we can talk of it.

## CHAPTER 4

# THE COMMUNAL UPRISING

### *INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

In any country in which two religious creeds with fanatical elements exist side by side, outbreaks of communal conflicts cannot be ruled out. The history of any country in the world confirms it and India is no exception to the rule. Europe has in the past shown the same tendency; what is currently happening in Ireland shows that, notwithstanding the spread of civilisation, religious conflicts are by no means a thing of the past. Quite often, these conflicts originate in small incidents which arouse a great deal of emotion covering a mass of people, when they break out in open violence. Within living memory, some of the years in the twenties, particularly 1924-26, have witnessed communal holocausts in northern India particularly in the United Provinces. Those were the days when the Suddhi (conversion) and Sangathan (organisation) movements came into conflict with a counter movement of Tabhli (expansion) and Tanzeem (organisation). During the British regime, these outbreaks of violence between Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and Sikhs had occurred on the question of music before mosques, cow-slaughter, the use of Tazias and Dusserah processions, the sprinkling of colour during Holi festival, and similar other occasions when fanatically held views or rights of one community came into conflict with those of the other. However, the frequency and the scale of such incidents never reached the dimensions of the political upheavals after the Cabinet Mission's failure. By that time, Jinnah had an uninterrupted six years of singing hymns of communal hate. The fanatical, orthodox and conservative elements of the Hindu and Sikh communities

sang the same tune. The result was that the masses began to react to the example set by the leaders of the two communities and the poison spread far and wide. While it is true that the malady was most acute in northern India where, because of influence and places in numbers of three communities, they were rivals for the loaves and fishes, nevertheless the political issues had an all-India aspect and consequently all over the country there were pockets of mutual recrimination and conflict. The excitement reached fever pitch in those areas which were potentially going to be affected by the League's claims for Pakistan, namely, Bengal, Bihar, the United Provinces, parts of Rajasthan, Punjab and the North-west Frontier Province. For purposes of explosion the gun powder magazine left nothing to be desired; it needed only a spark to set it alight. That spark was provided by Jinnah when as the further account would show he gave a call for 'Direct Action' and found in Shaheed Suhrawardy the Prime Minister of Bengal his High Priest. Curiously enough the latter's name was Shaheed, the Persian word for 'martyr'. In Muslim religious lore the epithet Shaheed is also given to one who dies in battle with infidels. Having acquired martyrdom in nomenclature already, he appeared to be determined to justify his title by being the spearhead of violence against Hindus in Calcutta.

Then followed the holocaust in East Bengal, reprisals in Bihar; and a subsequent short-lived riot in Bombay. But the organised and colossal blood-shed and massacre in many towns of the Punjab and, after partition, on both sides of the dividing line, threw all this into the shade. It is interesting to reflect that most of the trouble was confined to areas which prior to independence were governed by the Muslim League mentality and in the case of Bengal by the Muslim League Ministry. The provinces which were administered by Congress Ministries were for the most part free from these outbreaks of violence. It was only in certain parts of Delhi and Western U.P. that after partition there was some organised violence. What is also instructive is that most of the Indian

States were free from communal violence, though there was some trouble in parts of some of Rajasthan States.

It is a fact of history that Jinnah had received direct or indirect encouragement in his political manoeuvres by the policy of the British Government of which the Viceroy Linlithgow was the most living instrument and in some cases the sponsor. That policy was definitely anti-Congress and pro-League in the sense that it virtually placed a veto for progress and liberalisation in the hands of Jinnah. The British Government did profess their faith in and preference for a united India but there was a wide gap between the profession and practice and between the precept and the example. It is impossible to deny that Congress itself under the leadership of Gandhiji and Nehru did not play its cards skilfully and in a statesmanlike manner. Whether they were obsessed by the fact at least in the beginning that the British were going to lose the war, or whether they felt strong enough to deal with two opponents at the same time, namely, the League and British, the fact remains that they failed to check the increasing influence of Jinnah among the Muslim community and the growing tendency on the part of the British Government to concede to him. The reorganisation of the Central Executive Council in 1940 in which Lord Linlithgow collected the reactionary elements in Indian politics should have been a pointer to them as to which way the Viceroy intended to take the country at least during the war years. The Cripps' proposals of 1942 which contained the germs of Pakistan should have been read as a definite writing on the wall. That was the first major constitutional victory that Jinnah had tactically scored. The concession by Gandhiji to Jinnah under the influence of Rajagopalachari of what Jinnah termed as a moth-eaten Pakistan was another milestone on the road to the division and a further dose of encouragement to Jinnah in his negative and obstructive tactics. The failure of the Simla Conference in 1945, merely because the Viceroy found it impossible to call Jinnah's bluff or to ignore his demand for the representation

of the League in the Viceroy's Executive Council, should again have been a warning to the Congress that it was powerless to deal with both the hostile elements at the same time. The manner in which the Cabinet Mission started very well but subsequently felt bound to modify their plans and attitudes in order to persuade Jinnah to walk into the lobby of Cabinet Mission Plan should have been again a pointer to the shape of things to come. The Viceroy's insistence and the British Government's support to him in his efforts to bring in the League element in the Interim Government, despite its public adoption of the Direct Action Programme, of which Calcutta and Noakhali held out visible proofs of what to expect, should again have made them think about the future in all its grimness and tragedy; but in a weak moment the opportunity of facing the Viceroy and the British Government to the logic of facts and reason was lost; it was clear that the Congress could not exploit sufficiently the power that it had wrested from the British Government after forming the Interim Government on 2nd September 1946. The great advantage thus gained to influence the course of events was lost and the initiative, thanks to the duplicity of Jinnah, the pathetic belief of the Viceroy in his words and the weakness of the British Government in dealing with the Muslim League was again wrested by Jinnah. The failure of the London Conference in December 1946, and the statement of the British Government after its conclusion thus compelled the Congress to retrace its steps and even to accept the interpretation of the British Government on the question of grouping and compulsory participation in Sections. Then came the declaration of the British Government in February 1947, which projected the fear and danger of Balkanisation and the transfer of power to more than one authority instead of to a united India. At that time, the choice before the Congress was the proverbial Hobson's choice. Events were bound to take their relentless course towards the division of India into two parts (or more than two) with the Indian states constituting a further danger

to the unity and integrity of the sub-continent. Even at this stage it should have been possible for the British Government to make a last-ditch attempt to force some sort of territorial and constitutional unity of India on the political parties but their plan was the plan of despair in which the transfer of authority was to be made to whatever units that existed in the sub-continent to take over authority and power from them. In this prolonged state of uncertainty and communal conflict in the political sphere it was inevitable that the minds of the people concerned should be affected adversely by anxiety and apprehensions and the psychology of fear. Where they pertained to the future, the interim in the words of Shakespeare becomes a phantasma and a hideous dream. In such an atmosphere, where masses in lakhs are affected, a blood-bath becomes unavoidable. It is to the credit of the Congress leaders at the time, particularly, Nehru and Sardar, that it was limited to a comparatively small part of India as against the prognostication of a civil war over the whole country. The blame for this tragic eventuality does not lie with one individual nor with one party, and more than one party must accept the blame and the acts of omission and commission which led to it must be objectively judged by history. The fact remains however incontrovertible that the greatest blame must squarely rest with the British Government and its representatives.

The beginning of the mass communal upsurge in North India had its genesis in the Muslim League Council's resolution, passed at its meeting held on 27 July 1946, in which the Council withdrew the League's earlier acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's Plan of 16 May 1946. After rejecting the Plan, to the accompaniment of violent speeches by Jinnah and other Muslim leaders, the Council went on to pass another resolution authorising the Working Committee to draw up a plan for "direct action"; and the Working Committee dutifully met and declared 16 August as the "direct action day". In passing these resolutions, the speeches made had been very intemperate. Jinnah had definitely said that the League was bidding goodbye

to constitutional methods; and had said "I also am going to make trouble". At that time the general tendency among the British Government and their officialdom appears to have been not to take these threats very seriously. In fact, the more intransigent and obdurate the League the more the Viceroy pressed the Congress to come to terms with it. Jinnah's blackmail seemed to march on the road to achievement. Bargaining with the Congress leaders for the formation of an interim Central Government, the Viceroy emphasised the need of persuading the League to retrace its steps. Despite all the venom spread by Jinnah and all the abuses flung by him on the Congress, Nehru in his correspondence and discussion with Jinnah was trying to persuade him to participate in the tasks of governing the country and framing its new Constitution. The Muslim League had also set up its candidates for the Constituent Assembly, and had the satisfaction of capturing a large majority of the Muslim seats in that body. H. S. Suhrawardy, the stormy petrel of the Muslim League and Chief Minister of Bengal, chose this opportunity to indulge in some sabre rattling. He threatened that there would be a declaration of independence by Bengal and the setting up of a parallel Government if Congress was put in power in the Centre. But even the Governor, in spite of his special responsibility for peace and tranquillity, and the Governor-General, with his powers of control and direction, did not take the situation seriously; and when the violence broke out in all its fury in Calcutta, they were caught flat-footed. Trouble actually did break out on the Muslim League "Direct Action" day the 16th of August. A recent chronicler\* of events has recorded that Suhrawardy decided to use the occasion to make a display of his own popularity and power and that his private army of strong-arm men organised a demonstration which soon got out of hand, with the result that bloody riots broke out, and for days the city of Calcutta was given over to loot, torture and murder. It was not till thousands were killed and

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\* See Michael Edwardes Nehru Polican Books 1973.

very many more injured that the army was able to bring the situation under control. The votaries of law and order, from the Viceroy down to the lower ranks of British officialdom seemed powerless or paralysed to act, and blood flowed freely in the streets of Calcutta under the very eyes of a Governor who seemed to be the repository of the confidence of Whitehall and Viceroy's house alike.

In the second week of October, the trouble broke out in the remote districts of East Bengal, Tipperah and Noakhali. By this time the Congress had joined the Interim Government; Nehru and Sardar, particularly the latter, had warned the Viceroy about the impending violence. Sardar had in fact warned the British Government even when the Cabinet Mission was in India that, if there was no settlement with the Muslim League, communal trouble was likely in Bengal and Sind, though elsewhere in India there would not be any trouble. Bengal was particularly mentioned as the likely scene of serious trouble. But Cripps told Sardar (Serial No. 3) :

“You need not be afraid of Bengal, as we have a Governor who would immediately put section 93 into operation in case of serious trouble.”

But when trouble did come, no such action was taken, and as Sardar commented bitterly, all through these terrible happenings, the Governor of Bengal was enjoying the bracing climate of Darjeeling. Similarly, warning of impending trouble in East Bengal were sent by Sardar and Nehru to Viceroy early in October; Nehru complained on 15 October 1947 (Serial No. 4) that “instead of being stopped in time, allowed to grow, and it is now spreading to other districts.” And Sardar, writing to Cripps four days later said :

“You would realise how difficult it is for an Indian Home Member to sit in his office quietly day by day when innumerable piteous appeals and complaints are received for some kind of help which would

give these unfortunate and helpless victims some protection.” (Serial No. 3)

One aspect of the matter which caused great concern to Sardar was the attitude of the Muslim League nominees to the Executive Council. A specific assurance had been given to Nehru by Viceroy Wavell that the Muslim League was joining the Interim Government with a view to cooperating in the immediate task of the Government and in the framing of new Constitution for India. But, even while the communal troubles in East Bengal were at their worst point, one of the Muslim League nominees, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, far from condemning the violence and bestiality of the forces unleashed by the call for ‘direct action’, was saying:

“The disturbances which have occurred in many parts of the country after the installation of the purely Congress Government at the Centre have established the fact beyond the shadow of doubt that the 10 crores of Indian Muslims will not submit to any Government which does not include their true representatives. The Interim Government is one of the fronts of the ‘direct action’ campaign....”

Sardar found it necessary to draw the Viceroy’s attention to this and ask for the withdrawal of this statement. But no satisfactory solution emerged.

The troubles in Calcutta and East Bengal had their repercussions in other parts of India, particularly in Bihar, where anti-Muslim acts were committed on a severe scale.

Bihar stirred the deepest feelings among Gandhiji and the Congress leaders. Gandhiji in particular felt it as a personal tragedy and devoted all his time to checking the conflagration. He toured Calcutta and the Eastern districts of Bengal extensively and Nehru, Rajendra Prasad and Sardar concentrated on Bihar. Bihar had a Congress Government, and the Congress leaders in the Centre had considerable influence over it. Nehru and Rajendra Prasad toured that province. Gandhiji himself

announced his intention to undertake a fast unto death if conditions did not improve. The army was called and there was repeated firing on Hindu mobs. The total effect of all this was that the troubles were brought under control in a relatively short time in Bihar. The Muslim League was of course interested in keeping the position tense, and, even after the situation became normal, some of them carried out propaganda calculated to dissuade Muslims from returning to their own villages and settling down there; the argument used was that government would again fail to give protection. This propaganda does not seem to have succeeded. In fact, the task of pacification and achieving communal amity progressed to the point that, while the troubles in Bengal and Bihar were very severe in their intensity, they were comparatively short-lived and during the dreadful days of partition these areas were more or less unaffected by the surge of communal rioting and the huge exodus of population that was taking place in the North-West of the sub-continent. In Bihar, however, the Viceroy found it necessary to send an officer of his own Secretariat, on the ground that he wanted first-hand information of the scope of the problem of rehabilitation of Muslim refugees. Sardar entered a protest (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 3, p. 175) and told the Viceroy that :

“Any interference with or by-passing of the Ministry ... would create a major crisis.”

He also wanted to know what corresponding action had been taken in East Bengal. He said:

“I wish to bring to your notice that there is a strong feeling that the unfortunate sufferers of East Bengal have not been able to enlist adequate sympathy and attention from official quarters.”

Sardar also warned the Prime Minister of Bihar of the possible effects of League propaganda, aided by the report of I. D. Scott, the officer deputed by the Viceroy. He very rightly

told the Prime Minister that while the latter would be within his rights in asking for financial help, he should agree to nothing which would derogate from his own responsibility or which gave the League any executive status, or made the influence of the League stronger in the areas at the expense of the Government. (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 3, pp. 173-75).

However, after having tasted blood in Bengal, the members of the League fomented troubles on a large scale in the Punjab, the other wing of the Pakistan-to-be, obviously with the idea of driving out the minority from that area. In spite of the Muslim League representatives joining the Executive Council, the League itself never withdrew the Direct Action resolution passed on 27 July 1946. We have already noted how League spokesmen publicly declared that their entry into the Executive Council was itself part of the Direct Action movement. It was on 29 January 1947 that, meeting in Karachi, the Working Committee of the League finally declared that it would not enter the Constituent Assembly and participate in its proceedings; a course of action which threw the whole future of India into the melting pot. We have also noted in an earlier chapter that this was followed by the British Government's announcement of 20 February 1947, which among other things envisaged the transfer of power not later than June 1948. In areas in relation to which no competent Central Government emerged by that date, the transfer would be to the provinces. After this statement, the Punjab became the key to the political situation, and a theatre of conflict with and coercion of the minorities. In the general elections of 1946, the League had been successful in securing a majority of the Muslim seats in the Punjab Assembly, but, because of its uncompromisingly communal stance it was not able to form a Ministry; the Unionist Party, though a minority, was running a Government in a coalition with the Congress, and the Akali Sikhs. The "direct action" programme of the Muslim League initiated in the Punjab in January 1947 now sought to bring down this Ministry by violence and disorder. The technique

had now become familiar. The organisation of bands of Muslim National Guards and civil disobedience, calculated to bring the Government to a standstill; the defiance of orders prohibiting meetings and processions; crowds, including women and students, making demonstrations before the Government House, the Secretariat, Legislative buildings, Magistrates' courts and jails; the shouting of League slogans; the hoisting of League flags on Government buildings in place of the Union Jack, and interference with railway traffic.

The 20 February statement gave the League movement a further impetus. The League leader convinced themselves and the Muslim masses in general that the principle of Pakistan had been conceded. Even Nehru made statement which went some way in supporting this contention. He said:

“This may lead to Pakistan for those provinces or portions which may want it.”

The main object of the League was now concentrated on an all-out effort to establish itself in those provinces which would make up the new State of Pakistan. If this effort was successful, the transfer of power due to take place in 1948, would be to the League. This was especially important in the Punjab, both because of its geographical position and its agricultural prosperity. So the League movement, aimed at bringing down the Khizr Hyat Khan Government, intensified its agitation after 20 February.

The demonstrations organised by the League soon degenerated into violence; and, in an act of surrender to the League, Khizr Hyat Khan resigned on 2 March 1947. The Government called upon the Muslim League party to attempt to form a Ministry, but the League party was unable to muster the necessary majority support; and on 5 March the State passed under the personal rule of the Governor under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This was followed by communal rioting on a large and increasing scale. To quote Michael Edwardes :

“By the end of March strong measures had restored some order to the towns but in the villages the terror continued. Official figures gave two thousand as the number of lives lost but there were probably many more. The casualties in the war of succession were beginning to mount up. Under the circumstances then reigning in the Punjab, there was no likelihood of any return to ministerial government. The Muslim League, in its endeavour to gain power, had not only ensured that power would be denied it but had also brought Punjab to the edge of civil war.”

However, the Governor's regime was unlikely to provide any durable counter to the League manoeuvres and tactics. The British element in the Punjab administration to a majority and the Muslim element to a man were in sympathy with the demand for Pakistan and generally anti-Hindu and anti-Sikh in their outlook. Muslim League members of the Governor-General's Council far from being a help to the cause of land and order, were dutifully playing their part in inflaming communal feeling, and we find Sardar drawing Wavell's attention (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 4, p. 6) to a particularly anti-Hindu speech, in which Ghazanfar Ali Khan made a pointed reference to Mohammad Bin Kasim and Mahmud of Ghazni and their so-called feat in invading India with a few thousands; and added:

“God willing, a few lakhs of Muslims will overwhelm crores of Hindus.”

Sardar commented :

“The parallel drawn is significant, particularly in regard to Ghazni's invasion, which consisted of repeated raids on India in which Hindus were killed in thousands and temples were destroyed.”

He added that instances like this only serve to strengthen the conviction that a corporate body like the Central Govern-

ment had ceased to exist and that sooner this state of affairs was put an end to, the better. He had earlier expressed his clear conviction that provincial governments had a right to expect the cooperation of the Central Govt. in their difficult task of maintaining law and order; and that if the Muslim League members were not willing to realise the impropriety of their acting in this manner, the Governor-General should clearly tell them that the only honourable course for them would be to resign.

By the middle of March, Sardar found it necessary to take serious notice of the murders, forced conversions, abductions, etc. in the Punjab, especially in the rural areas, and to suggest the imposition of martial law at least in some of these areas (Serial No. 22). But Wavell was unwilling to take drastic measures.

It is somewhat strange to find a soldier-Viceroy so overwhelmed by his political sympathies for the League that he was unable to call a spade a spade and call upon his Muslim League colleagues in the Council to play the game. His Private Secretary could, as we shall shortly see, hold out a threat of special responsibility in the case of a police action to oust illegal immigrants in Assam; but not a finger could be raised by His Lordship, the Master, to silence and effectively deal with more serious delinquencies on the part of League Members of his own Cabinet.

The League adopted similar tactics in the North-West Frontier Province with varying degrees of success. In the North-West Frontier Province, the Congress Government of Khan Saheb appears to have tackled the agitation firmly even incurring a certain amount of unpopularity in the process, when they had to arrest the Pir of Manki Shariff, a prominent Muslim League leader, who had some following among a section of the tribes of the frontier. Thus we find a Red Shirt leader telling Sardar (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 4, p. 231) :

“In spite of the communal frenzy which the League leaders have created, the mass of the people in the rural areas are with us. At present we have 10,000 Red Shirts in Peshawar city. We have also Red Shirts in Mardan, Kohat and Bannu towns. We intend to launch a great campaign against reactionary forces. . . . In this critical time we need your help more than at any time in the history of the province. . . . Our cause is just and it appeals to the heart and head of the people.”

Khan Sahib refused to be stampeded into any hasty action by the threats of the Muslim League and refused to bow to their demand for his resignation; and, in spite of the Muslim League's success in inflaming communal feeling among a section of the people of the Province and a section of tribes and despite the obvious antipathies of their Governor and Chief Secretary, he seems to have made a serious effort to hold the fort, till his dismissal after Jinnah became Governor-General of Pakistan on 14 August 1947. There was certainly a great deal of violence in certain areas, especially Dera Ismail Khan, where there was much arson and other crimes. But the Punjab overshadowed other provinces at this stage.

In Assam the situation was different. In that province there was a clear majority of non-Muslims, and the Government itself was Congress. The claim of the League to include Assam in their theocratic Pakistan State was based purely on the geographical position of the State. Further, any civil disobedience movement in Assam, on the lines of the agitation in the Punjab, was bound to fail for want of popular support. The movement in Assam was therefore organised for the purpose of encouraging unauthorised and illegal emigration in large numbers of Muslim peasants from neighbouring poverty-stricken Bengal into the fertile lands of Assam. This movement had started even in 1946. Naturally, the Government of Assam took steps to stop these unauthorised incursions and illegal occupations. We, however, find the Private Secretary to the

Governor-General writing to Sardar on 15 November 1946 (Serial No. 12) suggesting that steps be taken to stop action for evicting these "squatters", and even contemplating the use of the special powers of the Governor-General. The ostensible reason for this extraordinary step was a fear that if such firm steps were taken, there would be danger of communal violence. Sardar, as was only to be expected, reacted strongly. He had no doubt whatever that the action of the Assam Ministry to evict these trespassers on Government land was right and lawful, and anything calculated to hamper the Ministry would only encourage intransigence and violence (Serial No. 13). Probably because of Sardar's stand, there was no interference with the State Ministry at the time; but in March 1947 Sardar got a report from the Premier of Assam (Serial No. 25) informing him of the declaration of civil disobedience by the Muslim League and of plans for what would be not less than an invasion of trained volunteers armed with spears and lathis. Sardar readily promised the Assam Government full support including the help of army units. He was emphatic that "not an inch of land should be surrendered to the illegal immigrants".

It was in this situation of trouble and violence that Wavell left India on what he himself called a virtual dismissal and Mountbatten took over as Viceroy and Governor-General on 24 March 1947.

It will be useful at this stage briefly to give an outline of the position of the security services and their preparedness to deal with communal outbreaks on a large scale. There had been very little recruitment to the cadres of the I.C.S. and the Indian Police during the war, while Government activity had vastly increased; Linlithgow the Viceroy and Amery the Secretary of State had always thought in terms of maintaining the European predominance in these services, and this naturally faced heavy Indian opposition. A scheme of recruitment launched during the war was given up in the face of such opposition. Many officers had not taken leave, and many of them

were weary, and, apart from this, they could see that power was soon to be transferred to Indian hands, and were therefore also losing their will to govern. In particular, there was a feeling of antagonism to the Congress, because the European element in the services could not ignore the fact that it was the Congress movement which resulted in (or was about to result in) the transfer of power. British troops in India were anxious, after the war years to be repatriated. To quote Michael Edwardes again:

“Britain’s control of the Indian Army was weakening rapidly as Indianisation of the officers corps increased, and British army troops in India were decreasing at a considerable rate as demobilisation proceeded. Very soon there would be practically no one to withdraw. The only alternative to departure open to the British Government would be, in the case of the civil service and the Indian Army, to reopen recruitment to Europeans, which would be unacceptable to Indians and not particularly appealing to British subjects looking for a secure career.”

To this picture of a general rundown in the strength of the cadres must be added another factor. In the Punjab, which as already mentioned was the key to the communal situation at this stage, the police force and the district administration was mainly Muslim in composition. And by this time the communal virus had affected the civil services also. We find, as early as November 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru recording his impression that it was asserted by a variety of people that some of the permanent officers, even in Bihar, were not too greatly displeased, at the embarrassment of the Provincial Government (Serial No. 7). Later on, when trouble was fomented in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, Sardar, who appears to have kept in close touch with every development in a changing situation, had complaints about the Punjab officials (Serial No. 42) :

“...Cases happen under the very noses of the police without the culprits being traced. I have also received

several complaints about police inaction or partiality on account of the predominant Muslim composition of the force. The Governor himself admits that the police in the Punjab are tired owing to prolonged disturbances."

The situation of the Congress Ministers at the Centre was thus particularly frustrating, because, on account of the federal structure of the Government of India, they were denied any power or responsibility for law and order in the Provinces. The only authority at the Centre that could act was the Viceroy and the medium for the exercise of his authority in the Provinces was the Governor. At that relevant period neither the Governor of the Punjab nor the Governor of Bengal commanded public confidence. The correspondence which Sardar had with Governor Evan Jenkins of the Punjab about the Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon, who had quite unjustifiably kept under detention some very respectable citizens of the district, shows conclusively his mistaken enthusiasm for the man-on-the-spot. Even such a well meaning Viceroy as Mountbatten found it impossible to avoid the temptation of supporting the Governor even though on this issue he was on slippery ground. The relevant correspondence shows Sardar at his best and the Viceroy and the Governor at their weakest (Serial Nos. 44, 48, 49, 50).

Mountbatten, immediately after his arrival in India, applied himself to the problem of law and order. He brought together Jinnah and Gandhiji on this issue and on his initiative they signed a peace appeal in which they deplored the recent acts of lawlessness and violence that had brought the utmost disgrace on the fair name of India and the greatest misery to innocent people. They denounced for all time the use of force for the achievement of political ends and called upon the communities not only to refrain from all acts of violence and disorder, but to avoid both in speech and writing any incitement to such acts. Sardar himself in his capacity as Minister for Information did his best to get the newspapers to observe a code of reporting which would be in consonance with the

appeal. He had already sent a message to the All India Newspaper Editors' Conference, asking them to help the Government in dealing with the difficult times. He issued another message asking all the newspapers to feature the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal, prominently at intervals or whenever tension and communal feelings threatened to get the better of human reason or judgment; and also to bear it in mind in the treatment and presentation of communal matters. He asked the All India Radio to use the appeal at frequent intervals, and in particular in their rural programmes in order to reach readers beyond the range of newspapers. Sardar also asked film exhibitors to use the appeal on cinema slides in various languages. But all the same, Sardar told Mountbatten quite frankly that the appeal would not serve any useful purpose unless the Muslim League was compelled to withdraw its "direct action" resolution, and followed it up by an active attempt to keep its followers under control. In a poignant letter to Mountbatten he pointed out that, while Gandhiji was buried in the midst of his self-imposed Mission in Bihar for assuaging the feelings of Muslims which overtook them six months earlier and was quelled within a week by the active intervention of Congress members of the Interim Government, no corresponding action was being made by Muslim League leaders when non-Muslim minorities were being systematically eliminated in Muslim majority areas.

He said :

"The signature of Mr. Jinnah on the appeal is a mockery if he does not himself feel the urge to visit the areas such as Dera Ismail Khan, Rawalpindi, and Multan which are, or have been the scenes of orgies of murder, arson and loot (Serial No. 28).

Sardar was also all the time urging the Governors-General—Wavell, Mountbatten and John Colville, who officiated during the absences of the permanent incumbents in England—that, since the civil authorities had failed, martial law should be enforced. In answer to this demand, two ordinances seem to

have been issued, arming the executive and the military with special powers to deal with the disturbances (Serial No. 37). But this did not have much effect, nor probably was Mountbatten's assurance to Cabinet—that such disturbances would be put down with an iron hand—translated into action. We find Sardar pressing again for martial law, and the Viceroy again refusing to go to that length. This was a curious decision because in the same letter Colville, the acting Viceroy, reports that the Governor had asked for a complete brigade for the Lahore area alone. If, therefore, there was any failure on the part of anyone to apply drastic remedies to deal with a drastic situation, it was not on the part of Sardar.

With the publication of the decision on 3 June 1947 to partition India, the whole question took on a new aspect. In his broadcast on that day Jinnah took advantage of the hospitality of the All India Radio to glorify the civil disobedience movement in the North-West Frontier Province, and Sardar had to enter a protest. After an initial improvement, the situation steadily started deteriorating in the Punjab, so much so that on 19 July Mountbatten found it necessary to pay a visit to Lahore for talks with the Governor. Sardar pleaded with him to visit other areas but to no effect. On 22 July the partition Council, which consisted of Sardar and Rajendra Prasad on the Indian side and Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan on the Pakistan side, took a number of important decisions. After declaring their determination to establish peaceful conditions, and reaffirming their assurances to safeguard the interests of all citizens, the Council set up a Special Military Command (The Punjab Boundary Force) covering the 13 Punjab districts where communal trouble was most severe. This force was specifically charged with safeguarding the peace in the Punjab "during the period of changeover to the new conditions". Major-General Rees of the Fourth Indian Division fame was given operational command of this huge force of 50,000 officers and men; it proved the biggest flop, and was wound up on 1 September 1947. A sad commentary on its functioning

is offered by the Indian High Commissioner, Sri Prakasa, who telegraphed as follows (Serial No. 62):

“The attitude of provincial Government and Boundary Commission most unhelpful. They are not prepared to do anything. They only say that everything possible is being done and repeat that conditions in east are much worse.”

Immediately after the announcement of partition we have noted that the publicly declared policy of the leaders was that everyone should be guaranteed safety of life and property. But the continued disturbances in the Punjab put an end to all hopes of this policy being carried out. Wholesale movement of population began immediately after partition. To quote V. P. Menon :

“A determined campaign to drive out the Hindus and the Sikhs was evident all over West Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. There were serious disturbances in the Lahore, Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Gujaranwala districts. A massacre on an unprecedented scale took place in Sheikhupura in West Punjab. This was followed by a violent anti-Muslim reaction in Amritsar. Thereafter communal frenzy gripped the people on both sides of the border, taking a heavy toll of lives and creating an exodus of the population between the two Dominions, the like of which has never been known in history.”

From that time onward the new situation overwhelmed everyone. It was no longer a question of guaranteeing safety and persuading the minorities to stay on. The flood had burst out of the dam through sabotage and there was no holding it. Hindus and Sikhs from West Pakistan just made for the Indian border with whatever possessions they could carry, in whatever transport they could get, and on foot, when no vehicles were available. In India this movement had its counterpart. The trouble spread to the whole of East Punjab, to some of the Indian States adjoining, to the border districts of

the United Provinces and to Delhi, and large masses of Muslim men, women and children all began to leave by road, rail and air for Pakistan.

The main burden of facing this problem fell on Sardar. He had to keep in constant touch with the Governor and Chief Minister of East Punjab and the Rulers of the Punjab States, particularly the Maharaja of Patiala, and enlist their co-operation for securing safety to refugees leaving India for Pakistan. The correspondence published in this chapter gives a vivid picture of the untiring efforts of Sardar and the degree of success which he achieved. In evaluating his success one has to take account of the fact that the entire administration in East Punjab had undergone a thorough upheaval on account of partition; that the Provincial Government had to do with improvised offices scattered in various places and staff which had just broken up from Lahore and reached their stations, and suffered innumerable privations in the process.

Delhi had to bear the main brunt of the first non-Muslim exodus from West Pakistan, and its reaction among the people of the State. One estimate is that by 5 September more than 2,00,000 refugees had arrived in the city and the recital of their sufferings created intense tension within the city itself. Sardar was particularly concerned with the Delhi situation both because, as Home Minister, he was in direct charge of the Delhi administration, and because, being the capital of the Dominion, it was most important that peace and order should be maintained at all costs. The handicaps of the administration, already mentioned, were accentuated in Delhi. More than half of its civil police and three quarters of its armed police were Muslims who were anxious to opt for service in Pakistan. The gaps in the various cadres were filled to a large extent by non-Muslim policemen and other officers drawn from the Punjab or from the ranks of those who had been forced to leave West Pakistan. However, Armed Police Constabulary from the United Provinces and police detachments from the Central Reserve Police balanced this rather

affected element. For a time, fortunately brief, there was trouble on a large scale. The situation was tackled with determination and a certain measure of ruthlessness. An Emergency Committee was set up, Mountbatten presiding and with Nehru, Sardar and other members of the Cabinet, the Chief Commissioner and other senior officers, to take charge of the entire situation. For Delhi itself, a small committee consisting of C. H. Bhabha, H. M. Patel and others functioned from the Control Room in the Town Hall. All available officers, including probationers from the I.A.S. Training School, were deputed; available army units were called in and acted with determination; citizens too helped a great deal. Within less than two weeks normal conditions had been restored and Muslims could move about in the city without fear or danger. But the sense of insecurity persisted for some more weeks. The communal outbreak had necessitated the opening of two camps in the city; the emptying of the camps was a gradual process. Despite attempts at the highest level to keep them back, many went to Pakistan; the rest returned to their homes.

The problem in East Punjab was more complicated. The horrors committed on non-Muslims in West Pakistan had produced violent anti-Muslim feeling, and the task of allowing refugees to go to West Pakistan became one of great difficulty, which greatly taxed Sardar's energies. V. P. Menon has recorded:

"I recall a particular occasion when, at Amritsar, Sikhs refused to allow the Muslim refugees from India to pass through the city on their way to the Pakistan border because of the attacks which were being made on non-Muslim convoys and trains in Pakistan, accompanied by massacre and abduction of women. . . . Vallabhbhai Patel made up his mind to go to Amritsar and I accompanied him. There a Conference was convened of all Sikh leaders, including the Maharaja of Patiala. . . . He handled the situation at Amritsar with admirable tact and understanding and persuaded the Sikh leaders to

allow the Muslim refugees to proceed through the city without let or hindrance. That same evening he addressed a public meeting. In the vast gathering I could distinguish none but Sikhs. He spoke to them for more than an hour. The crowd was at first very sullen, but in the end, by his forthright approach and sincerity, he was able to win them over."

The editor of these papers was himself with Sardar at the time and can recall the electric effect his speech, in the colloquial Hindustani of his own, created on the audience. At the end of that very effective and inspiring speech, the self-same crowd which gave the impression of having blood in their eyes acclaimed it to a man and gave enthusiastic support to his plea for safe passage to the approaching Muslim caravans on its way to Pakistan. Almost overnight a city, the passage through which was fraught with blood and sorrow became an area of peace and quiet. Sardar was constantly making personal efforts to help in the emigration of those who wanted to go to Pakistan. It was mainly due to his patience, personal standing and relentless effort that a situation which threatened to explode in cataclysmic disaster did not and that it was soon brought under control.

This might be a convenient opportunity to refer to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's tirade against Sardar in his book *India Wins Freedom*. Since Azad has not spared Gandhiji and Jawaharlal Nehru as well, it seems that he stands self-condemned and consequently his fulminations were hardly worthy of notice. But in view of the authority from which his prejudiced allegations proceed, it seems necessary to refer to them here, particularly since he figures in the correspondence. But before it is done, it is worth-while recalling that in his book Maulana completely distorted the history of the Nariman episode and made the fantastic revelation that Jawaharlal Nehru's acceptance of partition was due to Mountbatten's persistent persuasion and the influence of Lady Mountbatten. As I remarked earlier at

another place, it is the most unkindest cut of all from anyone, particularly from as close an associate as Azad; that his judgment on such a vital matter should be clouded by persistent advocacy of a wrong cause or an august feminine influence is to our minds *lese majeste* of the worst order. Although he has not spared Gandhiji and Pandit Nehru, his worst venom was reserved for Sardar. Only on a few occasions Sardar comes in for some sort of complimentary references; once when Sardar felt shocked with Maulana over Gandhiji's treatment of the Maulana and the second time when he shares with the Maulana his views on Krishna Menon; otherwise Sardar was one of the villains of the piece when it comes to differences between the Swarajists and the non-changers. He is again the culprit when after the declaration of war there are differences between pacifists and the leaders of Maulana's way of thinking. Sometimes he is charged with blind following of Gandhiji, at another time he is credited with having influenced Gandhiji against Maulana's views. By refusing to give up the Home portfolio to the Muslim League and accept Finance instead, Sardar becomes the main person responsible for partition. Azad adds to Sardar's responsibility by the allegation of succumbing to Mountbatten's influence. Even Gandhiji was apparently converted by his erstwhile blind follower to the idea of partition in a two-hour meeting with Sardar, even though earlier he had told the Maulana that partition could be accepted only over his dead body. Azad also expresses the view that Sardar threw his weight in favour of partition out of irritation and injured vanity. There are sneering references to Sardar exhibiting weapons recovered from some Muslims during the course of post-partition disturbances, forgetting that those weapons were intended to show violent and murderous designs and in refutation of the general theory that they harboured designs of peace and innocence. The whole book is so lacking in adherence to facts that it is difficult to place credence in any part of it. According to Maulana Azad the resolution in favour of partition was passed by the A.I.C.C. by 29 votes against 15; actually the resolution was carried by

157 votes against 29. Azad's final attack on Sardar is the acts of omission and commission with which he charges Sardar in relation to Gandhiji's death, despite the fact that this was very forcefully and in a forthright manner dealt with on the floor of the House by Sardar in answer to a question put by Shri M. Anantasayanam Ayyangar. It is worth-while giving that statement in extenso :

“Prior to the bomb explosion the guard at the Birla House where Gandhiji was staying consisted of one Head Constable and 4 foot constables. After the bomb outrage, the guard placed at Birla House and their respective duties and functions were as follows :—

(i) One Asstt. Sub-Inspector of Police, two Head Constables and sixteen foot constables were employed at the entrance and at various important points near the main building and at the place where the meeting was held. They had instructions to stop all persons who appeared to be doubtful characters.

(ii) A plain clothes staff of one Sub-Inspector, four Head Constables and two constables, all armed with revolvers were deputed for personal protection. Their duty was to watch suspicious characters at the prayer meeting and act promptly in the event of any indication of trouble or threat to life. They were posted mixed with the crowd at the prayer meeting.

(iii) Three plain clothes men were stationed on the path leading from the main building to the place where prayer meetings were held. They were to deal with suspicious characters or to prevent any of the crowd from attacking Gandhiji while he was on his way to the platform at the prayer meeting and back.

(iv) A small detachment of troops consisting of one N.C.O. and about twenty men were placed on duty for patrolling the compound and preventing ingress of visitors from over boundary walls.

“The police considered that to make these precautions more effective, they should search every stranger going into the compound for attending the prayer meetings or at other times. The Supdt. of Police, New Delhi, approached Gandhiji's staff with this proposal but was told that Gandhiji would not agree to this. The D.I.G. then approached Gandhiji's staff but with the same result. The D.I.G. then saw Gandhiji and personally represented to him that there was danger and they should be allowed the facilities asked for, otherwise, they would be discredited if anything untoward happened, but Gandhiji would not agree. He said that his life was in the hands of God, that if he had to die no precautions could save him and that he would not agree to anybody being restricted from coming to the prayer meetings or anyone being allowed to come between his audience and himself. I myself pleaded with Gandhiji for allowing the Police to do their duty in regard to his protection, but without success. To my profound regret and utter sorrow and to the irreparable loss of all us the nation and the world, the weak spot, both I and the police had apprehended, was deceitfully and successfully exploited by the assassin and Gandhiji's prophetic words that if he had to die no precautions could save him came true.”

There is a belief still held in some quarters, particularly among the Muslim community, that Sardar was anti-Muslim and a Hindu communalist. The correspondence that has been extracted contains sufficient evidence to refute this impression. Sardar was undoubtedly a Hindu and was proud to be one. To be a Hindu is no national crime, nor does it necessarily mean being anti-Muslim. Sardar continually made it clear in his speeches that a loyal Muslim is entitled to the same protection and same privileges in the Indian Dominion as a loyal Hindu. If he was hard on anyone it was on those Muslims who prior to independence had supported the League and even after independence harboured the idea of leaving for Pakistan or had sympathies for that Dominion. There have

been many occasions in his time when he appointed Muslims to high posts. His relations with the late Ruler of Rampur and the Ruler of Bhopal and the manner in which he got the Nizam to like him are sufficient evidence to disprove that he had any bias against Muslims as such. When the daughter of the Nawab of Bhopal wanted to visit her husband in Pataudi during the disturbances, Sardar decided to take her himself and to arrange for the safety of the husband and wife during their stay in Pataudi. He appointed Josh Malihabadi despite his political affiliations and the community to which he belonged to a responsible post as Editor of the Urdu magazine 'Aaj Kal' under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The first Indian Chief Commissioner of Delhi whom he appointed, was a Muslim—Khurshid Ahmad Khan. Even in the body of the correspondence portions are worthy of notice from the point of view of Sardar's attitude towards the Muslim community but perhaps the best and most convincing evidence of his objectivity is his attitude on the Urdu language, and it is with due apologies to the readers, (as the letter is out of context), the author has ventured to introduce it here. Though not strictly relevant to the subject-matter of this chapter, we have included Sardar's letter dated 14 December 1949 to 'R. R. Diwakar the Information Minister, on the place of Urdu in AIR, because it has communal overtones.

“Thank you for your letter of 5 December 1949, regarding the language policy of All India Radio and the I & B Ministry.

I am afraid our approach in regard to AIR has to be somewhat different from our approach to the question of national language. AIR's language policy, while taking note of the official language, must have due regard for the objective. The objective of AIR cannot be confined to the propagation or promotion of the national language. It is much more comprehensive, viz., it has to make itself understood and appreciated by the common man. Any attempt on the part of AIR to mould public opinion, or

to promote and improve public tastes, is bound to fail, if it does not express itself in a language which can be understood by the greatest possible number. I realize that the aim of AIR must also be to express itself in a language which is chaste, precise and dignified. All these virtues can, however, be present in simplicity. Although, therefore, there should be a somewhat different bias, having regard to the constitutional provisions regarding national language the criterion of general intelligibility must remain as the guiding point of AIR language policy.

As regards the nature and extent of the bias, that must obviously be more and more pronounced as Hindi becomes the generally accepted language of the whole of India. The fact that it is not so today is implicit in the recognition of English as the official language for the first fifteen years. You cannot assume, even now, that at the end of the period of fifteen years Hindi would automatically take the place of English. We have found what difficulties we have to face in getting Hindi recognised and accepted. What attitude of mind will be displayed at the end of fifteen years is an uncertain factor. Your language policy, therefore, cannot even proceed on the assumption that, fifteen years hence, Hindi would make such rapid strides as to become the generally acceptable language of the people, even though it might be the generally acceptable official national language. The difficulty proceeds as much from the fact that Hindi has to contend with the linguistic pride of the various linguistic areas as from the fact that the protagonists of Hindi itself have to realise that a national language is formed by fanaticism, nor is it imposed by statute, but grows consciously and sub-consciously by the efflux of time with inevitability of gradual recognition.

If we, as I think we must, accept the criterion of general intelligibility, then obviously the standard of AIR language has to be different from the literary

conceptions of orthodox Hindi. AIR is not, and should never be, a literary club. Once it is constituted into a club of that sort, it would become exclusive and cease to be a national institution. Whoever is at the head of AIR has, therefore, to be guided by a breadth of vision and of outlook which should transcend extremism in language, in literature, in the choice of words and in the selection of forms or idioms of expression. The basic approach must be catholic and the aim should be to select words which combine with simplicity the dignity of language and with intelligibility a high standard of expression and style. If one carefully studies Bapu's speeches, one would realize that this aim is quite capable of realization without doing violence to the standard of language. For technical expressions, I agree that you will now have to resort more and more to Sanskrit; at the same time, in the interim period, I feel that it will still be necessary for you either to use wider-understood English words or to evolve a style of narrative which, while giving a technical term, amplify its meaning. I am sure, if the language policy of AIR were conceived and directed in this way, we shall not only be promoting much better the cause of Hindi as a national language but also be serving much better what would obviously be our aim, viz., the service of the large body of AIR listeners.

As regards Urdu, I am doubtful of either the propriety or the wisdom of relegating it entirely to the regional domain. In a sense, Urdu like Hindi, cannot belong to one region. Those who speak and understand this language are not concentrated in one geographical area. To this extent, Urdu differs from other regional languages. Its votaries are spread all over India. There are four crores of Muslims, most of whom speak this language. There are refugees from Punjab, a majority of whom definitely speak and understand this language better than any other

Indian language. In the East Punjab, even this year 69% of those who appeared for the Vernacular Final Examination adopted Urdu as their language. In UP, there is a large concentration of those who speak the Urdu language. It is, therefore, quite clear to me that you cannot confine the Urdu language to any one particular region, though you can say that it is mainly spoken in a large portion of Northern India. If you recognise this fact, as I think you must, I do not think it will be possible for us, at least for the time being, to treat Urdu merely as the **language of a particular region** and thereby to consider it as the main or the main subsidiary language of any particular AIR station. It is possible to include it as one of the main languages of AIR stations in Punjab and UP but I feel that, if we have to make AIR effective as an instrument of publicity and promotion of ideals of a secular State and culture amongst a large majority of Muslims and refugees, we must, for the time being, assign a portion of our AIR programme from Delhi to Urdu.

I have expressed my views fully and frankly, on this very difficult question. I know that your task is difficult and that you are under pressure from more than one quarter who would like you to adopt an extremist attitude in the matter of language, but I think we have to mellow our idealism, or our predilections, by practical considerations. If we lose sight of the circumstances in which we must work our policy regarding national language we would not be doing a service but a positive disservice to the very cause which we wish to promote. I would, therefore, ask that we must give this problem a very serious consideration, fully recognizing and realising what is at stake. It is in this light that we should formulate the language policy of AIR. I also feel that, having regard to the importance of this question, you must obtain the approval of the Cabinet to whatever policy you wish to suggest, in the light of the views which you might obtain on this question."

## *SELECT CORRESPONDENCE*

### 1. SARDAR TO SARAT CHANDRA BOSE, DATED 24 AUGUST 1946 (EXTRACT)

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Calcutta has gone through an unparalleled ordeal and our hearts are there with you. In its suffering, we have not been able to do anything. But we have all our sympathies for all those who have lost their lives and who have suffered during these riots. Those who were responsible for these black and inexcusable crimes and who have brought discredit to the city and the country will have to be punished. There will, I hope, be a fair, impartial and independent enquiry. It will take long for Calcutta to recover from the shock. I do not know what will happen to that Government during whose regime such disgraceful events have happened. In no civilized country such a Government should have a day's existence. But we are living in strange circumstances and we have to go through the ordeal. Let us hope that from evil cometh good, and Providence in His wisdom may have inflicted these sufferings for some ulterior purposes.

### 2. G. L. MEHTA TO SARDAR, DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 1946 (EXTRACT)

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It now seems certain that the Europeans have decided to remain neutral on any motion of no confidence against the Ministry. This will prevent the defeat of the Ministry which is wholly undesirable if any confidence is to be revived or any sense of security to be ensured for innocent and law-abiding people. The Europeans seem to be anxious to throw

the onus on Jinnah to have a Coalition Ministry and also on the Provincial Congress. But Jinnah, for reasons of prestige, will presumably back up H. S. Suhrawardy. The local Britishers' partiality for the League is stronger than their sense of justice or even their abhorrence of the terrible happenings of a fortnight ago. Unless, therefore, there is some pressure from the Centre, i.e., the Viceroy, neither the Governor nor the local Britishers will move. It will be a disgraceful thing if the present Ministry is allowed to continue. As it is, it is a disgrace that it is still in office. The same thing happened during the days of the Bengal Famine when, despite all their inefficiency and corruption and the criminal incompetence shown by them, they continued in office all the time. That was because the British Government wanted the support of the League as against the Congress. Now there could be no justification for such an attitude.

The other point which is causing us anxiety here is the position of Muslims with a nationalist bent of mind. I am told on good authority that A. K. Fazlul Haq was physically coerced into signing the pledge of the Muslim League. I have known some Nationalist Muslims staying in Muslim localities who have been bullied and intimidated to hoist black flags on 2 September and were also compelled to put on black strips on their coats. You might have seen the statement made by Mr. Nausher Ali, ex-Speaker of the Bengal Legislative Assembly, and the manner in which he was treated and ultimately driven out from his own house. On the other hand, such Nationalist Muslims also stand in danger from ignorant and illiterate Hindus who treat all Muslims alike. I saw Dr. B. C. Roy yesterday and discussed this matter with him, but, frankly, I am not able to suggest my effective steps. The situation, however, is so serious in some quarters that many independent-minded Muslims would have to fall in line with the League on pain of being killed and their houses being looted. I have suggested to some of the leading papers here to take up this question in a cautious way because if more provocation is

offered their position would tend to become worse. I am told that at the mass meeting on 16 August where Suhrawardy spoke, it was openly stated that the league should see that no Nationalist Muslims existed within eight days. You must have no doubt heard that none of the speeches made at the meeting has been allowed to be reported even in the League papers. But I am told that they were very wild and inflammatory. I would, therefore, beg of you to consider the steps that could be taken by the Government and by the Congress in order to ensure the safety and freedom of opinion of independent and Nationalist Muslims.

Lastly, I would like to mention that the ratio of casualties as between Hindus and Muslims is not at all certain. Those who go about saying that three Muslims have been killed for every Hindu are not accurate. From all that I have seen and heard, nobody knows the exact figures. In any case, to state these figures would be extremely misleading and, in fact, would be playing into the hands of the League which is trying to make out that more Muslims have been killed than Hindus because of the premeditated attack made on the Muslims. . . .

### 3. SARDAR TO STAFFORD CRIPPS, DATED 19 OCTOBER 1946

(EXTRACT)

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You will, I am sure, remember that when you were here we had a long conversation on the likelihood of communal trouble in India in case there was no settlement with the Muslim League. I told you that there was no possibility of any trouble except in Bengal and Sind, and you told me, "You need not be afraid of Bengal as we have a Governor who would immediately put Section 93 into operation in case of any serious trouble." You have heard, I believe, of the "Great Calcutta Killing". Those who have seen the thing can alone realise what it was. But now what is happening in Eastern

Bengal is much worse and the Calcutta incident pales into insignificance before Noakhali. In Calcutta, Hindus had the best of it. But that is no comfort. Was Noakhali by way of revenge? My point just now is that the Governor did nothing to prevent the mischief if he had wished to avoid it. At least that is the general impression. I will not bother you with the details, but I am just sending you a copy of a letter which Jawaharlal wrote to the Viceroy on the eve of his departure for the Frontier. I am also enclosing a copy of a letter from another friend who has been a member of the Working Committee for many years (not printed).

Would you believe that the Governor of Bengal has all throughout these terrible happenings been enjoying the bracing climate of a hill station known as Darjeeling?

I myself received many letters and telegrams from the terror-stricken people of the unfortunate area. Similar warnings were addressed to the Viceroy and the Governor, but provincial autonomy serves as a screen to prevent Government action. You would realise how difficult it is for an Indian Home Member to sit in his office quietly day by day when innumerable piteous appeals and complaints are received for some kind of help which would give these unfortunate and helpless victims some protection.

You must have seen that the League has decided to come into the Interim Government at last, but you will see the correspondence that has passed between Mr. Jinnah and Pandit Nehru which has been published and which will give you an idea of the object with which they have come in. There is something uncanny in the way things are done. Whilst we fully realise your difficulties, all three of you must at least give some thought to the terrible strain that has been put upon us.

I have ventured to write this letter to you because I was encouraged by your kind letter. You may share it with your two colleagues. My best wishes to you and them.

4. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO WAVELL,  
DATED 15 OCTOBER 1946

Thank you for your letter of today's date about East Bengal.

I am going to the Frontier tomorrow morning, but my mind is full of what is happening in East Bengal. Both the reconstitution of the Interim Government, important as it is, and my Frontier visit, which I have looked forward to for so long, have suddenly become of secondary importance. Indeed, I have come seriously to think whether it serves any useful purpose for me to be in the Interim Government if an important part of India sinks to barbarism or something much worse. The accounts we have received and are receiving from hour to hour are incredible, and yet there can be little doubt that they are largely true. A vast area of Bengal has ceased to have any Government functioning, any security, and has just become the happy hunting ground of the worst elements in the community. Mass slaughter, arson, burning of human beings, rape, abduction on a large scale, forcible conversions and all manner of other horrible things are happening.

For at least two or three weeks past we have been receiving warnings that this was going to happen in East Bengal. Indeed, it began in Dacca some time back. Instead of being stopped in time it was allowed to grow, and it is now spreading to other districts. Bengal, which has long led India in many ways, has rapidly become a shambles and a ruin. It is a small matter to discuss legal responsibilities when such a horrible catastrophe overtakes a people. It is evident that the Bengal Government is completely incapable of controlling the situation. Indeed, many people think that they have no desire to control it. You have told us that this is the domain of provincial autonomy and that for rest it is a special responsibility of the Governor and the Viceroy. It may

be so, but I should like to know how that responsibility is discharged either by the provincial Government or the Governor when these conditions that are worse than war are allowed to prevail over wide areas and for indefinite periods. It would appear that not only Government but also general and special responsibilities have all ceased to function in these parts of Bengal. Only the gangster, the hooligan and other anti-social elements function there.

Surely it serves little purpose to say that all this is due to communal friction and to divide up the blame between various parties or groups. Conditions are difficult in various parts of India, but it has become the special province of Bengal to indulge in this horror and frightfulness. There was the famine three years ago. There was the Calcutta Killing two months ago, and there is now this mass slaughter, etc., in Noakhali and the surrounding districts which, if reports are correct, is far worse than the Calcutta Killing. Law and special and other responsibilities have no meaning when they become completely incapable of controlling such a situation. It is a terrible responsibility for all those in charge. But it is also a terrible responsibility for us and we too have to answer before the people of India. What is the good of our forming the Interim Government of India if all that we can do is to watch helplessly and do nothing else when thousands of people are being butchered and subjected to infinitely worse treatment ?

I am greatly perturbed. I feel that we must face this issue somehow or else we retire from the public scene.

5. STAFFORD CRIPPS TO SARDAR,  
DATED 24 OCTOBER 1946

Thank you very much for your letter of the 19th (Serial No. 3). I am so glad that you sent it to me and I shall actually see that my colleagues and the Prime Minister have copies of it.

I realise very fully what a difficult situation you are all in and how terrible are the happenings in Bengal. It is of course quite impossible for us to judge from here exactly what is happening and why it is happening. It seems to us that firm measures are being taken to quell the riots and I hope they will be successful.

I know how exasperating it must be for you especially, but that is always one of the difficulties with a Central Government where there is a large measure of provincial autonomy. The system has many advantages, but it also has its difficulties and drawbacks. We are all very impressed the way in which your team is tackling its most difficult job and I send you my very best wishes and may your patience not give out !

6. SARDAR TO WAVELL, DATED 25 OCTOBER 1946

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have received from a British member of the Indian Civil Service who prefers to remain anonymous. The feelings expressed in the letter about the situation in Bengal are similar to what have been expressed in shoals of letters and telegrams that I have been receiving every day on this subject, and the letter provides a revealing commentary on the situation. I am sure you will find it of some interest.

## ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL NO. 6

[This letter was written by an I. C. S. officer of the United Provinces to Shri Govind Ballabh Pant.]

Although it is perhaps irregular for a district officer to write to you direct, I take the liberty of doing so on a somewhat personal matter. I have already written demi-officially about it to Mr. Banerjee, and trust that you will have no objection to my addressing you privately in this way, as the matter is not one which falls completely under any special conduct rule.

It seems to me quite obvious, from what is happening in Bengal, that if India is to have any chance of working out any scheme of unity, or even of communal agreement, the goondaism in Bengal must be firmly and completely stopped. Quite apart from this, the most elementary tenets of humanity and commonsense demand that such a state of affairs be not allowed to continue. It is quite obvious that the Bengal administration is not capable of dealing with these troubles; and so the logical thing would be to strengthen it from outside. It is possible that Bengal may have to borrow officers from other provinces, just as she did during the war; and I should like to be one of these volunteers. I fully appreciate that the present Muslim League Ministry in Bengal will be unwilling to have such officers from outside; there is no use trying to conceal the fact that Suhrawardy and his Ministers are the leaders of the goondas who are ravaging Bengal, and I do not propose to try to do so. At the same time, I do not see how the Government of India can do anything else but step in and take over Bengal after removing the Ministry; and I imagine that for the subsequent "mopping-up" operations extra civil officers will be required. I feel that I could be of some use in this capacity. I have had a certain amount of experience in the work which will be required in the guerilla formation in which I served during the war; and my administrative experience as a district officer might be useful if added to this. I have had a certain amount of

contact with Chittagonians and Bengal Muslims during the war, in the L of C area, and have learned a little about how to deal with them. Surely it is the duty of every person to oppose in the best way he can the sort of thing that is happening in Bengal; and I feel that I could be most useful working on the spot, helping to stop the trouble, and to hunt down and destroy those who have caused it, and to help to clear up things and set the administration on its feet afterwards. As I think you know, I have asked for permission to retire from the ICS in January, and I feel that I must do so under normal conditions—not because I disapprove of the idea of Indian nationalism, for I do not, but because I am convinced that I cannot give service as it should be given by remaining in the ICS. But I should be prepared to postpone my retirement if I could do anything to help to stop the appalling state of affairs which at present exists in Bengal, and I would gladly offer my services for this work until such time as conditions are satisfactory again. I have approached you in this matter in the hope that you will be able to appreciate my attitude as a private individual as well as from the official point of view and would be prepared to recommend my case to the Government of India. I may add that I feel very strongly the necessity of putting an immediate stop to the state of affairs which exists in Bengal, and of the part which individuals outside that province must play in doing so—not merely to relieve the sufferings of the people who are affected but to prevent the spread of a creed of violence and anarchy which is as bad as anything which has ever been known in the world and which strikes at the roots of world peace and the rights of man. Commissions and resolutions may be all very well in their way; but a lot of action on the spot is needed also, and I feel that my experience in the war could be turned to good use if I were allowed to go to a position in Bengal in which I could help in that action. I should be most grateful, therefore, if you would be good enough to give my case consideration.

## 7. SUMMARY OF A REPORT ON COMMUNAL DISTURBANCES IN BIHAR—OCTOBER–NOVEMBER, 1946—BY PRIME MINISTER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

[This is a summary of an appraisal by Prime Minister Nehru of the situation in Bihar as on 7 November, 1946.]

*The Background* : Ever since, in 1940, the Muslim League adopted Pakistan as its objective, and embarked on a campaign of hatred and bitter denunciation of the Congress, there was a reaction among the Hindus. This did not affect the widespread popularity of the Congress among the masses so far as the political issues were concerned; it did, however, produce a certain communal feeling, and a tendency among the middle classes to criticise the Congress for not supporting the Hindu cause against the Muslim League. Progressively, a feeling of exasperation took hold of the Hindus at the unpatriotic and highly objectionable attitude of the Muslim League as revealed in its threats to use force and at slogans like “Pakistan khun se lenge” (We shall take Pakistan through blood). There were also attacks and denunciations of the Hindu religion. Never too docile, the peasantry reacted rather aggressively, but were kept in check by Congress leaders. Among the Muslims also, a fairly considerable movement arose among the Momins, or the weaver class, which refused to associate itself with the Muslim League, and was on the whole friendly to the Congress and cooperating with it, rejecting the idea of Pakistan.

*The Immediate Cause* : The news of the Calcutta Killings of August 1946 affected people in Bihar greatly. Bihar had a large Bengali population; and many of the Hindus who were killed and whose shops were looted in Calcutta had relations in Bihar. The excitement in Bihar was considerably increased at the news of the events in East Bengal (especially Noakhali)

more particularly when they heard about the large-scale abduction of women and forcible conversions.

*The Riots :* On or about 25 October 1946 there was a big procession and meeting in Patna on the occasion of Noakhali day. The riots took place shortly after this date. It was for the most part confined to the Patna District and part of the Monghyr District, but there was large-scale arson and killing. Governmental action was not as swift and effective as it might have been. Partly this was due to the absence of many of the Ministers as well as the Governor, partly to the suddenness of the outbreak, and partly to the complacency of the permanent officers. There was even a feeling that some of the permanent officers were not too greatly displeased at this new embarrassment of the Provincial Government. The movement had the appearance of a spontaneous uprising in various parts, chiefly involving the peasantry—though certain anti-social elements including some notorious dacoits participated. Within a week or so, however, the military was called in. They acted with firmness and determination, not hesitating to shoot at rioting Hindu mobs, even if this took heavy toll in deaths. In this way, the situation was brought under control.

Naturally, there was a large-scale exodus from Muslim areas; and the Bihar Government did their best to help Muslims to be brought from outlying villages to relief camps in Patna and other places. The State Government was doing its best to feed and clothe them and look after their accommodation and safety.

8. WAVELL TO SARDAR, DATED 7 NOVEMBER 1946

I discussed with you and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan last night the need to control the Press. I am sure we must take urgent action and I hope you will go into the matter at once. I see that the contents of Dawn today are by no means helpful. Probably the best remedy would be a gentleman's agreement, but if this cannot be secured we must clearly consider legal action, which would of course mean enforcing the law against the Press of all parties.

I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.

9. SARDAR TO WAVELL, DATED 7 NOVEMBER 1946

Many thanks for your letter dated 7 November 1946.

I have called a conference of the Editors of important newspapers in Delhi at 11 a.m. on Sunday 10 November 1946 to consider the ways and means of securing the co-operation of the Press in relieving the existing tension and the sense of insecurity prevailing in the country. I must, however, confess that I do not expect that a gentleman's agreement would emerge. The attitude of the Dawn and other papers of that type has been progressively deteriorating rather than improving even under the stimulus provided by recurrent tragedies. Its latest activity is a cleverly disguised and mischievously conceived incitement to violence to the Muslims of the Punjab in retaliation for what has happened in Bihar. I doubt whether the approach of this section of the Press would at all be helpful.

I am, however, glad to note that Your Excellency has now come to the same view which I expressed some time back regarding the desirability of taking action in respect of the continuous outpourings of communal venom and hatred which is being indulged in by a section of the Press and is largely responsible for the recent unfortunate happenings.

10. SUMMARY OF SARDAR'S LETTER TO WAVELL,  
DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1946  
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO CABINET,  
RE : COMMUNAL INCIDENTS

The sources of information of the Home Ministry about communal incidents in provinces are : (1) the Intelligence Bureau and (2) the Provincial Governments. The reports of the Intelligence Bureau obtained from Central Intelligence officers through their own resources or Provincial Governments, were sketchy, second-hand and sometimes inaccurate. The Fortnightly Reports of Provincial Governments would usually be out of date by the time they were received. Sardar felt that the position was most unsatisfactory. While the Central Cabinet was not interested in the day to day administration of law and order in the Provinces, it could not remain entirely indifferent, specially in emergencies requiring military aid. We should, therefore, have daily detailed reports from Provinces. The two methods of obtaining such reports are :

- (1) Governors should be asked by the Governor-General to send daily reports;
- (2) Defence Department could ask for such reports from Provincial Governments in order to assess their responsibility to aid civil power in dealing with public disorders.

11. SARDAR TO GOPICHAND BHARGAVA,  
DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1946

I have received your letter of the 11th instant. (not printed— forwards a verbal circular alleged to have been passed by Jinnah and the Muslim League containing highly inflammatory directions to Muslims).

The circular which you have mentioned appears to have had countrywide circulation, but there is no proof that it is authentic. There are many other similar documents which are circulating and if we started taking notice of some and not of others, the feeling would naturally be widespread that those, of which we did not take any notice, are authentic. The best course, therefore, would be to take notice of none.

You must have noticed from Press reports today that the Press in Delhi have come to an agreement on the question of treatment of communal news, and the Press Note makes it clear that we are not satisfied with it, but at the same time are prepared to give it a fair trial. My policy is to watch for the time being, but to act swiftly if the arrangement appears inadequate or defective.

I received news about the trouble in Rohtak yesterday. I hope it has been localised and not spreading to villages as was the burden of that information.

12. G. E. B. ABELL TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1946

H. E. has received a telegram from the Governor of Assam to the effect that in spite of his attempts to dissuade them and in spite of a warning from the Defence Department that troops cannot be spared to deal with communal disturbances the Assam Ministry persist in their programme of evictions of Bengali Muslims from the Assam valley.

2. It is anticipated that the result will be retaliatory attacks on Hindus in the Surma Valley.

3. There have, as the Home Department have already been informed by the Assam Government, been two incidents connected with the preparations for these evictions.

4. It seems that H. E. will have to consider whether he should not advise the Governor to overrule his Ministry, but as he is on tour I think I ought first to write and ask you

whether as a result of your discussion with H. E. you have felt able to make any approach on party lines to the Assam Ministry and whether you have any reason to suppose that they will be prepared to postpone this dangerous action.

13. SARDAR TO G. E. B. ABELL,  
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1946

I have just received your letter of today regarding eviction of illegal immigrants in Assam (Serial No. 12).

2. In pursuance of my discussion with H. E. on the subject, I sent a telegram to the Assam Premier on the afternoon of 13 November enquiring if it was correct that the Government of Assam had decided to implement their eviction policy with effect from 14 November, whether he apprehended any trouble and, if so, whether he was prepared to deal with it. I am still awaiting a reply to this telegram.

3. There is no dispute about the unauthorised and illegal nature of the possession of these immigrants as H. E. himself had agreed with me. The action of the Ministry would be in defence of Government's lawful right to evict these trespassers on Government land as they propose to continue in unlawful possession. It would not be justifiable to overrule the Ministry in such lawful action. I have no doubt that it would be improper; besides such action is likely to encourage intransigence and violence. It is impossible to believe that His Excellency would contemplate such consequences to arise from his advise. If the Muslims of Surma Valley take any retaliatory steps on the innocent Hindus of the district, the Ministry will have to take strong measures to suppress their illegal and criminal actions and we will have to support them in doing so.

#### 14. SUMMARY OF GOPINATH BARDOLOI'S LETTER TO SARDAR, DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1946

Apparently, for quite some time before the Congress Government under Bardoloi took office after the general elections of 1946, the problem of illegal immigration into Assam and "squatting" existed. There was an agreement between the Muslim League Government and leaders of political parties to settle some of the immigrants and the Assam Government had reserved some lands for this purpose. But this land was forcibly occupied by hordes of illegal immigrants making orderly settlement impossible and setting at naught all Government authority. These illegal immigrants attacked the villagers already resident as well as their cattle and created the situation of law and order impossible. This process had reached such dimensions that forcible eviction *en masse* of these illegal entrants had become unavoidable, if Government authority was not to be allowed to collapse. For this purpose the help of the Army could be necessary (and a battalion had in fact been sent to Assam to help the Provincial Government).

The Assam Government proposed to start eviction proceedings in certain reserves, and then go on to others. But an offer had been made that, if the squatters cooperated with the State Government in respect of those reserves where eviction action had been initiated, the Provincial Government was willing to discuss and negotiate in regard to eviction from other reserves.

15. SARDAR TO G. E. B. ABELL,  
DATED 16 NOVEMBER 1946

In continuation of my letter of yesterday regarding the eviction policy of the Assam Government (Serial No. 13) I send herewith a copy of a telegram which I have just received from the Premier on this subject (Serial No. 16). From this telegram you will see that for the next fortnight at least there is no question of any physical eviction of the old immigrants who have illegally occupied Government land.

From the telegram it is clear that the problem is entirely different. Fresh hordes of immigrants are making an organised attempt to take forcible possession of both Government and private lands on a very large scale. No government with any sense of responsibility can submit to forcible action of this nature.

The only way to avoid an unpleasant situation in Assam seems to be that you should approach the Muslim League leaders here to advise their followers to desist from these organised efforts to obtain forcible possession of Government and private lands and thus render orderly government impossible.

It seems the information originally supplied to H. E. was inaccurate. This is a case in which there is no question of forcible eviction of old illegal occupants but of preventing fresh trespassers from taking forcible possession.

16. TELEGRAM FROM ASSAM GOVERNMENT,  
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1946

ASSAM GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT HAVE DECIDED REAP-  
ING ATTACHED PADDY IN RESERVES EVICTED BY LAST  
GOVERNMENT AND PRESENT GOVERNMENT. THIS WILL  
TAKE AT LEAST FORTNIGHT. ACTUAL EVICTION FROM  
OTHER RESERVES TAKES PLACE AFTERWARDS. MEANTIME  
RESERVES AND LANDS PROPOSED BY GOVERNMENT FOR  
PLANNED SETTLEMENT OF PROTECTED IMMIGRANTS AND  
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FORCIBLY TAKEN POSSESSION OF  
BY HORDES OF IMMIGRANTS MAKING ORDERLY SETTLE-  
MENT AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IMPOSSIBLE. LATELY  
THOUSANDS OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS ARE COMING IN  
BOATS AND TRAINS AND FORCIBLY SQUATTING OVER  
ANY VACANT LAND INCLUDING SOME PRIVATE POSSESSION  
ALSO. SOME VILLAGERS HAVE LEFT THEIR ABODES.  
GOVERNMENT DECIDED EVICTION IN THIS CIRCUMST-  
ANCES ALTHOUGH PREPARED DISCUSS WITH ANY PARTY  
WITH AUTHORITY FOR PLANNED SETTLEMENT ABOVE.  
THE OBJECT OF MAKING THIS A COMMUNAL QUESTION  
AND STOP ACTION BY GOVERNMENT IS OBVIOUS. WE  
PREPARED ACCORDING TO OUR APPREHENSION BUT  
PRAY FOR MILITARY EMERGENCY.

17. SARDAR TO G. E. B. ABELL,  
DATED 25 NOVEMBER 1946

I should like to draw His Excellency's attention to the  
following extract from the daily report of the CIO, Bihar,  
dated 18 November 1946.

Although the conditions obtaining in the villages now  
admit of the refugees going back home, there is strong  
propaganda by some of the Muslim League workers that  
they should not go back to the villages where, according  
to them, Government will once again fail to give them the

necessary protection. While such alarming advice may be given with all sincerity, there is also no doubt that some Leaguers think that they are furthering the cause of the League by dissuading the Muslims from going back to their own villages.”

I notice from the report on communal disturbances in Bengal received from H. E. the Governor of Bengal that a similar situation has arisen in the affected areas of East Bengal, and it is proposed to give the District Magistrates powers which will allow them in certain circumstances to intern such persons.

18. G. E. B. ABELL TO SARDAR,  
DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1946

Thank you for your letter of yesterday about Bihar and Bengal. His Excellency has drawn the attention of His Excellency the Governor of Bihar to the power proposed to be taken for District Magistrates in East Bengal under Bengal Act III of 1926.

19. WAVELL TO SARDAR, DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1946  
(EXTRACT)

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2. Scott, my Deputy Private Secretary, is returning from Bihar today. I informed my colleagues on Wednesday that I proposed to send him and he went off the next morning. I wished to get first-hand information of the scope of the problem in Bihar.

3. There is no question of bypassing the Bihar Ministry. What is proposed is that an offer of assistance should be given both to them and to the Bengal Government. Both Bengal and Bihar will be treated alike, except that the scope of the problem is very much larger in Bihar. I have already informed the Governor of Bengal that his Government are likely to receive an offer of help.

4. I strongly deprecate a political or communal outlook on this problem of relief and rehabilitation. What we have to do is to ensure that the miserable victims of these disgraceful outbreaks are helped as promptly and effectively as possible.

20. WAVELL TO SARDAR, DATED 28 NOVEMBER 1946

I have had a telegram from the Governor of the Punjab in which he says that his Government are gravely concerned at the tone of the last few issues of Dawn which has published inaccurate and inflammatory account of the Rohtak disturbances and other articles likely to stimulate communal hatred in the Punjab.

2. The Governor says that orders have been issued for the immediate arrest of Dawn's Rohtak correspondent if he can be found. The Government have in draft an amendment to the ordinance empowering the Punjab Government to ban the entry of objectionable newspapers etc. into the province, and this is likely to be submitted to me shortly for concurrence. But the Premier and the Governor consider that the Central Government should take immediate action to stop the publication of communal articles such as those complained of. A provincial ban on newspapers published elsewhere may not be effective.

3. I suggest this matter should be urgently examined and I have informed Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan that I have written to you to this effect.

4. You will of course agree that any restriction found necessary must apply impartially to all newspapers.

21. SARDAR TO WAVELL, DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1946

Please refer to your letter dated 28 November 1946, regarding the Dawn (Serial No. 20).

2. The Punjab Government have represented the need for action against the Dawn once or twice before and we have had similar suggestions from the Government of Bombay. Apart from its delinquencies in the past, we have been observing that its implementation of the convention, to which the editor of the Dawn himself was a party, has not been satisfactory. The approach of the Constituent Assembly makes the need for action most urgent. Recently, we referred to our Legal Advisers some material for opinion as regards the desirability of action under the present Press laws. The opinion of the Solicitor to Government and of the Advocate-General was not helpful. In these circumstances, I consider that special powers would be necessary which we would have to take under a Governor-General's ordinance. A. E. Porter, who agrees with this suggestion, has been asked by me to take up at once the preparation of a suitable draft for the purpose, and in view of the extreme urgency of this matter it is possible that this ordinance may have to be issued in your absence in London.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 of Your Excellency's letter, you have already mentioned this question once to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, but the Dawn has not improved its ways. I am extremely doubtful if any intercession on his part would have any different effect now.

4. I am afraid I am unable to appreciate paragraph 4 of your letter. Powers under the existing law or under the proposed ordinance would obviously apply to all newspapers and it is quite clear that in the actual implementation of

those restrictions, it is only those papers which offend that would be involved. If Your Excellency's intention was that the Home Department should be impartial in the administration of those powers, it hardly needed any reminder.

## 22. WAVELL TO SARDAR, DATED 16 MARCH 1947

2. I am sure that everything possible is being done to restore order in the Punjab, and a fair measure of success has already been achieved. I do not think that martial law, which has many grave disadvantages, is at present necessary. Nor does it seem that the casualties are on the Bihar scale, though one cannot be sure of the figures at present.

3. The Hindustan Times of 15 March, both in its cartoon and in the report from the Punjab, seems to me to contain matter which is actionable under the Press Ordinance. I realise the depth of feeling that has been aroused by these communal disturbances, but I think that you should look into the question whether or not action should be taken against the Hindustan Times.

## 23. SARDAR TO WAVELL, DATED 19 MARCH 1947

I thank you for your D. O. of the 16th instant.

2. I note that you do not seem to favour the use of martial law in the worst affected areas. I still feel more severe action is required. From the latest telegram you will notice that the situation in the Eastern Punjab is full of explosive possibilities, and any prolongation of the disturbed conditions in the North and Western Punjab might bring about a flare-up at any time. However, if you still feel that the action which is being taken is adequate, I must wait till further developments.

3. Regarding para 3 of your letter, I agree that the cartoon of the Hindustan Times was open to objection, but I do not

think it is actionable under the present ordinance which, as you will recall, is limited to any thing likely to promote communal hatred. It would be impossible to establish that the cartoon has this effect. It is no doubt a vulgar or mischievous cartoon, but if you have been reading the Dawn, you would find that even worse things have been appearing there; I enclose a cartoon which appeared some time ago. I am sure this cartoon does not suffer by comparison with the one to which you refer. It may be noted that the report attributed to the Home Department in the cartoon is wholly false.

4. As regards the report which appeared in the Hindustan Times, my difficulty is that similar things have been appearing in other papers, and the article to which you referred followed the lead given by other papers, as for example the Statesman. The execution of the ordinance is left, as you know, in the first instance to the Chief Commissioner. I have had enquiries made, and it appears that the Chief Commissioner has not initiated any action against any of the papers which have been indulging in similar objectionable behaviour, ever since the trouble started in the Punjab after the resignation of the Khizr Ministry. I have already informally spoken to the Managing Editor of the Hindustan Times, and am also considering how best these breaches of the convention and possible breaches of the ordinance could be dealt with.

#### 24. SARDAR TO WAVELL, DATED 20 MARCH 1947

I am sending herewith a copy of a telegram which I have received from the Assam Premier (Serial No. 25) regarding the situation in that province as a result of the activities of the Muslim League both there and in the neighbouring province of Bengal.

2. I am sorry to trouble you with this almost on the eve of your departure, but I feel that the position is such as cannot be allowed to rest where it is without peril to public safety in

Assam. It seems to be anomalous that a party the representatives of which are in the Central Government should indulge in unlawful activities in a province. In the absence of any restraining influence of these representatives on the provincial leaders, the position of our Ministries becomes weakened for assistance from the Centre cannot obviously be as full and effective as circumstances demand while that of agitators becomes stronger for want of sufficiently resolute action. You will recall that in November last when Abell wrote to me on the subject I pointed out that what the Assam Government was doing was in defence of their lawful claims in their own lands and that it was for you to persuade the Muslim League to pursue a different course from that of forcibly securing their unlawful object. What has happened in the Punjab and what is happening in the NWFP should convince you that the so-called non-violent agitation is merely a cover for more sinister activities and designs and that the aim quite clearly is to cause a severe shock to law and order with a view to forcing the provincial Government or Governments to surrender to the League's unlawful demands.

3. In these circumstances, the duty of the Central Government is quite clear and we must give the provincial Government such timely and effective military aid as may be necessary. I am, therefore, requesting the Defence Member to see what can be done to meet the Assam Premier's appeal and hope that you will give all possible support to the Assam Premier in his efforts to deal with a difficult and potentially dangerous situation.

25. TELEGRAM FROM PREMIER OF ASSAM TO  
SARDAR, DATED 19 MARCH 1947

ASSAM SITUATION SERIOUS CAUSING GOVERNMENT GREAT ANXIETY. ASSAM MUSLIM LEAGUE AND BENGAL MUSLIM LEADERS PLANNING INVASION ASSAM BY ORGANISED VOLUNTEERS FROM BENGAL. SINCE 20 FEBRUARY LARGE CONCENTRATION OF MEN IN BENGAL BORDERS WITH SPEARS AND LATHIS NEAR DHUBRI SUBDIVISION HAVE ERECTED SHEDS FOR TRAINING VOLUNTEERS. MANY PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREAS IN ASSAM ALREADY INFILTRATED EXCITING PEOPLE TO VIOLENCE AND CREATING DISAFFECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT. ASSAM MUSLIM LEAGUE DECLARED CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND ARE HAVING FREQUENT PROCESSIONS. CLASH INEVITABLE AS TENSION CONTINUES. ASSAM GOVERNMENT'S ARMED STRENGTH NOW POSTED (IN) SMALL DANGER AREAS QUITE INADEQUATE MEET SITUATION. PRAY POST AT LEAST A BRIGADE HERE IMMEDIATELY AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED AND DIRECT PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT USING THEM WHEN REQUIRED FOR EMERGENCY. LETTER FOLLOWS.

26. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 12 APRIL 1947

With reference to the discussion we had this afternoon, I am sending herewith a copy of the appreciation of Muslim League movement situation in the NWFP on 5-4-47 and the Governor's note below it, about which I spoke to you (Serial No. 27). I am also enclosing the Fortnightly Report for the second half of March 1947 which gives a statement of the situation up to 31-3-47 and which was apparently prepared on 2 April 1947.

2. I find that Mr. Mitchell has less than 17 years' standing. Apparently, the Governor thought that the Ministry had to

learn a great deal from him in regard to the situation in the province with which Mr. Mitchell had dealt at first hand only for a few days, while the Ministry had been dealing with it for a much longer time. You will also observe that this note was got prepared by the Governor over the head of the Chief Minister and that the Governor's suggestion for conciliation or compromise is in regard to a movement, the two demands of which referred to the return of the widow of a Sikh murdered by Muslims, who was converted forcibly to Islam and married off to a Muslim, but subsequently returned to the Sikh by the Ministry according to her free choice, and to the refund of Rs. 75,000 collected from the Tribes under orders of the Central Government for wanton and wilful raids on a peacefully settled district involving several murders in cold blood and serious loss of property.

3. It is quite clear that if anything the situation demands firm and resolute handling. Instead we have the defeatist mentality of a comparatively young Chief Secretary who is apparently the conscience-keeper of a responsible Governor and the compromise plea of the latter whose especial responsibility it should be to safeguard constitutional government against the organised attacks and criminal conspiracy of irresponsible agitators and not to persuade it into abdicating its functions.

4. Finally, I need only comment on the difference between the Appreciation, by the same officer, of the situation up to 31-3-1947 and his Appreciation only three days later. It seems that all demoralisation, danger of breakdown and tiresomeness of the services came about during those three or four miraculous days.

5. The conclusion is irresistible that the note was prepared to serve the purpose of a Governor who has made no secret of his determination to hand over the province to a League Ministry.

## 27. APPRECIATION OF MUSLIM LEAGUE MOVEMENT SITUATION ON 5TH APRIL 1947

(EXTRACT)

PREPARED FOR THE GOVERNOR BY THE  
CHIEF SECRETARY, NWFP.

1. I submit for consideration the following appreciation. I very much hope that it will not prove annoying to Hon'ble Ministers, whose opinion may be very different. I venture to do this only because things seem to me in the last degree serious and that it is my duty to present this view with its reasons. I do not presume to comment on the merits or otherwise of the Muslim League motives and methods. I shall try to state only facts, following those with my own inferences.

2. The agitation has met with a great deal of success. The jails are full to capacity. To release many offenders in order to make room for more is only an apparent remedy. It can be no permanent solution of this problem. Indeed as far as I can see there is none.

3. All officers down to and including sub-inspectors of police and corresponding ranks are at the limit of their endurance. It is known that the District Magistrate, Mardan, has been recommended leave on medical certificate. It is for all practical purposes a certainty that most or all senior officers at least will crack up sooner or later; and all the sooner as the hot weather comes on. They have been exposed for about two months already to a physical, nervous, and moral strain which they cannot fairly be asked to endure any longer. They have been abused by responsible people (I state a fact) on grounds of disloyalty, which has not helped. I know that many of them do hold their private political views, though by no means all incline to one particular party. But I have failed to find evidence of any officer's political views having affected the execution of his duty.

4. The rank and file of the police are also exhausted and bewildered. There have been many cases of illness, including T. B., as the result of unbroken weeks of physical strain, irregular and bad meals, sleeping on the ground in the open, and so on.

5. We have heard on best authority that the military are not happy about the circumstances in which they have had to work; but it is not for me to state any more when the facts are not fully at my disposal.

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7. I now consider the people in three categories :

(a) Hindus. It is known that deputations have been to the Mullah Sahib of Manki expressing themselves in favour of Pakistan and craving protection. Many Hindus have stated to me that they have no confidence in any present authority for their protection. The exodus of Hindus from every district to other parts of India goes on everyday. A substantial number of the forcible conversions reported has been forcible only in the sense that those converted seized with some degree of spontaniety the chance to live as Muslims in safety rather than as Hindus in danger.

(b) Muslims. I have found it impossible to assess accurately the extent to which, if any, the Muslim League have gained ground with the electorate in all districts. Facts conceded by members of the Congress Party, however, are that all large towns and Hazara district are now Muslim League sympathisers, active or otherwise. In areas where the Congress Party had strong support in the past, reports of meetings usually include mention of hostile demonstrations by Muslim League sympathisers. One opinion, from a person whose opinion is entitled to respect, was to the effect that D. I. Khan and Bannu would show a Muslim League majority, the rural areas of Peshawar and Mardan a Congress majority, with Kohat doubtful but inclined to the Muslim League. The fact does stand out, however, that the Pathans are bitterly divided against one another.

(c) The tribes. I have not been able to find any evidence of Congress sympathisers anywhere except for a small portion

of the Mahsuds. The general tribal policy until recently was for them to hold aloof from Indian politics; but at the same time strong sympathy was generally expressed for the Muslim League. But (to avoid what might be very lengthy detail) the arrest of the Mullah Sahib of Manki, and the firing on March 10 at Peshawar, have had very serious consequences. On 4-4-47 the crowd in Peshawar included Afridis and Mohmands. The former said to a senior officer that on that day they were few; next time there might be 20,000. A deputation of Afridi Maliks has told the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, that they cannot (and by inference will not) control their young men. Mohmand jirgas have uttered similar threats. The Dre-Mahsud marakka passed more specific resolutions. I see every possibility of tribal inroads on a large scale culminating in general war. It happened in 1897 and to a less extent between 1916 and 1919, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the same thing happening again.

8. At this point I leave facts as I have been able to collect them and turn with great diffidence to inferences. One frequently reads and hears that the situation, generally or locally, is under control. I believe that an analysis of the facts shows this not to be correct. From time to time and in different places individual situations have been brought under control. Not so the situation as a whole, regarding which it can only be said that it is being coped with from day to day and from hour to hour. The officers of Government at least are unable to see more. If this inference is correct, it follows that measures are required to settle the situation, not merely to cope with it; and it is not only the writer of this note who recommends deliberation on this point. The whole population of the province and the tribal areas, and especially the persecuted minorities and overwrought officials, would welcome the news that something was being done other than a grim continuation of the present struggle.

5-4-'47

A. N. Mitchell

## [GOVERNOR'S NOTE]

9. I asked the Chief Secretary, with his fresh approach to the question as he has just taken over, to let me have his appreciation of the present position arising in the province as a result of the League movement. His appreciation above, I might differ in certain details of his conclusions, but I consider that his application is broadly correct. It is particularly necessary for the provincial Government to bear in mind the strain on officers, which is very great indeed and may lead to a breakdown if some thing cannot be done to deal with the trouble at its root instead of with its symptoms. I do not consider that the present agitation is likely to grow less without an attempt to work towards some form of conciliation or compromise.

10. The form of conciliation or compromise is of course not at all easy to envisage. What it might be is an announcement by the provincial Government that, while in no sense they yield their constitutional rights, they wish in the public interest to negotiate a settlement and to that end propose to release all persons imprisoned under the Section 40, Frontier Crimes Regulation and for breaches of orders under Sections 144 Cr. P. C., only retaining in jail those under trial or convicted of offences under the IPC (other than Section 188 IPC). The ultimate aim of such a move would have to be very carefully considered, whether it was leading up to the possibility of a coalition Government or to elections eventually. It would probably be very difficult in any case to hold elections during the hot weather.

11. If no form of conciliation is attempted it will be necessary to consider what action to take should there be a real breakdown of civil forces of law and order, complicated possibly by tribal aggression.

12. I thought it well to get all this on to paper, for I regard it as a matter of utmost importance on which close thought is necessary.

7-4-'47

O. K. Caroe  
Governor

28. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 20 APRIL 1947

I received your letter dated 19 April (not printed: asks re: plan for inducing Press to implement Gandhi-Jinnah appeal) yesterday afternoon on my return from Bombay after my Gujarat tour.

2. In the message which I sent to the All India Newspaper Editor's Conference, I had already appealed to the editors to assist Government in dealing with the difficult times through which we are passing. When I was at Surat, I received a suggestion from my Secretary that I should send another message to the Conference to take action regarding the appeal issued by Gandhiji and Jinnah. Since the League Press is not represented in the Conference, I thought it futile to make a suggestion to one side only to follow up the appeal. I am, therefore, issuing another message to all newspapers asking them to print the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal repeatedly in a prominent position, particularly at any time when local tension or similar circumstances require it. A copy of my message is enclosed for your perusal (Serial No. 29).

3. All India Radio are being instructed similarly to use the appeal at frequent intervals, and in particular in their rural programmes which reach listeners who may not be able to read the newspapers. A letter is also going to all associations of film-exhibitors urging them to ask of their members to use the appeal on a cinema slide in various languages to be shown at intervals or at other appropriate times in their programmes. Finally, an express letter is going to all Provincial Governments informing them of the action taken by us and suggesting that they should produce posters and leaflets in the languages of the provinces and give them the widest and most prominent distribution possible.

4. If you consider that my department can be useful in any other way in this direction, please let me know, and I shall see that the needful is done.

5. But I feel I should be failing in my duty and be untrue to myself if I concealed my innermost conviction that, unless and until the Muslim League is compelled to withdraw its 'Direct Action' resolution, and this step is followed up by active attempts to keep its followers in check and under control, the necessary psychological atmosphere in which the appeal could strike a responsive chord would be completely lacking, and the appeal itself would not serve much useful purpose. It is futile to expect an ordinary man in the street to exercise restraint or to make any positive contribution to the restoration of feelings of amity if incidents are happening which outrage and inflame public opinion. After reading an account of the wholesale murders, looting, arson and forced conversions of non-Muslims in Dera Ismail Khan, there would indeed be few among them who would be able to pay any attention to an appeal to eschew violence. I am enclosing a typical example of the letters which I receive from different corners of India together with cutting to which the writer refers. I am also sending you another cutting which gives the allegations in greater detail. Such are the events on which the mass mind is being fed and such is the reaction which is being produced! While untold sufferings and outrages are being perpetrated on non-Muslims and minorities are being systematically eliminated in the Muslim majority areas and organised whole-scale preparations are being made to "capture" the province of Assam without any corresponding effort on the part of the League leaders to deal with their followers on the spot, in contrast Gandhiji is buried in the midst of his self-imposed mission in Bihar calculated to assuage the feelings of Muslims in regard to a tragedy which overtook them six months ago and which was quelled under the active intervention of Congress Members of the Interim Government within a week. The signature of Mr. Jinnah on the appeal is a mockery

if he does not himself feel the urge to visit the areas such as Dera Ismail Khan, Rawalpindi, and Multan which are, or have been, the scenes of orgies of murder, arson and loot. If he is sincere in his appeal, his place is quite clearly in the Frontier to restrain his followers and not in Delhi.

6. Ever since you assumed office and I had my first interview with you, I have been pressing upon you the need for urgent action. While I do not deny that the signature of Mr. Jinnah on the truce would be a creditable achievement, if sincerely followed up, I feel that time, which we are letting slip and everyday that these tragedies are being perpetrated without securing positive actions such as I have suggested above, would make the success of your mission more remote than ever. You have already acquired a reputation for being a man of quick decision and action and a person possessed of a great sense of urgency. India has also been impressed by the earnestness of purpose and the message of good-will underlying your first speech on the assumption of office, but the sands of time are running out and I hope you will believe me when I say that the man in the street is already commenting that a month has elapsed, while bestiality still prevails in the NWFP and parts of the Punjab and Bengal. I shall appeal to you with all the earnestness at my command to create, by securing a firm and positive action from the League such as I have stressed above, a psychological atmosphere in which the excellent appeal issued by both the leaders will touch the hearts of the people. Therein lies the only chance of putting an end to the tension and the insecurity, which the poisoned atmosphere, ever since the passage of the 'Direct Action' resolution in July and the first sample of its enforcement on 16 August 1946, has created and continued to promote and which the attempts of the League, after the declaration of 20 February, to capture the provinces of Assam, NWFP and the Punjab have accentuated, and to the resultant tragedies which have overtaken thousands of men, women and children.

## 29. MESSAGE FROM SARDAR TO NEWSPAPERS

The forthright call for self-discipline and a halt to senseless bloodshed and violence, issued by Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah, has been universally welcomed and acclaimed in India. But the appeal should not be allowed to remain a mere pious expression of hope and sentiments and it is incumbent on all of us in our respective sphere of duty and service to follow it up by instant and effective action. The Press can make a worthy contribution not only by featuring the appeal prominently at intervals or whenever tension and communal feelings threaten to get the better of human reason or judgment, but also by bearing it in mind in the treatment and presentation of communal matters. A moment's reflection on the message and significance of the appeal may prevent a hasty word or deed from doing incalculable harm to life and property. I would, therefore, appeal to every newspaper and periodical to respond to the appeal in the spirit in which it was made, to give it all possible prominent publicity and to make it an article of faith and a guide to action.

## 30. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 23 APRIL 1947

Many thanks for your letter dated 22 April 1947 (not printed : acknowledges letter dated 20 April).

I am glad you are visiting the Frontier. In fact, I was going to suggest it myself and thought of utilising my tomorrow's interview for the purpose. But I would suggest the inclusion in your programme of the affected areas of Rawalpindi, Multan, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts. I am sure your visit to these areas will not only give you first-hand information of what has taken place and how the minorities in that area have been affected, but will also go some way towards reassuring

the minorities that they are in your thoughts and that they could depend on your interest in their protection and welfare.

I know how difficult it is for you to get away from Delhi, but I would recall to your mind how Lord Wavell's visit soon after his assumption of office to famine-stricken Bengal built up a fund of goodwill which was of such assistance to him for years to come. He also visited other riot-affected areas shortly after disturbances.

### 31. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 7 MAY 1947

I am sending herewith a copy of the report which the Director of Intelligence Bureau has received from the Inspector-General of Police, Bengal. You will notice that ministerial interference in the actions of the police and in internal matters like transfers, etc. is seriously affecting the morale of the police force. The Director of Intelligence of the Defence Department has, in another connection, mentioned that in the event of any large-scale disturbance in Eastern India, the Army will be presented with an increased problem owing to the state of the police forces in Bihar and not Calcutta. It seems that our problem in Bengal would not be merely Calcutta, but all over.

2. Regarding Bihar police, I have had discussions with the Bihar Premier and will be writing to you separately.

### 32. REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, BENGAL, DATED 28 APRIL 1947

The police have continued to work satisfactorily in very trying circumstances and discipline has on the whole been good.

Morale outwardly appears to be high, but there are increasingly obvious circumstances which will inevitably tend to cause deterioration.

News of the police mutiny in Bihar was received with considerable interest but, though the events were freely discussed,

there have been no apparent repercussions in Bengal. Posters issued by the CSP urging the Bengal police to follow the example of their brethren in Bihar have been found in one district. Copies of appeals addressed "Bharatiya police Bahinir Kachhe" have also been traced and seized from a private house.

Government's delay in issuing final orders on pay scales continues to involve unfavourable comment.

The ever increasing communal tension amongst the populace is inevitably having an adverse effect on unity in the subordinate ranks, which is in no way mitigated by Government's frequently repeated appeals to the people to restore communal harmony, possibly because these appeals have so far been ineffective. Officers and men are perturbed by the political considerations which influence the result of police action generally and which are viewed with considerable misgiving by all ranks. In Noakhali district there is a distinct feeling that vigorous action against the aggressor community will not meet with the approval of those in power. Needless to say, steps are being taken to endeavour to counteract this feeling, but circumstances make it difficult to eradicate the justifiable impression, which is gaining ground throughout the province, that the authority of superior police officers is being undermined. Ministerial intervention in such matters as transfers within a district, disciplinary action taken by competent authority, and the normal investigation of crime has strengthened this impression. The authority of superior officers has always been highly respected in the past, and the undermining of such authority is viewed with dismay and alarm by officers and men, both Muslim and Hindu. There are indications that a situation has been created in which it has become possible for persons claiming responsibility to question subordinate officers regarding the ability of their superiors. All ranks of both communities (including officers of the I. P.) fear the results of communal favouritism which is likely to result from ministerial intervention in domestic matters and are apprehensive that merit will count for nothing in the matter of promotion and disciplinary action in respect of alleged

offences. These circumstances are having an increasingly deleterious effect on the morale of the force as a whole

S. G. Taylor

I. G. of Police, Bengal.

33. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 13 MAY 1947

Thank you for your letter of 7 May about reports made by officials who investigated the Noakhali disturbances. (not printed—suggests that Mountbatten might obtain these reports from the Governor of Bengal.)

2. I have not seen these reports myself nor have I seen any official reports of the related disturbances in Bihar. I intend therefore to ask both the Governor of Bengal and the Governor of Bihar to let me have copies of these reports. Although law and order is a provincial responsibility, there may well be something in these reports which we may wish to discuss in Cabinet later.

34. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 13 MAY 1947

Thank you for your letter of 7 May enclosing a report of the DIB about the morale of the Bengal police.

2. I myself have been perturbed by the events which have recently been taking place in Calcutta, and I had a long talk with the Governor when he was staying with me in Delhi last week. He told me trouble with the police force has now become really serious and that the armed conflict between the Gurkhas and Punjabi Muslim policemen is extremely disturbing. The Bengal Government have suspended those of Gurkha policemen from duty who attacked and killed five Punjabi Muslim police and propose to dismiss all the doubtful elements. They intend to use soldiers temporarily on police duty, which I do not

like but I suppose is unavoidable and are going to raise new police as fast as they can, on a fair communal ratio.

3. On the same general question I am afraid that interference by Ministers and their parties is all too common in a number of provinces and is causing a steady deterioration both in efficiency and morale. All the reports which I am continually receiving, and talks which I have with people from all parts of India, confirm that it is not only the police which is affected in this way (though the consequences may be more immediately serious in this service than elsewhere) but every Government department.

4. This matter was discussed at length at the recent conference I had with the provincial Governors, all of whom mentioned the ministerial interference which had been taking place in such matters as transfers within a district whenever there had been the slightest trouble. I asked all Governors to impress on their Chief Ministers how essential it was that those in authority should receive their full backing and that good and efficient services can only be obtained if political influence is kept away from them.

### 35. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 16 MAY 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 13 May 1947, regarding police morale.

2. Your impression that interference by Ministers and their parties is all too common in a number of provinces and has affected all Government departments, has come as somewhat of a surprise to me. I have been keeping myself in touch with both officials and non-officials from various provinces, who happen to come to Delhi, but have not derived the same impression from my contacts with them. The reports which we receive have also made no reference to such intervention. On receipt of your letter, I asked the Director of Intelligence Bureau if he had received complaints similar to those coming from

Bengal from other provinces as well. He said he had not received any from the IGPs or from the Central Intelligence officers, who, as you are probably aware, are stationed in all provinces. In my discussion with Premiers and Ministers I have always impressed upon them the need for taking the Services with them and maintaining their cohesion and *esprit de corps*. I cannot imagine that there would be any large-scale departure from this principle in the Congress provinces. But if you have any particular instances relating to these provinces, or if you could say which provinces are intended, I shall be glad to put the respective Premiers wise about it and will secure improvement where necessary.

36. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR, DATED 17 MAY 1947

Thank you for your letter of 16 May. I have no doubt from my talks with all the Governors, and from other officials I have met, that there is interference by Ministers and their parties with the day-to-day work of officials. At the present time, however, when we have so much at stake about the future of India, I do not think it will be fruitful to go into details in regard to these matters; but I am most grateful to you for impressing on Premiers and Ministers the need for preserving the integrity of the various Services.

37. SARDAR TO JOHN COLVILLE,  
DATED 21 MAY 1947

I have been receiving some letters and telegrams from Lahore regarding the serious situation in the city. Arson and stabbings on a large-scale have been taking place, and therefore it seems the situation has not been brought under control. In fact, the latest telegram from the Governor of the Punjab seems to indicate that the general population, and even top-ranking leaders, are reconciled to the inevitability of the continuance of trouble. I feel that, particularly at the present

juncture, the continuance of such a state of affairs is fraught with dangerous potentialities. I had some correspondence with Lord Wavell just before he left for England, in which I suggested to him the desirability of imposing martial law in the affected areas of the Punjab. He then replied that he felt that a middle course should first be followed. And the result was the enactment of two ordinances to arm the executive and the military with special powers to deal with the disturbances. It seems that these special powers are not proving effective, and a suggestion has been received that the city should be placed under martial law. None can appreciate better than the ordinary civilian the difficulties and handicaps of a martial law regime, but at the same time it is of the utmost importance these days that a disturbed situation is brought under control with the least possible delay and with the minimum possible waste of the time and life. At a Cabinet meeting Lord Mountbatten gave the assurance that in future such disturbances would be put down with an iron hand.

In these circumstances, I would request you to consider once again, in consultation with the Governor of the Punjab, the suggestion which has been made to me by responsible leaders of the Punjab that the worst affected areas of the city should be placed under the military.

38. JOHN COLVILLE TO SARDAR, DATED 24 MAY 1947

Thank you for your letter of 21 May, which I have just received. Since you wrote, the situation in Lahore has improved to some extent, and a telegram I received from the Governor this morning reports that the city is relatively quiet.

2. I have been disturbed since I have been here about the situation in Lahore and Amritsar and have been in close touch with the Governor daily. In a telegram I received two days ago Sir Evan Jenkins told me that he would like, at as earlier date as possible, a complete Brigade for the Lahore area alone, in addition to troops already allocated.

3. I had a talk with Sardar Baldev Singh about this request, and, after consultation with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, it has with regret been found impossible to meet it. As you know, the 4th Division is already well on its way up to the Punjab. The reserve of troops available in India is low and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief feels, and I agree with him, that it would be unwise to dissipate our reserves at the present time as it is by no means certain yet that HMG's forthcoming announcement may not be followed by further disorders.

4. The Deputy Commander-in-Chief, with the approval of Sardar Baldev Singh, is, therefore, sending a telegram to the Army Commander today, pointing out that very wide powers are given to the military by the Punjab Disturbed Areas (Special Powers of Armed Forces) Ordinance, 1947, and that if these powers are properly used they should be adequate for any purpose which the authorities may require.

5. I am getting into touch with Governor of the Punjab again today, Saturday, but I am sure that he feels that the powers available to him are adequate, and that with the arrival of the extra troops in the immediate future, the position should improve. I do not think that martial law, which has many grave disadvantages, is at present necessary, as I feel that the wide powers of the ordinance which I have quoted above should be sufficient.

### 39. SARDAR TO JOHN COLVILLE, DATED 24 MAY 1947

I find that the daily telegraphic reports which we receive from the Governors are inadequate and sketchy. In these disturbed days, it seems to me necessary that, from wherever there are disturbances on a larger-scale, we should get detailed daily reports from the provincial Governors. They can be sent by air to Delhi, and I am sure a delay of a day or two will not make them lose their importance in any way. If you agree with this suggestion, I would request you to circulate instructions to the Governors as soon as possible.

40. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO VICEROY,  
DATED 26 MAY 1947

HAVE JUST SEEN PUNJAB GOVERNOR'S TELEGRAM DATED 21 MAY 1947 ABOUT LAHORE SITUATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT POLICE ARE UNABLE TO CONTROL SITUATION AND THAT EVEN MILITARY AID IS NOT PROVING ADEQUATE. I AM SURE YOUR EXCELLENCY REALISES DANGEROUS POTENTIALITIES OF CONTINUED DISTURBANCES IN LAHORE. CONSEQUENCES MAY NOT BE CONFINED TO PUNJAB ALONE. I FEEL GOVERNOR'S TELEGRAM FULLY VINDICATES STAND IN MY LETTER DATED 21 MAY REGARDING PLACING SERIOUSLY AFFECTED AREAS IN LAHORE UNDER MILITARY REGIME. I WOULD EARNESTLY ADVISE YOUR EXCELLENCY TAKE ACTION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

41. JOHN COLVILLE TO SARDAR, DATED 29 MAY 1947

Thank you for your letter of 24 May about Governor's reports which I shall show to Lord Mountbatten.

2. Meantime I should explain that the Viceroy only receives telegraphic reports from Governors if there is trouble in their provinces. These reports are made as full as possible on the information available and copies are supplied to Hon'ble Members. When there are widespread disturbances in a province, as in the NWFP and the Punjab, no daily report can be really detailed, since the men on the spot, who are actually dealing with the disturbances, have little time to report fully. A district magistrate with trouble in his district usually deals with it before reporting about it, and when he does report, it is usually by telegram.

3. A Governor's day-to-day information therefore can consist only of what is reported to him by telegram and telephone, and is not detailed. Detailed reports, therefore, though

they would be extremely valuable, are, I am afraid in the nature of things, impossible to get quickly, and speed is essential. The provincial Government's fortnightly confidential reports usually give a considerable amount of detail, and these, with the information received by the Intelligence Bureau and the situation reports which come into GHQ, are, I think, the earliest full reports we can hope to get.

4. I appreciate your point however and would like to meet it so far as is possible. I am therefore proposing to write to all Governors to ask that in reporting incidents in the provinces, they should make a point of giving as much information as possible.

#### 42. SARDAR TO JOHN COLVILLE, DATED 30 MAY 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 24 May 1947 regarding the situation in Lahore.

2. From the latest telegram it does appear that the situation is comparatively quiet. But at the same time, it is quite clear that high tension still persists and that it seems that the local authorities apprehend trouble to break out anywhere at any moment. You must have noticed that it has already broken out in a very serious form in Gurgaon district where both communities have embarked on an extensive plan of mutual destruction.

3. Hitherto it appears that the policy has been followed of dealing with the situation when it arises and that too not with a view to scotching it before it gets worse, but with a view to bringing it gradually under control. The result is obvious. The disturbances persist for some considerable time; casualties and damage mount up gradually; both sides make preparations for blows and counter-blows; tension spreads and feelings of revenge overtake a much larger area. I sincerely feel that this policy is completely unsuitable for the present moment, though it might have some advantages in ordinary

times. Action to deal with the situation should be both swift and timely and the sterner the measures taken to start with, the better the hope of localising the trouble and curbing it with the least possible delay. I feel that something should be done to impress upon the provincial authorities in the Punjab the need for adjustment of their action to deal with disturbances on this basis.

4. This seems to me all the more necessary from the implication contained in paragraph 4 of your letter that the available powers have not been utilised to the extent that they should have been. But it appears from the Governor's telegram of 21 May, to which I have referred in my telegram to you from Mussoorie, that cases happen under the very noses of the police without the culprits being traced. I have also received several complaints about police inaction or partiality on account of the predominant Muslim composition of the force. The Governor himself admits that the police in the Punjab are tired owing to prolonged disturbances. This, to my mind, even further emphasises the need for swift action to start with rather than later. It is axiomatic that statutory powers are of no avail if the machinery of enforcement is inadequate or not sufficiently active. It is in this sense that I feel that if the civil power is unable to deliver the goods with such military aid as has been placed at its disposal, there is no alternative but to bring the military in at the earliest opportunity rather than as late as possible.

5. I hope it will be possible for you to review the situation in the Punjab in consultation with the Governor in the light of what I have said above.

43. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 30 MAY 1947

I am sending herewith a copy of the letter which I have written to Sir Evan Jenkins (Serial No. 44). The papers speak for themselves and I need hardly make any further comments beyond stating that this admittedly high-handed action of the Deputy Commissioner has created quite a sensation among the Hindus of Gurgaon.

44. SARDAR TO E. M. JENKINS, DATED 30 MAY 1947

I am sending herewith a copy of the representation from the president of the Bar Association of Gurgaon and the Deputy Commissioner's endorsement thereunder, concerning the arrest of some leading Hindus in Gurgaon district, which were handed to me and which I have seen in original. From these papers it is quite clear that these persons have been arrested and are being kept in detention until they or someone on their behalf give the information required by the Deputy Commissioner.

2. The Defence Member and I decided late last night to visit the affected areas in Gurgaon. On the way we met the Deputy Commissioner who was returning from a patrol. I questioned him about this. He first denied that he had given such a thing in writing. I then showed him the papers. He then said he meant the note to be a reply to a private letter which he had no time to send in the usual way. I pointed out to him that the whole thing had definitely an official appearance and could not be treated as private, but he seemed quite unable to appreciate anything and was speechless. He merely explained that the peace committee had committed a breach of pledge and he wanted information as to how the incident happened. I pointed out to him the seriousness of the

position in which he had involved himself by giving it in writing that he would release the persons if certain information were furnished to him, but he did not seem to realise it.

3. I myself feel that whatever may be the facts regarding the incident, the methods adopted by the Deputy Commissioner are indefensible and bound to react most unfavourably in the present situation in Gurgaon district. In effect the arrested persons are hostages for the supply of information which may not be in their knowledge. Failure of peace committees to maintain the peace is not an unusual occurrence. Inability to give information, howsoever valuable, cannot be a bona fide justification for arrest and detention even under the special powers under which the arrests have been made.

4. The action is bound to be challenged in a court of law and will attract considerable publicity. It may conceivably have ugly consequences in the district itself. I feel that to avoid further unpleasantness of the situation and to restore confidence in the local administration, the sooner the mistake is rectified the better.

45. SARDAR TO S. P. JAIN, DATED 1 JUNE 1947

I have received your letter of 23 May 1947, (not printed) and I thank you for the appreciation of the work that we have been doing.

We are aware of the apprehension felt by the non-Muslim population in Calcutta by the possible attempts at destruction of property by the Muslims, and we have taken all precautions to prevent such a catastrophe. You must have seen the broadcast of the Governor of Bengal who has spoken for the first time about his preparedness to meet with the situation and has assured the people that he will do his best to prevent destruction and vandalism. Enough force has been sent to Calcutta and there is complete preparation to meet with any situation that may arise.

46. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR, DATED 3 JUNE 1947  
(EXTRACT)

I am writing in reply to your letter of 7 May (not printed—see Serial No. 33), in which you said that you had seen Press reports that the Chief Minister, Bengal, had refused to publish some official reports on enquiries into the Noakhali disturbances.

2. These reports are of course a matter for the provincial Government since law and order is a provincial subject. However, I wrote to the Governor of Bengal who informs me that the subsequent reports which have been received by his Government have not materially affected the accuracy of the summary on the Noakhali disturbances which was circulated to Members of the Interim Government by Lord Wavell on 22 November 1946. The Governor has however sent me a copy of the statistics relating to the disturbances corrected up to May 1947. . . .

47. SARDAR TO SECRETARY, SHIROMANI  
COMMITTEE JAIN BARADARI, RAWALPINDI,  
DATED 22 JUNE 1947

Thank you for your letter of 13 June 1947 (not printed—asks for Sardar's advice in light of impending partition). The questions which you raise are very pertinent ones in view of the division of the Punjab which, I have no doubt, will be decided upon tomorrow. I fully appreciate the sentiments and feelings of those who have suffered or witnessed the sufferings of others during the recent Punjab disturbances. Lahore and Amritsar are even now disturbed areas. Whether these disturbances will continue after partition is difficult to prophesy and still remains to be seen. Those who have got a stake in Pakistan of the future cannot leave their places unless they are prepared to face the misery and sufferings of refugees. The

question is, therefore, for every individual to argue out for himself and to be prepared to face the consequences of such action as he may take. It is possible that the Pakistan Government may find the presence of Hindus and Sikhs indispensable and, therefore, now that the Muslims have secured a homeland for which they have agitated in season and out of season, they may find that it is in their interest to ensure protection and justice to the minorities. If that comes about, minorities may not have anything to fear. We may also be able to afford some protection on the basis of reciprocity in regard to treatment of minorities.

2. Each individual must, therefore, judge for himself as to how far he can feel safe where he is. If he feels that he cannot face up to the danger, he has got no alternative except to leave the place, but if he feels that he can bide his time and see how things shape themselves after Pakistan, he should stay where he is and depend on such protection as the Pakistan Government may be able to afford and we may be able to secure for him on the basis of reciprocity or such other arrangement with the Pakistan Government as may be possible.

48. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 9 JUNE 1947

I have been receiving representations from responsible men of Gurgaon against the present Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Brandan, about whose conduct in relation to the arrest of leading Hindus of Gurgaon I had to write to Sir Evan Jenkins (Serial No. 44). I sent a copy of that letter to you. They have since been released. But this provocative conduct of his had completely destroyed the confidence of the majority community of the district in the Deputy Commissioner. His subsequent attitude and activities have, it appears, made the people completely hostile to him. Stories have gained currency that he gloats over events, probably because he is entirely out of sympathy with the scheme of transfer of power and feels that

troubles such as have afflicted Gurgaon would demonstrate the utter folly and impossibility of the policy of "Quit India". It is difficult to be dogmatic about the accuracy or otherwise of these stories, but the fact remains that they are widely believed in and are, therefore, undermining both the prestige and the position of the Deputy Commissioner.

2. In these circumstances, I feel that there is no alternative but to transfer him from the district without delay. At present both communities are engaged in making vigorous preparations for a renewed offensive on a wider scale. The situation is full of very dangerous possibilities and everything should be done to relieve this tension. I understand that according to the customary methods of "warfare" in the Jat Areas such situations are settled by a panchayat of both sides. I have been advising the local representatives to settle their quarrel by this means but they have been telling me that in the present atmosphere vitiated by the presence of Deputy Commissioner such a move is impossible of success. At the same time, they feel that nothing but the method of panchayat would settle it and restore the situation to normalcy. From this point of view also the transfer of the Deputy Commissioner would seem to be inevitable and I see no reason why prestige or any other factor should stand in the way of implementation of this well-considered and well-meant advice. Public opinion may or may not be reasonable, but it is sensitive and I am sure that instead of loss of prestige there would be returning confidence in fairness and impartiality if my suggestion regarding the immediate transfer of the District Magistrate were accepted. It is just possible that a catastrophe may be avoided by this transfer.

3. I would, therefore, earnestly request you to take up the matter with the Governor of the Punjab immediately.

49. EVAN JENKINS TO SARDAR, DATED 9 JUNE 1947

Thank you for your letter of 30 May which arrived only on 8 June. Letters from Delhi are now taking longer to reach Lahore than air mail letters from England.

2. The Viceroy gave me a copy of your letter and of its enclosure when I was with him in Gurgaon on 1 June, and I discussed the matter with the Deputy Commissioner. I am satisfied that the Deputy Commissioner made the arrests in good faith, and without the idea of detaining the gentlemen concerned as hostages. It was later, when he was pressed to release them, that he wrote the note to which you took exception. His line was that he had no desire to keep the gentlemen in jail and that if they could satisfy him that they were not acting prejudicially he would certainly release them.

3. I told the Deputy Commissioner that I would not interfere with his discretion. He had, I think, already released one of the five gentlemen concerned (Ch. Jugal Kishore) at the time of my visit; and I am informed that the other four have since been released.

4. There can of course be no possible objection to the validity or propriety of any order being questioned in the courts.

50. SARDAR TO EVAN JENKINS, DATED 27 JUNE 1947

I received your letter of 9 June 1947 some time ago, but I did not send a reply earlier mainly because I felt that it would be profitless writing to you and perhaps a needless addition to the mental strain which you are already undergoing. Moreover, my discussions with the Viceroy on this matter led me to think that some action would be taken for

the transfer of Mr. Brandan. But now that the action required has been taken, I feel I should let you know what my reactions were to your letter.

2. I must frankly say that your letter grieved me and came to me as a great surprise. When I wrote to you my letter of 30 May 1947, I was in full possession of the facts and had **documentary evidence to support them. It was with a full sense** of responsibility that I assessed the situation and suggested the remedy. It was not one of the usual complaints to which perhaps you were accustomed in the past, and in dealing with **which the attitude which you have adopted in this case was** invariably the rule. It is impossible to defend the indefensible. Yet you seem to have performed that feat by placing failure to give information on the same plane as acting prejudicially. It was not the District Magistrate's case, both in writing and in conversation, that he was not prepared to release them because they were acting prejudicially. He told me himself that if they gave this information he would release them. **It cannot, therefore, be a case of a hurried note which he wrote** in reply to the president of the Bar Association. It was clearly and definitely a well-considered reply which reflected the District Magistrate's attitude over an appreciable period of time.

3. Para 4 of your letter seems to indicate an attitude of indifference to the case being taken to a court of law and is presumably in reply to my suggestion that, if this matter went to court of law, there would not only be undue publicity **but possible unpleasantness. If so, it is most unfair, since you** knew full well that after the release of these persons, no question of reference to a law court arose.

4. I have made no secret of my view that, if firm and resolute action were taken in time both in dealing with the situation and in dealing with Government servants who may be contributory to its worsening, the position in the Punjab could never have deteriorated to the extent it did. Brandan's case is an instance in point. From the very beginning of the

trouble, he had taken a stand which was hardly conducive to the restoration of peace and confidence. He buttressed his stand by an action which was not only illegal, but was calculated to make the majority of the population hostile to him. Still he had been kept there and had been sustained, as would appear from your letter, in his attitude. I am not surprised, therefore, that the situation has not resumed normalcy. It is true that the Administration has not suffered any losses and therefore has not felt, as intimately as the people have, the consequences of continued arson, murder and loot. But those who have to count the price in terms of houses burnt, property looted or destroyed and relatives and friends massacred, can hardly be consoled by the fact that the authority of the local officials has been vindicated and their prestige maintained.

51. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, DATED 1 JUNE 1947

I am sending herewith a copy of the report which has appeared in the Dawn of the speech of my honourable colleague, the Minister of Health, at Patna (Serial No. 52).

2. I am sure you will agree with me that it is most improper and thoroughly objectionable in its attack on the provincial administration. I thought that, after the manner you proposed to tackle Nishtar about his speech condemning the Frontier administration, such things would not recur, but this one beats the rest and I feel that, if the Provincial Government had externed or arrested him for making this sort of speech, I for one would certainly have upheld their action. If such things go on, I shall have the greatest difficulty in persuading the provincial administrations concerned to restrain their hands.

52. EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY GHAZANFAR  
ALI KHAN AS REPORTED IN DAWN ON 1-6-1947

“Brethren, I wish to assure you that even though I could not personally come here during those days, my heart and my full sympathies were with you as fellow Muslims.

“In the Punjab about which I can speak with intimate knowledge, a wave of horror went throughout the province and the nature and extent of the crimes that were committed against the weak minority here earned unbounded sympathy for the sufferers. There was grave danger of a sudden outburst of Muslim feelings in the Punjab, which would have taken an ugly turn, but this danger was averted only by the strict discipline maintained by the Muslim Leaguers. Even our women workers insisted on sending a special deputation to succour and console their unfortunate brethren and sisters. A deputation of Muslim women accordingly toured Bihar under the leadership of Begum Tasadduq Hussain, one of the two women members of the Punjab Assembly.

“Recently I saw a Press statement issued by the Premier of Bihar giving the number of firing carried out by the police before Sardar Nishtar and Pandit Nehru visited this province. Technically the statement may or may not be correct. For instance, the Premier would be correct in his statement even if here and there the police party fired a few rounds only to help rioters, which I am told was exactly what happened. . . .” He said there were fundamental differences between the Muslims and the Hindus. “People like Mahmud Ghazni and Aurangzeb are our national heroes but they are considered by the Hindus as their greatest enemies. Similarly, Shivaji is considered by us as our arch-enemy but is revered by them as a national hero. What we eat away is considered by them as the greatest god.”

53. SARDAR TO PARMANAND TREHAN,  
DATED 16 JULY 1947

Thank you for your letter of 7 July 1947 (not printed).

You can have no idea how much worry and anxious thought have been given to the plight of refugees and to the situation in the Punjab nor of the sorrow and bitterness with which we agreed to partition. The plight of refugees and the tragedies being perpetrated on the Non-Muslims in Punjab have given me not a few sleepless nights. After a great deal of thought we all came to the conclusion that partition was the only way to save a large number of Hindus and Sikhs, though it meant separation from a considerable number of our brethren; but I can assure you that the minorities in Western Punjab will not go uncared for by their brethren on this side. You must not forget that almost an equally large number of Muslims (are) also left here and it will not be in the interests of Muslims in Pakistan to continue their present treatment of the minorities there.

As regards the rights of citizenship at present, the matter is under the consideration of the Constituent Assembly, but whatever the definition may be, you can rest assured that the Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan cannot be considered as aliens in India.

Regarding the other matters to which you have referred, very soon we shall have a refugee officer who will look into the needs and requirements of refugees and make his recommendations as to how best they should be met.

54. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF  
PATIALA, DATED 25 AUGUST 1947

HAVE JUST SEEN TRIVEDI'S TELEGRAM TO YOU. WOULD STRONGLY URGE ON YOU PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE ACTION IN PREVENTING DEPREDATION OF JATHAS FROM YOUR STATE INTO JULLUNDUR CITY AND ALL POSSIBLE SECURITY MEASURES FOR TRAINS PASSING THROUGH YOUR TERRITORY. WITHOUT FULLEST COOPERATION FROM STATES IN INDIA IT IS IMPOSSIBLE CHECK THIS GRAVE MENACE TO LAW AND ORDER AND HOPE WE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VALUABLE COÖPERATION.

55. SARDAR TO ZAHID HUSSAIN,  
DATED 25 AUGUST 1947

I am sending herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from Trivedi and another of a telegram which Menon has sent to Nawab Gurmani, Prime Minister, Bahawalpur. I hope your Government will be able to use its good offices with Bahawalpur State in the matter. We shall all be so grateful for any help that you and your Government may be able to render.

ENCLOSURE

TELEGRAM FROM C. M. TRIVEDI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 24 AUGUST 1947

MY PREMIER AND I HAVE READ TELEGRAMS THAT NEARLY FIFTEEN THOUSAND HINDUS ARE SURROUNDED IN BAHAWALPUR STATE. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF STEPS COULD BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR THEM.

56. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO C. M. TRIVEDI,  
DATED 25 AUGUST 1947

YOUR TELEGRAM DATED TWENTYFOURTH REGARDING HINDUS IN BAHAWALPUR. MENON HAS SENT A PERSONAL TELEGRAM TO GURMANI ASKING HIM TO DO HIS BEST. SUGGEST IMMEDIATE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN EAST PUNJAB AND BAHAWALPUR TO SECURE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE PERSONS ON SAME LINES AS WITH WEST PUNJAB. IF YOU AGREE YOU MAY TAKE UP MATTER DIRECT WITH BAHAWALPUR STATE AND INTIMATE TO US SO THAT WE CAN FORMALLY PRESENT PROPOSAL TO BAHAWALPUR.

57. TELEGRAM FROM LIAQUAT ALI KHAN TO  
SARDAR, DATED 26 AUGUST 1947

MOST IMMEDIATE REFERENCE YOUR MOST IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GHAZANFAR ALI KHAN. BEGINS. REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM NONMUSLIM REFUGEES IN WAH CAMP NEAR RAWALPINDI ARE SAFE. THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY TROUBLE OR COMPLAINT. RATION ARRANGEMENT MOST SATISFACTORY. GENERAL MESSERVY, COMMISSIONER RAWALPINDI, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ATTOCK VISITED CAMP TWO DAYS AGO AND NO COMPLAINT MADE TO THEM. I HAVE TAKEN FURTHER PRECAUTION BUT COMPLAINT UTTERLY UNFOUNDED. ENDS.

58. TELEGRAM FROM MAHARAJA OF PATIALA TO  
SARDAR, DATED 26 AUGUST 1947

YOUR TELEGRAM. FOLLOWING REPLY SENT BY ME TO GOVERNOR PUNJAB. BEGINS. HAVE MADE ENQUIRES ABOUT PEOPLE FROM PATIALA RAIDING AREAS IN JULLUNDUR DIVISION. NEWS NOT CONFIRMED. ENQUIRIES PROCEEDING. MEANWHILE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD GIVE ANY INFORMATION REGARDING ARMED GANGS FROM PATIALA, WE SHALL DO ALL WE CAN TO CONTROL SITUATION AND FULLY COOPERATE. HAVE JUST RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM PEOPLE OF LEHNA MUHABAT FEROZEPUR DISTRICT THAT SERIOUS TROUBLE EXPECTED THERE. HAVE ASKED MY PRIME MINISTER TO GET INTO TOUCH WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. GRATEFUL SUPPLYING INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND COMPLETE INFORMATION OF HAPPENINGS IN EAST PUNJAB TO MY GOVERNMENT AS IT WILL GREATLY ASSIST. ENDS. SHALL DO ALL I CAN. CLOSEST COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST PUNJAB AND PATIALA ESSENTIAL.

59. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF  
PATIALA, DATED 26 AUGUST 1947

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GHAZANFARALIKHAN. BEGINS. MOST ALARMING REPORTS THROUGH RELIABLE CHANNELS AND FROM EYE-WITNESSES ABOUT WHOLESALE INDISCRIMINATE MURDERS OF MUSLIMS LOOT AND ARSON IN PATIALA BETWEEN RAJPURA AND LUDHIANA AND RAJPURA AND BHATINDA. SITUATION WHOLLY OUT OF CONTROL. PLEASE MOVE AND STOP IT. ENDS. WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD TAKE ALL ACTIVE MEASURES TO PROTECT MINORITIES AND CREATE CONFIDENCE IN THEM. THIS IS BOUND TO HAVE CORRESPONDING FAVOURABLE REPERCUSSIONS IN WEST PUNJAB,

60. TELEGRAM FROM MAHARAJA OF PATIALA  
TO SARDAR, DATED 27 AUGUST 1947

YOUR TELEGRAM. THERE HAVE BEEN ATTACKS ON TRAINS AND SOME MUSLIMS KILLED AND INJURED. INCIDENTS SCATTERED. SITUATION BEING CONTROLLED. ACTIVE MILITARY AND POLICE PATROLLING IS CONTINUING. HOPE TO HAVE EVERYTHING QUIET SHORTLY. PLEASE INFORM GHAZANFARALI ACCORDINGLY. AS REGARDS MINORITIES I HAVE ASSURED THEM MANY TIMES THAT THEIR INTERESTS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED AND THEY SHALL BE PROTECTED BUT WHAT ARE WE TO DO WITH CERTAIN PEOPLE OR GROUPS WHO ALWAYS WANT TO CREATE MISCHIEF AND WANT NOTHING SETTLED.

61. TELEGRAM FROM SRI PRAKASA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 AUGUST 1947

PERSONAL FOR HON'BLE SARDAR VALLABHBHAI PATEL FROM SRI PRAKASA. NOTHING POSSIBLE THIS END REGARDING EVACUATION OF SIALKOT REFUGEES DUE TO UNHELPFUL ATTITUDE OF GENERAL REES AND WEST PUNJAB GOVERNMENT. SEE MY TELEGRAM OF 27 AUGUST TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU IN WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED SOLICITING MILITARY AID FROM NEIGHBOURING INDIAN STATES. IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTED KASHMIR GOVERNMENT WOULD NO DOUBT BE ABLE TO HELP.

62. TELEGRAM FROM SRI PRAKASA TO  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, DATED 27 AUGUST 1947

PERSONAL FOR PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. ATTITUDE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND BOUNDARY COMMISSION MOST UNHELPFUL. THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING. THEY ONLY SAY THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IS BEING DONE AND REPEAT THAT CONDITIONS IN EAST ARE MUCH WORSE AND HAVE THEIR INEVITABLE REACTIONS HERE WHICH THEY CANNOT PREVENT. REES EXPECTS WHOLESALE SLAUGHTER OF SIKHS IF CONDITIONS DO NOT IMPROVE IN EAST PUNJAB IMMEDIATELY. THIS MORNING IMPORTANT CONFERENCE HELD AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE WHERE LADY MOUNTBATTEN AMRIT KAUR PROVINCIAL MINISTERS GHAZANFAR ALI GOVERNOR MUDIE AND MYSELF WERE PRESENT. MUDIE IS SENDING A NOTE WITH AMRIT KAUR. IT IS CLEAR THAT TRANSFER OF POPULATION IS INEVITABLE AND ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IF MAJOR DISASTERS ARE TO BE AVOIDED. CHAMANLAL FEARS NOT WITHOUT REASON THAT HOLOCAUST AT SHEIKHUPURA WILL PROBABLY BE REPEATED IN MANY OTHER MOFUSSIL AREAS IN WESTERN PUNJAB AND THAT 40,000 LIVES ARE IN DANGER DURING NEXT 48 HOURS. GOVERNMENT HOUSE CONFERENCE DEFINITELY FELT THAT BOTH DOMINION GOVERNMENTS MUST EFFICIENTLY RECOGNISE THAT SUCH TRANSFER OF POPULATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE. THIS SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AND WOULD STOP INDISCRIMINATE MURDER AND ARSON. NEUTRAL ARMY SHOULD BE ON BORDER HELPING TRANSFER WHILE TROOPS SHOULD PROTECT THE MINORITY POPULATION IN VARIOUS PLACES.

63. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL  
NEHRU, DATED 29 AUGUST 1947

FOLLOWING FOR PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU FROM SARDAR PATEL. TODAY'S LAHORE CONFERENCE SHOULD CONSIDER QUESTION OF NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES IN FRONTIER. INFORMATION REACHING HERE SUGGESTS IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY OF REPETITION OF DERA ISMAIL KHAN TRAGEDY OR WHOLESALE MURDER ARSON AND FORCED CONVERSION. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ALSO SHOW ATTACKS ON HINDUS AND SIKHS IN ISOLATED PLACES. PAKISTAN RADIO AND PRESS PROPAGANDA ABOUT PUNJAB EVENTS MAY SPREAD CONFLAGRATION IN FRONTIER. CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN FRONTIER HAS CREATED PANIC AND UNEASINESS AMONG HINDUS AND SIKHS. STATEMENTS OF RESPONSIBLE LEAGUE LEADERS IN FRONTIER HAVE ACCENTUATED THEIR FEARS AND ANXIETIES. THEIR RELATIONS IN INDIA ARE GETTING EXTREMELY WORRIED AND RESTLESS. IMMEDIATE STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO REASSURE MINORITIES IN FRONTIER AND FOR THEIR PROTECTION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE QUESTION OF THEIR SAFE EVACUATION SHOULD BE TACKLED.

IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE FINDING IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO RESTRAIN PEOPLE HERE. REFUGEES COMING TO DELHI AND OTHER PLACES ARE TELLING HARROWING TALES OF ATROCITIES AND BRUTALITY. IF PRESENT POSITION IN WEST PUNJAB DOES NOT IMPROVE SOON OR IF FRONTIER IS AFFECTED SITUATION HERE MAY GO OUT OF CONTROL AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS WOULD BE VERY WIDESPREAD AND DISASTROUS. AS IT IS OUR RESOURCES ARE BEING STRAINED TO THE UTMOST AND IT IS DOUBTFUL IF THEY CAN STAND FURTHER STRAIN. PENDING EVACUATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR NON-MUSLIM TROOPS GUARDING OF NON-MUSLIM REFUGEE CAMPS SHOULD CONTINUE. IN FACT IT SEEMS DESIRABLE REINFORCE THEM. ANY CHANGE AT THIS STAGE WOULD CREATE

PANIC AND CONSTERNATION AMONG REFUGEES. REPORTS ARE REACHING ABOUT ATROCITIES IN BAHAWALPUR STATE. MENON HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED TO BALDEV SINGH TO TAKE UP THIS QUESTION. YOU MIGHT SUGGEST THAT ALL ARRANGEMENTS SETTLED SHOULD INCLUDE BAHAWALPUR STATE AS WELL

64. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 31 AUGUST 1947

I have received your two telegrams and I have shown them to Liaquat Ali Khan and others. I shall not discuss these matters in detail here because that will serve little purpose. We are up to our eyes in work and worry. The problems we have to face are stupendous. Nevertheless we will face them.

After a little tour we intend having a meeting in Lahore on 3 September at 11 a. m. to lay down detailed instructions by both Provincial Governments as to what should be done. This is essential as so far only general principles are laid down. At this Lahore meeting Ministers of the two provinces will be present as well as, I hope, the two Governors. Also Liaquat Ali Khan, Baldev Singh and I, also probably some senior officers. I think it will be very desirable if you could attend this meeting. This is necessary from many points of view. Your presence will energise the people here and you will bring a fresh mind to bear on these problems. I must confess that I feel a little overwhelmed by these difficulties and the urgency which accompanies them.

I suggest to you therefore with all earnestness to come to Lahore for a day. You can come by plane in the morning and return the same evening. Probably I shall return with you. This invitation is also made on behalf of Liaquat Ali Khan.

Being away from Delhi even for a few days one gets out of touch with developments and that is another reason why I should like you to come and tell us what the general position is.

Generally speaking, agreements have been arrived at between the various Governments on all grounds of principle. The real difficulty is carrying them out in practice. I think something is certainly going to be done but our approach has to be rapid and all embracing. Therefore very detailed instructions have to be issued to both Governments.

I have come to the conclusion that this refugee problem requires very special attention. I am thinking of asking K. C. Neogy to take charge of it with considerable authority in all its many aspects. I am summoning him to Delhi. We shall discuss this matter further afterwards.

Please expedite the despatch of as many trucks and lorries, military or civil, as possible. I am writing separately to the people concerned but you might also do something about it.

The Amritsar Civil Hospital has become a kind of provincial hospital for refugees. It is totally lacking in medicines and other supplies. Amrit Kaur was given a list of some of these things but really much more is wanted. I suggest that a full load of supplies be sent by plane immediately to Amritsar.

It is also necessary in Amritsar to equip another hospital immediately at least for the less serious and convalescent cases so as to make room for the more serious cases. It is impossible to throw out people into the street because they have no homes to go to. Some kind of equipment is necessary for this hospital. A building can be obtained here. It is suggested that some equipment from a military hospital might be lent for this purpose. I understand that this can be done from the Ambala or some other military hospital. All these things should be flown to Amritsar. We have to function as if we were in wartime and everyday's delay is vital.

A large number of doctors of all grades, sanitary inspectors, etc. are wanted all over this area. The condition of the camps is pitiful. I suggest that as many of these people as can be raised be sent here. An appeal might be made to other provinces.

In the new military set-up I am insisting that the brigadiers should be Indians. I told our Commander-in-Chief so. (General) Rees is creating difficulties but I propose to insist on this point.

I hope you will pull up the Punjab States, specially Faridkot, Nabha and Jind. They are centres of trouble and disorders and they must be made to behave. Mountbatten mentioned in Lahore that if necessary order will be kept in these States or some of them by us directly.

PS.

Since the above was written, I have spoken to you on the phone. I am glad you will be coming to Lahore on 3 September.

I think the time has come when Bapu should be asked to come to East Punjab. I am sending him a message accordingly. I enclose a letter from him with its enclosures.

(Maj. General K. S.) Thimayya is going to be in charge of our brigade.

The immediate situation in East and West Punjab is somewhat better, but the refugee problem looms large.

65. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1947

I received your letter dated 31 August 1947 at Jullundur yesterday.

2. We left Delhi at 7.45 and reached Jullundur at about 10 a. m. Immediately thereafter, I had a meeting with the Governor and at 11 we had a conference with the Governor, Dr. Gopichand Bhargava, Master Tara Singh, Mr. P. N. Thapar, the Refugee Commissioner for East Punjab, Mr. Sachdeva, the Chief Secretary, and a representative of the Hindu Mahasabha. The various problems regarding refugee relief and evacuation were gone through and we came to an

agreement regarding respective spheres of Central and Provincial Government and the Army. I am seeing the officers concerned today so that there may be no delay in taking the action required.

3. The situation in Jullundur district seems to have been under control, but the trouble has spread to Ludhiana district. Both on my onward and return journeys I saw several villages on the side of the Sutlej in flames. It seems that fire had been started in the morning. Otherwise the general situation in the East Punjab seemed to have improved as rapidly as could be expected. I get the same impression from a reading of the intelligence reports.

4. The position in West Punjab, however, seems to be still very serious, and the Sikhs appear to have been made a special target for attacks. I interviewed a host of refugees from various places and they all had a tale of indescribable horror and woe to tell. Rather than concentrate on restoring normal conditions in his own area the Pakistan Minister for Information and Interior appears to believe in flinging mud at others. I am enclosing a cutting from the Free Press Journal (Bombay) giving in brief what he said at a Press Conference in Karachi on August 29. I wish they saw the utter futility of driving a wedge between the Sikhs and the Hindus. After all this savagery and atrocities in the East and West Punjab, any amity between the Sikhs and Muslims is out of the question. An attempt, therefore, to put the Government of India in the wrong in the eyes of the Sikhs can only be regarded as mischievous and dishonest.

5. While this sort of publicity goes on in West Punjab and Pakistan Radio is giving garbled versions of what is happening in the East Punjab and saying little, if any, about the occurrences in West Punjab, it seems to me impossible to achieve any substantial results in the direction of restoring normal conditions by any publicity that we undertake. To give lurid and detailed accounts of what is happening in West

Punjab would make matters worse. To sugarcoat the bitter pill would open us to the charge of suppressing the truth. In these circumstances, it is rather difficult for me to understand what our journalists or publicity officers attached to various offices in West Punjab would achieve. I have read this morning the joint Press reports of the correspondents whom you took with yourself. There is little in what they say which is not known to everybody here already. In fact, people know much more than what they have said.

6. The crowds I met at Jullundur were complaining bitterly about the attitude of Muslim officials, both military and police. I do not know whether you are aware that some Muslim soldiers in East Punjab were found to be wantonly shooting at refugees and were arrested by non-Muslim patrols. Nothing has been done about them so far. Their names are: Hira Mian, and Zalil and one section of the 3/1 Punjab Regiment. The former were arrested by Lt. Ranjit Singh and were handed over to Lt. Ghulam Husain, OC 2nd Battalion, Bihar Regiment, and the latter were arrested by Captain Bahl of the 18th Cavalry. It is usual for a Court of Inquiry to be held after a military officer is arrested. Apparently nothing has been done by Government, by General Rees and it is generally feared that when the splitting up of the Muslim and non-Muslim elements of the Boundary Force takes place, these officers will be handed over to the Pakistan Army, where they will give a coloured version of what has taken place and will probably pose as heroes rather than as criminals. I feel I should also let you know that the feeling is vehement and genuine that General Rees is a completely wrong choice for the command of the area. He has created so much prejudice and distrust among the general population that so long as he is at the head of the Force it is impossible for people to look to that Force with any degree of confidence which is so essential for the restoration of peaceful conditions. I do not say that the general feeling is justified. I am not competent to pass judgment on that point. But it does seem

to me very difficult to maintain our choice in the face of public antipathy and loss of confidence.

7. In your letter you have referred to K. C. Neogy to be put in charge of the refugee problem. I feel that this would be a wrong step to take. He does not even know the language and it will be difficult for him to understand the mentality of the people with whom he will have to deal. Apart from this, I feel, and all of us agreed at Jullundur, that the field-work in regard to the refugee problem must be entrusted to the East Punjab Government, the centre confining itself to such general direction, co-ordination and assistance as may be necessary. I feel that this field-work must essentially be in charge of an officer with district experience. The East Punjab Government have appointed Thapar as Refugee Commissioner for East Punjab. I do not know much about him but the choice as well as the responsibility for the appointment must be left to the East Punjab. As regards the Centre, (C. N.) Chandra's functions will now be to deal with the problem only in so far as it affects the centre and to secure for the refugees Commissioner of the East Punjab such assistance in regard to staff, transport, medical stores, etc., as may be necessary. I have asked Chandra to have a full discussion with Thapar as to East Punjab's requirements and come here tomorrow morning so that we can settle the various problems immediately. We have also proposed that (H.V.R.) Iengar, Chandra and (S. K.) Kripalani should form a sort of staff committee which will feed and take orders and directions from the Committee of the Cabinet consisting of yourself, myself and Baldev Singh which would meet daily or as circumstances demand and take decisions on all major questions. It is little useful, therefore, that Neogy would be able to do at the Centre. In the matter of staff, the East Punjab Government have asked for 28 officers and I am ordering the Principal of the Administrative Training School to release 28 probationers from that school for service in the various refugee camps in the East Punjab. They will be leaving for the East Punjab in a day or two. . . .

9. I received reports about atrocities on Hindus and Sikhs stranded in Bahawalpur. I have, therefore, arranged to send (V. P.) Menon there to settle evacuation arrangements in consultation with Bahawalpur, Bikaner and Jodhpur States.

10. At Jullundur (C. M.) Trivedi was complaining about the fact that he had not seen the IGP, East Punjab, ever since he assumed office. It appears that Swaran Singh, to use Trivedi's own words, is treating the IGP as his personal attendant. On enquiry, I learnt that he also accompanied you on tour. The result has been that Trivedi has been able to do precious little about the reorganisation of Police. I feel that the IGP should have been at headquarters instead of moving about in this manner.

11. I have already sent telegrams to the Rulers of the States of Faridkot, Patiala, Kapurthala, Nabha, Malerkotla and Jind. But it has not been possible for me to get to Nabha and Malerkotla because of lack of communications via Lahore. I have also suggested to Trivedi that he should have liaison with the States from which he apprehends trouble and have said that, in particular, a representative from Patiala should be welcome. . . .

66. RAJENDRA PRASAD TO SARDAR,  
DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1947

Last night a large mob of Meos, some 500 or so, came out in Karolbagh and began demonstration in the streets. Subsequently the military party arrived and they dispersed. The situation, however, is extremely explosive and the non-Muslims in that area, who are in minority, are very apprehensive of an attack. I find from today's newspapers a report that the proposal is to transfer the Meos to West Punjab. The sooner this is done the better, but while this process goes on, and it is likely to take time, it would be better if they could all be concentrated in camps near Jama Masjid or

elsewhere separated from the Hindu basties (localities) and kept well under guard. If once trouble starts in the city it will be difficult to check it. I know the local authorities have been very vigilant, still I thought it necessary to draw your attention to this fact.

There are one or two things which have been brought to my notice. I do not know about their correctness but if they are correct something should be done to remedy the resulting difficulties. I understand that a large number of police officers in charge of various police stations are Muslims. They are said to be from 70 to 80 in number. The Hindus are naturally apprehensive that they may not get protection from them when the trouble starts. Shops dealing in arms are also owned by Muslims and I am told there are at least three such shops. This has to be taken into consideration. There is a demand on the part of the Hindus of the city as distinguished from refugees that they (the residents of the city) should be provided with arms for self-defence against immigrants like the Meos. I am passing this on for your consideration. Whatever has to be done should be done without delay so that trouble may not start.

PS.

After the above was typed, my attention was drawn to a letter of the Dawn correspondent published in this morning's (5 September) News Chronicle in which it is stated that permanent accommodation for a further quota of more than 35,000 Meo refugees has been provided for in Delhi. This is besides the 15,000 who had been here from before. It is also **said that the Government of India has made a grant of Rs. 5 lakhs for the relief of Meos.** All this is bound to inflame further the feelings. I do not know how far the news is correct. If not correct, it should be contradicted at once.

67. SARDAR TO RAJENDRA PRASAD,  
DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 5 September 1947 (Serial No. 66).

2. I am sending you herewith a copy of the Delhi Daily Situation Report for 4 September, 1947 which will show what the factual position is in regard to attacks by one community or the other. You will notice that the attacks have been almost all one-sided and the aggressors have been Hindus or Sikhs. This seems sufficient to disprove the fears entertained by Hindus and reported to you. In the meantime, however, I realise the possible danger to law and order, health and sanitation of the city from the three camps in which Meos are at present housed; and we are trying to arrange their transfer to West Punjab by army trucks which are going to help evacuation of refugees from East and West Punjab. It will not be possible, however, for the present Karolbagh camp to be transferred to Jama Masjid. The latter is already full of Meos in a very unsatisfactory condition. The danger to the health of the city from those unhygienic conditions is real, and to add to that population would mean enhancing that danger.

3. There is a sufficiently large number of Muslims amongst the police force in Delhi, but it is difficult to displace them because they are permanent Government servants, and to discharge them without any charge would involve the payment of compensation. We suggested to the Pakistan Government that they might exchange with us the staff in the Chief Commissioners' provinces who might opt for Pakistan with the staff in Baluchistan who might opt for India, but the Pakistan Government were unwilling and therefore the matter had to rest there. Nevertheless, we have been able to restore

the balance in the representation of various communities in the upper ranks of the police force. As regards the lower ranks, the position is difficult, but I am trying to have the Muslim element rendered as innocuous as possible.

4. Regarding arms licences, we have already given licences to two or three Hindu dealers for the sale of arms. We have also, during the last six or eight months, been giving arms liberally to non-Muslims applicants, but it would be impossible during the present disturbed conditions of Delhi to embark on any more liberal policy, as in the present atmosphere surcharged with distrust, suspicion and grievances against Muslims for tragedies of West Punjab, we cannot be certain that this would not be used in aggression against Muslims, thereby resulting in the creation of a complete state of lawlessness.

5. As regards the postscript in your letter, the news regarding finding permanent accommodation for a further quota of 35,000 Meo refugees is incorrect. I issued instructions about a week ago, and a Press Note also appeared that no more refugees could be accepted. There was a proposal, however, to transfer the Meo refugees to places near Purana Quila and Qutab Road, but it has not materialised and perhaps it will not be implemented at all. The Government of India have made no grants for the relief of Meos. You will recall that at the Cabinet meeting it was decided to make a grant of Rs. 5 lakhs for relief of refugees. That amount has been placed at the disposal of the Refugee Commissioner, and out of that sum Rs. 50,000 have been granted to the Chief Commissioner for all refugees at present in Delhi. I am doubtful, however, whether we need give the matter such prominence as to issue a contradiction. Canards like this appear from time to time, and the best policy seems to be to ignore them.

68. RAJENDRA PRASAD TO SARDAR,  
DATED 10 SEPTEMBER 1947

I have just heard from a source which appears to be reliable that there is a proposal to bring Baluchi troops into Delhi in order to guard the Meos and to escort them. From the account that we all hear there seems to be a large number of automatic weapons in the hands of Muslims in Delhi and it seems to me a most dangerous proposal that troops of this kind should be imported into Delhi for whatever purpose. There are not enough troops in Delhi for law and order purpose and if Baluchis are added, we may well have a catastrophe.

69. SARDAR TO RAJENDRA PRASAD,  
DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1947

... 5. Regarding the presence of Baluchi troops, I quite agree with you regarding the danger involved, but under the Lahore decisions, we are committed to have refugee camps guarded by the troops of the community which are accommodated in them. Apparently, the Supreme Commander could find only Baluchi troops for this purpose in Delhi.

70. NAWAB OF RAMPUR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1947

The Rampur Special reached Rampur this morning with over a thousand men, women and children. Their evacuation from Delhi was most orderly and uneventful and everything passed off most satisfactorily. I know that this was all due to the powerful support which you extended to me in the matter. My people and I will be under an abiding debt of

gratitude to you for your great help on this occasion. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Chief Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi, Mr. Sanjevi Pillai and Mr. Lall, Senior Superintendent of Police, for all the help which they extended to (Col. B. H.) Zaidi, my Chief Minister, during his stay in Delhi.

I would also like to take this opportunity of thanking you for the loan of two companies of the CRP. They did splendid work here and have both been returned. My appreciation of their fine work and exemplary conduct may kindly be conveyed to the OC concerned.

There was no accommodation left on the special train which I sent to bring Rampuris back home from Delhi and a few hundred people are still left there. I should like to know whether you would agree to my sending a second train to bring these people back. As on the previous occasion, it will have a military escort, consisting of 90 Gurkhas and 30 Muslims, and will remain halted at Ghaziabad. Our own lorries will collect the men from Delhi and bring them to the special at Ghaziabad. For the work of evacuation from the various places in Delhi, I trust that Delhi police will give the help which they gave on the last occasion when under the instructions of Mr. Sanjevi Pillai four constables were spared to accompany the lorries. With the contacts already established with the authorities concerned in Delhi, and the experience gained, I think their evacuation should not take more than a day or so. If there is no objection to this, a telegram may kindly be sent to me.

71. TELEGRAM TO CHIEF SECRETARY, EAST  
PUNJAB AND MAHARAJA OF PATIALA,  
DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1947

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR STOPPING CONTINUING ATTACKS ON REFUGEE TRAINS PASSING THROUGH EAST PUNJAB. I STRONGLY URGE THAT FOLLOWING MEASURES BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH VILLAGE FOR PROTECTION AND SAFETY OF TRACK LYING WITHIN ITS AREA SHOULD BE IMPRESSED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS ON VILLAGERS. VILLAGE PATROLS SHOULD BE ORGANISED IMMEDIATELY FOR DAY AND NIGHT WATCH. GENERAL WARNING SHOULD ALSO BE ISSUED THAT COLLECTIVE FINES WILL BE IMPOSED ON VILLAGES WITHIN WHOSE AREA DAMAGE TO TRACK OR ATTACK ON TRAIN OCCURS. FINE SHOULD ALSO BE ACTUALLY IMPOSED AFTER EVERY ATTACK. IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN ATTACK ORIGIN OF JATHAS SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED AND TRACED BY IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEAD AND INTERROGATION OF WOUNDED. INFORMATION REGARDING THE ORGANISATION OF ATTACKING JATHAS AND MEN BEHIND THEM SHOULD BE AVAILABLE BY THIS MEANS.

VILLAGE PATROLS WERE ORGANISED AND COLLECTIVE FINES IMPOSED ON SIMILAR LINES IN 1942 DISTURBANCES. THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN IN FIRST INSTANCE ON DANGER SPOTS ON RAILWAY LINE OF WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT PRESUMABLY HAVE ALREADY SOME INFORMATION.

72. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF PATIALA,  
DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 13 September 1947 (not printed : stresses the importance of safeguarding shrines sacred to the Sikhs).

2. I need hardly say that we are most sympathetic to the Sikh sentiment in regard to their shrines and the threat to the villages on the borders of India and Pakistan. When Dr. Gopichand Bhargava and Sardar Swaran Singh were here last week, I discussed this particular matter with them and Sardar Swaran Singh promised to send me a note on the whole position, so that we might consider the problem in its defence aspect. I might also add that officially we were told that there had been eight raids from Pakistan to India and four in the reverse direction.

When Liaquat Ali Khan was here on Friday and Saturday, we discussed this particular matter with him and he promised to look into the matter and take all possible steps to check these raids from his side.

You can rest assured that we are keenly alive to this problem and will take early and effective action to put a stop to these raids.

73. TELEGRAM FROM MAHARAJA OF PATIALA,  
DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1947

YOUR TELEGRAM DATED 23RD. I AND MY GOVERNMENT FULLY ALIVE TO THE NECESSITY OF STOPPING ATTACKS ON MUSLIM REFUGEES AND TAKING ALL NECESSARY MEASURES. ORDINANCE BANNING ASSEMBLY OF MORE THAN FIVE ARMED PERSONS BEING ISSUED. MEASURES ALSO BEING TAKEN TO ENFORCE COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY ON VILLAGERS THROUGH OR NEAR

WHICH RAILWAY TRACKS. AM TAKING EFFECTIVE STEPS AND POLICE PATROL BEING STRENGTHENED NEAR RAILWAY AREAS. AM ALSO SENDING ROUND PROMINENT PUBLIC MEN TO DISSUADE PEOPLE FROM ADOPTING RETALIATORY MEASURES AND INDULGING IN LAWLESSNESS. DUE PUBLICITY BEING GIVEN TO THESE MEASURES AND LEAFLETS BEING DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE STATE. DUAL CONTROL OVER RAILWAY LANDS OWING TO CONTINUANCE OF EXISTING POLICING ARRANGEMENTS RENDERS OUR MEASURES LESS EFFECTIVE IN RAILWAY TERRITORIES. CONSTANT REPORTS REGARDING REPEATED ATTACKS ON NON-MUSLIM REFUGEES IN WEST PUNJAB PROVOKE RETALIATION AND ARE MAIN PERTURBING FACTORS. TRUST EFFECTIVE PREVENTIVE MEASURES BEING TAKEN AGAINST ATTACKS ON NON-MUSLIM REFUGEES FROM WEST PUNJAB. ASSURE YOU OF MY FULLEST COOPERATION AND SUPPORT IN ALL MEASURES FOR RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST AND HOPE THERE WILL SOON BE DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION.

74. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1947

I am sending herewith, in original, a letter which I have received from the Delhi Provincial Congress Committee containing notes on special police, on the situation in Delhi and on the steps to be taken to relieve it, together with the requirements of the committee in motor cycles, jeeps, arms, etc.

I gave the letter to Gandhiji who had sent for some office-bearers of the committee. I do not know what discussions he had with them, but I called them myself last evening and had an hour's discussion. Five persons were present, including Lala Deshbandhu Gupta and Raghunandan Saran.

**I was surprised to receive this letter, more particularly at the mention therein of certain orders having been issued by you direct to local authorities in the matter of recruitment of special police officers.**

I told the representatives quite clearly and emphatically that there were only three ways in which they could carry on whatever work they had in mind : (a) co-operation with local officials; (b) independent arrangements; and (c) local officers working under their direction, which obviously involved practically handing over the administration to them.

As regards (a), I have been assured by (M. S.) Randhawa that generally he has been able to maintain good relations with the local Congress Committee. As far as I could make out, those who saw me held Randhawa in high esteem. Co-operation would not, of course, mean that the District Magistrate was, as the Committee seemed to think, bound to follow the advice tendered by them. If the Committee's presentation of your orders is correct, I am concerned to note that that was in effect the purport of the directions which you gave to the local authorities in the matter of special police officers. I am sure you will appreciate that it is impossible to run day-to-day administration on party lines.

Nevertheless, Randhawa tells me that he accepted all the 574 nominees which the Congress Committee suggested to him. Those who saw me said that this was a fact, but it seemed that their complaint was that they had not been consulted in the recruitment of others. This, I feel, is an impossible position to adopt or to accept. Of the 1,304 special police officers, 574 are Congress nominees. Of the 49 Special Magistrates, 19 are Congressmen.

As regards their other demands, you have only to run through the list to be convinced that it is impossible to fulfil them.

If the committee cannot work in co-operation with local administration and official backing is still asked for, then the only alternative is to make the tenure of officials subject to their working in co-operation with the committee. This naturally involves changes in personnel whenever the officials are unable to work with the committee. I put it to the

representatives of the committee that, if they said that it should be done, I would be prepared to transfer whomsoever they found unsatisfactory, but I told them quite plainly that Randhawa had been highly spoken of to me by Maulana Sahib shortly after the riots began and that about a couple of days ago, a Muslim deputation told Gandhiji that Randhawa had saved them and they had nothing to say against him. Amongst the representatives present, as far as I could make out, Raghunandan Saran was the only one who had something against Randhawa. It is quite possible that there may be something personal in it, but whatever it is, it may not be fair to attach much importance to his opposition.

Finally, I should like to suggest that it is somewhat embarrassing both to me and to the local officials if orders are issued to them direct by you in respect of matters which fall within my departmental responsibility. The officials are bound to be in difficulties as to whose instructions they should take in respect of particular matters. Unless there is one channel of communication of instructions and orders, confusion is inevitable and conflicting instructions might result. Even if some instructions were issued by you, I feel that I should at least have been informed and that those instructions should not have come to my notice indirectly through a non-official organisation....

75. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 28 September. There is no question of my having issued any orders directly to the local authorities in Delhi. What happened was as follows :

2. During the early days of the Delhi disturbances I went about the city chiefly to see what was happening. On one or two occasions I visited the Town Hall and found the Military Headquarters situated there. I was told that the Chief Commissioner's and the Deputy Commissioner's offices were

situated two miles away. The Police Headquarters were somewhere else. This struck me as a very odd arrangement and I suggested to the Chief Commissioner and Randhawa as well as to the Military that it seemed to me essential that temporary headquarters of both the civil and the military as well as the police should be in one place. They all agreed to it. There was some discussion. Randhawa suggested that the military should move to his office in Old Delhi. General Rajendra Singhji, who was with me, said that this would be very undesirable as this would cut them off from the fort which was their base; also Randhawa's was in the Civil Lines of old Delhi which is rather out of way. Ultimately there was an agreement that the next day all headquarters would be shifted to the Town Hall.

3. I suggested further that it was necessary to have as much non-official co-operation as possible and a room should be set aside for Congress workers and others working with them to be near at hand to be able to offer such assistance as they could to the civil authorities.

4. Further I suggested that it would be desirable to have a small emergency committee for Delhi to bring about co-ordination between the civil and the military and police and some non-officials. I envisaged a committee of about 7 or 9 persons (this was before the formation of the present Emergency Committee). I went to the Town Hall again the next day and discovered, to my surprise, that the joint offices had not been established there as agreed to. The next day the question of forming a Delhi Emergency Committee came up before the Cabinet Emergency Committee and it was decided to form it with Bhabha as Chairman.

5. In the course of my visits to the Town Hall during the early days I discussed on many occasions with Randhawa and the Chief Commissioner the preventive action that should be taken. I felt that the instigators of the disturbances should be traced and arrested. Randhawa seemed to think that the

whole affair had been a spontaneous one and he could not think of any person who could be called an organiser or instigator. This rather surprised me because it seemed pretty evident that there was plenty of organisation behind the thing. Also it was stated definitely by some Delhi people that they were well-known persons who had organised and encouraged these disturbances. I suggested to them that any named or suspected persons should be handed over to Randhawa. I believe this was done some time later. I further suggested to Randhawa that special police and magistrates might be appointed as was usually done in such circumstances. He agreed. I added that it would be desirable to consult the leading Congressmen in Delhi as to the names.

6. The next day, I think, or the day after, when I went to the Town Hall, I was informed that among the names of the special magistrates and special police were some persons whose names had been included in the list of principal organisers of the disturbances. The Chief Commissioner himself complained of this to me and further said that although this was his responsibility, he had been completely ignored in drawing up the list. I was very much surprised at this and I told Randhawa that it was very odd that persons charged with doing mischief should be included in the list of special magistrates. I knew nothing about these persons, but I suggested that any person who was supposed to be guilty by a number of others was hardly suitable to be appointed as special magistrate or a member of the special police. I found that the method of choosing special constables and special magistrates had nothing to do with their reliability but was based on their educational qualifications. The choice apparently was made by some junior officers under Randhawa. I suggested to Randhawa that this was hardly a satisfactory way of drawing up lists when reliability was the most important qualification and he might revise the list from this point of view and also keep the Chief Commissioner in the picture as the responsibility was his also.

7. I suppose this talk of mine was interpreted as my having given orders though there was no question of orders but certain obvious suggestions which were discussed. I did not say that special police officers should be recruited through the DPCC but that some noted Congressmen, who knew the people in Delhi, should be consulted.

8. After this incident I did not visit the Town Hall for many days. I heard a number of complaints from Congress people that their services were not being utilised. But I did not intervene in any way.

9. I have known Randhawa for a number of years when he was in the U.P. Ranjit Pandit (husband of Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit) knew him well and liked him. My own impression has been that he is a good officer. He has functioned well in Delhi during these past few months prior to these disturbances. It was because of this that I spoke to him and made certain suggestions. It seemed to me rather obvious. It surprised me that in spite of previous intimation no preventive action had been taken by way of arresting suspicious people. I have found out subsequently that intelligence reports indicated what was likely to happen and indeed even the persons and groups were named. But unfortunately nothing was done then and even later. After the riots had continued for some days no such step was taken. It is only now, I believe, that an effort is being made to round up some of the suspicious people.

10. The information that has reached me from many sources indicates that the trouble in Delhi was caused by certain well-organised bands, some Sikh and some Hindu. Probably most of the murders were committed by one or more organised and well-armed Sikh bands which had come here specially for the purpose and which subsequently visited Simla and Kalka and other places. The Hindu bands seemed to owe allegiance to the RSS. It seems to me clear that the RSS have had a great deal to do with the present disturbances not only in Delhi but elsewhere. In Amritsar their activities have been **very obvious.**

11. While the connection of the RSS with these disturbances is fairly well known, still noted members of the RSS were appointed as special magistrates and special police officers. This seemed very odd to me. But after my first experience I did not interfere at all in this business though it seemed to me all wrong.

12. I believe the Delhi police have got sufficient information in their possession against the RSS as well as the Sikh bands and that they have slowly begun to take action now. There appears to be a lacuna somewhere and the delay in taking action which should have been initiated long ago. Why this has happened I do not know. In other matters also, such as the suppression of highly undesirable periodicals and leaflets, nothing was done for weeks although the most objectionable articles and news items appeared. In regard to punitive fine also nothing was done although the Cabinet Emergency Committee discussed this matter on several occasions.

13. All this slackness and delay on the part of the local authorities at a time of grave crisis did not do credit to the authorities. I realise that the situation was too big for almost any person to handle satisfactorily and it came with some suddenness. Nevertheless, something could have been done and this was not done.

14. It is a mystery to me why Randhawa, who had functioned so effectively previously, should have slackened at such a moment of crisis. From his talk it would appear that his sympathies lay in a certain direction and this perhaps prevented strong action. But I cannot be sure of this and would not like to come to a conclusion without further evidence.

15. As far as I can make out, we have had to face a very definite and well-organised attempt of certain Sikh and Hindu fascist elements to overturn the Government, or at least to break up its present character. It has been something much more than a communal disturbance. Many of these people have been brutal and callous in the extreme. They have

functioned as pure terrorists. They could only do so, of course, with success in a favourable atmosphere so far as public opinion was concerned. They had that atmosphere. These gangs have not been broken up yet although something had been done of them, and they are still capable of great mischief. Last night's incidents when four Muslims in the Safdarganj Hospital were killed in their wards is a horrible reminder of the type of persons we have to deal with.

16. I entirely agree with you that orders should be conveyed through proper authority. Any other course would lead to confusion in the administrative machinery.

17. I understand that there have been many instances of grave dereliction of duty among the special magistrates and special police officers. Many of the RSS men, who have been appointed, have functioned improperly and an attempt is being made now to purge these people.

76. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 1947

For the last four days I have been going into the city, addressing meetings, meeting groups of people, etc. The impression I have got is that while there is an apparent improvement and incidents are few, this improvement is only on the surface. It is a lull and preparations are going on for a fresh and organised attack. The few remaining Muslim shops or occupied houses in the city are rather a pretext for an attack on Government. Reports come to me from various sources to the effect that these preparations are proceeding. I hope the Intelligence Service is inquiring into this matter and that we shall not be caught unawares again. These reports have come to me entirely from Hindu sources, shop-keepers, etc. Many of these persons are themselves alarmed by the developments that are taking place.

The atmosphere of Delhi is being poisoned by the numerous news sheets that continue to circulate. You must have

seen all articles which appeared in the Hindu Outlook some time ago. There are other more or less similar articles appearing. I think strong and swift action should be taken against these papers.

I am convinced also that the impositions of heavy punitive fines on various mohallas of Delhi is necessary. Even the mention of this has produced a good effect.

Information has reached me that in the Sikh States, notably Faridkot and Nabha, Hindus are being deliberately attacked and pushed out, more especially everyone who has been connected with Praja Mandal activities. Indeed, Hindus are beginning to leave these States.

There appears to be some kind of contact between subversive elements in Delhi with the rulers and some of the Sikh States as well as with Alwar and Bharatpur.

77. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 1 OCTOBER 1947

I am sending you herewith an extract from a despatch of the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph at Karachi. I do not mind so much the obvious biased tone of the despatch as the correspondent's assertion that Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck subscribes to the view that refugee traffic could be possibly resumed in both directions if the Sikhs of the East Punjab and the Sikh States could be effectively disarmed. I am writing separately to Sir Claude Auchinleck to enquire if what the correspondent has stated is true.

ENCLOSURE

"The Daily Telegraph's Karachi correspondent, Douglas Brown, reports that the Pakistan Government are seriously contemplating appealing to the other Governments of the British Commonwealth for immediate diplomatic and, if necessary, military help in saving the lives of Muslim refugees from the Indian Union. It is fully recognised, the correspondent

says, that such a step might have the gravest constitutional and international consequences and that at best it could hardly fail to embarrass the Governments to whom the appeal would be addressed.

“But the issue here is looked at in terms of simple humanity—the rescue of at least one million innocent people from what seems otherwise certain extinction. The correspondent goes on to say that the Pakistan Government take the view that refugee traffic could be peaceably resumed in both directions if the Sikhs of the East Punjab and the Sikh states could be effectively disarmed. The correspondent reports that he understands that Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck who paid a flying visit to Mr. Jinnah on Tuesday subscribes to this view.

“The authorities in Karachi are reported to have reached the conclusion that even if the Delhi Government wished to suppress Sikh violence, the Indian Union Army as now constituted on communal basis would be incapable of doing so.”

78. CLAUDE AUCHINLECK TO SARDAR,  
DATED 3 OCTOBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

Thank you for your letter of 1 October, enclosing an extract from the Daily Telegraph quoting a despatch from their Karachi correspondent.

On reading this I was as surprised as you were.

There is no foundation whatever for the statement that I have subscribed to any such view, whether expressed by the Pakistan Government or any one else. In fact I was not aware that this expression has been made.

Steps have been taken to represent the matter to the Daily Telegraph with the object of making them refute the statement.

79. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 3 OCTOBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 1 October. I sent my press Attache, Campbell-Johnson, to have a private talk with the Supreme Commander, and he has the latter's authority to say that the Correspondent's reference to him is completely without foundation. Field Marshal Auchinleck says that he does not know, and he has not met, the Correspondent in question.

A statement is accordingly being issued to the Daily Telegraph in the following terms:

"The Report in the Daily Telegraph of 27 September that Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck subscribed to certain views in the course of his recent visit to Karachi is **completely without foundation**. The purpose of the visit was to discuss with members of the Pakistan Government matters in connection with the division of the Armed Forces, and to inspect British troops stationed there."

80. TELEGRAM FROM NAWAB OF BHOPAL TO  
SARDAR, DATED 3 OCTOBER 1947

INFORMATION JUST RECEIVED INDICATES THAT CONDITIONS IN PATAUDI STATE ARE AGAIN DETERIORATING AND MY DAUGHTER AND FAMILY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO DELHI AND ARE THERE WITH A SICK CHILD. I SHALL BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR AUTHENTIC NEWS AND FOR NECESSARY ACTION TO PROTECT PATAUDI. I HAVE PLACED MY DAUGHTER AND WHOLE FAMILY UNDER YOUR CARE AND HAVE NO ANXIETY BUT SHALL FEEL FURTHER GRATEFUL IF THE DAUGHTER AND CHILDREN IN DELHI COULD BE FLOWN TO BHOPAL BY SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS. PERHAPS LORD MOUNTBATTEN OR SUPREME COMMANDER MAY WITH PERMISSION OF UNION GOVERNMENT BE ABLE SPARE THEIR PLANES FOR FLIGHT TO BHOPAL. WILL PAY EXPENSE OF FLIGHT IF NECESSARY. MY DAUGHTER'S WHEREABOUTS IN DELHI ARE I BELIEVE KNOWN AT THE HOUSE OF SUPREME COMMANDER IN DELHI.

81. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO NAWAB OF BHOPAL,  
DATED 4 OCTOBER 1947

YOUR TELEGRAM REGARDING PATAUDI. YOUR DAUGHTER AND HER CHILDREN WERE BROUGHT TO DELHI BY BRIGADIER SHERALI OWING MAINLY TO CHILD'S ILLNESS. SHE HAS BEEN SUFFERING FROM FEVER FOR LAST TWO MONTHS WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DIAGNOSED. SHE IS BEING EXAMINED BY DOCTORS AND WILL BE EX-RAYED AND AS SOON AS SHE IS IN A POSITION TO LEAVE I SHALL ARRANGE FOR AEROPLANE FOR BHOPAL. THIS MORNING I GOT IN TOUCH WITH YOUR DAUGHTER AND BRIGADIER SHERALI PATAUDI'S BROTHER. IN PATAUDI THERE IS TENSION BUT NO OTHER TROUBLE. AFTER BRIGADIER SHERALI RETURNS FROM BHOPAL WHERE HE INTENDS ACCOMPANYING YOUR DAUGHTER AND CHILDREN I PROPOSE GOING TO PATAUDI MYSELF. YOU NEED HAVE NO ANXIETY.

82. V. SHANKAR TO MORARJI DESAI,  
DATED 4 OCTOBER 1947

Sardar is very busy and he has therefore asked me to write to you regarding one or two matters which have been agitating his mind.

First is the question of the Pathan and Muslim employees of the Bombay dockyard. He feels that if any actual trouble breaks out on that account, it would again paralyse Bombay's port activities and would have serious repercussions on its industrial enterprise. He has therefore asked me to request you to look into this question at once and take suitable action to do away with these employees. Hindu employees of the Karachi dockyard are anxious to come over to the Indian Dominion and

it might therefore be possible for you to have an exchange with Karachi.

The second point is regarding Sindi watchmen who are generally kept by cultivators in Gujarat and Maharashtra to watch their crops. He thinks that this is a possible danger spot which should be cleared up as soon as possible.

He has also asked me to send you the enclosed cuttings of some Gujarati papers. He feels that Muslim papers of this type have got no place in India. If they cannot behave loyally, they must clear out. He has asked me to request you to suppress such papers with a strong hand.

83. SARDUL SINGH CAVEESHAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 4 OCTOBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

I left Lahore on 10 September. After the division of the Punjab I had decided to remain in Lahore. But when all others with whom I was connected in business and otherwise had left and would not return, it was quite useless for me to remain there any more. I could do there absolutely no work. Besides, owing to what had been done by the Sikhs in the East Punjab, even according to the Muslim friends who were very intimately connected with me, it was sheer foolhardiness on my part to remain there any longer.

But remaining in Lahore so late did me one good. I was able to have first-hand knowledge about the designs of the people there about India. As very few non-Muslims were left in Lahore, friends there made no secret of their aims and objects and of how to accomplish them.

I am now in Delhi and have seen what is going on here. From reports in papers of what sort of arms and ammunitions have been found in the Capital city of India, I have found ample corroboration of what I had come to know in Lahore.

I have read your recent statements and speeches very carefully. I am deeply touched by your bold patriotism and wise statesmanship. I have decided to whole-heartedly offer my services to you and through you to the Congress High Command at this critical juncture; though only with a little reservation that under the present set-up it shall not be proper or possible for me to accept any salaried job in the state.

Since I resigned from the Congress Working Committee, I had often to criticise Congress policy and programme. But I always endeavoured that such criticism should be constructive; its aim was always to strengthen the organisation whose leaders had toiled so hard and suffered so heavily for the uplift of the country. But now when the Congress is attacked by the reactionary elements from amongst its own erstwhile followers, and when hostile forces near our borders plot to deprive us of our hard won freedom, I regard it my duty to stand by you and your colleagues and offer to them my humble services to be employed by them in any way they might find useful.

I have great regard for all members of the Congress High Command. Their sufferings and sacrifices have always commanded my admiration and homage. But I am writing this letter to you as I find myself more near to you in my sentiments and feelings than to those of any one else.

84. TELEGRAM FROM NAWAB OF BHOPAL TO  
SARDAR, DATED 5 OCTOBER 1947

I CANNOT TELL YOU HOW DEEPLY TOUCHED AND GRATEFUL I AM TO YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST AND ALL THE TROUBLE YOU HAVE KINDLY TAKEN ABOUT MY DAUGHTER AND PATAUDI. I SHALL ALWAYS REMEMBER WITH GRATITUDE YOUR COURTESY AND YOUR PERSONAL CONSIDERATION IN THIS MATTER.

85. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 6 OCTOBER 1947

I am writing to you about Delhi. Conditions here are certainly better but they are still far from normal. There is tension in many areas and all manner of rumours about future undesirable occurrences are afloat. Apart from this, there are so many acute problems in the country that difficulties may arise in other parts. If so, Delhi will be affected by them.

2. We have thus to be very careful about Delhi and not relax our vigilance.

3. I hope the Emergency Committee will continue in some form or other. Possibly the Emergency Committee is somewhat unwieldy; a smaller committee may be more effective. However, that is a small matter. I am anxious that some emergency organisation should continue, not only the committee but the central control arrangements that had been made. These arrangements have been much appreciated and, if they are wound up there will be great disappointment.

4. An important matter to which a reference has previously been made is the proper functioning of our intelligence services in regard to Delhi. We have been let down in the past in this respect. If we are kept properly informed and take preventive action in time, our difficulties will be definitely less. I am glad to know that something is being done in this respect.

5. Preventive action means not only the removal of trouble-makers but also the control of the irresponsible Press. There are plenty of people in Delhi today who are bent on mischief and there are many newspapers, recently started, which are carrying on an astonishing campaign not only against Government but against all decency.

6. From all accounts attempts are being made to carry trouble to the United Provinces and elsewhere. The people who started this show in Delhi have spread out to other places though some remain here still.

7. Delhi is an important charge. It is worthwhile considering whether, in view of the importance and delicacy of this charge, responsibility should not be divided, that is to say, instead of one district magistrate, there might be three or four with Delhi and New Delhi divided in these areas. Each district magistrate would of course have his normal complement of staff, civilian police, etc.

8. The military should also continue to keep in touch with the civil authorities. Each district magistrate having a military liaison officer would be under the control of the Area Commandant.

9. The position of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi has been very peculiar. He has hardly functioned with any authority during the past few weeks. This seems to be bad from the point of view of work and discipline. It must demoralise the services somewhat. If the present Chief Commissioner is not considered wholly suited to the job, perhaps some other man might be appointed in his place. The point is that the Chief Commissioner should function and should not be there for show only.

10. The policy to be followed by the newly appointed Custodian of Evacuee property has also to be clearly laid down as there appear to be varying opinions. The ordinance was clear enough, I thought, and yet it has been interpreted in many ways. It is common knowledge that empty houses are being occupied not only by the refugees but by others who do so with the intention of profiteering. Indeed Punjab refugees have come to me to complain that these empty houses have been occupied by others who charge heavy rent for them and ask for big premia. One Punjabi Hindu woman came to me today bringing a case to my notice of this kind where a Delhi

resident had occupied several houses and shops and was charging heavy premia apart from rent. She herself had offered Rs. 100 a month and Rs. 2000 as premium, but he wanted more. This profiteering at the expense both of the original owner of the house and the Punjab refugee is scandalous and I hope that effective steps will be taken to put an end to it. Indeed something should be done to stop this unauthorised occupation and to punish those who have been trying to profiteer.

11. Another question of policy arises about Muslim refugees in the city. I imagine that of the 1,20,000 persons in the Purana Qila and Humayun Tomb, about half will go away to Pakistan. Where are the other half to go ? According to our policy they will return to Delhi. To what parts of Delhi? Some parts of Delhi which the Muslims did not evacuate, like Ballimaran, Faiz Bazar, etc., are already full and there is not much room for additional people. Where else then are they to go to except to certain areas from which they were evacuated ? These areas thus cannot be considered as reserved completely for non-Muslims. This matter will have to be carefully thought out so that wherever Muslims may live they should be in some kind of close proximity to each other in an area and not in isolated groups. In any event it is desirable that nothing should be permitted to be done now which comes in the way of future policy and rehabilitation of those who remain.

12. I am sending these suggestions to you so that you may consider them and if you think proper pass them on to the other authorities concerned, I am sending a copy of this letter to (K.C.) Neogy and H. M. Patel and asking Patel to show it to (C. H.) Bhabha.

86. NAWAB OF BHOPAL TO SARDAR,  
DATED 8 OCTOBER 1947

My daughter and her children escorted by Brig. Sher Ali arrived here safely and I hasten to write you a line to thank you from the bottom of my heart for all you have done to help them and to get them an aircraft. Sajida Sultan (Begum of Pataudi) is returning to Delhi tomorrow morning *en route* to Pataudi to be by the side of her husband and I am very glad that she is doing so. Her place is in Pataudi with the people there.

I am so glad to learn that you are yourself going to Pataudi. Your visit there at this juncture will be of great value to those who are in distress and constant fear. It will put courage into their hearts and restore confidence. I leave the rest under your care in your hands.

87. MORARJI DESAI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 8 OCTOBER 1947

**I have received Shankar's letter of 4 October (Serial No 82).**

I understand that about 1,500 Muslims from the HMS dockyard, Bombay, have opted for service in Pakistan and they are waiting to be moved by the naval authorities. The local officers are anxious that they should be moved quickly and have been pressing for necessary orders from naval headquarters. I would request that the question of their move may be taken up with Sardar Baldev Singh

I also find that a large number of Muslims who have opted for service in Pakistan are being collected in Bombay, particularly by the military and railway and postal authorities, but very limited transport by sea is available. Their presence

in Bombay is a potential source of great danger. I am very anxious that they should be moved out of Bombay as quickly as possible and will be thankful for all assistance that you can give. At this end I can assure you of fullest co-operation from all our officers in expediting their departure.

**I am taking necessary steps about the Sindhi watchman.**

I had noticed the articles in Millat and had asked steps to be taken to demand security. We are also taking steps against other Muslim papers which write in the same strain as Millat.

In Bombay we are enforcing our conventions very strictly but our efforts are frustrated as papers coming from other **provinces contain highly inflammable articles**. Even API messages, which are supposed to be passed by the *ad hoc* committee before being transmitted, frequently contained matter likely to incite communal ill-feeling, but we are not able to take action against them. Moreover, papers published in Delhi and Karachi in the morning are being brought by air and sold in Bombay in the evening. The Dawn invariably contains highly objectionable articles, but even papers like the Hindustan Times and the Statesman also publish objectionable reports from their own correspondents. These reports are used by papers in this province of both sides to propagate their respective points of view. Apart from this, Sindhi and Urdu papers from Sind and Hyderabad also find large circulation in Bombay and it is not possible to stop them. These problems have been referred to you officially and I shall be very thankful if you can have the question thoroughly examined. The point is whether publication of communal killings in the Punjabs can be confined to some authorised reports only and whether the test of inciting communal ill-feeling can be applied fairly strictly in all provinces. I am aware that this will not affect newspapers in Pakistan and Hyderabad. If they cannot be kept out under the Customs Acts, it seems necessary to consider whether a special Act cannot be passed for the purpose.

88. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO NAWAB OF  
BHOPAL, DATED 9 OCTOBER 1947

I HAVE RETURNED THIS AFTERNOON AFTER VISITING PATAUDI. SITUATION WELL IN HAND AND YOU NEED HAVE NO ANXIETY. I AM LOOKING INTO CERTAIN DEMANDS WHICH WERE MADE BY YOUR SON-IN-LAW. I NEED HARDLY SAY THEY SHALL HAVE MY BEST CONSIDERATION.

89. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 11 OCTOBER 1947

In your letter of 30 September 1947 you mentioned *inter alia* the policy of some of the Punjab States, particularly Faridkot and Nabha, to push out Hindus. I raised this matter at the conference which we called on 6 October and it was unanimously agreed that such a policy would be suicidal for the States concerned and should be discouraged. I shall take occasion to impress this upon the Rulers concerned when I have a chance of meeting them. His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala was most emphatic on this point at the conference.

2. Regarding the Hindu Outlook, there is no doubt whatsoever that it does not deserve to exist as a newspaper. We have, however, passed a precensorship order against the paper and hope that either its contents would improve or it will come into further trouble and will eventually have to stop publication.

3. In your letter of 6 October you have referred to certain matters connected with the organisation of the Delhi Administration. You will have noticed that the Emergency Committee has now already ceased to function, but the central Control

Room continues to discharge its functions as before. This, to my mind, provides for the necessity of continuance of the emergency structure until we are definitely out of the wood.

4. You have already had the note from the IGP about the intelligence arrangements in Delhi. From this note you will see that the CID did function, but the reports were not followed up, probably mainly due to the ineffectiveness of the head of the police administration. I have under contemplation a reorganisation of the whole Delhi Police and I expect to have in a day or two proposals for its complete overhaul. I have no doubt that after this reorganisation is carried through, which would obviously take some time, the Delhi Police would be a very efficient body and breakdowns like the one we had to face lately would not occur.

5. In order to keep myself in touch with developments, I have asked for weekly reports to be made to me in regard to situation in Delhi and the likely trends of public agitation or undercurrents so that we can take effective and preventive action as soon as possible.

6. I do not feel it is necessary to divide up Delhi in the manner you suggest. In fact, divided control is likely to lead to more confusion and chaos. What is required is to keep the District Magistrate free from ordinary routine and to confine his functions to an effective co-ordinating agency for the law and order situation in Delhi and any other matters. After all, Delhi neither in population nor in extent is as complex as places like Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, where ultimately there is one final authority in whom the functions of a district magistrate vest. I am convinced that the solution does not lie in the direction of breaking up the unity of administration, but in making that unity effective by means of concentrated co-ordinating functions. After I have been able to put right the re-organisation of police, I shall look into the changes that would be necessary to achieve the objective which I have mentioned above.

90. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 11 OCTOBER 1947

Please refer to your letter dated 9 October 1947 in which you have communicated me certain information and views of Dr. Zakir Husain on the present situation in Delhi.

2. Our policy regarding Muslims in Delhi has been made abundantly clear by you in so many public meetings and statements. It has not been contradicted by any responsible man. There is no doubt a difference in the approach to the problem, but that need not create any confusion in the public mind. I know that you are much worried about the situation in Delhi but in spite of all our impatience and anxiety we have to take into account certain serious difficulties inherent in the situation. So far as the general policy is concerned, we have decided that those who are willing to go may be given all facilities to leave and to the rest we must make all possible efforts to give protection in case they are prepared to return to their homes. It is difficult for anyone to guarantee complete security under present conditions, but that does not mean that we should fail in our duty to take all possible steps to create in them a sense of security.

3. It is a question whether it would be wise to create any Muslim pockets in or near Delhi. Such pockets for any large number of people which, according to your rough estimate, is about 60,000, would naturally attract the attention of people and perhaps invite hatred of the neighbouring non-Muslim areas or villages. Besides, the building up of such separate residential accommodation would take a fairly long time during which period the present problem of providing facilities for these people would remain. I doubt whether this would be a practical proposition, but this question may be examined by the department concerned.

4. I agree with you that it would be a pity to lose good artisans and craftsmen, but there is reason to believe that quite a large number of them have already left with valuable raw materials, jewellery, etc., which had been given to them by the jewellers, etc., in Delhi for preparation of ornaments etc. Apparently they thought it was a good opportunity to escape with these valuables and establish business elsewhere. There may be a good number of innocent people of this class left in Delhi in the camps and the best way for them would be to go to mixed localities which may be safe and not to create any separate bastis for themselves.

5. You have often expressed your dissatisfaction about the police and Dr. Zakir Husain's vague allegations about their activities add nothing further on which any action can be taken. The present strength and quality of the police force is well known and the only thing which we can do is to make the best of it. Of course there would be no hesitation in punishing any one of them against whom there is any evidence.

91. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 11 OCTOBER 1947

I am rather worried about developments in Delhi city. During the last week there has been a widespread acquisition of Muslim houses in the city, including Chandni-Chowk. The appointment of a Custodian, instead of stopping this process, has actually accelerated it because people wanted to take possession before anything definite was done. I understand that this process is being helped by the subordinate staff, including the police. This will naturally create grave complications for any future settlement of the problem.

In Mussoorie and Dehra Dun the same process was going on accompanied by looting. The UP Government took stringent measures and stopped it completely and as a consequence all looting, etc., has also stopped.

I have a feeling that there is not enough co-ordination between the district authorities and their superiors, that is to say, the Government of India's policy is not given effect to by the district authorities. I drew your attention the other day to a speech by Randhawa. Apart from the speech, his general view appears to be not at all in conformity with the policy we have laid down and he is continually saying this to people. In his meetings he is accompanied by others who are well known for their opposition to our present policy.

It seems to me that much of the trouble is not due to the Delhi citizens, but rather to a certain official element which is bent on carrying out a policy not in conformity with ours. Where any attempt is being made to further our policy, it succeeds, such as in Narela recently where Choudhari Sher Jung has brought about a very amicable arrangement among the people.

I suggest to you to consider that a change in officials in Delhi might be made. This would bring fresh minds to bear on these problems and there will be a greater chance of our solving them in conformity with our policy.

Very soon we are going to have the Dussehra celebrations. Round about this time also there is the Bakr Id. Every precaution should be taken to avoid any trouble then. There is no chance of the Muslims misbehaving then because they are thoroughly broken up and cowed down. There is a possibility of some further organised attacks being made upon them. I trust that this matter will be enquired into. From a number of sources, more or less independent of each other, I have learnt that the persons named below have been, and are, carrying on a very mischievous propaganda in Delhi City. I send these names to you for such action as you may think proper.

The names are :

In Kishanganj :        Dr. Bhagwan Das and Lala Hariram.  
In Rui ki Mandi :    Moolchand Vaid.

In Bara Hindu Rao : Manoharlal, Municipal Commissioner.  
In Faiz Bazar : Master Jubla.

There is one other matter to which I drew your attention in my last letter. There are a number of people in Purana Qila or Humayun's Tomb camps who are residents of those mohallas in Delhi city where Muslims still dwell. They have every desire to go back, but they have been kept back because of quarantine. The sooner these people are allowed to go back to these mohallas the better. There is no question of security involved, as they go back to the mohallas inhabited by Muslims still. This will relieve tension in Purana Qila and help in solving the problem.

92. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 11 OCTOBER 1947

I had a message from Govind Ballabh Pant to say that the way many of our newspapers are presenting news about the Punjab, in a rather one-sided way, is creating great excitement. He asked if something could not be done to tone down this presentation, so that a calmer atmosphere may prevail. He mentioned that the AIR broadcasts had also this exciting effect.

Some days ago Master Tara Singh gave a Press interview about Muslims in northern UP being made to leave; also in Delhi. As nothing was said by us in answer to this, people felt that this might be our policy. In a statement (by) Liaquat Ali Khan appearing today, it is stated that at last Sunday's conference in Lahore the Ministers from the Government of India present wanted to include Muslims from Delhi province and the western districts of the UP in the evacuation programme. All this is leading to numerous queries and excitement. The Nawab of Chhatari has written to me about this and is going to see me. Others have also enquired. I think this matter has to be cleared up. I propose to give a Press conference tomorrow afternoon.

I am afraid our Press is not very helpful. The recent statements published about the position in Hyderabad have not helped us. Again, the news about Mountbatten's going to London and somebody else taking his place had no basis in fact, so far as I know, except that Mountbatten does intend going there for a short period for the wedding (of Princess Elizabeth).

93. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 11 OCTOBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 11 October 1947.

I am glad you are giving a Press conference, and I hope you will give the Press some idea of how they should in the present emergency carry on their duties. The Standing Committee of the All-India Newspaper Editors Conference met in Bombay on 8 October. They had before them the consideration of a general code of conduct to be prescribed by them for newspapers. When Devdas (Gandhi) returns to Delhi, I shall know what happened to that proposal. **Before he left for Bombay,** I had a general discussion with him and Banerjee. Devdas and (J. N.) Sahni had a meeting in which they devised a tentative draft.

I am already writing separately to Gopalaswami Ayyangar to issue a statement dealing with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's statement about last Sunday's conference in Lahore and with Choudhary Khaliq-uz-Zaman's fulminations against the Congress for the so-called policy of ousting Muslims. I myself am issuing a statement in reply to Liaquat Ali Khan's criticism of my speech at Amritsar. I am afraid it is asking for the impossible if you expect Government to prevent the Press from publishing information which they secure (from) their own sources, which they apparently consider credible.

I am rather surprised to note Pantji mentioning the AIR broadcasts as having an exciting effect on the present distur-

bed conditions. AIR gives out mostly matters which it receives from official sources or reliable news agencies like the API (Associated Press of India). It does not, except in very exceptional circumstances, give news published by correspondents of individual papers. I myself am a habitual listener (to) AIR news broadcasts. If anything, AIR errs on the side of too much suppression. In fact, I have issued standing instructions that news regarding disturbances must be drastically curtailed, and whatever is given must be given in subdued terms. I have no reason to believe that AIR is not acting up to these instructions.

94. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 12 OCTOBER 1947

I am sorry your letter dated 30 September 1947 and the last paragraph of your letter dated 9 October regarding Randhawa, have remained unreplied so far owing to my various preoccupations and the rather varied problems which your other letters have raised.

2. As regards special police officers, I have already mentioned that out of 1,304 special police officers, 574 were Congress nominees. Indeed they were all that the Delhi Congress Committee had recommended and Randhawa accepted that recommendation without any question. Out of the remaining, 203 were recommended by various departments of the Government of India; 340 were selected and recruited according to the District Magistrate's instructions while 187 were a miscellaneous lot out of whom 95 men were selected from the Delhi Volunteers Board. This would seem to indicate that in selecting special police officers Randhawa did make an attempt to recruit special police officers from as wide a field of choice as possible. His own instructions applied to a bare one-third of the total number. If such a large organisation has to be created overnight, some relaxation of standard here and there is bound to result and if in addition the District

Magistrate has to be guided by the opinion of sections of people as to the desirability or otherwise of a person being taken in, his task even at the best of times would be impossible.

3. Similarly, I have mentioned that out of 49 Special magistrates, 19 were Congress nominees. The others were, as far as I can make out from Randhawa's statement, persons who commanded some influence in the various localities. As far as I am aware, no complaints of any special magistrate having taken a partisan attitude in the present disturbances has come to light. It would, in my submission, be wholly wrong to disqualify persons of influence from taking up these important jobs in an emergency merely because some disgruntled men feel that they are in the opposite camp.

4. I am rather surprised to hear that Randhawa's "sympathies lay in a certain direction and this perhaps prevented strong action", because I remember full well that only after a couple of days of the disturbances, Randhawa came to me and spoke in bitter terms about what the non-Muslims were doing against Muslims and expressed it as his firm opinion that Martial Law should be imposed throughout Delhi in order to bring the Hindus and Sikhs to their senses. I also recall the action which Randhawa took at the railway station when under his own supervision he had shot down about half a dozen non-Muslims who were found attacking Muslims on the platform. These actual facts taken with the opinion of Muslim leaders to which I have already referred would seem to indicate that any imputation of any particular sympathies to Randhawa would perhaps be unfair to him, particularly if they are based on information conveyed by those whom he had to disoblige.

5. In this connection, I would like to refer to the letter which you gave me from Saran Brothers regarding Randhawa having given a shop, of which they were the owners, to another person without their approval. The facts, as reported to me by Randhawa, are that Mr. Raghunandan Saran approached him and wanted the shop to be transferred to the landlord from a person who had occupied it after the Muslim tenant

had left. He gave Randhawa to understand that there were no complications and that the matter was a straightforward one. Randhawa, to my mind, indiscreetly passed an order transferring that shop to Saran Brothers. He should have referred Mr. Raghunandan Saran to a civil court or should have told him that it was none of his business to authorise the transfer of the shop. Nevertheless, he did so because he thought that the matter was entirely free from doubt. He was then approached by the ousted occupant who said that he was a partner with the Muslim tenant who had left and that if the transfer were made and the fruit shop, which was housed there, were not opened, he would incur considerable monetary loss. Thereupon Randhawa realised that his original order was wrong and had been obtained under representation of different circumstances and thereupon cancelled his previous order. He ordered that the possession should be given back to the person from whom it was originally delivered to Saran Brothers. In other words, the status quo was restored. It is difficult to say how far this instance has influenced Mr. Saran but before this, he was always appreciative of Randhawa and the first time I found him adopting a critical attitude was when he met me in connection with the representation of the Delhi Provincial Congress Committee.

6. Regarding Randhawa's public speeches, I thoroughly disapprove his addressing public meetings and have asked him not to do so any more. I was astonished when I first read that Randhawa had made a public speech, but I thought since he had seen you the previous night, it might be part of some peace propaganda settled there. However, immediately on hearing from you, I have stopped him from addressing any further meetings.

7. I have not referred to Randhawa the report which you have enclosed with your letter, but I am enclosing Press cuttings of the particular meetings to which that report refers and some others as well. It seems to me that whoever has supplied to you that report has torn portions out of the con-

text in order to present Randhawa's speech in its most unfavourable aspect.

8. I feel that in assessing the acts of commission and omission of the local administration we must give due regard to their difficulties. Half the police force was completely ineffective. Most of them either deserted or resigned in the midst of crises. Most of the other half had tainted sympathies. All of a sudden I had to ask for a loan of 300 police from the CP Government as there was a complete breakdown. These people were quite new to Delhi. The calls on the District Magistrate's time were too many. I realise this because I myself was receiving calls almost every fifteen minutes. In fact, I am surprised that Randhawa could stand the strain of it all and there was no breakdown. The Chief Commissioner's position was more difficult and delicate. I need not say anything here about him at present. The telephone communications in Delhi were particularly dislocated during this emergency. The result was that very often Randhawa had to go from station to station to see that the orders relating to rushing of police force etc., were executed. He himself had to rush from one area of disturbances to another not only in Delhi but also in the rural areas. I know that many things which should have been done and about which I personally gave orders, for example, immediate collection and recovery of collective fines, were not attended to with the promptness which we expected. I have already taken the local administration to task for these omissions, but I feel that we can judge these omissions in their correct perspective only if we take into consideration the most unusual circumstances which the local administration had to face and also allow for the fact that the chief police executive, the SSP, was completely ineffective and did not act with determination, decisiveness and forethought which were necessary either to prevent what happened or to stop it from getting worse.

9. Both you and I know that Randhawa has his defects, but on the whole, I feel that he has served Delhi and his Govern-

ment well. Nevertheless, if you still feel that there should be a change, I am prepared to give effect to your wishes, but I feel I should say that such a change is not likely either to create public confidence or to give any sense of security to the officers of the local administration. I feel that one of the redeeming features of the local administration has been that this officer did his duty well in the most trying circumstances and that the general public had the feeling that if they approached him they were certain of something being done to relieve their distress.

10. I also note what you say of the Chief Commissioner in paragraph 9 of your letter of 6 October 1947. There is no doubt that the local administration had virtually to be supplanted by the Emergency Organisation we had to set up in the Town Hall. I do not think we can disguise the fact that a large section of the population of Delhi suspects the Chief Commissioner, rightly or wrongly, of leanings towards the League. His contacts and relationship with some League personalities, some of whom were suspected of illicit possession of arms and ammunition, added to the intensity of public belief. One or two recent acts of his have filled me with some misgivings. Nevertheless, I feel that an immediate change would probably not be relished by, and might even fill with apprehensions, the Muslims of Delhi. Now that the Emergency Organisation has been wound up, the Chief Commissioner could function in the ordinary way, but of course we shall have to make allowance for the facts mentioned above.

11. After dictating the above, I have received your letter of 11 October.

12. I note your views on the need for a change in the Delhi officialdom. It is easy to make the change you desire; you have only to express your wish and I will execute it, but I feel bound to warn you that a change in present circumstances is fraught with serious consequences. Only this morning Suhrawardy was telling Ghanshyamdas (G. D. Birla) that Muslims held a very good opinion of Randhawa. His public speeches

which have attracted very large audiences seem to reflect on the whole the policy of the Government; the gatherings are an index of his popularity. I have no doubt that his transfer would evoke considerable public agitation apart from damping the ardour of an enthusiastic public servant and causing concern to the whole administrative set-up in Delhi. Moreover, we can replace Randhawa only from the Punjab cadre since the UP Government have told us more than once that they cannot spare any more officers. I doubt if any one from that cadre in these days would be a more suitable substitute.

13. I am afraid I have no evidence before me to believe that a systematic effort is being made by any official element to sabotage Government's policy. Howsoever much we might like officials to behave like gods, we have to take note of the fact that they are human beings and it is likely that in the case of a few officials here and there, their inward sympathies get the better of their discretion and they indulge in objectionable behaviour. The duty of public men of standing is, as I have made it clear to Congressmen visiting me with such vague imputations, to expose such men and to lead concrete evidence to prove their contentions. Instead, I am asked first to suspend them and then to collect evidence. It is obvious that such an action would, apart from being unfair and unjust, completely throw the administration out of gear.

14. I am not surprised that in Mussoorie and Dehra Dun the process of looting, etc. has stopped. I understand few Muslim shops have been left to be looted. The Daily Situation reports show that conditions are settling down in Delhi as well and once we can enforce peace it would not be difficult to turn out trespassers of yesterday or even today. But if we resort to simultaneous stringent action on all fronts with inadequate resources, police and military, we are inviting either ridicule of the administration's ineffectiveness or a breakdown of administrative machinery by giving it too much to do.

15. As regards the particular persons mentioned by you, I am authorising their arrest on the information given by you. I note that you have satisfied yourself about the veracity of your information.

16. As regards the last paragraph of your letter, the question of a quarantine is for the Health Ministry to advise. I am writing to H. M. Patel about it.

95. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 12 OCTOBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 12 October about the Delhi Administration. I am grateful to you for your having written to me at length on this subject. I thought it necessary to draw your attention to various facts coming from different sources to me. It is for you, with your more direct sources of information, to judge the position and to take such action as you may think fit and proper.

2. For me it is not easy to judge of individual officers without going deeply into the question. My general impression has been that the administration in Delhi has not functioned as effectively as it should have done and that it has been watered down very greatly by the addition of numbers of people who are more of a hindrance than a help. One can understand the natural feelings of officers coming from the Punjab and I am not prepared to blame them too much. But because of those feelings, they are not as effective as they should be in a crisis of this kind. When I suggested to you to replace some of these officers, it was more with an intention of bringing some fresh blood here than to punish in anyway any particular officer. But I realise that the choice is limited for you and it may be difficult to improve matters in this way.

3. When I was in Amritsar quite a number of people (Hindus) asked me if it was not possible to send some UP officers

there. They felt that a new element from another province would be free from local rivalries and jealousies.

4. I mentioned the names of, I think, four persons to you in my previous letter because I had heard persistent complaints about their activities from quite a number of independent persons, among them being several Congressmen. Then Indira (Gandhi) mentioned to me also that two or three of those persons were speaking openly in her presence against the Government's policy and asking people not to pay any attention to it. It seemed to me that this kind of open defiance should not be encouraged in anyway and they should be warned accordingly. I thought that some inquiry should be made and I asked Sanjevi (Director, Intelligence Bureau) to find out about these persons so that his report might be sent on to you. I do not yet know what this information is. I suggest that you might find out from him. I was not interested in their arrest unless specific reasons for their arrest were placed before you.

96. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 14 OCTOBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 12 October 1947.

With reference to para 4 of that letter, I had no indication in your letter that you had already referred the matter of the four persons against whom you had information to Sanjevi for further enquiry. Your letter gave me the impression that you had reliable information which you had verified from independent sources. I have, therefore, authorised their arrest on your information and they have already been arrested.

97. GOVIND BALLABH PANT TO SARDAR,  
DATED 21 OCTOBER 1947

I regret very much that I have been delayed in answering the letters I received from you during the last six or seven days. I have been slightly indisposed otherwise I would have probably seen you on the 17th or 18th. That also accounts for this delay.

I am glad to know that General Curtis will be replaced by Major-General Kulwant Singh. This will make the co-operation between the military and the civil authorities cordial and they will be able to work smoothly and I hope with redoubled vigour and efficiency. General Curtis was a hardened soldier and it had become rather difficult for him to readjust himself to his present environment and its growing needs and demands. Every time we stood in need of help from him we could bring him round to our point of view only after prolonged argument which called for considerable restraint and a great deal of persuasion on our part. I am certain that things will take a different turn on the arrival of Major-General Kulwant Singh. His own outlook will be in harmony with ours and we will be jointly able to overcome all obstacles and difficulties that may happen to come in our way. General Curtis himself told me that the Pakistan army personnel still in our midst here did not fall short of 10,000. He could not give me the exact figure, but I gathered from him that it would in no case be less than that number. I am relieved to learn that the matter is engaging your attention. Their presence in this province is a constant source of danger and anxiety and the sooner they leave the more secure will our people feel. Some of them are said to be also in charge of armouries, arsenals and ordnance depots. Even if their immediate removal to Pakistan be not feasible, I hope it will be found possible to transfer all arsenals, etc., to our own Indian Army.

The Nawab of Rampur has been constantly in touch with me. He has been writing to me almost every second day. Mr. Zaidi has also been seeing me off and on. I have tried to comply with their wishes, although it was not always easy to do so. We have provided a number of officers for police, revenue and other departments, have instructed all districts bordering on or in the neighbourhood of Rampur to render every possible help to the State and have taken steps to prevent the influx of Muslims from outside into Rampur. The Nawab has repeatedly expressed his appreciation of the attitude of this Government. I enclose herewith a copy of a letter which I received from him only recently. As you will notice, the last sentence in his letter runs as follows :

“It gives me great pleasure to recall how you have fulfilled to the letter your promise of helping me in my difficulties whenever I approached you.”

I received your letter about the recruitment of officers for the Pakistan Army from Aligarh University on the 17th. The matter had, however, attracted my attention some time earlier. The CID and the district authorities had been doing the needful. I am forwarding herewith a copy of all relevant papers from our file. The District Magistrate has sent us what purports to be a true copy of a letter received from the headquarters of Pakistan Adjutant-General's Branch to the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh (not printed). There is an endorsement on this letter by the Vice-Chancellor directing Captain S. M. Ali to take necessary action. Captain Ali has accordingly invited the students to see him with written applications giving full particulars. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents. I have, however, asked the Collector to take necessary steps to collect the original documents or to record necessary evidence, so that no room may be left for any formal objections or for tampering with or destroying authentic records. But I have already warned the University that if any steps

of the nature suggested by the Pakistan authorities are taken then this Government will take effective action according to law. He has, I think, made it known to the University that the Government are taking a serious view of this matter.

In all likelihood no one from Pakistan will now visit the University in this connection. It is, however, likely that a letter may be addressed by the University to the Government of India seeking their advice in this matter. But the University has already carried out the instructions received from the other end. Written applications had been invited from the students under the instructions of the Vice-Chancellor and a list of students from among whom the selection was to be made was also to be prepared under his orders. I think this was in every way wrong and improper. I had expressed my views in the note that I had recorded on the file. So I need not say more. As in all likelihood no officer from Pakistan is going to visit the University for this purpose and no overt action is going to be taken by any representative of Pakistan, there will be no occasion for setting the law in motion. But Aligarh University is mainly financed and fed by the Government of India. It gets a very substantial grant from the Centre. The Governor-General is, I think, the Chancellor of the University. So the Government of India can, if it so chooses, take disciplinary action against the University and exercise complete control over its affairs. . . . Various ways are open to it and it can deal with the matter in an effective manner without the least difficulty.

I am grateful to you for forwarding to me a copy of the letter sent to you by the Maharaja of Bharatpur. This is an old affair and I do not exactly remember the words that I used. But I am not prepared to say that the Press report attached to his letter, so far as it affects Bharatpur is not substantially correct. What I said was called for and perfectly justified. I do not know if you are aware of the propaganda that had been actively carried on in and around Bharatpur about the establishment of an independent

Jat State. It had created uneasiness and a certain amount of panic in Mathura. Besides the Meos, a goodly number of non-Jat Hindus had also migrated from Bharatpur. The Maharaja was, I believe, actively associated with this propaganda. Bharatpur had begun to entertain fantastic dreams at that time. I was told that a new army was being actually raised for the conquest of Mathura and certain other parts. You will be interested to see an appeal by one of his men which I am enclosing herewith (not printed). I had no doubt about the truth of the reports that had reached me. All this was having a very demoralising effect. It was necessary to scotch it. What I said had a salutary and heartening effect. Only once did I mention Bharatpur as I did not think that it was worthy of greater attention. That was enough for restoring confidence which had been shaken in those parts.

I think I have dealt with all out standing matters. If there is still anything left over I shall include it in my next letter. On the whole the situation seems to be easier. There have been no serious incidents during the last week or two. Dussehra and Id are, however, fast approaching. If these festivals are celebrated in a normal way without any breach of the peace, I hope there will be no recrudescence of deterioration thereafter.

I enclose herewith two telegrams exchanged between me and the Refugee Minister of Pakistan. You may be interested in particular in seeing the telegram that I sent him. (not printed—Denies allegations of communal incidents in the U. P., strongly deprecates Pakistani interference with provincial affairs. Emphasises that Provincial Government is responsible to Indian Dominion Government only.)

98. SARDAR TO GOVIND BALLABH PANT,  
DATED 23 OCTOBER 1947

I have just received your letter of the 21st instant giving the detailed replies (to) several questions pending and I thank you for the same.

Major-General Kulwant Singh will be coming there in about a week's time, the delay being due to General Cariappa going to England on special duty. We are trying to weed out Pakistani Army personnel as quickly as possible. We have to work against odds.

I am glad you are helping Rampur as much as possible and Rampur Nawab appreciates your help. We are equally interested in maintaining peace in Rampur as the large bulk of the population in Rampur is of Hindus, who are a timid lot and get nervous and panicky at the least disturbance of peace anywhere near about.

Regarding the Aligarh University question, the Government of India would certainly take suitable action if the Pakistan Government persist in their efforts to temper with the loyalty of the institution. We cannot allow the University to be used as a base for recruiting candidates for their army officers. I have seen copies of correspondence sent by you and I am glad that you have taken prompt action in the matter.

Some of the Princes, particularly the smaller ones, have begun to feel that power is slipping from the Union Government's hands and they think that now is the opportunity for them to revert to pre-British days. Bharatpur is one of them and we have to handle it carefully. I am glad you have sent me the leaflet published under the signature of Dhruva Singh. I have also got a report from Shankar Prasad from Ajmer

quoting chapter and verse about raids and dacoities organised and committed by gangs of Jats under the leadership of Bharatpur's brother. I am collecting facts about Bharatpur's maladministration and misconduct during these troubled times and if I get sufficient evidence I propose to set an example so that others may take heed of our action.

Your reply to Fazlur Rahman, Refugee Minister of Pakistan, is good, but I think it would have been better not to have any direct correspondence with any representative of Pakistan Government. They should not be encouraged to have direct contact from provinces, but they should be referred to the Dominion Government.

I am glad things are under control in UP. The Punjab troubles have put considerable strain on the border districts in your province; but thank God you have escaped the fate which overtook Delhi. We had a hard time, but we are getting the upper hand now, although there is considerable room for anxiety.

99. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 23 OCTOBER 1947

Please refer to your letter of 18 October 1947 regarding searches. The orders about searches are clear and unequivocal. No outgoing passengers are to be searched at all and searches of incoming passengers are to be conducted only where there is a definite and well-founded suspicion that unlicensed firearms and ammunition are being brought into Delhi. It is clear that if any police officer gives a twist to these instructions or claims orders from any higher authority, he is deliberately ignoring the orders or finding an excuse for his exceeding the instructions.

2. You had an occasion to complain about the search of Suhrawardy and about which you spoke to Shankar some

time ago. Enquiries were made and it transpired that Suhrawardy himself was not searched at Palam aerodrome when he returned to Delhi from Calcutta, but his luggage was. He was not subjected to any harassment whatsoever. On another occasion the Special Police and the local police at Willingdon aerodrome were going to examine his luggage but eventually did not do so when they learnt of his identity.

3. As regards Sir Sultan Ahmed, when he was approached by our SP, he was unaware of any search and was surprised to learn that any search had at all taken place. His private secretary told the SP that Sir Sultan Ahmed left Delhi for Hyderabad on 28-9-1947 and returned on 30th September 1947 by Deccan Airways. He was not searched on 28-9-47, but on 30th September, his luggage was searched along with the luggage of other passengers partly because the CP Government had given an intimation that by this plane, which was coming from Hyderabad, some illicit arms were being smuggled and partly because a telephonic conversation had been intercepted between Hyderabad House and Hyderabad which confirmed CP's report and showed that some Bren guns and Sten guns had been asked for by the Hyderabad House staff. In view of this, I think it was a reasonable precaution to take to search the luggage of passengers coming from Hyderabad that day.

4. As regards Dr. Syed Hussain's luggage, it has been ascertained that he travelled by air from Calcutta on the 15th inst. arriving at Palam at about 12 or 12.30. After the passengers had alighted and their luggage had been put outside the main waiting hall, the luggage of Muslim passengers was set aside under instructions of an aerodrome officer and then searched by the police. The persons of men and women were not searched. This is the information given to the SP by Dr. Syed Hussain himself and bears out the police officer's report as well. The police officer conducting searches undoubtedly exceeded his authority and gave a false excuse for his action.

This particular officer has been transferred and departmentally dealt with.

5. I am sure you will agree that the present instructions which I have mentioned in para 1 above are necessary and searches must be carried out in accordance with those instructions. We are not yet out of the wood in Delhi and we cannot rule out the possibility of attempts being made to import illicit arms into Delhi. We must retain, therefore, the liberty to search persons and luggage suspected of importing illicit arms. What is, therefore, necessary is to see that these instructions are strictly adhered to by the police officials responsible for searches at aerodromes. I am writing to the IGP to tell these officials that any abuse of these instructions and/or any improper conduct in relation to these searches would be severely dealt with.

6. The IGP has also sent to me a copy of the letter which he received from the Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations wing of your Ministry. It is dated 20 October 1947, and quotes your order and asks for a report in the course of the day. I am doubtful if the letter is issued with your authority. Since you had already written to me on the subject on the 18th and since I was already seized of the matter, there was hardly any point in the IGP being approached direct by your Secretary on the same matter. I feel that it is only right and proper that such matters should be brought to my notice in first instance and should not be taken up direct with the officers serving under me. Some time ago I suggested that any matter on which you desired information or wanted comments should either be referred to me by you or to my private secretary by your Secretariat. Apparently that suggestion has not been followed up and has resulted again in duplication and unnecessary effort which it was the object of my suggestion to avoid. I would, therefore, request you to ask your office to follow the procedure suggested by me.

100. SARDAR TO NAWAB OF CHHATARI,  
DATED 25 OCTOBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 18 October 1947 (not printed — suggesting definite and practical gestures of goodwill to minorities in India and Pakistan). I much appreciate the sentiments which you have expressed therein. Jawaharlal has in his speech after speech expressed the mind of the Government that they are determined to see normal conditions restored and to give all possible protection to the minorities. He has also mentioned that there was no question of India becoming a religious State. Indeed, the Congress Working Committee resolution on this subject is clear and unequivocal. None of us spared any words in condemnation of the brutalities and atrocities which have been perpetrated on this side. On the other hand, you will notice that the declarations of Mr. Jinnah generally ascribe all the brutalities to India and gloss over the events on the other side. The latter are regarded merely as incidental and of comparatively little consequence. I hope, therefore, that the appeal which you have made to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr. Ghulam Mohammad will have some effect and that we shall get an unequivocal declaration on the lines which you suggest. I am sure such a declaration will have a good effect.

101. MAHARAJA OF PATIALA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1947

Information has reached me that a very large number of 'birs' (volumes) of Shri Guru Granth Sahib are now in Sargoda, Gurdwara Bhai Dayal at Multan and other Gurdwaras in the West Punjab. At Multan there are also some very old records and books of great historic importance and

value to the Sikh community, which are at present guarded by a small band of Sikhs at considerable peril to themselves. As you are no doubt aware, the sanctity that the Sikhs attached to Shri Guru Granth Sahibs is so great that the danger of their defilement is likely to provide the greatest provocation. I am, therefore, writing to you to do whatever may be possible to get these 'birs' and historical records and books, together with the men who are now there, out with as little delay as possible. I would strongly urge that the quickest method should be employed for this purpose so that the community becomes reassured.

Besides this the protection and maintenance of our historic shrines on the other side is also deeply agitating the Sikh community. The present position seems to be that only a few sewadars are looking after the shrines, but even they are in constant danger and without adequate protection. Since there are also Muslim shrines in the East Punjab, I would suggest that arrangements on a reciprocal basis should be made with the West Punjab Government that all these shrines are looked after by those people on both sides who want to stay there and who should be provided adequate protection for the purpose. I consider this matter also of supreme importance, because such an assurance on both sides is likely to go a long way to avoid further deterioration of the situation. I am writing this to you as I know you to be a friend of the Khalsa (Sikh community).

I am sending a copy of this letter to Pandit Nehru and Sardar Baldev Singh as well, and shall be grateful if the Government of India would interest themselves actively in this matter with the least possible delay and take necessary action.

102. MAHARAJA OF PATIALA TO SARDAR.

DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1947

The holocaust through which the Punjab has recently passed, and from which we have not yet emerged altogether, has brought considerable ruin, as you know, on the Sikh community in particular, as their losses in life and property are so enormous. The Sikhs have practically been crippled economically and politically, and their condition is deplorable. But the tragedy is further heightened by the fact that a very well organised propaganda is being carried on against them in America, Great Britain and other places outside India to fasten the guilt of blood upon them, although they are themselves the victims. I am sure you would agree that the Sikhs do not deserve it. They have been loyal to India in the past and no assurance is necessary that they will remain so in the future. They have fought for their mother-country and brought glory to her. It will be their pride to practise that high ideal always. As such it is only natural that they should look to the Government of India for protection from such malicious attempt to paint them black. It is only the powerful effort of the Dominion Government which can counteract this ugly campaign outside India.

It is not in any spirit of bargaining that this suggestion is being made, but in the fullest confidence that the Government of India would feel that the community has to be rehabilitated not only within the country itself, but its position and name cleared up outside as well. They are entitled to assistance and protection from all those whom they regard as their well-wishers, and the Government of India are surely looked upon by them as such.

The Sikhs are not unmindful of the promises of support that they have received so far, and also realise that such

assurances do buck them up, but the present situation is so perilous that something much more substantial is necessary to be done for this small community. If this is not forthcoming it is very difficult to say that they will be able to stick up much longer. There is the threat of war and the threat of famine. With the huge losses they have already suffered and the danger that lurks in the present situation they are really face to face with complete extinction. There are people who still want to continue giving blows to them and it seems as if the Sikhs will have to fight a losing battle if they do not receive the immediate and powerful support of the Government of India. I feel that it is time that the Cabinet took up all these matters, which are of immediate importance.

I would not have troubled you with this letter if I had not thought that the question brooks no delay. There are several other questions which affect the Panth, which can wait, and may be taken up later on, but this one needs immediate attention. They feel that they have been harmed almost beyond recovery.

103. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1947

You must have heard of the plight of the refugees in Karnal, Panipat, etc. I am greatly disturbed at the way the East Punjab Government is dealing with this matter. They cast the blame on us for everything although the Central Government is doing its utmost to help them and the refugees. This is a completely irresponsible way of functioning. Again the Sikhs or some of them are misbehaving very much in various places. The Home Department and the police in the East Punjab are dominated by the Sikh element. Unless something about this is done, the Hindus of the East Punjab will suffer very greatly as they are suffering now. I enclose a copy of a telegram I am sending to Dr. Gopichand Bhargava.

The condition of East Punjab refugees in Delhi is also very bad. Some of the small camps, like Wavell Canteen, are full to overflowing and the railway station is in a very bad way. While we should try to stop this influx, we cannot leave these people in their present state.

We have been anxious not to open a new camp but I really see no way out of the difficulty except by opening a refugee camp for Hindus and Sikhs. This need not be on a very big scale and no protection will be necessary for them as in the case of the Muslims. If we do not do this, these people, wandering about Delhi and squatting down (at) odd places, will do harm to themselves and to us.

104. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 4 November 1947. I have seen the telegram which you have sent to Dr. Gopichand Bhargava. I entirely agree with you that the administration of the East Punjab requires tightening up. The whole point is that the Services there are so deeply affected, both personally and intimately, by recent events in the Punjab that efficient and impartial administration seems to be most difficult to secure. The outlook of the general public, be it Hindu or Sikh, finds a responsive echo among the Services. As regards the Cabinet, you know what is wrong and where.

The cumulative effect of all these factors is that the whole tone of the administration has deteriorated. What we can do to restore this is a problem which has been continually disturbing me. I hope your telegram meets with some effective response.

I agree that the influx of refugees, much against our will and policy, has been creating a most difficult problem. Rather than open a camp here, I would suggest that we arrange to send as many of them as possible to the camp at Kurukshetra.

In addition, we have the problem of refugees from Kashmir. Some 1,000 are lodged in Birla Mandir alone. They would probably have nowhere else to go and have to be kept in Delhi.

The Chief Commissioner of Delhi sometime ago had set up a committee to deal with refugees. I do not know how far that has functioned, since the matter soon after became the concern of the refugee Ministry. I have no objection to another camp being opened for these refugees, provided we at the same time ensure that the influx of further refugees in Delhi is effectively controlled. You will doubtless take up these matters with the Minister for Refugees.

105. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1947

You have already received a letter from His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala regarding some sacred and historical records and books of Sikhs and the Sikh shrines in the West Punjab. I feel that we must tackle this question as promptly as possible, otherwise even if we are able to carry through the programme of exchange of population this sore point would remain to disturb seriously the peace between the two provinces and finally the two dominions. The subject needs, in my opinion, comprehensive treatment and the best way to deal with it would perhaps be to go into it at your next meeting with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.

2. If you agree, I shall inform the Maharaja of Patiala accordingly.

106. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF PATIALA,  
DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 2 November 1947.

2. I need hardly say how much I appreciate the Sikh sentiments on the question of propaganda which has been spread in foreign countries about their responsibility for the recent disturbances and about the extent and magnitude of the atrocities committed. During my several discussions with you and other Sikh leaders I have never failed to present this question in its true perspective. In all our directives to foreign embassies and our information services we have asked them to present these disturbances in their true historical background tracing their origin right from 16 August last year when the League launched its Direct Action movement in Calcutta. We have also emphasised how the disturbances in the East Punjab were the direct consequence not only of the atrocities perpetrated on non-Muslims in the western Punjab during March but also of the ceaseless propaganda of hate carried out by the League and their shouting from the housetops that the Sikh bluff had been called. In my own talks with foreign correspondents, I have not failed to emphasise this aspect. I feel, judging from the reports, that on the whole this counter-propaganda has been having beneficial results and that people outside are beginning to realise increasingly that the blame does not rest entirely on Sikhs but has to be shared by other communities as well. You will notice that in my latest statement in reply to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's broadcast I made particular mention of this point.

3. From this I am sure you will realise that we are doing as much as we can to counter the propaganda to which you refer. You can depend on it that we shall continue to do so as long as it is necessary.

107. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 NOVEMBER 1947

Your letter of the 14th about the sacred books of the Sikhs in the West Punjab. Some days ago I telegraphed to the Pakistan Government and the West Punjab Government about these books. I do not think any reply has come. This matter might well be taken up at our next meeting with the Pakistan Ministers.

108. SARDAR TO K. C. NEOGY,  
DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1947

I have just now seen an office memorandum signed by (S. K.) Kirpalani intimating that it has been decided that houses in certain predominantly Muslim mohallas in Delhi, which have fallen vacant, should not be let to non-Muslim refugees, but given instead only to Muslims so that certain mohallas could form compact Muslim blocks in the city. As far as I know, there is no Cabinet decision on this matter. If any such decision was reached, it is obvious that it has wide repercussions from the internal security point of view and I feel that I, as Home Minister, should have been consulted before this decision was reached.

2. The dangers and evils of predominantly Muslim or predominantly Hindu areas in the city or outside have been clearly and unmistakably emphasised during the last disturbances. I thought we should be wise after this experience, but I regret to find that the decision which has been notified to all of us is going to perpetuate these dangers and instead of increasing mutual confidence and trust between the major communities it is going to create eye-sores and miniature Pakistans and Hindustans in the whole city.

3. I should be grateful if you would kindly apprise me of the circumstances leading to this decision and would also withhold the implementation of those orders until the matter has been considered in all its aspects and a policy decision taken, (copy sent to Jawaharlal Nehru).

109. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1947

I have your letter of the 21st enclosing a copy of the letter sent to Neogy.

2. I have not seen Iengar's letter to which you refer. But probably it was based on a talk I had with him. Nobody likes compact Muslim or any such blocks in a city. The normal population of a city should be evenly divided. The problem however was not of having a compact Muslim block but of preventing trouble spreading to those two or three areas in Delhi city where Muslims still live in some numbers. Cases have been reported to me where houses vacated by Muslims in a predominantly Muslim mohalla were occupied by non-Muslims, usually Sikhs. Immediately petty trouble arose there between the new-comers and the old residents and this tended to grow. The Muslims in that mohalla were threatened by the new-comers and in view of the prevailing atmosphere these Muslims were frightened and many of them left their houses and went to Humayun's tomb.

3. As I understood our policy, it was to create conditions of security for those Muslims to live in Delhi as well as those who had left Delhi and might want to come back. We have so far failed to create that feeling to any appreciable extent, with the result that the population of Humayun's tomb has increased. If this process continues there is little doubt that more and more resident Muslims of Delhi will be forced by circumstances to leave the city.

4. As you know, this matter was repeatedly discussed in the Emergency Committee meeting and the general direction given

was that Muslims should be encouraged to remain in the areas they live in and nothing should be done to create any apprehension in their minds. The recent AICC decisions went much further in this respect and even stated that Muslim houses which have been vacated under pressure of events should not be given to refugees. In fact the whole policy laid down by the AICC is to prevent a Muslim exodus and to keep the door open for Muslims to return to their original homes. How far it is possible to keep houses vacated by Muslims vacant in very large numbers is exceedingly doubtful, especially where the whole areas have been so vacated. The question then arises as to what we should do with empty houses in the few predominantly Muslim localities. It seems to be inevitable that if these houses are handed over to non-Muslims, there will be continuing trouble and the impression will grow that we want to drive out the remaining Muslims from the city. That would be a direct contradiction of what we have stated and (of) the policy laid down by the AICC.

5. As things are today it is an unfortunate fact that frightened people tend to leave and to go for security and self-protection. Very few Muslims can find houses or any security in predominantly non-Muslim areas. I hope that some time later this difficulty will cease to operate and a mixed and balanced population will grow up. Meanwhile we have to face the situation as it is and there seems to be no way out, if we have to adhere to our professions, than to avoid giving houses vacated by Muslims in a predominantly Muslim mohalla to non-Muslims.

6. There is also the question of some Muslims wanting to go back to Delhi city from some camp or wherever they might be. Where are they to go ? Also there is a relatively minor question of some Congress Muslims who have been turned out of their homes elsewhere finding some place to live in. We have to find answers to these questions.

7. When I was informed that actually some Sikhs had taken possession of some houses in a Muslim mohalla and created

trouble there and as a consequence neighbouring Muslims were leaving their houses, I told Iengar to mention to Kripalani that this kind of thing must not be encouraged and that such Muslim houses should not be given over to others. I suppose that in pursuance of this that Iengar wrote his letter.

8. I am told that there is trouble in Bara Hindu Rao because of some similar development there. I feel that if we are serious about the policy we have laid down we must not only clearly state it but see that it is acted upon. Any half-hearted attempt to implement it would be unfortunate and would lead to confusion and failure.

9. If you feel that what I have stated above is not a correct policy for us, I shall gladly put up this matter before the Cabinet. Indeed it is desirable that the directions given by the AICC should be considered by the Cabinet in their entirety, that is, insofar as they apply to the situation confronting us. I was in fact going to send copies of these resolutions to the provincial Prime Ministers as well as to some Members of our Cabinet who are dealing with these matters.

110. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 21 November 1947. I need hardly say that I am in entire agreement with the policy laid down by the AICC. I also fully agree that the Cabinet should consider at an early date in what manner we should apply the directions of the AICC to the situation which is confronting us.

2. It is because I sincerely felt and still feel that the creation of Muslim pockets would be directly contrary to that policy that I ventured to take this matter up with Neogy. Creation of Muslim pockets in the city would not restore conditions of security. Instead it would lead to constant friction and

conflict between rival camps entrenched in their respective positions. I also feel that the mere fact that a certain number of wrong type of persons settled in some localities have given rise to some trouble should not be decisive. We could replace them by better elements. It is also difficult to believe that in a predominantly Muslim locality a few non-Muslims could create a situation which would compel Muslims to leave the locality. The answer in such cases is to replace the unruly elements and to make adequate security arrangements to ensure that this kind of mixed locality prospers rather than vanishes. I also feel that the notion that Muslims can feel or can be given a sense of security only in Muslim mohallas is a negation rather than corollary of the AICC resolution. In any case Muslims from outside should not be imported into mohallas of Delhi.

3. In these circumstances, I would suggest that the matter had better be discussed by the Cabinet before any further action is taken to implement the proposal.

111. K. C. NEOGY TO SARDAR,  
DATED 25 NOVEMBER 1947

I am enclosing copy of a letter received by me from Miss Mridulaben Sarabhai. As the letter raises an important issue, viz., the transfer of a considerable number of Muslims from a district in East Punjab to Delhi, I should be grateful if you kindly let me have your views in the matter.

ENCLOSURE

112. EXTRACT FROM MRIDULA SARABHAI'S LETTER,  
DATED 22-11-47 TO SHRI K. C. NEOGY

I met Maulana Haqim Sharifuddin Sahib care of Gali Talin Nawab Darwaja, Karnal, of the Jammiat-Ulema. He wants to collect his workers and supporters from Karnal dist. and bring them to Delhi for rehabilitation in places where they have relatives or friends. He would like to have a truck and an escort at his disposal. This I think is not difficult to do and therefore I have promised him to do so within four days.

It is difficult to say what their number will be, but is expected to be between 20,000 and 30,000 or even more. The Government of India will have to start a special camp for them in Karnal.

113. SARDAR TO K. C. NEOGY,  
DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 25 November 1947. The present policy of Government is quite clear. It is definitely against the influx of any refugees whatsoever from anywhere to Delhi. It is, therefore, out of the question for us to facilitate any influx of refugees. In my view, therefore, we should have nothing to do with the attempts on the part of Maulana Haqim Sharifuddin to collect his followers in this city.

114. ABUL KALAM AZAD TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1947

The position of Muslims, especially the business community, in Delhi has become very precarious. In Chandni Chowk only three or four Muslim shops are left. From reliable reports received by me, it appears that non-Muslims go to the shopkeepers daily and threaten them with naked swords if they still refuse to evacuate and even snatch away their goods. One shopkeeper, Mohd. Shafi, who has been a genuine Congressman for the last fifteen years and who was boycotted by the Muslim Leaguers, is one such sufferer. This poor man at least expected to be given some protection and special consideration looking to his political affiliation; but unfortunately even his shop is visited daily by these gangs and when he appeals to the police, nothing is done.

I should be grateful if you could kindly let me know what advice in these circumstances I can give to these Muslim shopkeepers of Chandni Chowk.

115. SARDAR TO ABUL KALAM AZAD,  
DATED 5 DECEMBER 1947

In continuation of my letter dated 3 December 1947 (not printed—acknowledgment), I am enclosing a copy of the report (not printed) which I have received from the Superintendent of Police, Delhi, on the situation in Delhi with particular reference to the case of Mr. Mohd. Shafi. I also give below a copy of the forwarding remarks of the DIG Police :

“I am enclosing herewith a copy of a report submitted by Fairhall who, as you know, is Superintendent of Police in charge Delhi city. Fairhall has rather put the

matter strongly, but I agree with him on facts, and cannot think of any reason why Mohd. Shafi did not approach him while Fairhall is present within 300 yards of Mohd. Shafi's shop.

“Regarding the general position in Chandni Chowk and other places in the city, there has been a great improvement during the last few weeks. But it is impossible to ensure that no crime is committed in a big city. What I want to prevent is a general feeling of lawlessness and I am glad to say that this has been checked to a great extent.”

I have nothing to add to these remarks.

116. K. C. NEOGY TO SARDAR,  
DATED 8 DECEMBER 1947

I enclose copy of a letter (Serial No. 117) which I have received from the Prime Minister, and shall be obliged if you kindly let me have your opinion on this proposal for my personal guidance.

117. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO K. C. NEOGY,  
DATED 3 DECEMBER 1947

Your office has to deal with large numbers of refugees and I have often suggested to you that you should have a competent staff to interview refugees and give them some mental relief, if nothing more. Most of your refugees are naturally Hindu or Sikh but in Delhi specially and partly from the neighbouring districts, many Muslims also go to your office. I think it would be highly desirable if you engaged some Muslims in your office temporarily, at least to deal with these Muslim evacuees, who would be able to approach them in a more friendly way than a non-Muslim.

This suggestion has been made to me by Maulana Azad and I entirely agree with it. I suggest that in appointing some such officers, you might consult Maulana Azad who would probably be able to suggest a suitable name.

118. SARDAR TO K. C. NEOGY,  
DATED 9 DECEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 8 December 1947.

I do not think we can accept the principle that persons belonging to one community should be appointed to deal with members of that community nor would it be desirable to concede that a non-Muslim Government servant is less friendly disposed to a Muslim evacuee.

Apart from these objections in principle, I do not think you have any large number of Muslim evacuees to deal with. The Muslim evacuees have either shifted to Pakistan or to a camp. I believe that the latter are already being looked after by Muslim personnel.

If you agree to accept the communal principle, you will have to accept the claim of Sikhs also.

119. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 9 DECEMBER 1947

I am enclosing a note which, if you agree, might be circulated to the Cabinet for discussion at its next meeting.

ENCLOSURE

120. NOTE FOR THE CABINET

Reference Cabinet decision on Thursday, 4 December 1947, regarding predominantly Muslim mohallas.

I have been carefully considering the implications of that decision and feel that before it is implemented my colleagues should be apprised of certain facts which, in my view, are essential to a consideration of this problem. The predominantly Muslim mohallas had before these disturbances began a small percentage of Hindu houses. According to a rough calculation, Balimaran and Lal Kuan had about 100, Phatak Habash Khan 60 and Pul Bangesh 100. Most of the Hindus had to leave their houses in the September rioting, but many of them have now come back and have re-occupied those houses. During the previous riots of November 1946 in these localities 14 Hindus were killed and 57 injured and during the riots of March 1947 five Hindus were killed and 13 were injured. This would seem to suggest that in times of disturbances it is the non-Muslims rather than the Muslims who require protection and the creation of Muslim mohallas would merely mean the creation in times of disturbances of pockets in which the lawless elements amongst Muslims would have full sway.

2. I have also received a suggestion from the Delhi Administration that in the vacant houses in the so-called 'Muslim mohallas' Government servants who have come from Pakistan and who would be subject to our control should be settled so that there would be no danger to the Muslims from any lawless elements and owing to the presence of Government servants there there was bound to be a greater sense of security. I feel that the suggestion is a sound one and should be accepted.

3. As regards the further question of importing Muslim refugees from outside, I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the latest report from the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, in which he makes the following statement:

"If the influx of refugees continues unchecked, the situation will again deteriorate. The entire brunt of the Punjab population movement has been borne by Delhi as the UP Government no longer allow refugees to enter their

province. The results of such a policy have been seen in September last. If peace is to be maintained in the Capital, it is desirable that the surplus refugee population must be shifted elsewhere and further influx of refugees must be stopped. A population equilibrium has been established and Muslims are slowly acquiring a sense of security."

121. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 12 DECEMBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

2. After my return from the Cabinet meeting, I saw the note circulated by the Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry regarding the houses vacated by the Muslims in Delhi with particular reference to predominantly Muslim mohallas. I was particularly struck by the following statement:

"No break-up can be provided as the survey of houses cannot be safely undertaken by Hindus in Muslim areas. There are also very few vacancies as the owners have made some kind of arrangement for looking after their houses in their absence."

I am wondering whether the assumption on which our discussions in the Cabinet were based, namely, that Muslims in predominantly Muslim mohallas suffered from a sense of insecurity is correct. If a Hindu official cannot even dare go into Muslim areas and whether, having regard to the actual dimensions of the problem, as revealed by this statement, all this attention to this problem was worth giving.

122. SARDAR TO BALDEV SINGH,  
DATED 22 DECEMBER 1947

I am enclosing in original a letter which I have received from Dr. Gopichand Bhargava and Sardar Swaran Singh. I understood from you that the question of defence of the frontier was engaging the attention of the Commander-in-Chief. I feel that the Sikhs and Hindus of the East Punjab are very considerably, and for good reasons, exercised over this problem and we should take immediate action to allay their anxiety. The matter, as far as I see, can brook no delay. I hear that the Pakistan Government have made arrangements to settle Frontier Pathans within a belt of the territory near the Indian border. This in itself shows that we should be extremely vigilant. If necessary, you can seek early orders of the Cabinet on this problem.

2. In the meantime, the provincial Government is organising a National Volunteer Corps and a sort of local militia. In the public meeting at Amritsar I myself made it clear that the Central Government would not hesitate to supply arms if people knew how to utilise them on the right lines. I feel that there is no getting away from ensuring local co-operation in the defence of the frontier and the only way to do so is in the first place to give the reliable element of this population the means to defend themselves and to demonstrate to them that we are making the necessary preparations.

3. I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible what action is being taken.

CHAPTER 5

SARDAR AND THE INTEGRATION OF  
INDIAN STATES

*INTRODUCTORY NOTE*

THE INDIAN STATES

The period of 4½ years during which Sardar was Deputy Prime Minister of India was notable for his many achievements as a statesman but the most important of his contributions to Indian polity was undoubtedly the integration of the Indian States. The enduring nature of achievement in building a political edifice in India in the course of a little over two years, in place of five hundred odd separate entities, earned for him the noble title of the architect of the country's unity. The achievement confounded the prophets of doom, the most illustrious of whom was the late Winston Churchill. This achievement also laid the foundations of Indian unity, which was so vital to its prosperity and greatness. An India divided would have been a prey to destructive forces, an irremovable obstacle to its economic progress, and an irretrievable blow to the prestige which was its due among the nations of the world. An India united provided a sure base for economic planning and growth and an indispensable take-off point for the implementation of its foreign policy, and for building up its foreign relations.

Nevertheless, the magnitude of the achievement can be appreciated only with an understanding of the nature of the problem that faced Sardar when he was fashioning the scheme of transfer of power. Today, whatever may be disruptive forces that threaten the country, the political solidarity **and integrity established by Sardar's statesmanship still holds.** When the Government of India, in utter disregard of solemn

commitments, decided in 1971 to use its massive Parliamentary majority to fight another battle against the Rulers of Indian States, to deprive them of their privy purses and their recognised Status as Rulers, it was merely putting on a brave act and riding a coach and pair through the Constitution; it was using all its big guns to deprive some three hundred individuals of certain payments guaranteed to them by the founders of Indian independence; but there was hardly any recollection or recognition of a historic process without parallel in the annals of any country.

The background to the problem of Indian States can be briefly stated. In numbers they were over 500; the largest of them, Hyderabad, had an area of over 82000 sq. miles and the smallest of them was just a few acres in extent. In the case of all States of any considerable size the Rulers exercised very considerable, in fact practically full, internal autonomy. However, there were a number of small units under "semi-jurisdictional" and "non-jurisdictional" chiefs. In the case of these semi-jurisdictional units the powers of the ruling chiefs were severely restricted within prescribed limits; and in the case of the non-jurisdictional chiefs they had no powers at all. These 'semi-' and 'non-' jurisdictional chiefs were a feature of Gujarat and **Kathiawar. A peculiar feature of these States was that all the powers in respect of these States other than those which the Rulers were competent to exercise were exercised on their behalf by the British Government through the Viceroy and his officers.** In extent, the Indian states comprised an area of over 600,000 square miles and were scattered all over the Indian sub-continent from Travancore in the farthest South to Kashmir in the North and Tripura in the East to Kalat in the West.

The peculiar doctrine evolved for governing the relations with the States was called Paramountcy. The doctrine of Paramountcy was the direct result of the system of subsidiary alliances initiated by Wellesley early in the nineteenth Century and practically completed by the days of the Marquis of Hastings who brought all States within its scope. Paramountcy

meant that the States accepted the Suzerainty of the British Government and the Government of India; ceased to have any right to foreign relations; were bound to carry out directions given to them by the Government of India. It was convenient to the British Government to refuse to define Paramountcy. The Butler Committee contented itself by saying that Paramountcy must remain paramount. Many were the acts of interference of varying degrees which acquired sanction under the umbrella of Paramountcy. Equally many were the sins of omission and commission committed by the Rulers under the protection of the paramount power. By and large, this sheltered existence made many Rulers the guardians of *status quo*, reaction and orthodoxy. It is to the credit of many others, such as Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, Bikaner, Travancore and Cochin that they, notwithstanding the existence of this massive great power, brought to bear on their administration the refreshing breath of freedom and enlightenment.

In order to stem the tide of advance towards popular rule in India a new doctrine was evolved in 1937. Until the Government of India Act of 1935 came into force, the Governor-General in Council, as the authority responsible for the civil and military governance of India, was in charge of relations with the Indian States as well. But as from 1 April 1937, when that Act came into force, there was established in India a separate authority for looking after the States. The authority was the Crown Representative, an office created at the time the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force; the machinery however continued to be the existing political Department which, in relation to what was described as the relations of the Crown with the Indian States, functioned under the Crown Representative. The Political Department consisted of a corps of officers, some drawn from the Army and some from I. C. S. which looked after the Indian States and the External Affairs of the Government of India and also furnished the senior administrative posts in the North-west Frontier Province and British Baluchistan. The officers selected for

service in the Indian States (known as Residents) were practically all Europeans. There were separate Residents for Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu & Kashmir. The others dealt with groups of States. Through these local officers the Crown Representatives exercised considerable influence over the Governments and Rulers of the States. Formal interventions, depositions of Rulers for gross mis-government and other similar drastic steps were not very common, but the British did not hesitate to take even such drastic action when necessary. The Residents and other functionaries held considerable sway over the Rulers. They constituted an *imperium in imperio* and consequently kept the Indian States aloof from the rest of India. What was worse, they inculcated an attitude of servility among many Rulers, mostly small, and used them as potentially obstructive elements in the country's progress to self-government. When the time came for Congress leaders to bring about a closer relationship with Rulers at the time of the transfer of power, it was this body of political officers which worked against the forces of Indian unity.

Two special aspects of Paramountcy may be mentioned here. The States had, naturally, to co-operate on all India policies (euphemistically referred to as Imperial interests), especially in regard to railways, posts and telegraphs, defence, etc. There were a large number of agreements governing these matters. Under some of these agreements, lands in the States were handed over to the Crown Representative (before 1937 to the Government of India) for the stationing of units of the Indian Army, construction of railways, etc. Administrative, civil and criminal jurisdiction over these areas were exercised by the Crown Representative, who made his own arrangements for exercising this jurisdiction.

The other point worth noting was the question of ensuring the guarantees given to the Rulers of protection against external aggression and internal revolt. The Crown Representative was entitled to call upon the Government of India for military assistance in case of need, but he found it more

convenient to create a few battalions of a police force of his own, called the Crown Representative's Police.

The money needed for the Crown Representative was found from the Government of India's revenues.

This brief account of the Indian States and their relations with the Crown may be rounded off with a mention of the fact that the persons holding the office of Governor-General were also always appointed to hold the office of the Crown Representative.

It has already been mentioned that the relation of the paramount power with Indian States was necessarily based on its superior military might, and on the consequent fact that the States were in subordinate alliance. Notwithstanding the separation of the Crown Representative from the Government of India, this relationship could be only sustained as long as the armed forces of the Government of India were available to the Crown Representative for exercising his superior powers, that is, only so long as the British Government was in control in British India. This was made clear in official pronouncements made on behalf of the British Government. Viceroy Reading's famous letter to the Nizam said:

“The sovereignty of the British Crown is supreme in India and therefore no Ruler of an Indian State can justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government on an equal footing. Its supremacy is not based only upon treaties and engagements, but exists independently of them and, quite apart from its prerogative in matters relating to foreign powers and policies, it is the right and duty of the British Government while scrupulously respecting all treaties and engagements with the Indian States to preserve peace and order throughout India.”

In a free and independent India, with a democratic Government, there would be equality throughout; this superiority based on military power would have necessarily to disappear

and new ties forged to take the place of Paramountcy, which was an extra Constitutional relationship and consequently carefully kept out of the Statutes dealing with India. But then the main point about the voluminous Constitutional discussions which took place in the late twenties and thirties was that Government then in charge expected that British control over Indian affairs would continue indefinitely.

We now know that Linlithgow envisaged that the British presence in India, especially the British army element and the ICS and the Indian Police, all with a substantial proportion of European officers, would be necessary for a long period. That would explain why no serious attention was paid to the problems of readjustment of relations with States in the context of a democratic independent set up in British India; it would also incidentally explain why no steps were taken to make substantial recruitment to senior ranks of the Indian Civil Service and Indian Police from India, when the ranks of these services were getting steadily depleted.

So far as the internal affairs of the States were concerned, the position was that while some of the States had efficient and progressive administrations, the setting up of responsible Governments was a slow process. The main reason was of course that the Paramount Power did not encourage it, though it avoided saying so in public. There were several reasons for this. The Indian National Congress spear-headed the freedom movement in British India and the encouragement of popular movements in the Indian States would have increased its hold on the people of the States as well. The British Government were not therefore over-enthusiastic about Constitutional reforms in Indian States. In fact, in the middle of the war we find Linlithgow, the Viceroy, and Amery, the Secretary of State considering a plan for the posting of Europeans in increasing numbers as Dewans (chief ministers) in Indian States. Amery, who was not in favour of the proposal, nevertheless thought that it would "be easier on the whole for the

right type of Indian to cope firmly with Congress activities in the States". On the other hand the Viceroy's view was:

'I am certain that an increase in the number of European Dewans has every thing to commend it, and there is the danger (obvious even at the present time) of having as Dewans (when the man has any competence) in major States Hindus with strong Congress leaning of the type of Gopalaswami Ayyangar of Kashmir.'

Neither Whitehall nor Delhi and Simla seemed to be in tune with the march of events in India and the rest of the world. It is a sad reflection on their angle of vision that they had eyes to see but would not see, and on their capacity that they had ears to hear but would not hear.

Gandhiji himself as early as 1925 declared that Congress should not interfere in the relations of Indian States with their subjects. Obviously the Congress did not want a fight on too many fronts. It was not till 1938 that at its Haripura session Congress reiterated its objective of standing for the same political, social and economic freedom in the States as in rest of India, and of considering the States as integral parts of India. Even so the burden of carrying on the struggle for freedom was left to the people of the States. Congress as an organisation could give only moral support and sympathy, though individual Congressmen would be free to render help and advice. Deprived of organisational assistance from the Indian National Congress, popular movements in the States were necessarily weak; and the Rulers, even in those States where administrative standards were high, did not hesitate to put them down.

Sardar had by his sacrifice, devotion and unremitting toil built up for himself a commanding position, especially in Gujarat and Kathiawar; and naturally he was looked up to for advice and guidance by the organisers of popular movements in the States in this area. At various times he was

the president of the Kathiawar Rajkiya Parishad, the Bhavana-gar Praja Parishad, the Baroda State Praja Mandal and was also associated with other organisations in the Indian States. But he was not taking any direct part in movements in Indian States nor does he seem to have been in favour of agitations in the States. He said:

“In all the States where I am connected, I am trying my best to divert the activities of the people to constructive channels.”

The reason for this lay in the background of the political situation of the Indian States already outlined. Sardar himself has summarised his attitude succinctly:

“In those days we were thinking that it was no use fighting with the princes because they themselves were not free agents under foreign rule. In those days, I believed with Mahatma Gandhi that the minute they became independent they too would play their patriotic part. Everyone wants a *kumkum* and not a black mark to be placed on his forehead.”

He also explained this attitude in some greater detail when he addressed the General Council of the All India States Peoples' Conference on 8 June 1946. Advising States' subjects not to get involved in isolated direct action, Sardar said that his experience for many years had been that the British had prevented Congress intercession in Indian States to bring about any kind of settlement between the Rulers and the ruled. The British had always sided with the Rulers in the suppression of the peoples' rights. Sardar said that Congress realised that the States' problem could not be solved unless British imperialism was eliminated from India, and there were many Rulers who wished every success for the Congress in its achievement of complete freedom. In the success of the Congress they saw freedom for themselves. While he was firmly convinced that sovereignty should vest in the people and not with individual Rulers, Sardar was

sure that in a free India Princes would be guided by a real spirit of patriotism and love of their subjects.

We have already seen that during the Viceroyalty of Linlithgow the policy of the British Government was to strengthen the operation of Paramountcy and that progress in the field of constitutional development and the establishment of representative institutions was slow. No serious thought had ever been given to the question of the practical steps necessary for fitting the peculiar mosaic that constituted Indian States into an all India polity. The British Government was chary of pressing the States to introduce constitutional reform: "No policy conceived by the British Government could by itself maintain the Rulers or ensure against their eventual capitulation to Congress agitation." Only one step was taken, a halting totally inadequate step, in the direction of consolidating a few of the fragments estates and jagirs. This was what was known as the attachment scheme of 1943, under which some of the semi-jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional estates in Gujarat and Kathiawar, comprising collectively about 7000 square miles, were attached to some of the larger States.

By the beginning of 1946, the new Indian policy was taking shape. The freedom of British India was now definitely in prospect and Wavell envisaged a Constituent Assembly as likely to be established very soon. Wavell therefore advised the States and the Rulers to pool their resources and form political entities of a sufficient size. He also suggested that they should bring into being popular institutions with elected majorities. At about this time the All India States Peoples' Conference also applied its mind to the problem of States. The Conference was now thinking in terms of a federation with limited powers at the Centre and in the Udaipur session of 1 January 1946, the Conference adopted resolution laying down that:

Only such States as have a sufficient population and revenue to be able to maintain modern standards of social

and economic welfare should continue as units which can join as such in the proposed federation of India.

For the smaller States the solution proposed was absorption in the neighbouring provinces, making suitable provisions for safeguarding the personal dignity and position of the rulers and for the States themselves being given a "measure of autonomy" within the province. But this resolution remained a vague general approach to the problem rather than a guide to concrete action, and the President of the States Peoples' Conference, Jawaharlal Nehru, himself recorded in April 1946 that no stress should be laid on this matter at the time "when larger issues are at stake". But even in 1946 everyone was thinking in terms of a fairly long "Interim" period during which the framing of the Constitution would be going on and the status quo in respect of States would continue. One prominent feature of the situation was that, when Sardar became Minister for States in July 1947, the Congress leadership (especially Nehru) was generally antagonistic to the Rulers of the States. B. Shiva Rao in his book *Framing of India's Constitution* has reported:

"On one occasion the Maharaja of Navanagar (at that time the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes) remarked, in discussing an alliance between the Muslim League and the Chamber of Princes for the federal elections: 'Why should I not support the League? Mr. Jinnah is willing to tolerate our existence, but Mr. Nehru wants the extinction of the Princes'".

It may be relevant to add that the Maharaja made a substantial contribution later on to the integration of States and also that during the discussions with the Negotiating Committee of the Rulers, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expressed himself not opposed to the continuance of the monarchical form of Government in the Indian States.

This narrative of the background of the problem of Indian States will help to show how complicated the problem was and

how difficult it was going to be to fit the States into a federal union with a free, democratic and independent British India. The Cabinet Mission's Plan of 16 May 1946 merely said:

- (i) that the participation of Indian States' representatives in the Constituent Assembly would be settled by negotiations; and
- (ii) that Indian States would retain the subjects and powers not ceded to the Union.

On one point only was the position clear. With the attainment of independence by British India, whether within or outside the Commonwealth, Paramountcy over the Indian States could neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government. In other words all the States, big and small, would each become an independent entity. And to add to the confusion, a Memorandum prepared on 12 May said:

. . . all rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power will return to the States. Political arrangements between the States on the one hand and the British Crown and British India on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the Successor Government in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it. . . .

This involved, as the statement itself said, several processes. Internally, the States had to strengthen their position by improving administrative standards. Where adequate standards could not be achieved with the existing resources of a State, they had to form or join larger administrative units. And they had to "take active steps" to keep constant touch with public opinion by means of representative institutions. At the same time, they had to work out arrangements for sending their representatives to the Constituent Assembly, and help in

evolving a Constitution in which they could have a proper and defined position and in which the constitutional relationship with the Union which was to be established in India would be set out in precise legal terms. The complicated nature of the problem was evident when Prime Minister Nehru had talks with the Nawab of Bhopal, Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, in April 1946. In these discussions certain tentative, if obvious, solutions emerged:

Ultimately it seemed that the only feasible way for the States to join the federation was . . . for major states to join as units, for smaller states to group themselves together if geographically situated and then form a unit or units, and for the remaining states to be absorbed in some existing unit.

On the question of developing the administrative structure in the States and bringing them up to the standards in the rest of India, the conclusions reached are interesting. Nehru has recorded:

“It was pointed out to me (by the Nawab of Bhopal) that the States or many of them, were so backward and so lacking in trained human material that any attempt to establish full-fledged responsible Government would end in failure and would delay progress. It was necessary, therefore, to have a preparatory period during which representative institutions could be progressively introduced and people trained in their use. It was suggested that during this period the Ruler should have considerable authority. The period may vary in the case of different States and some might hardly require it. Vaguely a time limit of fifteen years was suggested.” (See *Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 3, pp. 334–35)

The Chamber of Princes had appointed a Committee to negotiate on the matters relating to the entry of States in the Constituent Assembly, but Sardar and his colleagues were then too fully occupied with the disputes on the various

matters in the Cabinet Mission Statement to consider the complex issues which the Indian States presented. So far as the Negotiating Committee was concerned, a Committee of the Constituent Assembly, elected on 21 December 1946, had discussions with the States Committee in February 1947, and the States' representatives started coming in as from April 1947.

Progress in the democratisation of States continued to be slow and halting. Sardar was in touch both with several Rulers and the Praja Mandal or State Congress leaders, and his advice was sought by some of the States—Bikaner, Cochin, Baroda, Bhavnagar. At that stage, Sardar seems to have been more interested in getting greater popular association with Government in the States. His correspondence with Sankaralinge Gowda of Mysore, is illuminating (Serial No. 12). The pragmatist that he was, he had no patience with the distinction Gowda sought to draw regarding the slogan "responsible administration wherein sovereignty vests in the people" and was clear in his mind that whatever the phrase used, sovereignty must rest with the people:

"No man in his senses in the modern world believes that sovereignty vests in a single individual whether he be a prince or a monarch or a Czar or a Hitler."

At the same time he carefully avoided the path of extremism and advised the peoples' representatives to accept whatever power was transferred to them. He told the President, Cochin Praja Mandal:

"I would advise the Praja Mandal to unhesitatingly offer its full co-operation by taking over as many departments as may be transferred immediately as well as in the work of drawing up a new Constitution wherein responsible Government is fully provided for." (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 3, p. 370)

When the Maharaja of Bikaner made an announcement of a scheme of reforms under which a new Constitution for

the State would be brought into force after three years, with an interim set-up by the end of 1947 under which half of the number of Ministers would be members of the Legislature, Sardar did not express impatience but promised to use his good offices to establish smooth relations between the Ruler and the Praja Parishad of the State (Serial No. 1). In short, the attitude of Sardar seems to have been that Indian States should not be content with purely administrative reforms, but should introduce the principle of the people's involvement; but he was willing that the pace of constitutional reform should be left to the Rulers. It looks as if Sardar was waiting for a peoples' Government to be established in British India before giving active assistance to States or trying to hasten popular movements in States.

The Constituent Assembly met in December 1946; and the first months of 1947 were devoted to efforts to get the participation of the Indian States in the Constitution making process. This itself was a difficult process. The future of the Assembly itself was uncertain, because of the open conflict of views between the Congress and the Muslim League. On the side of the States, there was divided counsel. Only a few States, like Cochin and Baroda, were willing to negotiate direct with the Constituent Assembly. The others preferred to wait until the committee appointed by the Chamber of Princes (which consisted of Rulers and their Ministers, with no one representing the people of the States) had finished its negotiations with Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar and the other members of the Negotiating Committee appointed by the Constituent Assembly. **In the counsels of the Chamber there was great difference of opinion.** One section of Rulers, led by the Maharajas of Bikaner and Patiala, was in favour of the States joining the Constituent Assembly immediately; another, led by the Nawab of Bhopal, was against. Sardar himself at this stage issued an appeal to the Rulers suggesting that they join the Assembly. In his frank manner he told them that Paramountcy would, when the British relinquished it, vest in

the people; and the Rulers should be abreast of the progressive forces in British India while organising themselves for their legitimate rights. Eventually seven States, Baroda, Cochin, Rewa, Bikaner, Patiala, Jaipur and Jodhpur sent their representatives to the Assembly on 28 April 1947; and other States followed later, though gradually.

It seemed at that time that the negotiations with the Rulers would be long protracted and complicated but an event happened which gave an entirely new turn to the course of these negotiations. The statement of 3 June 1947, announcing the partition of India and the end of British rule, and with it the end of British control over the States by 15 August 1947, had most unexpected consequences and made Rulers alive to a potentially dangerous situation. The Indian States and British India were territorially interwoven so closely that for administrative purposes close ties and understandings over the whole field of governmental action were inevitable. There were postal and telegraphic communications, railways, roads, defence arrangements involving the stationing of troops in cantonments in Indian States, currency, coinage and a number of other matters. Reginald Coupland's statement of the position cannot be bettered:

“An India deprived of the States would have lost all coherence. For they form a great cruciform barrier separating all four quarters of the country. If no more than the Central Indian States and Hyderabad and Mysore were excluded from the Union, the United Provinces would be almost completely cut off from Bombay, and Bombay completely from Sind. The strategic and economic implications are obvious enough. The practicability of Pakistan must be admitted, but the more the separation of the States from British India is considered, the more impracticable it seems; India would live if its Moslem limbs in the North-West and North-East were amputated, but could it live without its heart?”

Till 3 June the position was that there was a period of over a year to decide on the constitutional nexus between the States and British India, and also to work out other agreements and arrangements; now, in the course of the ten weeks, all these ties would be snapped. A divided India, weakened by the almost disastrous consequences of partition, would be further balkanised. Ten days after the announcement, Mountbatten held a meeting of seven leaders—three from Congress, three from the Muslim League, and Baldev Singh—and at this meeting certain papers prepared by the Political Department (Serial No. 17) were discussed. These discussions again showed up the differences between Congress and the Muslim League. Nehru wanted the Political Department and the Residents and the whole paraphernalia of the Crown Representative should continue in a new incarnation (V. P. Menon—p. 89) and said that, if any State opposed the policy of the Central Government, that would be considered as unfriendly act. On the other hand, Jinnah maintained that every State would be a sovereign State.

It was only with the setting up of a State Department with Sardar in charge of it on 5 July 1947 that a positive policy emerged, and specific and concrete action, consistent with the urgency of the problem to be faced, was taken. On the same day Sardar made a policy statement (Serial No. 23). In contrast with previous statements made by Nehru and the declaration of Gopalaswami Ayyangar in the Constituent Assembly, it was conciliatory in tone and practical in its approach, but emotional in its appeal. He asked the States to join the Constituent Assembly and accede on the three subjects of defence, external affairs and communications. The whole statement was set in such a key that it was bound to touch the hearts of the Rulers and appeal to their minds. The response was both enthusiastic and quick.

Sardar was already in communication with several Rulers, their Ministers and leaders of Praja Mandals. In addition, he (and the whole Indian Cabinet) enlisted the services of

Mountbatten to convert the Rulers and induce them to join the Indian Union. The task was not altogether an easy one. Several Rulers, Hyderabad, Travancore and Bhopal, took an initial decision to stay independent; and there were a number of waverers—Jodhpur and Indore being prominent amongst them. Junagadh acceded to Pakistan, an action which threatened the peace and harmony of the whole of the Kathiawar peninsula. But these difficulties were short-lived. Even the redoubtable C. P. Ramaswami Ayyar, Dewan of Travancore, had to face the reality and to concede that accession to India was inevitable. Opposition from other Rulers also crumbled rapidly and all except Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagadh acceded to the Dominion of India. Along with the Instrument of Accession they also signed "Standstill Agreements" continuing in force the pre-existing arrangements on all administrative matters of common concern, thereby preserving the links that kept the sub-continent together. As was only to be expected both these documents specifically declared that there would be no attempt to revive Paramountcy.

Very soon events showed that these were not merely formal arrangements, but that the process of integration had gone deep into the hearts of the Rulers as well as their subjects; and that the sense of oneness created by the handling of Indian States affairs by Sardar and the States Ministry was an abiding one. Following close on the heels of partition came the Kashmir war and the great exodus. The Indian States, particularly the Rulers of Bikaner and Patiala, played a notable part in assisting Government over the refugee problem; and all States including Travancore in the far South placed their troops and resources at the service of the New Dominion at a time of sore need, when the Dominion's army itself had not been properly organised. The contribution of the States at this critical period certainly helped to maintain stability in the Dominion. Sardar had told a correspondent on 4th August:

"Paramountcy will disappear from 15 August and it is hoped that neither the Princes nor the people will shed

a tear for its disappearance. May be there will be a temporary vacuum but time and circumstances will evolve a suitable machinery which, while abandoning all the evils of the defunct Crown Department, will work in co-operation with the people and the Princes and create an atmosphere of peace and harmony. (Serial No. 28)

Sardar's hope was more than fulfilled. There was no temporary vacuum.

It has been mentioned that three States geographically situated in or contiguous to the Dominion of India, did not accede by 15 August 1947, viz. Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir and Junagadh. The developments about Hyderabad and Jammu & Kashmir have been dealt with in separate chapters. Junagadh, situated in Kathiawar, with an overwhelming Hindu majority, presented a difficult problem because the Nawab by previous arrangements with Jinnah, decided to accede to Pakistan. This immediately created an intolerable situation; and there was considerable public agitation both among the people of Junagadh and among the Rulers and the people of the other States in Kathiawar. Both Mountbatten and the Government did their best to negotiate a reasonable settlement with Pakistan, but Pakistan was in no mood to be reasonable. Jinnah rejected all proposals of the Government of India, including one for a plebiscite. Meanwhile, the Nawab of Junagadh aggravated the situation. He not only claimed suzerainty over Mangrol and Babariawad, small Rulers whom the lapse of Paramountcy had released from the overlordship of Junagadh, and who thereupon had acceded to India, but sought to enforce this claim by sending troops to these areas. These incursions had necessarily to be resisted, and in September 1947, the Government of India decided to send troops for the purpose. The unsettled conditions resulted in a grave deterioration of conditions in Junagadh and the Nawab decided to leave the State and go to Karachi, leaving the State administration in the hands of the Council headed by the Dewan Shah Nawaz Khan Bhutto,

the father of the present Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Council found it necessary, if total chaos was to be averted, to have a complete reorientation of State policy, even if it involved a reversal of the decision to accede to Pakistan. It took the obviously sensible decision in the circumstances, to hand over the State to the Government of India. This was done on 9 September 1947. It took the Government of India a few months to put the administration of the State again in good order. In February 1948, a referendum was held to ascertain the choice of the people in the matter of accession; it was overwhelmingly in favour of India. A year later Junagadh was integrated in the Saurashtra State.

It is not clear whether the tremendous historical development that took place during the next three years was the result of deliberate design or the natural outcome of India getting freedom and the establishment of a democratic political set-up in Delhi and the Provinces. Paramountcy in the States under the British rule was sustained by the force of British arms. One unexpected consequence of the disappearance of Paramountcy was that in any confrontation between the Rulers and their subjects the help of the Military forces of the Paramount power was no longer available. The Government of India, now a peoples' Government, could no longer lend its military strength to crush peoples' movements in States. Above all, the Congress had been fighting the British Government over the years, and the British were therefore greatly interested in keeping the States free of Congress influence, which would inevitably extend in any popular movement. This was so no longer, since Congress was Government. Realising this, several States — Mysore, Cochin, Travancore, Bikaner etc. — started introducing constitutional and political reforms. The problem became more acute in the smaller States because these lacked the resources. This resulted in the formation of Unions particularly in the Eastern region, comprising the Orissa and Chhattisgarh States, the Southern region, comprising the smaller Deccan States, and part of the Rajasthan area. Sardar had been consulted

about the Deccan States; he was not very enthusiastic—these States consisted of scattered bits of territory in two linguistic regions of Bombay. But the peoples' movements gave rise to real trouble in some of the smaller States of Orissa where the problems of backwardness and lack of any worthwhile political organisation was complicated by the presence of a considerable proportion of aboriginal population; and a similar situation arose in the small and scattered Chhatisgarh States in the Central Provinces. Sardar made up his mind that in order to build up the resources of these States adequately for ensuring modern government and give them the benefits of democratic rule, the only solution was to make them a part of the adjacent Province Orissa in the case of the Orissa States and the Central Provinces in the case of the Chhatisgarh States. This was the basis of the discussions which he and his secretary V. P. Menon had with the Rulers. It did not take long to convince the Rulers. One day's discussion in Cuttack and one day in Nagpur were sufficient. The Rulers could have created trouble by opposing Sardar's policy. They were however wise enough to understand that their position vis-a-vis their people had become difficult and that it was better for them to come to an honourable settlement with Sardar (everyone had by now found that Sardar was a person who would keep his word). Such a settlement involved (1) that their small states were merged in the Province and (2) as a *quid pro quo* their personal position as Rulers was recognised and they were given a reasonable amount as privy purse. These arrangements were embodied in a simple instrument called merger agreement; Sardar's statement made on the occasion (Serial No. 50) is a historic pronouncement and gives the outline of his policy.

The merger of the Orissa and Chhatisgarh States was soon followed by the merger and integration of other States. The first Union to be formed was Saurashtra, which was established by the uniting into one State, with a legislative, an executive and a judiciary, of thirteen salute States, seventeen

non-salute States together with a large number of small semi-jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional Estates, forming a compact area in the Kathiawar peninsula. This area comprised States of comparatively small size, none of the States being of sufficient size to send an individual representative to the Constituent Assembly.

The inspiration of Sardar and the vigour and efficiency of his officers in the States Ministry gave a marked impetus to the process of integration and by the middle 1949 the process had been practically completed. It is not necessary here to give a detailed account of each State. The picture which eventually emerged was as follows:

- (1) Small scattered areas were absorbed in the neighbouring Province—like the States in Gujarat and Deccan, the three States in Madras (Banganapalle, Pudukkothai and Sandur), the States of Banaras, Rampur and Tehri-Garhwal in the United Provinces, the three States of Dujana, Loharu and Pataudi in East Punjab, Cooch Behar in West Bengal. In this category the “viable” States of Baroda and Kolhapur were for reasons peculiar to these States included; these States were merged in Bombay.
- (2) Where special reasons for direct Central administration existed as in Manipur, Tripura, Bhopal, the group of Hill States round Simla, formerly known as the Punjab Hill States (now forming Himachal Pradesh) and the group of Bundelkhand States and Rewa (known at the time as Vindhya Pradesh), the Indian States were directly administered by the Indian Government.
- (3) Compact blocks constituting State territory were joined together in “Unions” with an executive and legislature for each Union (Saurashtra, Travancore-Cochin, Madhya Bharat, Patiala and East Punjab States Union, Rajasthan).

- (4) This left as separate States Mysore, Hyderabad and Jammu & Kashmir.

The original intention was that integration (whether by merger or by the formation of unions) was to be confined to the smaller States and that "viable" States should be exempted from its scope. But when the Vindhya Pradesh and more particularly the Madhya Bharat Unions were considered, it became apparent that, having regard to their geographical situation, it would be impracticable to leave out Rewa in one case and Indore and Gwalior in the other. Sardar at this time, early in 1948, made a study of the problem and came to the conclusion that, apart from Jammu & Kashmir, only Hyderabad and Mysore could stand by themselves. He is known to have recorded a note to this effect. In any case, V.P. Menon has said (*The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, p. 231):

"... his (Sardar's) personal view was that, with the exception of Hyderabad and Mysore, which could not but stand by themselves, all the other States should be grouped into Unions. He told me that integration was really to the advantage of the Rulers themselves. In that event, the Government of India would look after the privy purses of the Rulers. If the viable States were allowed to exist as separate units, the rights and privileges of the Rulers would be at the mercy of the local legislatures; and he was not altogether confident that the local leaders would give the Rulers a square deal."

The Rulers were most co-operative; practically all of them did exactly what Sardar wanted them to do. For his part Sardar was very considerate to them; his object was a rational integration which would (1) make these States as organic part of the Indian Union and (2) enable them to get democratic governments. Once that was assured, he was anxious to ensure that all regard should be paid to the personal dignity of the Rulers. On the question of privy

purse in particular, he was most anxious to "look after" it. In his correspondence with Nehru (See Chapter 4, Vol. 2) he was insistent that the Constitution of India should guarantee these payments and that they should be continued in perpetuity. Jawaharlal Nehru was opposed to this guarantee—especially the undertaking to give the privy purses in perpetuity. But Sardar could not admit any compromise on this issue. In a letter written from his sick bed in Bombay on 9 August 1949 he said:

"We have entered into solemn undertakings and agreements with the Princes about the privy purse. I do not think we can, in good conscience, leave it to future Parliaments to do as they like with these amounts. These are commitments which have been consecrated by the signature of the Head of the State on behalf of the people of India, with the full approval of the Cabinet, and it is our moral duty to ensure that these commitments are fully honoured both now and in the future. This can only be possible if we guarantee these payments under the constitutional provisions. Any other alternative would not satisfy those who have accepted in good faith our pledges and our promises. We are therefore in honour bound to include these guarantees in the Constitution."

This essentially fair attitude, coupled with Sardar's own advocacy was able to win over both the opponents and the waverers. Sardar had said:

"If the Chairman of the Drafting Committee or any of my colleagues feels any hesitation in sponsoring these proposals before the Constituent Assembly, I am quite prepared to interrupt my stay in Bombay and to come to Delhi merely for the sake of sponsoring these proposals. I consider it a matter of faith and honour, and I feel it would be moral cowardice on my part if I refrained from discharging this obligation."

Prime Minister Nehru was able to assure him that an interruption of Sardar's rest and treatment would not be

necessary and that he would include a specific article in the Constitution guaranteeing payment, etc. of all obligations entered into by the Government in regard to the Rulers. And subsequently, in the Assembly all irresponsible opposition was silenced by the logic and eloquence of Sardar's speech of 12 October 1949 which has been reproduced as Appendix III.

The act of self-sacrifice which led to the complete unification of India has been rightly described as one without parallel in history. Sardar had however all along recognised that this was the first, if most important, step in the building of a democratic India. He was all the time aware that the integration meant that the burden of building a democratic political structure in the States, side by side with an efficient administrative machinery, had still to be shouldered, and that in the discharge of this task the Congress leadership and Sardar personally would have to assume full responsibility. He had said, when inaugurating a short-lived democratic regime in Baroda:

“It has been comparatively easy for us to win freedom. It would be much more difficult to prove ourselves worthy of it. Freedom would be meaningless if it did not result in the general amelioration of poverty and disease in the uplift of our character, in increased sense of civic responsibility and in higher standards of public conduct.”

The political aspect of the problem presented many difficulties which Sardar had to handle himself. Simultaneously with the formation of the Unions, the political leadership had to be democratised and this gave several headaches. The Saurashtra Union was able to elect a legislature fairly early and Madhya Bharat and Travancore-Cochin had Legislatures already existing. But in three Unions—Rajasthan, Vindhya Pradesh and PEPSU—there were no legislatures functioning, and Sardar had to install as Ministers those leaders of public opinion who commanded public confidence. These were unfortunately too few, since conditions in the Indian States

had not been conducive to the development of political parties and organisations. Vindhya Pradesh, the Union formed next after Saurashtra, started off with two Ministries, one for Rewa and one for Bundelkhand. In three months this arrangement was terminated and a Ministry was formed with Avadesh Pratap Singh at its head; Sardar advised the Raj Pramukh, in the best traditions of constitutional Government, that the responsibility for Government would be that of the Ministers, and that the Raj Pramukh could himself only advise and warn his Ministers and could not over-rule them (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 7, p. 596). But, owing to various reasons, this Ministry could not function at all. The Ministers were for ever quarrelling among themselves and administration was neglected. In April 1949, the Vindhya Pradesh Congress Committee held an emergency meeting in Delhi, took statements from some of the Ministers and passed a motion of no-confidence in Avadesh Pratap Singh. One of the Ministers was at about this time arrested on a charge of taking a bribe (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 8, p. 441). Sardar, in all the circumstances found it necessary to call for the resignation of all the Ministers and to set up an official regime in the union. This arrangement continued till the beginning of 1950, when Sardar called on the Rulers to abrogate the Covenant and sign an agreement surrendering all powers to the Dominion Government. Sardar's idea at the time was to divide the State between the Central Provinces (now Madhya Pradesh) and the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh). But here he came across irreconcilable difference between the Premiers of these Provinces; and eventually Vindhya Pradesh was taken over as a Centrally Administered area.

Sardar had similar difficulties in other States also. In Rajasthan the controversy between the Premier, Hiralal Shastri and the other politicians became quite acrimonious. The Rajasthan Union was formed in several stages. First, we had the Matsya Union consisting of four States, Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli. Then we had a union of

the Rajasthan States of Udaipur, Kota, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Partabgarh, Banswara, Kishangarh, Shahpura and Tonk. In 1949, the Rulers of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer decided to come in and the new Union was inaugurated on 30 March 1949, and Matsya Union was merged in it shortly afterwards. By this time the political confusion in some of the Unions had manifested itself and Sardar had now come to realise that even the democratic popular Ministries would require guidance from the Centre; accordingly a clause was inserted in the Rajasthan Covenant providing for the Government of India's powers of superintendence and direction in matters affecting the governance of the Union. The necessity for this was soon to become apparent. Factional politics soon started manifesting themselves. Hardly two months elapsed before the Provincial Congress Committee held a meeting and passed a resolution expressing lack of confidence in Hiralal Shastri and calling on him to resign (it was only in March that the Provincial Congress Committee had elected Shastri unanimously as the leader). Sardar found it necessary to administer a public rebuke to the newly elected Congress Provincial Chief Jainarain Vyas:

"... You should understand that Hiralal Shastri as Premier is not responsible to the Provincial Congress Committee which cannot appropriate to itself functions of the Legislature. He owes his premiership not to election as leader or to mandate of Provincial Congress Committee but to my choice of leadership at the unanimous request of all of you. As Premier and Ministers they are responsible to the States Ministry and will continue till the election of the Legislature unless in the meanwhile they lose our confidence. You are fully aware of this position and your persistence in the undesirable and harmful course which you have adopted will merely recoil on you. I am quite sure the tactics you have adopted are a disservice to the organisation to which we all belong, and are injurious too, though your narrow outlook may make

it appear as serving your own interest.” (*Sardar Patel's Correspondence*, Vol. 8, p. 557)

The issue was referred to the Congress Working Committee which upheld Sardar, but the faction arfare continued.

Things were not so good in Machya Bharat either. Here also, especially over the issue whether the capital should be located in Gwalior or Indore there was acrimonious controversy. Differences mainly personal arose within the Ministry itself. These came to a head in October 1950; the Premier G. K. Vijayavargiya was now faced with the resignation of a senior colleague (Liladhar Joshi). Sardar had to intervene; after discussion with the prominent political leaders, it was decided that both Vijayavargiya and Liladhar Joshi should stand aside and a new Chief elected. The choice fell on Takhat Mal Jain.

The Patiala and East Punjab States Union was equally difficult. This Union was inaugurated on 15 July 1948; and trouble between political parties broke out even at the outset. There were three parties adjustment among whom was necessary in order to constitute a Ministry—the local Prajamandal, the Akalis and the Lok Sewa Sabha. Prolonged negotiations failed to reach an agreement and eventually Sardar had to direct, as in the case of Vindhya Pradesh, that an official caretaker Government should be set up. It was not till 1949 that a Ministry was constituted consisting of seven representatives of the political parties. Even so, it proved to be weak.

The result of all this trouble and dissension in the Unions was that unstable Governments continued to plague them. But Sardar was determined that these political squabbles should not affect administrative improvements. The States which were merged into Provinces presented the least difficulty; but even here there were some troubles. Bihar, for example, started agitating for the inclusion of a number of the Orissa and even some of the Chhatisgarh States in that Province, and this proved a source of friction between Bihar on one side and Orissa and the Central Provinces on the other. Eventually Sardar settled the matter by transferring Seraikella and

Kharaswan to Bihar from Orissa. But Sardar had to warn the Bihar Government that they should be careful and avoid giving the people of the merged States the feeling that their interests and sentiments were being neglected or ignored. By and large, however, the Provinces rose to the occasion. Hare Krishna Mahtab in Orissa, Ravi Shankar Shukla in the Central Provinces and B. G. Kher in Bombay—these were the Provinces which absorbed a large number of States—were seasoned administrators and could be depended upon to do their best. The officers sent to the Centrally administered areas were also experienced men. Sardar also insisted on sending to the Unions experienced administrative personnel to man senior posts, as well as to function as Advisors—particularly in dealing with problems arising out of integration; and he himself personally, and through his trusted Private Secretary and other officers of the States Ministry, supervised the progress of their work. Sometimes there was friction between Ministers and the officers. But all this combined effort did result to a greater or less degree in the establishment of an administrative system, uniform all over India, which was calculated to serve the needs of efficiency and development. And this was supplemented by the participation of all these States in the All-India services scheme which Sardar succeeded in establishing. This participation ensured that the future needs of all these Unions in the matter of senior administrative positions would be taken care of through all India recruitment. For State services, there were established Public Service Commissions with independent Status to help recruitment and look after Service Administration. Finally came financial integration which, while providing for a short transitional period, during which certain existing taxation powers were continued established for the States the same financial relationship with the Centre as existed for the Provinces.

The integration of States was a multi-dimensional process. It involved first the accession of the Indian States to the Indian Dominion on the three subjects of Defence, External

Affairs and Communication. Then came the breaking down of geographical frontiers of the States, the voluntary retirement of the Rulers, and the realignment of boundaries in such a way that India ceased to be a jigsaw puzzle consisting of nearly six hundred administrative units and had instead, a small number of Provinces, Chief Commissioners' Provinces and Unions each of sufficient size to enable a Parliamentary democracy to function. Simultaneously an effort was made to bring about a uniform pattern of administration at the Provincial, District and lower levels. Then came financial integration and the application of one Constitution. Sardar was the central figure in this tremendous transformation. The collection of correspondence in this, as in other chapters, is necessarily fragmentary but it is hoped that the role of Sardar in this historic process can be understood with the help of this introductory note.

The saga of Indian unity achieved by Sardar will be written in history in letters of gold. What is important to bear in mind is that the miracle was performed in defiance of history, against tradition, in the face of many adverse circumstances and forces and in the short span of two years. It is a feat without parallel in the history of the world. The contemporary generation may not appreciate the difficulties and complexities of the situation and may regard it as an achievement got easily, but those like the compiler of this collection who were both participants in and witnesses of the tremendous exertions involved, under the inspiration, guidance, leadership and statesmanship of Sardar, will always cherish the memory of that colossus on the Indian stage, who took time as well as problems in his stride, who got out of every hour sixty minutes of work and out of every minute sixty seconds of exertion, who never lost the initiative nor missed the tempo, and who was conscious in himself of the little time left to him. Like Tennyson's Ulysses, Sardar knew that the tasks that faced independent India after centuries of troublesome history and poverty:

Life piled on life were all but too little  
And of the little to me little remains.

Yet he applied himself heroically and energetically to the task breathing confidence in himself and imparting faith in others, spreading goodwill and trust, and infecting everyone with a sense of urgency and the call of patriotism. Thus the message of integration was translated into action from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari and from Kamrup (Assam) to Kutch. It was a vision of this unity which he in silent and deep prayer recalled to the author when in May 1950 he stood at the feet of Mother India at a holy spot where the waters of the three seas—Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean—are believed to meet. Seldom have so few achieved so much in such a short time at such little expense!

## *SELECT CORRESPONDENCE*

### **1. SARDAR TO RULER OF BIKANER, DATED 24 JULY 1946**

Captain Menon has delivered your Highness's letter dated 22nd instant together with its accompaniments (not printed — discusses Praja Mandal agitation especially re: Congress flag). **The question of the display of Congress flag by Praja Parishad workers, so far as I know, is not so acute in any other State, but I had gathered from our conversation and from the recent incident of firing that took place in Bikaner that it has assumed such proportion as would give cause for anxiety.**

The real question which comes in the way of establishment of cordial relations between the States and their people is the reluctance on the part of most of the States to recognise the fundamental rights or civil liberties and to meet with the people's natural demand for responsible government. This demand has become more incessant and urgent owing to the unequivocal declaration and determination of the British power to withdraw from India. If there could be a settlement on this question between the British Indian leaders and the State Governments, the question of flag would be solved without any difficulty. I believe that efforts should be made to have a solution of this question for all the States. It is true that the conditions in all the States are not uniform and it may not be possible to have a common formula but the general principles applicable to all the States can be easily agreed upon by mutual discussion and then individual questions affecting individual States can be tackled separately.

So far as Bikaner is concerned, the flag question can be easily settled by adoption of the Mysore formula, for the time being till an All-India solution is found at a later stage.

If Praja Parishad workers in Bikaner are unwilling to accept that solution, I am prepared to use my influence and induce them to abide by it till the general all-India question is settled.

About your suggestion for the appointment of a committee for settling the general question, it would, I think, be better to wait till the question of representation of the States in the Constituent Assembly is settled with the Negotiating Committee.

I see no objection in your stating that the question is under consideration and negotiation with the Congress leaders and in that connection also making reference to my name as mentioned in para 10 of your letter. I believe with the release of political prisoners and the announcement of granting of responsible Government to the people of Bikaner as contemplated by your Highness, the sting of the agitation will disappear and the people will readily accept your advice not to force the issue of the flag or to aggravate the situation or to create any trouble.

I am awaiting with great interest the formal issue of a proclamation outlining the new constitution, which as I have understood from our conversation, is going to give a lead to all the States in India, on your Highness's birthday on 31 August.

I am grateful for your Highness's kind invitation to visit Bikaner in the first week of September, but I am afraid we will all be so very busy in those days with the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly and, I hope, with the formation of Provisional National Government, that it will not be possible for me to accept it. I hope that your Highness will appreciate my difficulty and excuse my inability to accept the invitation, the warmth of which I fully appreciate.

## 2. SARDAR TO C. R. REDDY, DATED 16 AUGUST 1946

... There have been considerable changes. The Congress President has been invited to form the Interim Government and for the first time, the British Government have (shown) the Muslim League its proper place. They have thus given proof of their bona fides and it is now for us to make or mar the future of India.

You do not agree with my defence of Pandit Nehru. But you will please appreciate the fact that in defending him, I am defending the organisation of which I am a loyal and humble soldier. You must have seen the resolution which the Working Committee has passed at Wardha and I think you will agree that our President has shown great statesmanship and risen to the occasion in drafting this resolution. If he had erred on a previous occasion on this subject, he had made ample amends. To err is human, but to accept one's error is something much greater.

I am glad you appreciate my attitude towards the Goa movement but your comparison about Kashmir is out of place. Goa today is a foreign sovereign State. Kashmir is a part of the British Indian Empire and the Maharaja is an Indian. Pandit Nehru has not started the movement in Kashmir and he wanted to go there to defend his comrade who was being tried in his capacity as President of the All-India States Peoples' Conference. The Congress as an Organisation has kept out of this movement in Kashmir. We have managed to ease the situation by calling him back from Kashmir and arranging to send him there again to fulfil his mission with the permission of the State. We hope to settle this question constitutionally and peacefully by negotiations. It is difficult to avoid sympathising with our people in the States, whether they be in Kashmir or Hyderabad or at any other place, when

a struggle is started by them on their own to improve their lot, which is indeed extremely miserable.

The non-co-operation of the Muslim League has commenced and they are observing this day as their 'Direct Action Day'. The Congress, claiming to represent the vast majority of the people of India, cannot afford to be weak or to fail to shoulder the responsibility of taking charge of the Government of the country, in spite of all difficulties that may have to be faced. If the British Government and the Congress play the game well, I have no doubt that we shall see India free sooner than many people imagine and neither the League nor any other group of people or interests, however strong or powerful, will be able to stop it.

### 3. N. C. MEHTA TO SARDAR, DATED 20 AUGUST 1946

I think you should see the enclosed letter from B. L. Mitter. (Serial No. 4)

We have every reason to be grateful to Providence to have given us such a unique opportunity to bend our energies for the welfare and re-orientation of the country. But times are difficult and we shall have to develop and tap fresh sources of strength, discipline and clear thinking more than ever. Firm and unflinching action is necessary to ride the storm that has already burst in Calcutta and might burst elsewhere any time in the near future. Action more than eloquence, I should even say reticence, combined with strength, is needed now more than ever, particularly to deal with people who want to disrupt the unity of the country. I do hope our ministries in the provinces won't let themselves be swamped by files and that they would go ahead with their schemes for planning and organising the productive capacity of our people. It is good that you would be at Delhi.

Wishing you all success.

4. B. L. MITTER TO N. C. MEHTA,  
DATED 8 AUGUST 1946

I am more and more inclining to the view that civil commotion in India is inevitable. We had recently a communal riot at a small taluka town which had always enjoyed rural peace and prosperity. From personal interviews with both Hindus and Moslems I have formed the following conclusion.

A Moslem's bullock straying into a Hindu's field led to an altercation which eventually developed into a riot.

The former set fire to a Hindu shop and fired two blank shots. The Hindu crowd scattered helter-skelter and hid themselves. The wind carried the fire from shop to shop, but no Hindu would come out to extinguish it. The Moslems saved most of their own shops and houses. When the suba (village headman) arrived on the spot the fire was still raging.

The Hindus' deputation asked me to disarm the Moslems. I promptly refused and administered a sharp rebuke to the cowards and offered to give them arms if they wanted. I said further that if they were willing, I would be prepared to arrange for military training with instruction and equipment. The Hindu deputation then suggested that Government should pay them compensation for the loss and recover the same from the Moslems. I repudiated this as fantastic. Government was not the wrong-doer and thus not liable to pay damages. The courts were open where they could go for relief. The next request was for posting military guards permanently in the town. I assured them that the military would be there so long as the tension lasted, but after that they must organise their own defence against sudden outbursts which no Government could anticipate.

5. SARDAR TO N. C. MEHTA,  
DATED 26 AUGUST 1946

I have received your letter of the 20th instant. The enclosure makes painful reading. If the facts are true, it makes us hang our head in shame. The cowardice of the Hindus in those parts is disgraceful but I am not prepared to absolve the State of its share of responsibility. The present Dewan is new but the traditions of the State have always been to prosecute the Hindus in any quarrel of a communal nature between the Hindus and Muslims, in which the State always takes the side of the Muslims. The police have generally harassed the Hindus by arresting and extorting money on such occasions and therefore they have not taken courage to defend themselves. It is the duty of the State to protect their subjects from such inexcusable intolerance and violence as also train the people in the art of self-defence. It cannot take shelter under the excuse that people are so bad. However, we have to confess that we in Gujarat have a large share of responsibility for this weakness.

6. SARDAR TO RULER OF PHALTAN,  
DATED 29 AUGUST 1946

I have received your letter of 24th instant along with its enclosure. (Re: Deccan States Union).

After our last meeting at Bombay, I have seen a report in the Press from which it appears that the people of the States concerned have passed a resolution against the proposed formation of the Union of Deccan States. I have not been able to ascertain Panditji's (Jawaharlal Nehru) views on the subject but I shall do so at the earliest possible moment. I, however, feel that it would be unwise to do anything against the popular will expressed through the Praja Mandal.

7. K. M. PANIKKAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1946

I enclose herewith for your perusal the proclamation (not printed) issued by His Highness on 31 August announcing the steps we are taking to implement his promise of responsible Government. I trust you will find time to read it.

(*Note* : The Proclamation announces the promulgation of a new Constitution within three years and a new Legislature and an interim Government by 1 November 1947.)

8. SARDAR TO K. M. PANIKKAR,  
DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1946

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant. I regret the delay in answering owing to pressure of work.

It is a matter of great satisfaction that you have taken the lead in the matter and I hope that the other Rajputana States will follow suit. His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner deserves congratulations for the bold step he has taken and, if the reforms announced are worked in a spirit of goodwill and co-operation, Bikaner will open a new chapter in the history of Indian States.

I thank you for your congratulations and good wishes.

9. B. L. MITTER TO SARDAR,  
DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1946

I am enclosing a note the significance of which you will appreciate better than any of your colleagues.

The constitution of the States Negotiating Committee in keeping with the Political Department's ideas is represented by the Jam Saheb. Gujarat is completely ignored. And spies of the Political Department are there. In Gujarat and Kathiawar the department is most active and evidence of the brokerage is to be found in the diamond market of Bombay. I shall give you more facts later.

ENCLOSURE

Now that the Interim Government is in the saddle and the Constituent Assembly is about to be summoned, it may be expedient to note the currents and cross-currents which are running. For the moment, the Muslim League is openly hostile but it is hoped that before long it will join hands with the Congress in framing the Indian Constitution. Outside the Muslim League, all British Indian parties are more or less in line, though with different ideologies. The only other big element is the States.

Regarding the States, it must be realised that paramountcy is still in operation and most of the States are in the clutches of the Political Department. That Department is vigorously angling for service as "the honest broker". Let there be no mistake about it that once the "broker" is engaged, he will not take any instructions from the principal, but will play his own hand. It will be on a par with British trusteeship of India in which the trustee was the first beneficiary. Can any one doubt that the object of the Political Department is to prolong Paramountcy as long as it can? It is not enamoured of the Interim Government and it will not be too anxious to

contribute to the successful termination of the Constituent Assembly. One method of obstruction is to create a division among the States. Some of the big States with strong governments may defy the Political Officer, but the majority are hypnotised by the department. An instance may be given. There is a move to create a Confederacy of Rajput Rulers in Western India. Most of the Kathiawad and Gujarat Rulers claim Rajput descent. The nucleus is Jamnagar and Cutch. If this move succeeds, Baroda, the only advanced State in Western India, will be isolated, and feudalism may have a chance of survival. Some of the smaller States adjoining British India are being threatened with absorption with the latter, if they do not join the Confederacy. Muslim States may form another group. The Department has also offered to negotiate revision of treaties with the Interim Government. Let the Interim Government beware of the delaying tactics which such negotiation will involve. The "brokerage" which is being vigorously exacted is a matter for the States concerned. Money made by trading with the enemy or in the black market or in dealings in frozen currency notes, can be and is being freely spent.

10. SARDAR TO B. L. MITTER,  
DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1946

I thank you for your letter of the 8 instant, and your note about the intrigues that are going on in the States through the Political Department. We are all conscious of the obstructionist attitude of this Department and there is need to be ever watchful.

Kathiawar has always been the hotbed of intrigues and I am not surprised to hear about what is happening there.

At present, we are engaged in checkmating the moves of the Muslim League, which is engaged in upsetting all that has happened since the Cabinet Delegation left. It is believed

that some of the States are in sympathy with the Muslim League and would like to take advantage of the situation created by the withdrawal of the League from the Constituent Assembly to sabotage the whole scheme. I am not sure whether this is a fact and if so what is the strength of that group.

I shall be glad to hear further from you.

11. RULER OF PHALTAN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1946

I have been favoured with a letter dated 8 September from the Hon'ble Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru regarding the question of the Union of Deccan States. I am sure the letter represents the joint views of you both. I can indeed never be too grateful to you for carrying out the assurance which you gave me in my personal visit to you in Bombay on 16 August. The views expressed by Panditji in his letter clearly bear the impress of the joint consultation of you both. I am fully satisfied at the attitude displayed in the letter. I shall now take up the matter with my brother rulers and I feel it will be up to us all to act up to the advice.

I shall never forget the kindness and courtesy which you have shown to me personally. The stress and strain under which all of you have been working for the past few months only heightens our admiration for you.

12. SARDAR TO M. SANKAR LINGEGOWDA,  
DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1947

I have received your letter of 21 January (not printed : suggests that Mysore Congress should alter its political demand from "responsible administration wherein sovereignty vests in the people" to "responsible administration without ending the Princely Order").

I do not understand what is your stand regarding the demand for responsible Government in Mysore. This is an old demand which has so often been repeated by the Mysore Congress and its representatives in the Assembly that no exception can be taken by anybody to such a demand. The words "wherein sovereignty vests in the people" added to the "demand for responsible government" are superfluous, and its addition in the principal demand makes no change in the meaning.

Your inference that these words would mean ending the Princely Order is only unjustified. Sovereignty in England vests in the people of England and not in His Majesty the King. It is a constitutional phrase and its meaning is clear. No man in his senses in the modern world believes that sovereignty vests in any single individual, whether he be a prince or a monarch, or a Czar or a Hitler.

Responsible administration means nothing. What is wanted is responsible government in the Indian States, and any attempt to draw difference between responsible government and responsible administration is bound to create suspicion. Therefore, I would advise you to join the demand for responsible government with the Mysore Congress; and if you make a unanimous demand of that nature from the Legislature, I am prepared to advise the Mysore Congress to drop the words to which you object about the vesting of sovereignty in the people. Even without your admission in that behalf, sovereignty is not going to vest anywhere else. I do not understand this kind of quibbling. Let us tackle this problem in a more practical manner. If Mysore, which has been one of the most advanced States in India, gibes even at this stage in granting the long overdue demand of the Congress for responsible government, you may take it that the State will have to face serious troubles in the near future. Nothing in the world can prevent the rapidly marching forces of progress, and it is wise to recognise the writing on the wall.

13. SARDAR TO M. SANKAR LINGEGOWDA,  
DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1947

I have received your letter of the 16th instant (not printed).

I do not see any objection to the publication of the substance of my letter to you in The Indian Express. It is possible that the Mysore Congress may have given this information for publication, but I do not see why we should worry about such publication. What I had written to you was nothing secret. My opinion in the matter is not one for private information and another for public information.

I have no recollection of your being present at the time of my presiding over the Baroda Praja Mandal Conference, but what I said then still holds good. Responsible administration does not mean ending the Princely Order. Nobody in the Mysore State Congress desires the ending of the Princely Order, but your idea of Princely Order seems to differ materially from others' and also from mine. No one in the world believes that sovereignty vests anywhere except with the people—either in England, or in any State in India, or anywhere outside. If you believe that the Mysore Maharaja has got the hereditary right to enjoy unlimited authority over his people, or any authority different from that which His Majesty the King Emperor enjoys over his people in England, you are much mistaken.

Any commitments made by the Mysore Congress in the past may not be binding in the changed set of circumstances. All the Princes in India were swearing loyalty to His Majesty the King and they felt proud in doing so. From June 1948 there will be no Sovereign in India, and paramountcy will evaporate in the air. You don't seem to realise the momentous

changes that are taking place with electrical rapidity and therefore you find difficulty in understanding the attitude of the Mysore Congress or the contents of my letter. All Princes in India will have to adapt themselves to changed circumstances and accept the position of a constitutional head as that of His Majesty the King Emperor in England.

The arguments that you have advanced in paragraph five are such as were used against us by the British Government in the past, but they have now realised the force of our claim and decided to quit. It is wise to recognise the sign of times, and it is unwise to persist in old theories which are antiquated.

To talk of loyalty on the ground of oath is absurd. You know we have also taken oath, but that does not mean that it is inconsistent with our claim for free and independent India. Your ideas of morality and sin are antiquated and such as would befit the old type of courtiers in Indian States. It is not surprising that your scheme of reform is consistent with your attitude as disclosed in your letter with reference to the position of the Princes and their people.

14. M. SANKAR LINGEGOWDA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 5 MARCH 1947

I have received your kind letter of 26 February 1947 on 3 March 1947 while I was an in-patient at the General Hospital, Mandya. I carefully studied your letter and noted the contents therein.

It is true that all the Princes in India were swearing loyalty to His Majesty the King and they felt proud in doing so. According to your version there will be no Sovereign in India from June 1948, and paramountcy will evaporate in the air. I take it for granted. If the Britishers quit India, H. H. the Maharaja of Mysore and his subjects will have a special right to demand (from) the British Crown to restore the territories, ceded in 1799, to Mysore. Regarding this matter

you have not answered and you are silent. The Mysore State Congress is also silent in this matter. Why ?

If the Britishers quit India, it is an admitted fact that the sovereignty of His Majesty the King will be reverted naturally to the British Indian people, who will have no rulers of their own in future, and the same will naturally be reverted to the Indian Princes, who still rule the States and not to the people of Indian States. People of Indian States will get sovereignty if there is no King or if the King is driven out by the revolutionary method. The revolutionary method which is being preached to the people of the Indian States by the All India States Peoples' Conference is to demand 'responsible government wherein sovereignty vests with the people'.

15. SARDAR TO M. SANKAR LINGEGOWDA,  
DATED 16 MARCH 1947

I have received your letter of the 5th instant. I am afraid I cannot afford to waste time in carrying on such prolonged correspondence with you. Your letters are too long and prolific to go through. It would require leisure and even then I don't think any useful purpose would be served by my spending time over them.

You think that the Maharaja of Mysore and his subjects will have a special right to demand from the British Crown to restore the territories ceded in 1799 to Mysore and you want my answer to such a question. You also want an answer from the Mysore Congress to this question. The answer is so obvious that it is unnecessary to express it. I don't think you will find anybody in India to support such a claim. To the other matters referred to in your letter, I need not say anything because I find that it would be impossible to make you take a sober view of things.

## 16. SARDAR'S ADVICE TO RULERS OF INDIAN STATES

My humble advice to the Princes is,

They cannot remain isolated. They cannot remain outside the Constituent Assembly. It would be suicidal on the part of the Princes to exploit the Hindu-Muslim differences in British India. If any member of the Princely order desires to establish paramountcy, he is mistaken. They cannot establish that paramountcy which the British are relinquishing.

Paramountcy vests in the people. The Princes should be abreast of the progressive forces in British India while organising themselves for their legitimate rights.

The meeting of the Princes Chamber in Bombay has passed a resolution which is worded in diplomatic language. If they are anxious to maintain peace and order in the country and cherish the ideal of a united and prosperous India they should co-operate with and take part in the efforts now being made for building the future of India on sound and firm foundations.

## 17. PAPERS CIRCULATED FOR MOUNTBATTEN'S MEETING WITH SEVEN INDIAN LEADERS ON 13 JUNE 1947

The Viceroy's meeting with the seven Indian leaders at 10 a.m. on Friday, 13 June 1947 (Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, J. B. Kripalani, M. A. Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdul Rab Nishtar, Baldev Singh).

1. With reference to the agenda for this meeting Item 1 — The States, attached hereto are Annexures 'A' and 'B' to be considered under Item 1.

THE STATES

2. These Annexes are entitled:

‘A’ Machinery for dealing with questions of common concern between States and the Successor Governments in British India.

‘B’ Formula for interim arrangements on a standstill basis.

3. Attached as Appendix I to Annex. B is a Draft Standstill Formula.

4. Also attached, and for consideration under Item I of the agenda but not mentioned on that agenda, is Annex. ‘G’, a note entitled “Disposal of Crown Representative’s Records”.

Annex. ‘A’

Machinery for dealing with questions of common concern between States and the successor Governments in British India.

1. The Cabinet Mission memorandum of 12 May 1946 stated that ‘the British Government could not and will not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to an Indian Government.’

2. As soon therefore as fully self-governing governments are set up in British India, paramountcy will lapse, the Crown Representative will disappear and the machinery which he controls (Political Department, Residents and Political Agents) will disappear with him.

3. Paramountcy functions, which are the main duty and preoccupation of this machinery, can no longer be exercised. This machinery however has been used as a convenient means of dealing with certain matters of common concern, and for this purpose alternative machinery is required.

4. This alternative machinery has already begun to function by means of direct correspondence between the appropriate Departments of the Central Government and States, especially the Food Department. The appropriate department for any

State which may opt for independence would presumably be the External Affairs Department of the Government concerned.

5. The memo of 12 May stated that the alternative machinery 'would have to be provided either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments or failing this entering into particular political arrangements with it or them.'

6. Direct correspondence is a normal federal relationship. It has worked perfectly smoothly with the Food Department for a number of years and with other departments who have started it. It is the procedure which States are likely to accept. The only problem arises out of the large number of States which require to be addressed. This problem is being solved by the grouping of States, e. g. the Eastern States which have established a joint agency to handle direct correspondence with 39 States. Similar steps are being taken elsewhere.

7. If the successor Governments set up Political (or States) Departments of their own, they will raise grave suspicion in States and as no machinery will work without the States' co-operation, this would be an unwise step, though the question is of course one for the successor Governments to decide.

8. If the existing machinery of the Crown Representative was handed over to the successor Governments for this purpose, the States would interpret this action as a transfer of paramountcy in practice. This interpretation would have less justification if the appropriate departments of the successor Governments took over the staff at present employed by the Crown Representative in order to deal with direct correspondence together with the relevant records, provided no political officers were taken over, though of course there is nothing to prevent these departments from employing Political Officers on new contracts for this purpose after the lapse of paramountcy.

9. The proposal therefore is that the States should be given the option of

- a. dealing with local representatives of the successor Governments or
- b. appointing their own representatives to the headquarters of the successor Governments.

Whatever the choice, these representatives should, under a federal system, deal with the appropriate department of successor Government with which it is likely to have matters of common concern.

#### Annex. 'B'

##### Formula for Interim Arrangements on a Standstill Basis.

1. The Cabinet Mission-Memorandum of 12 May (para 4) stated that 'in regard to the future regulation of matters of common concern, especially in the economic and financial field' it will, in order to avoid administrative difficulties, be necessary to arrive at an understanding between the States and those likely to control the successor Government or Governments, that for a period of time the then existing arrangements as to those matters (of) common concern should continue until new agreements are completed. It was added that 'in this matter the British Government and the Crown Representative will lend such assistance as they can, should it be so desired'.
2. A draft agreement has been produced, which may serve as a basis for negotiation, and it is proposed to circulate this to States for their comments. The views of the successor authorities upon it are also required. A forum for arriving at an agreed formula by direct negotiation must then be established if any agreement is to be reached in time.
3. It has to be borne in mind that these interim arrangements cannot also be on a purely standstill basis. With the lapse of paramountcy 'all the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power will return to the State'. This means that

all jurisdictions in State territory (e. g. over railways, cantonments and other administered areas) will revert to the States. Interim arrangements can therefore only be made on this basis. This is recognised by the provisions of proviso (c) of Article 3 of the Draft Standstill Agreement.

4. The Political Department have been trying for some months to secure the co-operation of the Central Government Departments concerned for negotiating interim arrangements with the States concerned in this sphere, so that the automatic reversion of jurisdiction to States on the lapse of paramountcy will not endanger all-India defence and communications. This co-operation has not yet been secured though much inter-departmental work has already been done to clarify the issues.

5. Where defence and communications are not involved the reversion of jurisdiction offers few problems. One however is the disposal of property. Lists of property belonging to the Crown Representative have been prepared and are being forwarded to the Works, Mines and Power Department. But the reversion of jurisdiction does not affect rights of property, and detailed consideration of the disposal of property can be dealt with by the successor Governments after the lapse of paramountcy, provided all property belonging to a State is handed back and direct negotiations between successor Governments and the States concerned are initiated forthwith regarding other property, so that suitable arrangements are made for looking after the property and its contents when the agents of the Crown Representative will have disappeared.

6. Even if States decline to entertain local representatives of the successor Governments, it is possible that States would agree to some clerical staff of the Crown Representative staying on in the employ of the successor Governments for a period in order to assist in the disposal of assets and settlement of liabilities. If desired, the Political Department will be glad to suggest this course to States, since the skeleton staff thus retained for a period would be useful for dealing with the leave and pension claims of clerical and inferior staff,

the settlement of which during the next two months presents a formidable problem.

#### APPENDIX I TO ANNEX. 'B' DRAFT STANDSTILL FORMULA

Where it is expedient that, without prejudice to the rights of any State or of the successor Governments in British India, existing administrative arrangements being mutually beneficial to the people of the States and to the people of the rest of India should continue in force while negotiations for new or modified arrangements are in progress between the authorities respectively concerned :

Now, therefore, the parties jointly and severally agree that:

1. No State shall be liable to pay any cash contribution falling due for payment after 15-8-47 otherwise than on terms to be mutually agreed upon between the parties to this agreement.

*Note :* In this Article the term 'cash contribution' has the meaning assigned to it in sub-section (5) of Section 147 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

2. For a period of two years, but subject to denouncement by any party concerned on giving six months' notice and subject always to earlier modification by mutual agreement of the parties concerned, a State shall be entitled to continuance of any privilege or immunity which it enjoyed immediately prior to 15-8-47 provided that it continues duly to fulfil all conditions or reciprocal obligations attached to each such privilege or immunity.

*Note :* In this Article the term 'privilege or immunity' has the meaning assigned to it in sub-section (6) of Section 147 of the Government of India Act, 1935.

3. In respect of all matters of common concern relating to the subjects specified in the attached schedule,

existing administrative arrangements shall continue in force for a period of two years from 15-8-47 and shall not be modified otherwise than by mutual agreement of the parties concerned; provided that

- a. nothing contained in this agreement, and nothing done in pursuance thereof, shall be deemed to create in favour of any party any right continuing after the date of termination of the agreement;
- b. nothing contained in this agreement, and nothing done in pursuance thereof, shall be deemed to derogate from any right which, but for this agreement would have been exercisable by any party to it, and
- c. nothing contained in this agreement shall affect the liberty of any party to it to exercise within its own territory all rights of jurisdiction which it may be entitled to exercise whether by revision on the lapse of paramountcy or by transfer from His Majesty's Government or otherwise.

18. BRAJENDRA LAL MITTER TO SARDAR,  
DATED 17 JUNE 1947

Jatashankar Pathak came today from Rajkot to Abu. He gave me the following information which I am conveying to you for what it is worth.

There was a gathering of Rulers in Kathiawar with the Jam Sahib as leader. The Resident and Political Agent are out to Balkanize India and advised the Rulers accordingly. The argument is that, if Travancore can declare independence, the Kathiawar States, being maritime States, can do likewise. The advantage is that they can rule without any interference from Delhi and develop their ports and they need not depend upon India for anything.

A secret meeting was held under the presidency of the Resident. It was decided that a "Union of Kathiawar" should be formed covering the whole peninsula and that it would declare sovereign independence subject to the right of Junagadh to declare separate independence or to join Pakistan. In case Junagadh separated, it would enter into an offensive and defensive treaty with the Union of Kathiawar and they would resist Baroda's claim to tribute. The Jamsaheb would be the President of the Union and seven States should constitute a council to govern the peninsula. The seven States are Jamnagar, Bhavnagar, Gondal, Porbander, Morvi, Dhrangadhra and Junagadh. Pattani of Bhavnagar was at the meeting. The constitution of the Union is under way. The Resident is helping and the Jamsaheb has promised to put up a crore of rupees in furtherance of the scheme. Baroda was severely criticised for joining the Constituent Assembly and all the States decided to repudiate Baroda's claim to tribute.

Pathak asked Major Hailey, the Political Agent, why Baroda should not get its tribute. Hailey said that the tribute was more than a hundred years old and when the British were resigning sovereignty, Baroda's sovereignty fell with it. Whatever the logic may be, there it is.

Junagadh's position is that it will either declare separate independence or join Pakistan.

A document was signed, but it is secret at the moment. Major Hailey refused to disclose the contents.

19. H. C. DASAPPA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 23 JUNE 1947

Your kind letter of 9 June was awaiting me here. You will have heard with satisfaction the announcement of the Mysore Maharaja that Mysore would enter the Constituent Assembly.

The Dewan has no doubt tried to make a distinction between joining the Assembly and joining the Union later

on. That evidently is intended to drive a good bargain with the Union Centre. I have no doubt that once it participates in the work of the Constituent Assembly, there would be no difficulty in Mysore becoming an integral part of the Union. The Dewan's attempt to keep the two questions distinct is perhaps also due to desire to placate the more recalcitrant States. As you say, in spite of all the bluff and bluster of some Princes and their Advisers, they will have to come in sooner or later.

The Mysore Dewan has fixed 5 July for the meeting of Joint Legislature for the purpose of electing representatives to the Consembyly. He has not yet given a clear indication as to how many of the seven representatives would be elected. He had long ago announced himself as the leader of the Mysore delegation, whatever that term may mean. The Mysore Congress has recently resolved that all the seven should be elected and any other arrangement would be "unsatisfactory and unacceptable". The agreement arrived at by the two Negotiating Committees has been accepted by the All-India States Peoples' Conference at its open session at Gwalior. The Dewan had been giving an impression that barring himself all the remaining six seats would be thrown (open) for election, but at the last Press Conference held on the 17th, at which he announced the message of His Highness, he seems to have given an idea that (only) three out of six would be filled by election. The election will not take place on the 5th itself but on the next day or the day after. Perhaps on that day he would address the House and decide upon the procedure. He is thinking of the Mysore delegation working as a team and I believe he will attempt to buttress his own position by securing at least a majority of yesmen.

The position of the Mysore Congress in the Legislature, as it is, is not altogether satisfactory. For one thing, many of the old tried leaders who were under disqualification at the time of the last General Election are out of the Legislature. For another, the strength of the Mysore Congress in the

Representative Assembly, which is the popular body, is about 120 out of 310, 12 of whom are nominated. In the Legislative Council in a House of 68, of whom 24 are nominated (16 of them being officials and eight being non-officials) the Mysore Congress is about twenty. It will therefore be seen that unless all the six are thrown (open) for election, the Mysore Congress may not be able to secure more than one or two. The question therefore arises whether it would be worthwhile to contest in the circumstances. The Dewan has not yet indicated his mind about the nominated element being not allowed to vote and about the question whether people outside the Legislature could contest the seats. We are awaiting clarification on these issues.

On my way to Mysore, I dropped (in) at Hyderabad and attended the State Congress session. I was very glad to note the tremendous enthusiasm of the people there and I feel very sanguine that the Hyderabad movement has been put on the rails and it is only a question of time for them to reach their goal. There are a few differences among the leaders and it would be well if the leaders from outside keep visiting Hyderabad fairly frequently. They very much appreciated the presence of various leaders at the session this time.

## 20. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO PATTABHI SITARAMAYYA, DATED 24 JUNE 1947

YOUR STATEMENT TO API REGARDING TRAVANCORE WOULD ADVISE YOU PROCEED TRAVANCORE AND GET MATTER CLEARED BY PERSONAL DISCUSSION WITH SIR C. P. RAMASWAMI. MISUNDERSTANDING IS CREATING BITTERNESS AND ILL-FEELING AND HOSTILE PUBLIC OPINION. IF YOUR INTERPRETATION CORRECT IT WILL ALLAY PUBLIC FEELING.

(*Note : C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Dewan of Travancore, announced on 11 June 1947, that as from the transfer of power on 15 August 1947 Travancore had decided to be an independent sovereign State.*)

21. PATTABHI SITARAMAYYA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 26 JUNE 1947

Many thanks for your wire which I received last night. I had also received a wire from the Dewan of Travancore, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, on the 24th instant. But I had not replied to it pending his confirmatory letter.

I hereby confirm my wire given to you last night :

THANKS. SIR C. P. WIRED ME YESTERDAY QUOTE. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR CLOSELY REASONED AND CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT IN NEW TIMES WHICH IN THE MAIN SETS OUT WHAT I HAVE ALWAYS REPEATED. TRAVANCORE IS QUITE WILLING TO COME INTO LINE ON BASIS OF COMPLETE INTERNAL INDEPENDENCE WITH REST OF INDIA OR TO ENTER INTO TREATY WITH REGARD TO MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. WE CANNOT HOWEVER TOLERATE THE KIND OF THREATS OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND SUBJUGATION AND OF INTERNAL REVOLT TO WHICH WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN TREATED BY SOME OF YOUR FRIENDS OF THE CONGRESS HIGH AND LOW COMMANDS. I SHALL ADVISE HIS HIGHNESS TO FIGHT TO THE LAST RATHER THAN SUBMIT TO SUCH THREATS. LET ME ASSURE YOU AS AN OLD FRIEND THAT I AM POSITIVELY THRILLED AND MOVED BY THE OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT WE ARE RECEIVING. I ONLY WISH THAT CONGRESS WAS LED AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE BY MORE MEN LIKE YOU. KIND REGARDS. C. P. RAMASWAMI UNQUOTE. MYSELF NOT REPLIED YET PENDING HIS CONFIRMATORY LETTER. BUT NOW WIRED. THANKS REACHING MADRAS THIRD MEET FOR FURTHER TALKS.

That is where matters stand. As Sir C. P. had given his telegram to me on the 23rd midnight, I expect he would have followed it up with a letter which I can only receive tomorrow 27th. In any case, I am going to Madras on 3 July and I

shall await his arrival in Madras for a further talk or a hint from him in case I should go to Travancore.

I have an idea that Sir C. P. wants to make a distinction between internal independence and autonomy. But as he has virtually accepted my interpretation, I anticipate no difficulty on substantive points. The only thing to evolve is the way to wriggle out of an embarrassing situation for him. . . .

(*Note: Pattabhi Sitaramayya was not able to settle this matter. But after discussions in Delhi in July 1947, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar agreed that accession was inevitable. Soon thereafter Travancore acceded and Ramaswami Aiyar himself left the State.*)

## 22. RAVI SHANKAR SHUKLA TO SARDAR, DATED 30 JUNE 1947

I am enclosing herewith a letter (not printed : suggests collaboration on a certain number of matters between the Chhatisgarh states and the Govt. of C. P. & Berar) received from the Raja Bahadur of Khairagarh. A number of things mentioned therein are purely provincial which can be arranged between the States and this province; but there are others which are either inter-provincial or Central, e. g., the highways. Even for those things which are provincial, the State Negotiating Committee may have come to some decisions, and I shall be grateful if you will kindly advise me what suggestions should be made for the guidance of the Ruling Princes. The subject of the splitting up of this province on a linguistic basis is one on which the Chhattisgarh States are keenly interested, and I would like to know what your suggestion would be in this connection.

### 23. SARDAR PATEL'S STATEMENT OF 5TH JULY 1947 ON INDIAN STATES

It was announced some days back that the Government of India had decided to set up a Department to conduct their relations with the States in matters of common concern. This Department has come into being today and the States have been informed to this effect. On this important occasion I have a few words to say to the Rulers of Indian States among whom I am happy to count many as my personal friends.

It is the lesson of history that it was owing to her politically fragmented condition and our inability to take a united stand that India succumbed to successive waves of invaders. Our mutual conflicts, and internecine quarrels and jealousies have in the past been the cause of our downfall and our falling victims to foreign domination a number of times. We cannot afford to fall into those errors or traps again. We are on the threshold of independence. It is true that we have not been able to preserve the unity of the country entirely unimpaired in the final stage. To the bitter disappointment and sorrow of many of us some parts have chosen to go out of India and to set up their own Government. But there can be no question that despite this separation a fundamental homogeneity of culture and sentiment reinforced by the compulsive logic of mutual interests would continue to govern us. Much more so would this be the case with that vast majority of States which owing to their geographical contiguity and indissoluble ties, economic, cultural and political, must continue to maintain relations of mutual friendship and co-operation with the rest of India. The safety and preservation of these States as well as of India demand unity and mutual co-operation between its-different parts.

When the British established their rule in India they evolved the doctrine of Paramountcy which established the supremacy

of British interests. That doctrine has remained undefined to this day, but in its exercise there has undoubtedly been more of subordination than co-operation. Outside the field of Paramountcy there has been a very wide scope, which relations between British India and the States have been regulated by enlightened mutual interests. Now that British rule is ending, the demand has been made that the States should regain their independence. In so far as Paramountcy embodied the submission of States to foreign will, I have every sympathy with this demand, but I do not think it can be their desire to utilise this freedom from domination in a manner which is injurious to the common interests of India or which militates against the ultimate Paramountcy of popular interests and welfare or which might result in the abandonment of that mutually useful relationship that has developed between British India and Indian States during the last century. This has been amply demonstrated by the fact that a great majority of Indian States have already come into the Constituent Assembly. To those who have not done so, I appeal that they should join now. The States have already accepted the basic principle that for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications they would come into the Indian Union. We ask no more of them than accession on these three subjects in which the common interests of country are involved. In other matters we would scrupulously respect their autonomous existence.

This country with its institutions is the proud heritage of the people who inhabit it. It is an accident that some live in the States and some in British India, but all alike partake of its culture and character. We are all knit together by bonds of blood and feeling no less than of self-interest. None can segregate us into segments; no impassable barriers can be set up between us. I suggest that it is therefore better for us to make laws sitting together as friends than to make treaties as aliens. I invite my friends, the Rulers of States and their people to the Councils of the Constituent Assembly in this spirit of friendliness and co-operation in a joint

endeavour, inspired by common allegiance to our motherland for the common good of us all.

There appears a great deal of misunderstanding about the attitude of the Congress towards the States. I should like to make it clear that it is not the desire of the Congress to interfere in any manner whatever with the domestic affairs of the States. They are no enemies of the Princely Order, but, on the other hand, wish them and their people under this aegis all prosperity, contentment and happiness. Nor would it be my policy to conduct the relations of the new Department with the States in any manner which savours of the domination of one over the other; if there would be any domination, it would be that of our mutual interests and welfare. We have no ulterior motive or selfish interests to serve. Our common objective should be to understand each other's point of view and come to decisions acceptable to all and in the best interests of the country. With this object, I propose to explore the possibility of associating with the administration of the new Department, a Standing Committee representative of both the States and British India.

We are at a momentous stage in the history of India. By common endeavour we can raise the country to a new greatness while lack of unity will expose us to fresh calamities. I hope the Indian States will bear in mind that the alternative to co-operation in the general interest is anarchy and chaos which will overwhelm great and small in a common ruin if we are unable to act together in the minimum of common tasks. Let not the future generation curse us for having had the opportunity but failed to turn it to our mutual advantage. Instead, let it be our proud privilege to leave a legacy of mutually beneficial relationship which would raise this sacred land to its proper place amongst the nations of the world and turn it into an abode of peace and prosperity.

24. SARDAR TO RAVI SHANKAR SHUKLA,  
DATED 9 JULY 1947

Thank you for your letter of 30 June 1947, with which you enclosed a letter from the Raja Bahadur of Khairagarh. Before committing yourself to any collaboration with the neighbouring States, you should await the result of the negotiations we are going to undertake with regard to temporary and permanent arrangements in matters of common concern after 16 August 1947. It is likely that the enthusiasm of these states for an arrangement with us would decrease if they knew that in nation-building departments they could rely on the co-operation of the provinces. You may reply that there would be no objection to collaboration in these matters if the offer is genuine, but the important thing to start with is the conclusion of arrangements with the Centre through the Constituent Assembly, and, once these are accomplished, arrangements with Provincial Governments will present no difficulty and that you will do the best you can to deal with matters of common concern.

25. TELEGRAM FROM PATTAM A. THANU PILLAI  
TO SARDAR, DATED 10 JULY 1947

SIR C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR DEWAN OF TRAVANCORE AFTER DESIRING TRAVANCORE INDEPENDENCE AFTER 15 AUGUST ATTEMPTS SUPPRESSION OF PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST HIS POLICY MAKING UNRESTRICTED UNWARRANTED USE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL AGENCY RESOURCES AND POWERS. TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS COMPOSED OF GOONDAS ARE FORMED THROUGHOUT COUNTRY UNDER CONTROL OF POLICE AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO WRECK PUBLIC MEETINGS AND ASSAULT PUBLIC MEN. K. A. MATHEW EX-LEADER OF STATE CONGRESS LEGISLATURE PARTY WOUNDED ON

THE HEAD WHILE ADDRESSING PUBLIC MEETING ON 7 JULY. LIFE OF PUBLIC MEN IN DANGER. MEMBERS OF ABOVE ORGANISATIONS PARADE PUBLIC STREETS ARMED WITH LATHIS (staves) KNIVES AND OTHER WEAPONS. THEY ARE TRANSPORTED IN LORRIES FROM PLACE TO PLACE WHERE MEETINGS ARE ANNOUNCED. LIFE AND PROPERTY INSECURE. GOVERNMENT VICTIMISE PEOPLE NOT SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT VIEW. CONDITIONS RAPIDLY DEGENERATING INTO WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY. TRAVANCORE IS SUBJECTED TO UNBRIDLED DICTATORSHIP BY AN IRRESPONSIBLE NON-TRAVANCOREAN DEWAN AND COMPLETE NEGATION OF LAW AND ORDER TO ENFORCE HIS POLICY OF KEEPING THE STATE OUTSIDE INDIAN UNION AGAINST THE WISHES OF PEOPLE. PRAY IMMEDIATE INQUIRY BY AN IMPARTIAL AGENT AND STEPS TO ENSURE GOOD GOVERNMENT.

26. H. C. DASAPPA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 16 JULY 1947

Mysore's delegation to the Consemby is there already. Sir Arcot (A. Ramaswamy Mudaliar) has managed to strengthen his block in it all right. He had held out that Mysore go much further than the agreed formula of 50-50. On 17 June he announced the decision to join the Consemby and soon after announced that a joint session of the Legislature would be summoned on 5 July for electing members to the Consemby, but gave no indication of the procedure as to the number to be elected, the persons who could contest, the method of voting, etc., until 2 July, three days before the joint session. That day he surprised us by saying that only four out of seven would be elected—two from each House on the basis of single transferable vote—and that only the sitting elected members of the Legislature could contest. It was designed evidently to (keep out) those Congressmen who on account of this disqualification could not contest the general elections last time. If it were a joint session at which the members could be elected there was just a chance of Congress getting three seats out of four. In order to have their own

favourites, the Government split up the electoral college into two. I must say that our Congress also did not move sufficiently vigorously in time to bring pressure on the Government.

The President, Shri K. C. Reddi, wrote to the Dewan only on 2 July--the day on which the Dewan made the belated announcement of the procedure. Since it was (based on) preferential vote and we had more than the required quota for one seat each in the two Houses, we could easily get Shri K. C. Reddi from the Council and Shri S. V. K. Murty from the Assembly. The Government backed up Shri Guruva Reddy (father-in-law of Shri K. C. Reddy) from the Council, as he is fighting the Congress and supporting Government, and Shri D. H. Chandrasekariah from the Assembly and got them returned. The Dewan nominated a Muslim and Harijan and so they are five as against our two. The Congress put up a Harijan as a second candidate in the Council and as expected he lost. Two European members, who had declared that they would not participate, took part and evidently voted for Guruva Reddy. It is something that you have our two friends, Shri K. C. Reddy and Shri S. V. K. Murty, to keep in touch with you.

27. P. L. CHUDGAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 30 JULY 1947

I read in the newspapers that the States Department in your charge will assume all the political powers which the defunct Crown Department exercised. The poor and oppressed voiceless people in these territories will read this news with great relief. I wonder why the semi-jurisdictional 3rd and 4th Class States have been left out; they are equally petty and do not deserve independence and full powers.

I also read that you intend to retain the English Political officers in Kathiawar in your service. I do not think this can be true, but if at all it is your wish, I must inform you that

they are a hopelessly inefficient lot, arrogant, insolent and most dangerous intriguers. It is they and their class who have, as you know personally, been the cause of all our evils; they must be sacked at once.

If you will kindly read the preamble of the Foreign Jurisdiction Order in Council, 1902, you will find that the source and authority of the political powers of Paramountcy which the King-in-Council exercised through the Political Department are stated to have been derived from "conquest, usage, sufferance" and all other diverse courses. Step by step, the Union Government of India can also assume all those powers on the same grounds and the further grounds of necessity to prevent a breach of the peace or conflict, which may spread in the territory under the Union Dominion and on the ground that it is the Union Government of India's responsibility to maintain peace in the territories of the States, big and small. These are called extra-territorial powers.

I read in the newspapers that Baroda is trying to maintain the attachment of about 200 states and estates forcibly attached to it against the will of the people and the Chiefs and the Talukdars of the attached areas; almost chaotic conditions prevail in all the attached areas; there is unmentionable corruption and tyranny under which the lakhs of people in these units are groaning; hundreds of cases, civil, criminal, political and Giras are pending in the courts of the Special Officers of the attached areas undisposed, and the sufferings of the litigants are terrible. Please see that all these units are detached and placed under the direct administration of your Department.

28. SARDAR TO P. L. CHUDGAR,  
DATED 4 AUGUST 1947

I have your letter of 30 July 1947.

There is no truth in the fact that the States Department will inherit the powers and the evils of the Political Department, but it is intended to be of any help to the States as well as the people.

There is no question of retaining any Political Officers in Kathiawar, either European or Indian. Paramountcy will disappear from 15 August and it is hoped that neither the Princes nor the people will shed any tear for its disappearance. May be that there (will) be a temporary vacuum, but time and circumstances will evolve a suitable machinery which, while abandoning all the evils of the defunct Crown Department, will work in co-operation with the people and the Princes and create an atmosphere of peace and harmony.

I do not know anything about the attempts of the States to grab and attach the non-jurisdictional States who will be detached by 15 August. The Attachment Order dies with the lapse of Paramountcy, and it will be open to these smaller units to do what they wish to do. There is no compulsion and they can just do what they like.

29. MEMORANDUM RECORDED BY MOUNTBATTEN  
OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH NAWAB OF BHOPAL,  
DATED 11 AUGUST 1947

His Highness (Nawab of Bhopal) came to see me at 11 o'clock this morning.

I showed His Highness my draft reply to his letters of 10 August, and he was kind enough to say that he would gladly write to put on record that I had at no time brought any

form of pressure to bear on him as to his future course of action; and that he remembered that on 23 March, the day of my swearing-in, he had forecast the possibility of his abdicating in favour of his daughter at some time in the near future. He assured me, therefore, that his abdication had nothing whatever to do (with) any pressure on my part.

We agreed that I should split my letter into two parts, one part dealing with the extension he had asked for, which was awaiting confirmation from Mr. V. P. Menon, which would remain private; and the other an open letter about the abdication to which he would reply also by an open letter which would be suitable for publication should the occasion for publication arise.

He made it very clear to me that the fact that he was perfectly satisfied with my handling of the situation as I had found it, did not mean to say that he was satisfied with the situation that HMG had created for him and the Princes.

I pointed out to the Nawab that I could not send off any letters until I had seen Sardar Patel this afternoon and obtained his agreement to the 10 day extension which HH has asked for; and that with his concurrence Mr. Menon should send the letter requested. I said, however, that although hitherto Sardar Patel had never refused any single demand I had put forward in dealing with any State, I had been warned only this morning by Mr. V. P. Menon that Sardar Patel had received information which would make it most unlikely that he would accede to my request for an extension.

I told HH the story that Sardar Patel had received was to the effect that HH had made contact with the young Maharaja of Jodhpur and induced him to come with him to Mr. Jinnah. That at his meeting Mr. Jinnah had offered extremely favourable terms on condition that they did not sign the Instrument of Accession, and that he had even gone so far as to turn round and say to the Maharaja of Jodhpur "Here's my fountain pen; write your terms and I will sign it."

The story continued that after I had sent for the Maharaja of Jodhpur and had a discussion with him and had sent him to see Sardar Patel, who had satisfied all his demands, the Maharaja had flown back to Jodhpur promising to come back that night or the following morning and to go straight to Sardar Patel to give him his decision.

The story goes that the Maharaja of Jodhpur returned on Sunday morning, but it was uncertain as to which airfield he would land at. HH of Bhopal was supposed, therefore, to have sent a staff officer in a car to each airfield—Palam and Willingdon—to make quite certain that the Maharaja should be found and taken straight to his house. He had been virtually a “prisoner” in this house and had not yet been released to keep his word and see Sardar Patel.

I pointed out to His Highness that no amount of friendship would enable me to protect either himself or his State or the new ruler of the State if the future Government of India thought that he was acting in a manner hostile to that Government by trying to induce an all-Hindu State to join Pakistan.

His Highness then offered to tell me the true version of events, which he gave me to understand on his word of honour would be the whole truth and nothing but the truth. I gladly accepted this assurance, for having been his friend and known him for years as a man of honour I had no reason to doubt that he would tell me the truth. The following is His Highness’s account, dictated in his presence:

“About 6 August the Maharaja of Dholpur and one or two other rulers informed me that the Maharaja of Jodhpur wished to see me. I said I would gladly see him at my house. When the Maharaja came, he told me that he was particularly anxious to meet Mr. Jinnah as quickly as possible to know what terms Mr. Jinnah would offer.

“As Mr. Jinnah was very busy and on the eve of his departure from Delhi to Karachi and I had fortunately

secured an interview with him that afternoon, I invited the Maharaja of Jodhpur to come along with me. The Maharaja therefore came back to my house and we drove together to Mr. Jinnah's house.

"At this interview His Highness asked Mr. Jinnah what terms he was offering to those States who wished to establish relationship with Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah said: 'I have made my position quite clear. We are ready to come to treaty relations with the States and we shall give them very good terms and we shall treat them as independent States.' They then discussed certain details about port facilities, railway jurisdiction and the supply of food, arms and ammunition. The question of whether he should or should not sign an instrument of accession never arose.

"I returned to Bhopal and while I was there I received a telephone message from Delhi, from HH of Dholpur and other rulers, to the effect that His Highness of Jodhpur was returning to Delhi on Saturday and that he wanted to meet me. I replied that I was in any case coming back to Delhi on Saturday.

"I arrived back in Delhi on Saturday morning and received a message at the airfield from HH of Dholpur asking me to come straight to him. On arrival he told me to wait with him since the Maharaja of Jodhpur was at present in with the Viceroy and was expected to come straight back at the conclusion of the interview. The Viceroy, however, kept him longer than was expected, so that HH of Jodhpur did not have time to come to the house but sent a telephone message to say he was going direct to the airfield to fly back to Jodhpur but was returning that evening.

"Since the message did not say which airfield he was taking off from, HH of Dholpur sent two ADC in two cars to Palam and Willingdon respectively to try

and catch HH of Jodhpur before he left. It is possible that one of these two cars may have been mine because mine was waiting outside the door, but I am still unable to confirm that it was used.

“One of the ADCs caught HH of Jodhpur who sent back a message to the effect that he was coming back that evening. I then went back to my house. His Highness of Dholpur came to see me on Saturday evening to say that HH of Jodhpnr had not come back that night. On Sunday morning it appears that HH of Jodhpur got back, but I do not know what time as he never communicated with me.

“At about 1.30 p.m, I received a message from HH of Dholpur inviting me to lunch. I replied that I did not wish to have lunch but would come at 2 o'clock. On arrival I found HH of Jodhpur there, and he had brought with him his guru, whom he introduced as his philosopher and guide. This was the first time I had seen HH of Jodhpur since our meeting with Mr. Jinnah.

“HH invited us all to have discussions with his guru, and HH of Dholpur and other rulers entered into a lengthy discussion with him, but I myself only contributed a few words to the conversation.

“As I was leaving, His Highness of Jodhpur said he was coming to see me on Monday morning at 10 o'clock. This morning (Monday) he kept his promise and came at 10. He told me that his guru had been unable to make up his mind but that he himself had decided that he would not leave the Union of India. I replied that I considered His Highness was the master of his own State and I would not attempt to influence his choice one way or the other.”

30. SARDAR TO AKBAR HYDARI,  
DATED 21 AUGUST 1947

I am writing this regarding the position of Tripura State. According to the Boundary Commission's Award, the Chittagong Hill Tribes have been handed over to East Bengal. This places Tripura State in a position of great difficulty and embarrassment. To the north it will have Sylhet, to the west and south East Bengal. There is a small portion of Frontier co-terminous with Assam and I understand that communications with Tripura State would be possible through this area. Nevertheless, it is probable that there would be a feeling of uneasiness in the State which a few months back lost its Ruler and is now under a Regency presided over by a Maharani who hails from Panna State. She saw me last month and seemed very nervous, which is quite understandable.

In these circumstances, we feel that the interests of Tripura State should be watched with vigilance by us and the State and its Maharani should be assured of all protection.

I feel that the best way to do so would be through you and would like to know, before we finalise any arrangements, whether you have any ideas on this subject.

31. AKBAR HYDARI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 25 AUGUST 1947

Thanks for your letter dated 21 August regarding Tripura State. It is really a question of communication, because if we have reasonable good communications between Assam and Tripura I could in time of need give requisite assistance to the State. As you know, your Government have substantially accepted my proposals for an increase in the strength of the

Assam Rifles, which is a semi-military force under the Governor's direct control. The additional platoons now sanctioned are being raised and plans are being prepared, which will shortly be submitted to the Union Government, for their proper equipment. I should therefore have a reasonably big force of men trained for this particular type of country and be able to give speedy assistance to authority menaced by external pressure or internal troubles. I had such possibilities at the back of my mind when making the proposals for an increase in the strength of the Assam Rifles.

2. Now for communications. We have first to get our road communications from Shillong to Silchar, now that we have lost the road communications through Sylhet. For this purpose, I have already obtained (Bishnuram) Medhi's (Finance Minister) concurrence to a road which, after consultation with my own staff and local military authorities, I propose should be built during the next few months from Shillong to Silchar (Headquarters of Cachar district) via Jowai, Garampani and Haflong; and as second priority another road branching eastward from Haflong to Kohima. The advantages, both from the economic and the security point of view of these roads, are obvious. As regards our communications beyond to Tripura, it is fortunate that the Boundary Commission awarded us the four eastern thanas of Sylhet which are now to be incorporated in Cachar district; for, there is already a road from Karimganj to Patharkandi and from the latter place to very near the Tripura border. There are possibilities of alternative or complementary roads from Badarpur and Silchar through the Lushai Hills to points on the Tripura frontier, which are low down the point at which the road from Karimganj and Patharkandi would strike the frontier. Experts will have to be asked to do a quick survey for our consideration and then we could take a final decision. My own preference for our immediate purposes would be to get the Karimganj-Patharkandi road extended quickly to the Tripura frontier and get the State authorities to construct a road in their territory to meet it. This has the advantage of

our being able to drive a road to the Tripura frontier during the next few months and at small expense to us; for the bit of country on our side through which there is no road is very short.

3. As you know, we in Assam are very short of technical assistance of all kinds and our PWD (Roads) is poor and is not helped by the fact that the Rev. Nichols-Roy, the PWD Minister, is not a good executive. I have therefore enquired from the local military authorities whether Army HQ would lend us units of the Indian Engineers for supervision purposes in constructing the Shillong-Haflong-Silchar road. If they undertake to do that, I think with prodding on my part we could get the proposed road to Silchar, and the extension of the Karimganj-Patharkandi Road to the Tripura frontier also, done during the winter 1947-48.

4. Simultaneously we must of course energise the Tripura administration and get them to do their bit. From that point of view, as well as from many others, it would be a good thing if the Governor of Assam were to be your agent for Tripura, as he is for Manipur. For my part I shall gladly accept this responsibility if you wish to lay it on me.

5. The expenditure on the Shillong-Haflong-Silchar road should, I think, be shared as between the military authorities and the Provincial Government; because that, as well as the proposed road from Haflong to Kohima, would be of considerable military value in time of trouble on India's eastern frontier or further down south. The same principle could be applied to the extension from Patharkandi to the Tripura border. In so far as the province is concerned, it should be allowed to meet its share from the Reconstruction Grant or the Road Fund, whatever the experts of the Union Ministry of Finance decide. I now await your decision in the above matters. Unfortunately, Bardoloi is away in Delhi, so I cannot consult him; but I have little doubt that he will fall in with the views I have expressed; as I have already stated, Medhi is agreeable to the Shillong-Silchar road.

6. I am sending this letter to you through my ADC, Captain Rashid Yusuf Ali, 4th Rajputs, whom I am sending to Delhi to push various other matters through for my Government. He knows all the details about my above proposals; in fact, it is he who has worked them out in consultation with the local military authorities. If you are not able to see him when he delivers this letter and then want to see him later, H. M. Patel will have his address.

7. Now for a passing remark on another subject. With Jalpaiguri cut off from West Bengal by a block of Pakistan, the commonsense course would be to attach it to Assam with which its boundaries march. That and Cooch Behar would improve and render safe the Indian Union's communications with her eastern frontier. But I suppose with Sarat Bose on the warpath and the Bengalis already howling for more territory in place of what they have lost to East Bengal, commonsense must stand down to emotion and so we had better not raise this subject just now !

### 32. NAWAB OF BHOPAL TO SARDAR, DATED 26 AUGUST 1947

By the time you receive this letter you will have heard the news that I have decided to join the Union of India. I feel, therefore, that it will help our relations if I write to you to define clearly my attitude towards you personally as Minister of the States Department and to the Dominion which Bhopal State has agreed to join.

During our talk on the 22nd you expressed surprise, at one stage, that I had so much opposed your plan. I do not disguise the fact that while the struggle was on I used every means in my power to preserve the independence and neutrality of my State. Now that I have conceded defeat I hope that you will find that I can be as staunch a friend as I have been an inveterate opponent. I harbour no ill feelings towards

any one, for throughout I have been treated with consideration and have received understanding and courtesy from your side.

I now wish to tell you that so long as you maintain your present firm stand against the disruptive forces in the country and continue to be a friend of the States as you have shown you are, you will find in me a loyal and faithful ally. Now that I am with the Dominion of India my influence will always be used in support of the Dominion Government and in combating disloyal elements, irrespective of caste, creed or religion.

I shall stand by you and if ever you need my assistance in maintaining communal harmony you have only to say the word and I will do everything in my power to help. Perhaps when I am next in Delhi we might have a further talk.

33. SARDAR TO NAWAB OF BHOPAL,  
DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1947

Many thanks for your personal letter of 26 August 1947.

2. I am deeply touched by its transparent sincerity and cordial tone and I can assure you that I warmly reciprocate the same.

3. Quite candidly, I do not look upon the accession of your State to the Indian Dominion as either a victory for us or a defeat for you. It is only right and propriety which have triumphed in the end, and in that triumph you and I have played our respective roles. You deserve full credit for having recognised the soundness of the position and for the courage, the honesty and the boldness of having given up your earlier stand, which, according to us, was entirely antagonistic to the interests as much of India as of your own State.

4. I have noted with particular pleasure your assurance of support to the Dominion Government in combating disloyal elements irrespective of caste, creed or religion, and your

offer of loyal and faithful friendship. During the last few months, it had been a great disappointment and regret to me that your undoubted talents and abilities were not at the country's disposal in the critical times through which we were passing, and I, therefore, particularly value this assurance of co-operation and friendship. No Government can tolerate even for a moment subversive influences and activities, and you can rest assured that we, on our part, realise that the sooner we get control over these the better.

5. I am looking forward to meeting your Highness when you happen to come to Delhi and to talk over our many problems and difficulties pertaining not only to the new relationship between the States and the Dominion but also the present situation in the country and the part which the States should play in the general advancement of the country.

#### 34. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR, DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1947

The Junagadh situation is developing rapidly and may lead to all manner of consequences. Essentially, this is a question of the relationship of India and Pakistan and we are already considering the possibility of military action. It is desirable, and indeed necessary, that the External Affairs Ministry should be kept in intimate touch with all developments. Normally, telegrams relating to this business should also go through the Ministry of External Affairs. You have been good enough to keep me fully informed. I think, however, that our Ministry as such should also be kept fully informed. This means that our Secretary General, Girja Shankar Bajpai, should be kept in touch. I should like him to attend any consultations or conferences on this subject. V. P. Menon may also consult him whenever he likes about any developments.

I have been thinking that it would be desirable for us to send a message to the British Government about the

Junagadh affair. This would be purely for their information. If you agree, could you kindly ask V. P. Menon to draft such a message and send it on to us.

35. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1947

Thank you for letter of 23 September 1947.

I gather from Menon that our telegrams to the Pakistan Government are being sent through the External Affairs Ministry. Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai should, therefore, be quite familiar with the inter-Dominion aspect of the problem. However, I have asked Menon to make it a point to keep Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai in touch with future developments. Menon will also call him to attend any inter-departmental consultations or conferences on this subject.

I am not quite sure whether we need say anything to the British Government at this stage, but I will think it over and let you know. Since this was written we have discussed this matter in the morning meeting.

36. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 29 SEPTEMBER 1947

I noticed in the Press a day or two ago that Liaquat Ali Khan claimed that "Babariawad consists of a group of jagirdars under the undisputed sovereignty of the ruler of Junagadh", and that "Mangrol has voluntarily placed itself in the position of a vassal of Junagadh and has no separate entity as a State".

I know, of course, that we hold a very different view on both matters, and that as regards Mangrol, Sir Walter Monckton unequivocally upholds our view.

Nevertheless, I wonder if there is any method, such as reference to some impartial tribunal, which could settle this matter once and for all. The reason behind this suggestion is that I feel that if we are going to put troops into either of the disputed areas, we must be sure that in doing so we are acting with unchallengeable correctitude.

I will take this up later today if we can arrange a meeting.

(*Note* : The Nawab of Junagadh after acceding to Pakistan had sent his troops to Babariawad and Mangrol—which had acceded to India—on the ground that he was their sovereign. India repudiated this claim and sent their troops to defend these two States.)

### 37. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN, 1 OCTOBER 1947

Please refer to your Excellency's letter dated 29 September 1947 regarding Babariawad and Mangrol. Although Liaquat Ali Khan claims that "Mangrol has voluntarily placed itself in the position of a vassal of Junagadh and has no separate entity as a state," the facts are quite the reverse. The Sheikh of Mangrol himself issued a Gazette Notification on 15 September stating unequivocally that he was independent of Junagadh and that his State was quite distinct and separate from Junagadh. He further went on to say that he would announce his policy regarding accession shortly. He followed up this notification by sending his Legal Adviser to Delhi to negotiate accession to the Indian Dominion. On advice being telegraphed by him to the Sheikh Sahib at Mangrol the latter went to Rajkot, had further full discussion with Menon and eventually signed the Instrument of Accession. All this would not have happened if it was true that Mangrol had "voluntarily placed himself in the position of a vassal of Junagadh". We have accepted the accession of Mangrol and it is Junagadh

and Pakistan who claim that Mangrol had no right to accede apart from Junagadh. Thus, if I may say so, the boot is on the other leg, and it is really for Pakistan to seek arbitration in support of its claim against Mangrol. I do not see how, after having accepted the accession of Mangrol, we can ourselves suggest arbitration, an implication of which would be that we have accepted accession without being quite sure as to the correct status of Mangrol. The same principle applies to Babariawad.

2. If, however, Pakistan wishes and suggests arbitration, we shall be prepared to consider the request, but I am quite clear in my mind that the approach for arbitration must in both cases be made by Pakistan and not by us.

38. KAILASH NATH KATJU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 1 OCTOBER 1947

I hope you have continued to enjoy good health in spite of the terrific pressure of public business during the last few weeks. Sitting here in a quiet corner of India, my thoughts constantly go back to the UP and Delhi and the Punjab. I hope normal conditions will soon be restored.

To avoid repetition I am enclosing here with a copy of a letter which I am sending today to Jawaharlalji. The portion about the Eastern States may interest you particularly.

39. KAILASH NATH KATJU TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU  
DATED 1 OCTOBER 1947

The Eastern States, with which you know Orissa is so inter-locked, present another difficult problem. I have no means of knowing exactly what is happening, though the other day Lt. Col Bedi, the liaison officer stationed at Sambalpur, came and saw both (H. K.) Mahtab and me. He was rather complaining that the rulers did not pay much heed to his advice

because they knew he had no political status and could exercise no authority or even moral pressure over them. In fact, the rulers have been asked by their federation to ignore Bedi altogether. The federation constitution is a curious set-up. The executive authority vests in a Board of 7 rulers with a President and there are so-called Ministers to aid and advise the Board. This is a misuse of language, because the Ministers are appointed by, and are responsible to, the Board and are in no way responsible to the Legislature. The constitution is a complete eyewash and transfers no real power to the people. The Prime Minister of the Federation, Krishnarao, came and saw me and Mahtab the other day and we discussed matters in general. He told me that he was quite alive to the very vague position in regard to the establishment of constitutional government in the States, and they propose to appoint a committee at once to draw up a model constitution for each State. What has been done in furtherance of this proposal I do not know. Meanwhile, so far as I can gather from confidential reports and the writings in the Press, the situation is getting quite explosive. Everyday the Orissa Press carries stories of repressions in one or other of these petty States. The latest is that the federation has employed a police force of 700 recruited from Pakistan Muslims and others and so on. The Praja Mandals in some States are carrying on vigorous propaganda and we get the familiar accounts of lathi charges, arrests and detentions without trial. I think these States should be definitely told that they cannot be permitted to swagger about with notions of independent kingship and sovereignty. Many of them are not even as big as some of the zamindaris of the United Provinces, and prior to 15 of August were dancing humbly to the tune of every Political Agent. Orissa can boast of a strong Press, four dailies and several weeklies, very wide awake, able and fully representative of all shades of political opinion in the country. This Press is unanimous in its attitude towards the Eastern States and strongly advocates the establishment of genuine responsible government therein. Having regard to the slender resources of the province and of these

States acting in isolation, it is imperative in the interest of further development that there should be the closest co-operation between them. This is a point which I stressed in my address in the legislature and I catalogued a long list of colleges and institutions which are urgently required in the interests of national development. I imagine the States Department, in spite of its other preoccupations, is fully alive to the gravity of the position in this part of India, and effective measures (will) soon be adopted to set this right and to bring these Eastern States "Potentates" to a just appreciation of their true position. I emphasise this because if there is any serious development in any State and any untoward incident takes place I have not a shadow of doubt that public opinion in the province will side wholly with the States people and even the provincial Government may be forced—not that they will be the less willing themselves—to take active sides in the controversy. You may be aware of the very strong resolution adopted by the Utkal Provincial Congress Committee on this matter.

40. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR,  
DATED 4 NOVEMBER 1947

As you know the Rulers of some States, for instance, Alwar, Bharatpur, Jodhpur, are misbehaving in their States. The brother of the Bharatpur Ruler is a Minister and is **definitely implicated in dacoities and looting**. Jodhpur has installed a foolish young man of 18 to be Home Minister. (C.S.) Venkatachar had to leave because of these changes.

These Rulers are exceedingly foolish and are injuring themselves and their States. It is perhaps true that we cannot take any very effective steps against them at present. That is for you to judge, but to remain silent at their misbehaviour may also have bad consequences. I suggest that your States Ministry might point out to them that what they are doing is objectionable and harmful. Further that we might stop all

export of arms and petrol to these States. Petrol is specially important.

41 SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter (not printed : re. Tripura) dated 4 November 1947. The Dewan of Tripura has already sent us a detailed letter which shows that he is quite alive to the dangers involved and of the requirements of the situation. We have already taken action on this letter and have ourselves communicated with the Government of Assam on several occasions. As a result of such consultations a programme of improvement of communications has already been decided and steps have been taken to ensure that Tripura has independent communications of posts and telegraph and wireless with us. We have written to the Government of Assam to post a force of the Assam Rifles in the State. There are some other important matters which have to be considered and for this reason I am asking both the Maharani and the Dewan of Tripura immediately to come to Delhi for consultations. (Sir Akbar) Hydari is being appointed our Agent to deal with Tripura State. . . .

42. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU  
DATED 5 NOVEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 4 November regarding certain States. We are already collecting evidence about Bharatpur and further action against the State will depend on the nature of the evidence. I have no information about the person who has been appointed as Home Minister (in Jodhpur). I have met Venkatachar and it appears that he had to leave on account of differences more fundamental than mere changes in personnel.

2. The internal position of some of these States is already under my consideration and you can rest assured

that whatever action is necessary and expedient will be taken. The present atmosphere and condition in the country makes it necessary to handle the state questions with a degree of caution and tact.

(*Note* : There were some anti-Muslim communal incidents in some parts of Alwar and Bhartpur. Mainly in order to maintain public confidence, Sardar, with the consent of the Rulers, posted officers of the Government of India in charge of these States; further enquiry showed that the Rulers were not involved in these incidents.)

43. TELEGRAM FROM SHAH NAWAZ BHUTTO  
TO SARDAR, DATED 8 NOVEMBER 1947

VERY GRATEFUL FOR GRANTING INTERVIEW TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE. WE ACCEPT YOUR ADVICE BUT DISTRESSED TO FIND I AM NOT ALLOWED SUFFICIENT TIME TO BRING BACK NAWAB SAHEB FROM KARACHI AND TAKE STEPS FOR PEOPLES GOVERNMENT. BEING PRESSED BY CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE ASKED REGIONAL COMMISSIONER RAJKOT TO ASSIST IN PRESERVING LAW AND ORDER AND AVOIDING BLOODSHED AGAINST AGGRESSIVE ELEMENTS FROM OUTSIDE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES INVOLVED. HIS HIGHNESS FROM KARACHI WIRES TO AVOID BLOODSHED AT ANY COST OF HIS BELOVED SUBJECTS AND HAS INVITED ME TO MEET HIM AT ONCE AT KARACHI TO DISCUSS SITUATION. ADDRESSED MAHATMA GANDHI REPEATED SARDAR VALLABHABHI PATEL DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD NEW DELHI.

44. TELEGRAM FROM BUCH TO MENON,  
DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1947

BUCH TO MENON. SITUATION QUIET SO FAR. HAVE ASSUMED CHARGE AND APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR. CAPTAIN HARVEY JONES LED OUR FORCES IN AND HAS BEEN COOPERATING. OTHER MUSLIM OFFICERS ARE SULLEN. INFANTRY CAVALRY AND POLICE ARMS HAVE BEEN SURRENDERED. HAVE MET DEPARTMENTAL OFFICERS TODAY. VANTHALI AND VERAVAL AND UNA HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED TODAY. TROOPS HAVE GONE TO KUTTIYANA. KESHOD WAS DUE TO BE OCCUPIED AND REPORT IS AWAITED. YESTERDAY BEFORE WE OCCUPIED JUNAGADH SOME MISCHIEFMAKERS BURNT SOME RAILWAY CARRIAGES AND SARADIYA RAILWAY STATION CUTTING SOME TELEGRAPH WIRES. ORDER WILL BE RESTORED TODAY....

45. MOUNTBATTEN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter of 26 November (not printed).

I am glad you have asked my advice about arresting Lt. Col. G. B. Williams, because this raises an important matter of principle. I am no lawyer, but the hearsay evidence of your "high placed official" is surely not to be accepted in any court of law.

Although I agree, of course, that the statements attributed to Lt. Col. Williams, if true, are extremely mischievous, I am unaware of any law operating in peace time which would permit of the arrest of any one of any nationality for activities of this type.

Presumably in a free country people are free to give vent to their opinion, however undesirable that opinion may be

and presumably also they are entitled to make suggestions for political alignments, even though they are as foolish as his suggestions.

I have managed to find out a little about this officer and find that no one has a high opinion of him. He has been reported as having neither the guile nor the intelligence to be a plotter and is more likely to be a gossip than an agitator.

If I am wrong about the legal position I shall be glad to be told what the position actually is.

In the meanwhile, I am trying to trace Lt. Col. Williams' whereabouts and would be prepared to follow the matter up unofficially if you will agree.

I shall be glad to talk this over with you next time we meet.

46. SARDAR TO MOUNTBATTEN,  
DATED 3 DECEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 29 November 1947, which I received on 1 December (Serial No. 45). As you know, I was out of Delhi the whole of yesterday. I could not, therefore, reply to it earlier.

2. The point of principle which you have raised is easily disposed of. The Bengal State Prisoners Regulation of 1818 as adapted gives us powers to place under personal restraint an individual for reasons of State connected with relation with acceding States. The information which I have received is not hearsay. It has been confirmed by His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur with whom I had a talk on this matter. For our purpose, therefore, there is ample information to justify action under the Regulation of 1818.

3. I might add that both Gandhiji and myself have had the privilege of having been arrested under the above-mentioned

Regulation the by British Government, who, I am sure, were equally keen to ensure the maintenance of the principle to which you have referred.

4. I am afraid I am unable to dismiss as foolish the activities of this individual. We know full well how the officers of the late Political Department plotted against our bringing in the States into an association with the Indian Dominion on democratic lines. Some of the Princes are even now foolish enough to listen to officers of the type of Lt. Col. Williams. Extremely mischievous statements, as you have rightly called those that have been made by Lt. Col. Williams, are, therefore, likely to result in equally mischievous consequences unless we nip this mischief in the bud. I should not of course mind at all if Lt. Col. Williams leaves the country as soon as possible, but if he does not, I see hardly any choice but to deal with him in the manner I have suggested.

47. K. C. REDDY TO SARDAR,  
DATED 8 DECEMBER 1947

I am in receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo regarding representation for Christians in the Mysore Constituent Assembly. We are keenly aware that they should have their due representation in the Assembly. But it was thought that any reservation for them would not be in consonance with the policy that is now being adopted by the Union Government. At the time of putting up candidates for election from the territorial constituencies it will be seen to it that Christian candidates are put up and their success ensured. Shri Dasappa, who is coming over to Delhi next week in connection with the Industries Conference, will discuss this matter with you further.

48. AKBAR HYDARI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 DECEMBER 1947  
(EXTRACT)

I hope you received my letter of 5 December written on my return from Delhi. It related to Tripura and Manipur. This relates to the Khasi States.

On 2 December I informed the representatives of the Khasi States Federation that I had brought with me from Delhi the Instrument of Accession, which incorporated the agreement reached by them with me in July this year and that they should now sign it. It was accordingly agreed that all the siems (head of a tribal clan) should assemble here on the 15th and individually sign the instrument. The meeting took place this morning, and I reported to you the result by the telegram, as in the copy enclosed, addressed to Cuttack. With 20 out of the 25 heads of Khasi States signing, the back of any dissident movement must be deemed to have been broken. This is not to say that Nichols-Roy on one side and Abdul Matin Chaudhury on the other (strange bedfellows!) will not try to keep the agitation pot boiling for as long as they can. That various underhand forces had been at work between 2 December and 15 December is shown by the fact that this morning's proceedings at one time seemed likely to break; for, three of the principal siems, i.e., those of Myllem, of Khyrim and of Cherra, (the last-mentioned borders on East Pakistan and he holds some land in Sylhet) refused to sign and wanted more time to "consult their people". I made them realise what the consequences of not signing would be, and after nearly an hour's confabulation among themselves they signed. The rest was easy. . . .

49. TELEGRAM FROM AKBAR HYDARI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 DECEMBER 1947

GLAD INFORM YOU TWENTY OUT OF TWENTYFIVE  
KHASI STATES SIGNED INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION  
THIS MORNING IN MY PRESENCE OUT OF REMAINING  
FIVE THREE ARE ILL AND WILL SIGN IN THEIR HOMES.  
AM SUMMONING THE OTHER TWO TO WHOM SUMMONS  
HAVE PROBABLY NOT REACHED.

50. SARDAR PATEL'S STATEMENT OF  
16 DECEMBER 1947

The public has already received through the Press and over the radio a fairly clear and a detailed picture of the settlement which I have reached during the course of my visit to Orissa and C. P. and Berar, with the Rulers of Orissa and Chhattisgarh States on the problem of integration of those States with their neighbouring provinces.

I feel, however, that for a correct appreciation of this important event it is necessary for me to explain the background and the policy underlying that settlement. Democratisation of the administration which has long been the keynote of Congress policy towards the States, has become a pressing problem since August 15th. The Princes themselves have in many cases begun to realise the spirit of the times and have been gradually introducing measures in accord with the spirit. The progress has been in some States slow, in others it has been swift, but everywhere it has been sure.

It should be obvious to everyone, however, that even democracy and democratic institutions can function efficiently only where the unit to which these are applied can subsist in

a fairly autonomous existence. Where, on account of smallness of its size, isolation of its situation, the inseparable link with a neighbouring autonomous territory, be it a Province or a bigger State, in practically all economic matters of everyday life, the inadequacy of resources to open up its economic potentialities, the backwardness of its people and the sheer incapacity to shoulder a self-contained administration, a State is unable to afford a modern system of government both democratisation and integration are clearly and unmistakably indicated.

In the world of today where distances are fast shrinking and masses are being gradually brought into touch with latest administrative amenities it is impossible to postpone for a day longer than necessary the introduction of measures which would make the people realise that their progress is also proceeding at least on the lines of their neighbouring areas. Delays inevitably lead to discontent, which in its turn results in lawlessness; the use of force may for a time check the popular urge for reform, but it can never succeed in eradicating it altogether. Indeed, in many of the States with which I had to hold discussions during the last two days large-scale unrest had already gripped the people; in others the rumblings of the storm were being heard. In such circumstances, after careful and anxious thought, I came to the conclusion that for smaller States of this type, placed in circumstances which I have described above, there was no alternative to integration and democratisation.

At the same time I felt that their rulers had acquired by heredity and history certain claims on the people which the latter must honour. Their dignities and privileges and their means of subsistence on a reasonable standard must be assured. I have always held to the belief that the future of the Princes lies in the service of their people and their country and not in the continued assertion of their autocracy. In conformity with these ideas, I felt that on release from an increasingly onerous and awkward responsibility, but at the

same time with their personal position and that of the ruling family fully safeguarded, they would have opportunities of service which have hitherto been denied to them and which many of them are genuinely longing for and genuinely anxious to secure and they would cease to be the targets of continuous bitter attacks and ill-will.

The settlement which we have reached at Cuttack and Nagpur is actuated by these motives, prompted by these considerations and governed by these principles. I have no doubt that it is in the best interests of the Rulers, the people and the country at large, I am particularly grateful to the Rulers of the States who showed a commendable appreciation of the realities of the situation and a benevolent regard for public good. To all of them, undoubtedly, the decisions they have taken have involved considerable sacrifice of powers and fortune. They have accepted the sacrifices cheerfully and voluntarily in the interests of their people and the country at large. I am sure their people will react favourably to this generous response to public interests.

Throughout my discussions with the Rulers I was careful to emphasise that the solution which we suggested for the difficult problems with which we and they were equally faced was for them to accept or reject of their own free-will. There was no compulsion save that of events and of the circumstances and peculiar problems of their States. I also told them that in offering this solution we were actuated by nothing but the friendliest disposition towards them and had nothing but the ultimate good of the Princes and their people at heart. I also maintained that their voluntary surrender of most of the powers that they wielded so far would increase and not reduce the prestige that they have enjoyed and would create in the hearts of their people a place of lasting affection and regard which would rebound to their glory. I am very glad that they all responded to these sentiments and would ask the people of these States to play their own part

and to extend to each one of them unfailing cordiality and unstinted goodwill.

In future, if the people of these States have any grievances, they can only be against the popular representatives and leaders who would be charged with their interests and welfare, and not against the Princes. These Princes have by their act of abnegation purchased in perpetuity their right to claim the devotion of their people. I am sure that very soon the Provincial Governments who would be acting for the Dominion Government in discharging administrative functions in these States will turn their thoughts and energies to ameliorating the conditions of the people and to devising ways and means of associating representatives of States with the fashioning of administrative measures. Let them all realise the stakes involved—some 56,000 square miles of territory with a population **of about eight million, a gross revenue of about Rs. 2 crores** and immense potentialities for the future. It is the undisputable right of the people in these territories to modern amenities of Government which should be the governing consideration in everything that we do for them. It will also be the duty of the people concerned to help and co-operate wholeheartedly with the respective Provincial Administrations in this process of unification and amelioration, so that they may derive the full benefit of this great achievement.

51. SARDAR TO AKBAR HYDARI,  
DATED 21 DECEMBER 1947

Thank you for your letter dated 15 December 1947. I received your telegram regarding Khasi States when I was at Nagpur, the day that we succeeded in getting the integration through from the Orissa and Chhattisgarh States. The news of the Khasi States therefore came on a day on which it seemed we were in luck. I congratulate you on the success which you have achieved in regard to Khasi States and would like to say that we feel that the happy result was due to the

skill and ability and tact with which you conducted the negotiations. As regards Nichols-Roy and Abdul Matin Chaudhury, I am looking into the matter. . . .

52. TELEGRAM FROM KAMALNAYAN BAJAJ TO  
SARDAR, DATED 22 DECEMBER 1947

DELIGHTED INFORM YOU THAT DECCAN UNION PRAJAMANDAL UNANIMOUSLY RESOLVED THE FOLLOWING. QUOTE. IN VIEW OF THE TREND OF PUBLIC OPINION AND RECENT EVENTS AND THE GENERAL FEELING AMONG THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED DECCAN STATES THE PRAJAMANDAL RESOLVED THAT IF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION MAKING BODY DESIRE THAT INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING WITH THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION STEP MAY BE TAKEN TO MERGE THE STATE INTO BOMBAY PROVINCE THE PRAJAMANDAL WILL NOT STAND IN THEIR WAY. PRAJA PARISHAD ASSEMBLY MEMBERS WHILE CONGRATULATING PRAJAMANDAL FOR THEIR WISE BENEVOLENT DECLARATION EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS IN FAVOUR OF MERGING. UNQUOTE. SELF AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS STANDING COMMITTEE AISPC (All India States Peoples' Conference) AND INDIA GOVERNMENT STATES DEPARTMENT REGARDING METHOD TO BE ADOPTED ASCERTAINING PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNION STATE. SELF REQUESTS YOUR KINDNESS SEND MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO RAJPRAMUKH AUNDH. KINDLY INSTRUCT ME.... AS TO METHOD TO BE ADOPTED FOR ASCERTAINING POPULAR WILL AND FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION. WILLING TO COME DELHI IF NECESSARY.

53. TELEGRAM FROM SARDAR TO RULER OF  
AUNDH, DATED 24 DECEMBER 1947

AM DELIGHTED TO KNOW THAT RULERS OF DECCAN UNION HAVE GENERALLY MAINTAINED A PROGRESSIVE OUTLOOK AND SHOWED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST THEMSELVES TO CHANGING CONDITIONS AND ACCEPTED THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AS DETERMINING FACTOR

IN ITS FUTURE. THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES WHICH UNDERLAY THE FORMATION OF THE UNION ITSELF AND THE SUREST WAY OF MAINTAINING PEACE AND HAPPINESS FOR THE PRINCES AND THE PEOPLE. PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THIS DECISION.

(*Note* : The Deccan States Union was finalised in October 1947, but only 8 out of the 17 Deccan Rulers joined it and these were scattered bits of territory in two linguistic areas. The merger agreements of the Orissa and Chhattisgarh States, finalised in December 1947, was followed by a popular decision in all these States for merger with the Bombay Province and this was effected in 1948.)

54. SARDAR TO RAVI SHANKAR SHUKLA,  
DATED 30 DECEMBER 1947

Three persons, whose names are mentioned below, came and saw me this morning with the suggestion that a referendum should be held in Khairagarh on the question of merger with CP:

Mr. Gulab Chand Jain

Mr. L. B. Mandlekar, and

Mr. S. Chakravarti.

I have given them a bit of my mind and told them that merger of the State with CP had already been accomplished, that the people's will did not require to be ascertained by a referendum and that the measure which had been blessed by the whole of India could not be detrimental to the interests of the people.

One of these three gentlemen, Mr. Chakravarti, seemed to be of communistic tendencies. Anyway, as far as Delhi is concerned, there is an end of the matter. But I still feel that you should mobilise public opinion in the States in your favour and deal effectively with any opposition that may manifest itself. If necessary, you or Mishraji could visit the

State. I (suspect) the ruler is wire-pulling in this matter. It would be better to have a resolution of a public meeting of the people of this State supporting our decision if possible.

55. TELEGRAM FROM RAJA OF AUNDH TO  
GANDHIJI, DATED 4 JANUARY 1948

RULERS OF EIGHT DECCAN STATES RESOLVED ON 21ST THE FOLLOWING : IF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION MAKING BODY DESIRED THAT INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING WITH FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN TO MERGE THE STATE WITH BOMBAY PROVINCE THE RAJMANDAL WOULD NOT STAND IN THEIR WAY. PRAJAPRISHADS OF OTHER STATES MAY VOTE FOR MERGER IN BOMBAY PROVINCE. GRAMPANCHAYATS AND TALUKA SAMITIES ONLY ACCREDITED AGENCIES OF PUBLIC OPINION IN AUNDH STATE. THEY EMPHATICALLY EXPRESSED DESIRE TO CONTINUE PANCHAYAT SYSTEM UNDER EXISTING CONSTITUTION AS AGAINST MERGER WITH BOMBAY PROVINCE. CONSISTENTLY WITH PAST POLICY I AM ANXIOUS TO ABIDE BY MY PEOPLE'S WILL THUS ASCERTAINED OR IF NECESSARY MAY BE FURTHER ASCERTAINED BY ANY INDEPENDENT AGENCY YOU OR SARDAR SAHIB MAY SUGGEST. WILL OF AUNDH PEOPLE SUPREME SOVEREIGN AND FINAL FOR ME. I SEEK YOUR GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE ACTION

56. RAVI SHANKAR SHUKLA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 20 JANUARY 1948

After the integration of the Chhattisgarh States was announced, reports have reached me from reliable sources that efforts are being made by officials and non-officials of Bihar to foment agitation in Jashpur and Surguja to integrate them with the Bihar Government. The Secretary of the District Congress Committee, Ranchi, the Commissioner of Ranchi and others have, I understand, visited Jashpur for this purpose.

Added to this are the efforts of Mr. Jaipal Singh, whom you know so well, for the establishment of Jharkhand or what he calls Adibasistan. These disruptive efforts, I feel, need to be put down with a strong hand and should not be encouraged by one government against the other. A large population of Jashpur is Christian. The missionaries, who are working in Jashpur State, have their headquarters in Ranchi. Mr. Jaipal Singh belongs to that mission. Most of the Christians are Oraons. I understand Congressmen and MLAs wearing badges of the Adibasi Mahasabha have begun touring the interior, criticising the action of the States Ministry in open gatherings and directly and indirectly denouncing the Congress. This will have a very injurious effect on the minds of the States' people, who have not known what freedom is. There are some disgruntled politicians in the States who have lost chances of becoming ministers and chief ministers by the integration. I think, therefore, it has become necessary for me to bring all these facts to your notice so that you may be kind enough to request the Bihar Government to put a stop to this sort of propaganda.

57. SARDAR TO RAVI SHANKAR SHUKLA,  
DATED 25 JANUARY 1948

Please refer to your letter dated 20 January 1948. We have also had reports about the activities of Jaipal Singh and others in one or two States of the Chhattisgarh groups. They claim these to belong to the future state of Jharkhand. The situation requires very careful handling because we should on no account allow this movement to gather any momentum. You should, therefore, deal strongly with any agitators of this type and nip the mischief in the bud. At the same time we should ensure that the Adibasis' claims are sympathetically dealt with and adequate steps are taken for their amelioration.

2. It is useless to write on this matter to the Bihar Government. They seem to be following a shortsighted policy, little

realizing that Jaipal Singh can never be with Bihar for long. His clear ambition is to form a Chhota Nagpur State in which he would be a sort of dictator, but in the desire to retain, or even to secure, a few States the Bihar Government do not seem to mind the harmful effects of Jaipal Singh's activities.

58. NAWAB OF PATAUDI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1948

You perhaps remember that during our last talk in Delhi I had told Menon in your presence that I personally would welcome a merger with the province if the people of my State wanted it. On our return from Bhopal a week ago I got busy and sent for the people and told them that though the Government had made no announcement in regard to its policy vis-a-vis the Punjab States, I, for my own guidance, would like to know whether the people wanted to merge with the province, join the confederation of the Punjab States (if formed) or remain as they are. I could not put things more frankly and honestly to them especially when I was under no compulsion to do so.

I naturally expected an equally frank and honest approach to the question by everybody. I asked the people to let me know their views between 6 and 13 February in the form of a ballot paper. People voted yesterday and today for merger and I am no wiser. The number of votes cast so far (1,124) are nothing compared with what they should have been if people really understood the issue. But the serious part of the whole thing is that some young gentlemen who are pleased to call themselves "Praja Mandal" and who are conducting the "elections" in favour of merger are using the highly dangerous and dirty arguments that the only way to get rid of the Mussalman Nawab and other Muslims in the State is to merge the State in Gurgaon district and whoever opposes merger is a Mussalman and an enemy of Hinduism !! There

is ample evidence in my possession to show that this has been said in practically every village.

What a reward for honesty and sincere work !!

Need I add that this has upset Mussalmans and many intelligent Hindus. It is obvious that no useful purpose will be served by my continuing the ballot except the grave risk of a communal clash. Besides, any opinion rendered on such issue can help no one.

I am stopping further the ballot for I have learnt all I wanted to know ! I can now talk details of the business with Menon and Desai when I am in Delhi, but I must also have a talk with you, for you should know what is being done by the alleged followers of the great martyr, the father of us all.

How can anyone discharge his duties properly in such filth and nausea !

I shall run over to see you whenever it is convenient to you, provided you let me know.

59. SARDAR TO NAWAB OF PATAUDI,  
DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1948

Thank you for your letter of 7 February.

I am sorry to hear that your good intentions in regard to plebiscite have been so much misunderstood. I shall be glad to see you whenever you happen to come to Delhi. I shall not be here on the 11th and 12th and on the 15th and 16th. Any other day would be quite convenient to me.

(Note : Pataudi, a small State in the Punjab (now Haryana) was merged in that Province.)

60. MAHARAJA OF PATIALA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 29 FEBRUARY 1948

For the last few days information had been reaching me that a large section of the local population at Patiala wanted to oppose the move of a few people here to hold a political conference, as it was suspected that this was being done with some ulterior motives. I was to come to Delhi this morning for certain meetings which had been previously fixed up, but a very serious situation developed here yesterday, owing to the utterances at this Praja Mandal meeting. The so-called Praja Mandal organisation has hardly any following except just a small group of people. They managed to get a certain number of tenants to attend this meeting by giving them wine and money, and also by taking advantage of the tenants-landlords dispute, which we are already on the point of settling.

Three days ago there was a very strong anti-movement in regard to this matter, and it took all my time to pacify the people who wanted to make it impossible for the Praja Mandalists to carry out their intention. I was anxious that a clash should not occur and was able to manage that this meeting of the Praja Mandal should take place as far as possible without counter-demonstrations and unfortunate incidents. I was approached by certain people with strong representations that this attitude was likely to be misunderstood not only by the organisers themselves but also by others both inside and outside the State, but I remained firm. At this meeting they took an inadvisable step and asked for the merger of Patiala into East Punjab, and during the course of the day slogans were uttered that Sikh Raj should be terminated. So far as views on political matters are concerned, it may be possible to extend tolerance to even a misguided attitude,

but I daresay you will immediately recognise that any attempt to attack the Sikhs here is likely to release volcanic forces, which it may be impossible to control. If the question of merger is to be made use of as a cloak for any such attitude, it will not be difficult to see through it. I am afraid this move has created an uncomfortable and unhappy situation which has led me to stay on here today, and also I have injured my ankle very badly and cannot walk. If I am slightly better I may be able to come tomorrow and speak to you personally, but in the meantime I am sending this letter through my Private Secretary, who would further explain the situation to you personally.

All I would like to ask you is to realise that anything that I would do in this part of the country for unity and harmony is likely to be upset by self-seekers, who would create confusion and most serious situation if they do not desist from making Patiala a playground for their ill-advised attitude. If they attempt to form a nucleus around which to expand their activities, with the eventual intention of effacing Patiala as an entity they are very much mistaken. I am sure you realise that the people of Patiala have no internal dissension and they will not stand by any such move.

It is possible that the activities which are now on foot on behalf of the Praja Mandalists might get a good Press, as the Press does not know the real sentiments of the people and the situation here. Possibly, the other side of the version might not get there, as it normally should, as the public at large have no professional agitators to put their case. But I would ask you to assist in this matter and try to keep the people, who come from outside Patiala, from unnecessarily creating trouble here and spoil the atmosphere which we are now trying to keep calm.

Further details of the utterances are not yet with me, but I would possibly get them tomorrow. The other complications of course, you can realise and I am, therefore, not mentioning

them here. All that I would say is that it would be wise to leave Patiala to Patialvies and the pepole of Patiala alone. Representations are still constantly coming to me of the widespread tension that has been created by this ill-advised move, and I am trying to keep control of the situation, and sincerely hope that I will succeed. If I can come tomorrow I may be able to give you a lot more information, which will come to hand in the meantime, but I cannot stress too strongly that it would be most unwise to let things drift. I would, therefore, request that you may do whatever is possible to strengthen my hands here by prevailing upon the outside element to leave the State immediately, and keep out of it in future, so far as such activities are concerned.

(*Note* : Popular feeling for merger with East Punjab was never very strong. Patiala and the other Punjab States—Nabha, Jind, Malerkotla, Kapurthala, Faridkot, Kalsia and Nalagarh were united into the Patiala and East Punjab States Union on 20 August 1948.)

## 61. AKBAR HYDARI TO SARDAR, DATED 3 MARCH 1948

### Position of Assam and Pakistan Activities.

Many thanks for your letter of 23 February enclosing a note handed to you on the above subject. I received it on 1 March on my return from tour in the North-East Frontier Agency, and hasten to send you my comments.

2. The basic fact from which most of Assam's troubles along the whole of her western border flow is the desire of Pakistan to harass our people living in these border areas economically and in other ways. They hope in this way (a) to squeeze the Government of Assam into giving them concessions on points of dispute between Assam and East Bengal, and (b) so far as the Khasi States bordering on Sylhet are concerned,

to attract them to their side and so utilise the mineral resources which East Bengal lacks.

3. In so far as the Khasis generally are concerned, they have no sympathy with or desire to join Pakistan. We, that is the Assam Government, must on our side see that, while we cannot save the people of those Khasi States which abut on Sylhet completely from economic harassment, we reduce its extent as much as possible. The Deputy Commissioner of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills is also my Deputy in the Khasi States, and I am constantly on the lookout for instances of economic harassment like refusal to sell the Khasis rice or buy their oranges or potatoes; and the remedy is to supply rice from Shillong, even though it may result in loss to us, and to find alternative markets for their potatoes and oranges, etc., even though that may mean purchase on Government account. Our willingness and ability to help them has gradually percolated into the interior, and I now hear fewer complaints than I did after the Boundary Commission's award.

4. The next point to consider is how far we can rely on the loyalty of the Khasi Chiefs to the Indian Union and to Assam. I think we can in the case of all but two or three, whose territories abut on Sylhet. One of them is Cherrapunji, who is mentioned in the note. This Siem even before he signed the Instrument of Accession was flirting with the local authorities in Sylhet; and when he came to sign the Instrument of Accession I warned him against playing this game. He is attracted to Pakistan for the reason that some part of his personal land lies in Sylhet district and he feels that he cannot get his rent unless he plays in with the local Pakistan authorities. Another, and perhaps even more important reason is that, owing to his unpopularity with his people, he is in danger of losing his Siemship. You will remember that in accepting their accession I warned the Khasi Siems that the fact of such accession was not a guarantee of a particular person continuing as a Siem whatever happened; and that if

there was a substantial amount of feeling in a particular State that a Siem was not doing his duty, I would have an enquiry conducted by my Deputy; and if it was found that the allegations against the Siem were true, to order a new election under the customary law of the State. This undertaking of mine is regarded by Khasis generally as their Magna Charta; and has reconciled them to the signing by the Siems of the Instrument of Accession and to the very wide power of interference which I, as your Agent, exercise over the administration of the Khasi States; but it is this very undertaking which is disliked by the Siems, who consider their tenure thereby made insecure, and by the Executive of the Federation of the Khasi States, who feel that in so far as it goes it is a diminution of their influence.

5. When I ordered the enquiries into the doings of six or seven Siems in pursuance of the undertaking (my Deputy is now conducting these enquiries) the Federation protested and requested that I should get them to conduct the enquiry. I did not accede to this request, because its grant would have invested them with power which they would probably have misused for party politics. As you know, there are two organisations in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills--those who support the Federation and those who support the Peoples' Conference. I have been endeavouring to bring the Federation and the Peoples' Conference together in the matter of setting up an administrative machinery for the Khasi States, and it would have been unwise to give the Federation power which they would have used to crush the Conference.

6. You may ask why I am going through this somewhat laborious process of conciliation, trying as it is to one's patience. The reason is that what we do in one Tribal area has its repercussions on other Tribal areas in Assam. If I were to act in the Cromwellian manner and say "a plague on all your differences" and take over the administration, it might have a disturbing effect in other Tribal areas, whose peoples or Chiefs might consider that it would be their turn

next; and even among the Khasis, who are by and large loyal to Assam and to the Indian Union, such action may offend their pride and so induce them to listen to the siren voice across our border, who have no principles and are ready to promise anything. I feel therefore that we must follow a policy of patient adjustment of difficulties.

7. I have sent my Deputy to the States of Nongestien and Rambrai with instructions to obtain the signature of these two Siems to the Instrument of Accession. Their failure to do so will be followed by pressure of various kinds and in the last resort by deposition. These are the only two Siems out of 25 who have not yet signed the Instrument. The States Ministry has been sent a list of the States who have signed the Instrument, but copies of the Instrument as signed have been kept here till the whole bundle can be sent to the States Ministry.

8. Mention is made in the note that the Khasi States deposit of Rs. 4 lakhs has not yet been handed over to the Federation. The reason is that I want the Federation first to set up a proper administrative machinery for the handling of affairs, including financial, vested in the States under the Instrument of Accession. The (setting) up of such an administrative machinery is being delayed because of the negotiations now going on between the Federation Executive and the Committee of the Khasi People's Conference. If I were now to hand over this money to the Federation Executive, it would, I am afraid, be frittered away; a number of new jobs would be created without its incumbents having very much to do; whereas once a proper administrative set-up is established this amount of Rs. 4 lakhs would be useful as a backing for their activities; for example, I would like some of it to be spent in trying out the experiment of having a sheep farm in an effort to popularise sheep in the Khasi Hills. At present the people use imported woollen garments when it may be possible for them to make their garments from their own wool.

9. It is true that Sylhet officials and their agents pay visits to Shillong and other parts of Assam. Lacking a good intelligence service we have not much idea of their activities. One remedy would be to prohibit the entry of certain Pakistan officials, like the Deputy Commissioner of Sylhet, into Shillong or other parts of Assam, and I have some times thought of that; but then we would at once invite retaliation against our own officers who, till the through road to Silchar is built, journey through Sylhet to get into Cachar and onwards instead of taking a circuitous railway journey via Lumding to avoid Pakistan territory; also this facility of being able to travel through Sylhet gives the more intelligent among our officers a chance to observe how things are going there and to report to us.

10. The "remedial suggestions" made in the note of constituting a belt of 20 miles along the Frontier of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills under military administration is too fantastic to merit consideration, and I will therefore not comment on them. I am afraid sometimes our self-constituted advisers forget that it is part of Pakistan's game to try and keep us constantly on the hop; while keeping vigilant we must not give them the satisfaction of succeeding in doing so. It is true that Assam is at the present moment in a difficult position economically and militarily, also she is in a position of some discomfort; but with the backing we are getting from you and the Central Government, I feel no cause for either alarm or despondency.

62. A. HYDARI TO SARDAR, DATED 20 MARCH 1948

This is in continuation of my letter of 3 March. This letter is merely by way of cheering you during your convalescence as I have already sent a telegram to your Ministry announcing that the formal accession of Nongstein and Rambrai had been obtained—these were the only two out of the 25 Khasi States which had not formally acceded. My Deputy, Jarman, who left for Nongstein on 7 March, has been there all this period. At one time it looked as if he might encounter armed opposition and so I sent a platoon of the Assam Rifles, whose presence and Jarman's tact did the trick. He got the support of the people and the Myntris and at one time actually deposed the Siem who was putting off signing the Instrument of Accession on one excuse or another. The Siem then thought better of it and apologised, asked to be reinstated and signed the Instrument this morning. I have accepted his reinstatement because I was informed by Jarman that both the people and the Myntris would welcome a friendly settlement. I propose however to establish an Assam Rifles post in Nongstein State near the borders of Pakistan, which will keep an eye on the Siem as well as protect the people from harassment from across the border. The Siem of Rambrai signed on the 17th of this month.

This episode has a lesson to teach. It is that we should as soon as possible open up road communications between Shillong and the Khasi States on the borders; for it is economic even more than physical harassment which the Pakistanis are using to sow discontent among the inhabitants of these areas against the Indian Union. This is a matter which I referred to in my letter to you of 3 March. Apart from Pakistan's general desire to keep us on the hop by creating trouble along our borders is a material reason also; it is

that in many of these Khasi border areas valuable minerals are to be found which East Bengal covets.

I hope you are now on the high road to complete recovery. My wife joins me in sending you and Miss Maniben our best wishes.

PS.

The Mountbattens had a good reception in Assam but nothing compared to what you had in its magnitude and warmth !

63. V. SHANKAR TO AKBAR HYDARI,  
DATED 27 MARCH 1948

I have explained to Sardar in very brief terms the contents of your letter of 3 March 1948, regarding the position of Assam and Pakistan activities. It was at the first available opportunity that I could do so, partly because I thought it would cheer him up to know what excellent work you were doing in that part of the country. He has asked me to say that he much appreciates all that you are doing and that he is quite convinced that you are proceeding on the right lines. He agrees that the problem of the Tribes is such as cannot be allowed to be made a mess of by irresponsible elements. Essentially, a practical approach is required and both firmness and tact have to be used. He is happy to find that this is exactly the manner in which you are dealing with the situation.

64. MAHARAJA OF REWA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 7 APRIL 1948

Kindly accept my most grateful thanks for your very kind message to me delivered through the Hon'ble Mr. Gadgil on the occasion of the inauguration of Vindhya Pradesh on 4 April 1948. How very much I regret that you could not come to Rewa on this occasion. I sincerely pray for your speedy recovery.

As desired in Menon's telegram, I am sending Deshmukh to apprise you of the whole situation regarding the formation of an interim ministry for Rewa State. My personal views... about the existing political parties in the State, are:

(i) Baghelkhand Congress Committee: This is the oldest political organisation functioning from 1930 but only recently divided into two camps owing to sharp differences among themselves, viz., president dissolving the working committee while the externed members passing a vote of no-confidence in the president. All of them have been called to Lucknow on 9 April by the Provincial Congress Committee to settle their dispute.

(ii) Affiliated Praja Mandal : This has come into existence only about a year and a half ago and is led by raw youths, very few in number having no following.

(iii) Azad Praja Mandal : This was started only two years back and has a wavering leadership often changing hands.

(iv) Pawaidar Association : Composed of zamindars, (it) cannot be solely entrusted to form an interim ministry.

Thus the only practical solution to form an interim ministry is to utilize the electoral college through which the member of the Constituent Assembly of India was elected. The composition of this electoral college is as follows : Panchas of Chauras all elected, 71; members of the municipalities elected on adult franchise, 44.

The District Congress Committee could have been asked to form an interim ministry, but on account of the differences mentioned above in the local Congress here, one workable method is as I have mentioned above. There is another method by which I can ascertain the real wish of the people. The electoral rolls on adult franchise basis throughout the State are ready and efforts can be made and elections held by 15 June and the majority party returned can choose the leader.

My whole point to writing this letter and emphasising my viewpoint is that peace should prevail in this State and no disturbance or untoward (incidents) should happen. When there are so many parties, each trying to gain power, there cannot be any workable solution except that the people should elect their own leader, more so when I have parted with power and entrusted it to the people. By no stretch of imagination can I think of power going to self-imposed leaders who have their selfish ends to meet and no concern for the welfare of the people.

(*Note* : The Vindhya Pradesh Union, comprising Rewa and 34 other States, was formed in April 1948. The Rajpramukh, the Maharaja of Rewa, formed two broad-based Ministries one for Rewa and one for the Bundelkhand States, with Ramrao Deshmukh as its head. This did not work and a composite Ministry was formed in July 1948.)

## 65. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU TO SARDAR, DATED 18 APRIL 1948

I returned from Udaipur this evening at 7-30. The function passed off successfully.

2. On arrival at Udaipur, however, I found that some difficulties had arisen, and in fact the Prime Minister-to-be, Manekyalal Verma, did not want to be sworn in at all at this stage. He and his colleagues felt that unless the full Ministry was previously decided upon, he should not get entangled in this business. They told me that attempts were being made to get the wrong kind of people in the Ministry, notably some jagirdars (landlords), and if this was so it would not be possible for Manekyalal Verma to function as Prime Minister.

3. There was little time to think of the names of the Ministry, and I did not feel myself competent to say much in this matter. I told Manekyalal Verma and his colleagues

that our general practice was that the Ministry should be appointed by the Prime Minister, though he should consult others, including of course the Maharana (of Udaipur). But after full consultation the choice should be his. To raise the question of the personnel of the Ministry at the last moment would upset all the arrangements made. So I advised him to take his oath as Prime Minister having made it perfectly clear privately that he expected to have the Ministry of his choice and that if this was not done he might find it difficult to carry on. I explained this position to Ramamurthi also. I added further that if there was any difficulty later on, Manekyalal Verma and Ramamurthi might come to Delhi to consult the States Ministry. On this understanding Manekyalal Verma agreed and was duly sworn in.

4. During my brief stay in Udaipur I met some leaders of the Rajputana Praja Mandal separately and then later I met two or three hundred Praja Mandal workers who had come from various parts of Rajputana. I also met some representatives of jagirdars, Kshatriyas, and a newly formed Kisan Sabha (Peasant Association).

5. Many of the Praja Mandal people expressed a strong desire that Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner should be included in the United States of Rajasthan. The point, however, on which there was the greatest feeling, loudly expressed, was about Sirohi. I gathered that some of the rulers present also shared this feeling. It was said to me repeatedly that Sirohi should join Rajasthan, as it had been connected with it for 300 years or more in many ways and was linguistically and otherwise a part of it. I told them that I was not in a position to say anything as I did not know all the facts. But normally where there was difference of opinion, the opinion of the people concerned should prevail. Anyway, I suggested there was no need to get excited about this question at this stage. Let other matters be settled and then they could discuss this with the States Ministry.

66. TELEGRAM FROM HARE KRISHNA MAHTAB TO  
SARDAR, DATED 22 APRIL 1948

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR SARDAR VALLABHBHAI  
PATEL FROM MAHTAB PREMIER ORISSA.

AT INSTIGATION OF CERTAIN RULERS AND WITH  
THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT MOVEMENT FOR SEPARATE  
UNION OF STATES HAS RECENTLY GAINED MOMENTUM.  
MAIN CENTRE OF ACTIVITY AT PRESENT IS SERAIKELLA  
WHOSE RULER AND HIS SONS ARE TAKING LEADING  
PART AND DIRECTING MOVEMENT. CERTAIN SINISTER  
DEVELOPMENTS ARE A DIRECT OUTCOME OF MOVEMENT  
FOR SEPARATE UNION HAVE JUST COME TO LIGHT.  
SOME MEMBERS OF PRAJA SAMITY SET UP BY A SON  
OF SERAIKELLA ATTEMPTED TO RUN A PARALLEL  
GOVERNMENT. RING LEADERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND  
WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR SPECIFIC CRIMINAL  
OFFENCES SUCH AS WRONGFUL RESTRAINT. DISTRICT  
MAGISTRATE SERAIKELLA HAS JUST REPORTED UN-  
EARTHING OF A PLOT FOR ASSASSINATION OF ORISSA  
OFFICIALS HATCHED BY OTHER MEMBERS OF SAME BODY  
AND PERSONS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH IT. FULL DETAILS  
OF PLOT HAVE BEEN FURNISHED INCLUDING NAME OF  
PERSON SUSPECTED TO CARRY OUT CONTEMPLATED  
EXECUTIONS. WE HAVE ORDERED IMMEDIATE ARREST  
AND DETENTION OF ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN PLOT  
INCLUDING SON OF SERAIKELLA UNDER THE MAIN-  
TENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER ACT. SERAIKELLA'S SON  
WILL BE KEPT IN DETENTION AT CUTTACK. FULLER  
DETAILS WILL FOLLOW BY LETTER. IT MAY BE  
NECESSARY LATER TO ARREST AND DETAIN RULER OF  
SERAIKELLA HIMSELF AS HE IS CLEARLY THE  
DIRECTING AND CONTROLLING BRAIN BEHIND MOVE-  
MENT AND POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO OTHER RULERS.  
PLEASE WIRE IF PROPOSED DETENTION OR AT LEAST  
EXTERNMENT OF SELECTED RULERS ON SATISFACTORY  
PROOF OF THEIR COMPLICITY IN ANY SUBVERSIVE  
MOVEMENT HAS YOUR APPROVAL.

67. SARDAR TO HARE KRISHNA MAHTAB,  
DATED 22 APRIL 1948

I have received the following telegram from Sri Babu (Sri Krishna Sinha) :

KINDLY REFER MY OFFICE D. O. DATED 1 APRIL ENCLOSING COPY OF NOTES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ORISSA PREMIER. FOLLOWING AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. TEXT OF AGREEMENT BEGINS. IT IS AGREED THAT THE DISTRICT AUTHORITIES OF SERAIKELLA AND SINGHBHUM SHOULD WORK IN CLOSE COLLABORATION SO THAT NO BREACH OF THE PEACE TAKES PLACE AND ALL PARTIES GET FULL SCOPE TO PROPAGATE THEIR VIEWS IN SERAIKELLA AND KHARSAWAN REGARDING MERGER TEXT ENDS. GOVERNMENT OF ORISSA AND PREMIER MAHTAB WERE REQUESTED BY LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT BUT WITHOUT ANY RESPONSE. MEANWHILE LOCAL OFFICERS OF SERAIKELLA AND KHARSAWAN ARE PREVENTING ENTRY OF MEN FROM BIHAR FOR DOING PEACEFUL MERGER PUBLICITY IN THE TWO STATES. PRO BIHAR MEETINGS BEING SYSTEMATICALLY DISTURBED WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF ORISSA OFFICERS. PRO-BIHAR WORKERS THREATENED WITH MURDER AND ASSAULT. THE UNFORTUNATE KHARSAWAN FIRING BEING USED TO TERRORISE SIMPLE ADIBASIS FOR ANYTHING AGAINST ORISSA. ONE PRO-BIHAR WORKER REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MURDERED. CASES OF ASSAULT (ON) ONE PRO-BIHAR MAN ALSO REPORTED. FROM ALL ACCOUNTS ORISSA OFFICERS HAVE LET LOOSE A VERITABLE REIGN OF TERROR. BIHAR SUSPICIOUS ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF ORISSA GOVERNMENT. BIHAR WANTS ONLY FAIR PLAY AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO BOTH SIDES FOR DOING PEACEFUL MERGER PROPAGANDA. UNLESS THIS IS ASSURED TRIBUNAL WILL FIND DIFFICULTY IN FINDING OUT THE TRUTH. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT WILL THEREFORE REQUEST FOR

PUTTING AN END TO THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS AND FOR DIRECTING ORISSA TO ALLOW FULL FREEDOM TO BIHAR FOR MERGER PUBLICITY. IN THE TWO STATES FAILING WHICH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA SHOULD ASSUME DIRECT CONTROL IN WHICH BOTH PARTIES WILL GET EQUAL AND FAIR CHANCE. IMMEDIATE ORDERS ARE SOLICITED. SRI KRISHNASINHA.

(Note : There was considerable bad feeling between the Bihar and the Orissa Government on the issue whether the two States of Kharsawan and Seraikella should be merged in Bihar, Sardar decided that this should be done and the transfer of these States to Bihar was effected on 1 May 1948.)

68. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 22 APRIL 1948

Thank you for your letter dated 18 April 1948 regarding your visit to Udaipur. I am very glad to know that the function was such a success.

I have today given to Manekyalal a letter addressed to the Maharana of Udaipur asking him to accept his suggestion regarding the formation of an interim Ministry.

As regards the inclusion of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner in the United States of Rajasthan, that would of course be an ideal thing, but unless the people of these States are themselves keenly alive to this, it is difficult to bring this about.

As regards Sirohi, I have already had a discussion more than once with these persons, and it was after consideration of all relevant factors that we decided that Sirohi should go with Gujarat. What they want is not Sirohi, but Gokulbhai Bhat. This could be met even without Sirohi coming into Rajasthan.

69. V. P. MENON TO MAHARAJA OF REWA,  
DATED 22 APRIL 1948

In our discussions today regarding the formation of an interim ministry for Rewa I communicated to you Sardar's wish in regard to it. Sardar is of opinion that in view of the uncertain party position in Rewa it would be best in the interests of the State if you appointed Deshmukh as your Prime Minister. It will be open to him in consultation with party leaders to form an interim ministry. Your Highness agreed to this arrangement and I hope the party leaders will co-operate with Deshmukh. After the elections to the Constituent Assembly a new ministry could be formed.

I also mentioned to you that both Sardar and Deshmukh have only the interests of Your Highness and those of the State at heart. If Deshmukh finds any difficulty in forming the Ministry, Sardar is prepared to discuss the matter further with him.

Sardar hopes that Your Highness' confidence in Deshmukh will not be misplaced.

70. MAHARAJA OF PATIALA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 9 MAY 1948

Now that the Patiala and East Punjab States Union has come into being, I am anxious to tell you of the great personal regard I have always felt for you, and how much I have throughout appreciated your sentiments towards me personally. Whenever I have met you I have felt as if I was in the company of my closest friend, for whom I have the greatest admiration. You were good enough to refer in your message to what I was able to do in the larger interests of the country.

This letter contains an expression of the innermost feelings of one who wants to convey them to you. I shall always be ready to take my due share in anything and everything concerning the welfare of our country. I have received utmost consideration from you so far, and have not the least doubt that you will continue to extend the same affection and regard in future. On my part, I should like to assure you, if any assurance was needed at all, that it shall be a great pleasure to me to consistently continue in the line I have adopted. Your guidance and sound advice is something which I value now more than ever.

I hope your will recover very quickly.

71. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF PATIALA,  
DATED 12 MAY 1948

Many thanks for your kind letter of 9 May.

I cannot describe how overwhelmed I feel at the kind words that you have said about me and how deeply I appreciate the spirit of cordiality, co-operation and, may I add, brotherliness which permeates your letter. I fully reciprocate your sentiments. I am now feeling better and hope to be normal after a few weeks.

72. AKBAR HYDARI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 24 MAY 1948

It is some time since I last wrote to you, and it may possibly interest you to know how we have been faring with the States in this little corner of India.

2. Relations with the Khasi States and the States of Manipur, Tripura and Cooch Behar, while providing administrative and economic headaches almost continuously, confront me at present with no political problems. The Khasi States, because of the factious and volatile character of the Khasi people,

may be likened to a cauldron always on the point of boiling; but it does not boil over, unless of course one does something very stupid. A firm, honest and straightforward policy has, if I may say so, got us safely through the separationist fever which afflicted these States, as it did other tribal areas in varying degrees. I am now implementing the undertaking I gave them at the time when they signed the Instrument of Accession that chiefs who had lost the support of the people would have to make way for successors who had it. I have laid down, however, that before a Siem can be deposed there should be a clear two-thirds majority of votes against him. Both the States Federation executive and the Khasi-Jaintia Federated State National Conference (the popular body) have after some discussion accepted it as a salutary safeguard against too frequent changes of the incumbency of a Siemship. Once a Siem is deposed by this process a bare majority is sufficient in the subsequent election for a new Siem.

3. Tripura, whose main trouble has been harassment by East Bengal National Guards, or a more appropriate term would be blackguards, is now breathing a little more freely following the Inter-Dominion Agreement at Calcutta and also because of the proximity of the Assam Rifles, a small force of which I still keep there with a promise that more will be flown in if they start their fun and games again.

4. Cooch Behar so far has presented no problem except an acute shortage of coal which I am trying to remedy. I hope to visit this State some time next month to see things for myself and also to try and put a little more speed into the making of the Assam and Cooch Behar part of the access road which has been completed but is still, so I am informed by General Nathu Singh, in a none too good condition.

5. In Manipur, preparations are now well advanced for the holding of elections on the basis of adult franchise, and it is likely that a fully responsible government will be in operation in the State by the end of June. This was one of the conditions

of my agreement with the Maharaja last year; and I must say that his Chief Minister, who is his brother Maharajkumar Priyabrata Singh, with a distinguished war record, has loyally implemented this undertaking. The institution of full responsible government in Manipur is a step fraught with considerable danger, but I am confident that with the reserve powers vested in me under the agreement we will get through the inevitable teething troubles without a major upset in the administrative machinery. Once they are overcome I hope that the turbulent spirit of the Manipuris, especially their women-folk, will be diverted to more constructive purposes than has been the case in the past. In recent times there was the case of the Resident and the Chief of the State Police being held prisoners in the Treasury at Imphal by a band of unarmed but none-the-less terrifying Manipuri amazons. One cannot help liking these people, but one hopes that with the coming of responsibility some of their more lawless instincts will be restrained.

While on the subject of Manipur I must say a few words about Debeswar Sarmah. His activities, as your Ministry probably guessed from my comments on his fortnightly reports were getting increasingly mischievous. He was giving encouragement (1) to the leaders of the secessionist movement among the State tribals, (2) was trying to upset the arrangement under which the Tulihal airfield and a suitable area surrounding it would be handed over to us in return for the old British reserve and (3) was taking an active part in the manoeuvres of the various parties in Manipur, adding to the confused politics which are a constant affliction to the State Government. All these activities were doing no good either to India or to Assam and so taking advantage of the authority given me by you I gave him notice of the abolition of the Dominion Agency in Manipur and enquiring when it would be convenient for him to lay down his office. He has replied intimating 12 June as a suitable date; this I have accepted and am making necessary arrangements for the safety of our property, records, etc.

This action of mine brought on my head a somewhat violent reaction from Bardoloi. I sympathise with his feelings, because Sarmah's leaving the post of Dominion Agent, Manipur, again, so Bardoloi said, sets him free to work against the Ministry. Sarmah now proposes to stand for the presidency of the Provincial Congress Committee vacated by Tayebullah on his appointment as a Minister. I have had a long and friendly meeting with Bardoloi today. I told him that in my view Sarmah was more dangerous to the Ministry from the vantage point of his position as Dominion Agent, Manipur, which he used for all he was worth in entertaining the Ministry's opponents and in other ways. Moreover, it was not the case that as Dominion agent he confined himself to Manipur but took frequent journeys, without permission, to Jorhat, which is one of the main centres of opposition to the Ministry, being the chief town in Upper Assam. There is a feeling in Upper Assam that it has been somewhat neglected owing to the Ministry's fondness for Gauhati and Lower Assam. Bardoloi did not agree with me that Sarmah was just as harmful to the Ministry as Dominion Agent as he will be now without the added prestige and means which that position gave him. But it was a friendly disagreement, and I cannot help feeling that in his heart of hearts Bardoloi knows that I am right. He asked me whether I saw any objection to his writing to you on this matter, and I said that of course I had none whatever. I feel very sorry indeed that I have been the cause of giving Bardoloi pain; I am beginning to feel for him, as one does for a brother, but one has to give a brother pain when family interests so dictate. I think Sarmah's removal was such a case and I hope that I am not mistaken in my view that I acted in the best interests of India and Assam. It was not a pleasant step to take.

I suppose you have gone to Mussoorie in preference to coming to Shillong because the former is nearer Delhi and an easier place for consultations. My wife and I hope, however, that you and Maniben will pay us a visit later in the year.

Please do. We hope that in your health you are now proceeding from strength to strength.

With kind regards to you and Maniben.

73. SARDAR TO SRI KRISHNA SINHA,  
DATED 29 MAY 1948

My attention has been drawn to the following extract of a statement made by Abdul Qayum Ansari :

“I hope that the question of other States of Chhotanagpur that have been temporarily merged with Orissa and the CP and which is now pending before the States Ministry will be settled in the same spirit and goodwill and justice and the happy and harmonious relationship between the provinces that have been lately disturbed on this account will be permanently restored. Bihar wants only justice and nothing more.”

I had hoped that with the transfer of Seraikella and Kharsawan to Bihar, Bihar's claims on Orissa shall have been completely met. Bihar never laid claim to any other States except Surguja and Jashpur, which matter has been separately settled. I am, therefore, surprised to find a colleague of yours giving expression to such ideas which merely seem to encourage Jaipal Singh in his nefarious activities. I should like to know why Abdul Qayum Ansari made this statement. I hope he will be careful in future.

74. SRI KRISHNA SINHA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 16 JUNE 1948

I am in receipt of your letter dated 29 May. Hon'ble Mr. Ansari is not at Patna. I will reply to your letter after I have a talk with him when he comes back from tour. I may, however, inform you that Bihar is grateful to you for having restored Seraikella and Kharsawan to it and it is not our intention to claim any other State now.

75. MAHARAJA OF REWA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 27 JUNE 1948

Thank you very much indeed for your kind letter dated 23 June 1948. I am very grateful to you for the assurance that the serious matters, about which I reported in my letter dated 19 June, will be set right and that Captain Avadesh Pratap Singh will be instructed to adopt the proper course in future. In deference to your wishes, therefore, I am calling upon Captain Avadesh Pratap Singh to submit a list of names to me for the formation of a Cabinet for the Vindhya Pradesh Union. I propose to make a final selection out of that list and forward the same to you for your information, as desired by you in your telegram dated 12 June.

In regard to deputation of an adviser and a Chief Secretary, I believe that my formal approval will be sought by Mr. Menon before final steps are taken.

I was delighted to hear that you are much better now, and I trust that the salubrious climate of Dehra Dun will help you regain your normal health before long.

76. ASAF ALI TO SARDAR, DATED 4 JULY 1948  
(EXTRACT)

. . . There are, however, two matters to which I must invite your pointed and immediate attention. The first relates to the Eastern States. Although the new administrative machinery for the integrated territories is getting into gear, it will be some time before it can develop any speed. The hangover of the past, which carries with it multiplicity of varying conditions from State to State, will continue to present embarrassing problems. I have had talks with Mahtab, Senapati (Chief Administrator of the Orissa States), Executive Councillors and other officers concerned. I notice from the reports of the Central Intelligence Bureau that you are being kept abreast of the activities of those who are engaged in the Eastern States Union movement. I understand from Senapati that the real leaders of this movement have their headquarters in Calcutta and they are also believed to have their sub-headquarters in Bihar, CP and Madras. Their whole effort is :

1. to go back on their agreement of 14 December 1947;
2. to work up a feeling among the gullible in favour of a union of the Eastern States (which, by the way, is blossoming into an allied movement for creating a new province of Jharkhand); and, finally,
3. to join hands with any mischief-maker who can create trouble and disorder.

They are reported to have bought up the editors of some newspapers, and they are trying to stir up the Adibasis, and, if newspaper reports are to be believed, they have matured a plot to encourage widespread lawlessness throughout their mountain fastnesses during this rainy season when the Eastern

States will be cut off from the mainland. Both Mahtab and Senapati have assured me that those newspaper reports are rather of an alarming nature and should not be taken too seriously. The actual proportion of those who are affected by this movement among the people of the States, according to Mahtab, may not be 2 per cent, and Senapati assures me that sufficient security measures have been taken against possible eventualities.

According to the information available, the Raja of Seraikella, who is also the real father of the Maharaja of Patna, was and still continues to be the prime figure in all this 'movement'. Kalahandi, Bonai, Bamra, Talchar and Gangpur are believed to be actively engaged in these activities, and there seems to be enough evidence in our possession against Kalahandi of a serious nature which may justify serious steps against him. I have given the most careful consideration to all the reports and all the facts concerning this state of affairs and I am in constant touch with the officers concerned. It is my considered opinion that something more than the warning which you have already issued is required to put a stop to the mischief which has been brewing almost since the beginning of this year. Perhaps a more pointed and seriously significant warning should be the next step, in which it should be pointed out that the benefits which have been assured to them under the Agreement will have to be seriously reconsidered if their activities are not terminated forthwith. It may be necessary to make an example to deter the others. I have told Senapati to send you as soon as possible a well-marshalled case against the most recalcitrant of them. I cannot help feeling that it will have to be Kalahandi.

I have most carefully examined the file of the habeas corpus petitions which have been referred by certain individuals before the Patna High Court. Certain persons were proceeded against under the Orissa Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1948, and it appears that, encouraged and financed by some of these ex-Rulers, particularly Kalahandi, they went up to the High Court

to test the validity of the Agreement, which lies at the root of subsequent legal proceedings. In this petition, they question the very factum of accession and also the cession of their powers and jurisdiction, etc., over these territories. In my opinion the Agreement fulfils requirements of Section 6 of the Government of India Act of 1935, as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitutional) Order of 1947, and therefore the rest of their contention falls to the ground. I do feel, however, that two steps should be taken without any further delay.

- (1) All the contracted instalments of their privy purse which have fallen due should be paid to them immediately. . .
- (2) In terms of sub-section (6) of Section 6 of the Government of India Act, 1937, the Agreement, which I prefer to call the Instrument of Accession, should be laid before the next session of the Legislature, which, I understand from press reports, is going to meet on the 8th of August next.

I can assure you that I am most anxious to meet as many of them as possible and try to conciliate and help them with fruitful advice in their own interest. But you will be amused to learn that, barring the Prime Minister of Mayurbhanj who is in a different category and has sent me the usual congratulatory message, not one of them has so far considered it due to the new Governor to get in touch with him. It looks like an attitude of sulky non-cooperation. I am told that they are extremely angry with you. I do not, however, desire anything to be said or done which may appear to suggest that we consider this movement in the Eastern States a matter of serious consequences to the administration. What I have suggested appears to me to be essential for nipping this evil in the bud lest the contagion should spread. . . .

77. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF REWA,  
DATED 10 JULY 1948

Thank you for your letter of 27 June 1948. I purposely did not reply to it because you were coming to Delhi for a personal discussion.

I am glad to know that the whole matter has now been settled and that Your Highness has accepted the advice of the Prime Minister in regard to the formation of Ministry. As I explained to you, that is quite in accord with the constitutional position of the Raj Pramukh in these matters. The Raj Pramukh, as was pointed out to Your Highness at the meeting, can only advise and warn in the matter of formation of Ministries and other non-reserved subjects. If the Prime Minister or the Ministry still persist in their course of action, the Raj Pramukh, like the king or the constitutional governor-general, cannot press them further.

As regards the Adviser and the Chief Secretary, I hope Menon has explained to you the position.

78. SARDAR TO ASAF ALI, DATED 6 AUGUST 1948

I have received your two letters dealing generally with the question of Orissa States. In your letter of 4 July, you have also referred to the reports of the Central Intelligence Bureau.

As regards the Orissa States, I have been very much concerned for some time past to find that Orissa is the only province in which merger has been attended by these unseemly public controversies and threats and counter-threats. In Bombay, as well as in CP, and to a much smaller extent in Madras, there has been practically no agitation except from Pudukkottah. There, however, the agitation was short-lived, and as soon as

we told them that the merger was final, we have heard no more about it. I sent for the Raja of Kalahandi who has had long talks with Menon. I have had a talk with one or two other persons also. It seems to me that each side has a grievance against the other. I have, therefore, felt it necessary to call a meeting, at which both sides would be present. We are calling seven Rulers of the Orissa States to a meeting in Delhi, and I propose to ask Mahtab and Senapati also to come over, so that we can adjust differences by mutual discussion. It seems to me that, if approached in the proper spirit, such mutual adjustment is even now possible without resort to any extreme action. . . .

79. JAI NARAIN VYAS TO V. SHANKAR,  
DATED 7 AUGUST 1948

I came to New Delhi last evening and shall stay here for a week or ten days. H. H. Jodhpur is reaching here on the 10th. Please see that he is tactfully handled.

When I met Sardar before I went back to Jodhpur I told him that H. H. was realising that he would one day be in trouble if he made the Jagirdars all powerful. He is to be dragged out of the rest. After going to Jodhpur I received a very horrible report. It was a statement made in a court in Bhindor in Udaipur State by one Chaturbhuj Mochi that some Thakur was getting steel kukris (knives Gurkhas keep) manufactured in Jodhpur in two different places. The statement said that the kukris were passed in the palace and the order for manufacturing kukris was very big.

I deputed a man of my confidence and found out the workshops.

The matter was brought to the notice of the Dewan. Next day when I was discussing with H. H. the acts of Jodhpur that put the Central Government in suspicion, I mentioned the case of the manufacture of kukris as well. H. H., thereupon,

admitted before me that it was he who ordered the manufacture of 10,000 kukris and stabbing knives as Col. Shamsingh, Thakur Bakhtawar Singh and Lala Harischandra wanted the stuff for military, police and Hakumats respectively. These kukris and knives are still lying in Jodhpur Fort etc. Mr. Pranlal Munshi, Refugee Minister, Baroda, who had recently visited Jodhpur and was my guest, was given the samples of the kukris and knives and H. H. told him that he would be pleased to sell Baroda State the kukris at the rate of Rs. 10 each and knives at the rate of Rs. 6 each. The kukri can cut steel.

Please bring this to the notice of Sardar Sahib.

Personally I am convinced that this young man got these 10,000 weapons manufactured for Jagirdars and Rajputs but later on better counsel prevailed. Perhaps he does not know that in the military kukris and knives, which are not officially considered as component parts of the equipment, cannot be kept by troops. This fact should be brought home to him when he meets the Sardar and the kukris and knives should be got out of his hands. They may be purchased by the Government of India at cost price and H. H. may be tactfully warned not to indulge in such manufacture. If you think proper Pranlal Munshi (may) be asked to send the samples to you for the inspection of Sardar.

This young Ruler is very intelligent at mechanism, but succumbs to evil influences. He has inherited the good quality of generosity from his father; but it is generally misplaced. Yesterday an hour before I flew to Delhi, I got the copy of an order from the Chief Secretary, saying that a bungalow worth at least Rs. 4 lakhs has been granted to L. Harish-Chandra. This gentleman is the minister who accompanied me. I have lodged a strong protest against this grant, by-passing the administration. I have asked for the withdrawal of the order.

I have given these facts which I hope would serve as background when Sardar talks to H. H. on the 10th or any following day.

I am preparing a note on the financial position of the State and how these gifts have affected the State treasury. I hope to send it on to you by the 9th.

Kindly keep this note to you and Sardar Sahib only.

Kindly acknowledge this on the phone.

80. SARDAR TO SRI KRISHNA SINHA,  
DATED 12 AUGUST 1948

There has been some agitation about the transfer of Seraikella and Kharsawan, particularly the former, to Orissa. I have been receiving letters and telegrams about it and the Ruler of Seraikella has himself seen me. I have told him that the transfer of Kharsawan to Orissa is out of the question unless Bihar itself wants to get rid of it. At the same time, I feel that if any genuine grievances do exist, you should try to remove them. It is no use keeping running sores and the only effective way to deal with them is to cure them. I do not know exactly what the position is, but I thought I would draw your attention to it so that you may prevent things from getting out of hand.

81. V. NANJAPPA TO V. P. MENON,  
DATED 14 AUGUST 1948

During his visit to Kolhapur last week, His Excellency the Governor of Bombay had confidential talks with the Maharaja Sahib of Kolhapur during which he made it clear to the Maharaja Sahib that Kolhapur State will have to merge with the Indian Union some time or the other and that this was only a question of time. The Maharaja Sahib told His Excellency that he was prepared to do anything for the Indian Union and hand over all powers etc., but he would not sign

the merger agreement willingly. The Maharaja Sahib has also suggested that he was prepared to abdicate in favour of his son or appoint the Maharani Sahiba as Regent if necessary. Personally, I consider that this is only a formal stand taken up by His Highness and that he would sign the merger agreement if tackled by the Hon'ble Sardar Patel. The Maharaja's stand is only natural and to be expected. In my opinion, he will go on saying this until he actually signs.

There is, however, an unfortunate reaction to the above talks. His Highness appears to have become desperate and has launched an intensive campaign against merger. He is attempting to rally round him all the reactionary and mischievous elements in the State. Immediately after the Governor's departure he had secret talks with Mr. (M. K.) Bagal in the palace when Bagal assured the Maharaja Sahib of his wholehearted support and agreed to fight against merger. This has been told to me by the Maharaja himself. The Maharaja has also contacted anti-Congress Maratha elements and particularly the leaders of the so-called Bahujanwadi party like Jedhe and More. Jedhe and More, though they are really in favour of merger, have agreed to support the Maharaja in order to spite the Congress party in power.

His Highness has now left the State for Dewas and is expected to return in the first week of September. Mr. Latthe, the Prime Minister, has also proceeded to Delhi to attend the meeting of the Special Selection Board of which he is a member. It is understood that the Special Selection Board will proceed to tour headquarters of most Indian provinces for interviewing candidates. I am sorry to report that both His Highness and Mr. Latthe are taking absolutely no interest in the administration of the State and the welfare of the people. Unfortunately, under the existing constitution of the State I have to obtain the signature of His Highness on legal enactments. I am just now considering the question of withdrawal of civil and criminal powers of jagirdars and feudatory chiefs in Kolhapur and the Maharaja is doing his best to avoid putting his signa-

ture on it. This is only one instance of the obstructionist and (delaying) tactics of the Maharaja. Both Mr. Latthe and the Maharaja are doing their best to make it as difficult as possible for me to administer the State. Files sent to the Maharaja for formal approval required under the law are delayed by him for weeks and months deliberately.

There is reason to believe that Mr. M. K. Bagal and members of his party are plotting to create trouble on 15 August, Independence Day, to mar the celebrations. They are advising people secretly not to take part in the celebrations. I suspect that Bagal is doing this under the instructions from His Highness. I wanted to arrange a military-cum-police parade on the 15th morning and His Highness has put forward all kinds of excuses for not asking the military to parade on the day. However, a police parade is being held and the public are expected to attend in large numbers. Incidentally, I understand that last year the Maharaja had ordered that the Indian Union flag should not be flown on any Government building on 15 August and his orders were carried out. This year I have ordered the flying of Indian and Kolhapur flags on the 15th on all Government buildings. I am also giving an 'At Home' to the leading citizens of the State on that day. I have advised Bagal and his men not to create trouble on the 15th and warned them about the consequences.

Mr. Latthe is also openly carrying on a campaign against merger. In addition he openly ridicules the Indian Government and Members of the Indian and Bombay Governments. He says that the Indian Government is inefficient and weak and will soon be defeated by Hyderabad.

After careful consideration of the situation in Kolhapur State, I have come to the conclusion that the time is ripe for completing its merger. Public opinion is very strongly in favour of merger except only a selfish minority consisting of a few jagirdars and communalists. I do not expect any outbreak of violence if merger takes place today. Further, I feel

confident that the situation is fully under control and I will be able to deal with any emergency that may arise. The police are thoroughly loyal and the top officers are now brought from Bombay. The Government services are all in favour of merger.

I hope to come to Delhi some time about the third or fourth week of this month when I shall explain the matter personally in further detail.

82. BRISH BHAN TO SARDAR,  
DATED 17 AUGUST 1948

In continuation of our confidential letter dated 16 August 1948, we hereby report to you the causes that led to the complete breakdown of negotiations for the formation of an Interim Ministry for the Union.

After the conclusion of talks last evening Mr. V. P. Menon, Secretary, States Ministry, conveyed the terms of the "gentleman's agreement" and the formula decided upon to Sodhi Jai Dev Singh, the Private Secretary to the Raj Pramukh (Maharaja of Patiala). Sodhi Jai Dev Singh contacted the Raj Pramukh at Patiala on phone and told him all about the affair. Our information is that the Raj Pramukh made it plain that none but his own nominee was agreeable to him.

This morning, when representatives of the three parties met Mr. V. P. Menon at 10-30 a. m., he did not ask the party leaders to submit the names of their nominees to be included in the Ministry and told them that the agreement arrived at the previous day had fallen through as it was not acceptable to "other quarters"

In the afternoon the Raj Pramukh himself arrived in New Delhi. He was in no case prepared to have a Congressman of the Union as Prime Minister, therefore, the talks of Ministry making could not proceed further, and the deadlock

over the formation of the Interim Ministry continues as before.

In fairness to us it is very essential that the States Ministry make a public statement giving a background of the talks, otherwise the whole burden of breakdown will be shoved on to our shoulders. The States Ministry's silence at this juncture will greatly help the Raj Pramukh, the Akalis and the Lok Sabha to confuse our position in the public mind. As the Secretary to the States Ministry, we presume that Mr. V. P. Menon has no special interest in the Raj Pramukh and that he is in agreement with the general policy of the Government of India to establish democratic administration in the Union. A detailed statement giving in full the background of the tentative agreement, written and unwritten arrived at between Mr. Menon and ourselves, we feel, is absolutely essential.

Reviewing the course of the latest phase of negotiations, we fail to understand the purpose behind all these talks if in the end the Raj Pramukh was to have the last word. However much we would wish not to drag the name of the Raj Pramukh into this controversy, we cannot help expressing the view with utmost reluctance that the Raj Pramukh is not at all serious about the proper constitution of a popular Interim Ministry.

We have been dealing with the Maharaja of Patiala for the last so many years (and) we have absolutely no illusions about his liberalism and "democratic instincts". If setting up of a popular Interim Ministry depends upon his will, it is better that he be named as the Maharaja of eight states rather than of Patiala alone.

We would venture to press upon you once again the need to take immediate steps to democratise the administration in the Union, for we feel that the explosive nature of the local situation in Patiala and other States of the Union makes it urgently necessary. Our fear is that if matters were left hanging fire as they have been, the situation is apt to become

a source of concern. As for the proposal to establish an Interim Government of the two parties, Akalis and the Lok Sabha, we think it our duty to point out that it will lead to widespread dissatisfaction giving rise to demonstrations and clashes.

(Note : There were three political parties in the Patiala and East Punjab States Union and a Ministry had to be formed by giving representation to all of them — the Praja Mandal, the Akali Dal and the Lok Sewa Sabha. Talks between them broke down and therefore on the formation of the Union, a Ministry of officials was constituted. Shri Brish Bhan was the head of the Praja Mandal. It was not till 1949 that Praja Mandal agreed to cooperate.)

83. V. NANJAPPA TO N. M. BUCH,  
DATED 22 AUGUST 1948

Mr. A. B. Latthe, Prime Minister, Kolhapur, returned to Kolhapur on the 19th from Delhi where he had been to attend the preliminary meeting of the Special Selection Board. En route he halted at Dewas to see the Maharaja Sahib of Kolhapur who is now staying at Dewas.

After his return from Delhi, Mr. Latthe has been spreading various adverse rumours regarding the Central Government and particularly the States Ministry. He has been saying that the States Ministry is extremely incompetent and high-handed and that Delhi is in a chaotic state. According to him, the Indian Government will be defeated by Pakistan very soon. At Dewas he had discussion with the Maharaja regarding the organisation of resistance to the merger of Kolhapur. Immediately on his return to Kolhapur he contacted the jagirdars and members of the ex-Ministry now dismissed, in order to gain their support for fighting merger. I saw Mr. Latthe preparing the defence statements for members of the ex-Ministry to be presented to the judicial enquiry. He is

also spreading rumours that the Maharaja has gone to Delhi to arrange for the dismissal of the Administrator.

I understand that the Special Selection Board have made it clear to Mr. Latthe that he cannot work simultaneously as Prime Minister, Kolhapur and as a Member of the Board. Mr. Latthe is expected to make his decision in week's time. I anticipate that Mr. Latthe will most probably resign from the Special Selection Board. The Maharaja has advised Mr. Latthe to resign from the Selection Board and continue as Prime Minister. It is understood that his pay is being increased from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 3,000 per month (free of income-tax and rent free house).

The Maharaja left for Dewas early this month and is still at that place. He is expected to return here by the first week of September. The ostensible reason for his journey to Dewas is to attend the Gokul Ashtami festival at that place. He says that he has to attend the function as a member of the Dewas family. He, however, conveniently forgets that he is now adopted in the Kolhapur ruling family and that his duties lie in Kolhapur State.... He finds the presence of the Administrator at Kolhapur rather awkward in this regard. He is also meeting the Rulers and Jagirdars of Central India States and indulging in his favourite pastime of mischievous intrigues. Intriguing has unfortunately become second nature to him.

The Rajaram Rifles Battalion of the Kolhapur State Forces, which is placed at the disposal of the Indian Union, is now stationed at Sholapur on the frontier of Hyderabad State. I have requested the Maharaja to visit his battalion and also tour part of the Hyderabad frontier seeing other Indian Army units. I further suggested that I could arrange for some publicity to his visit and that he might usefully issue a statement regarding the placing of the Kolhapur State resources at the disposal of the Indian Union and appealing to the Marathas to support the national Government wholeheartedly.

I regret to say that he has not followed my advice so far. I have again conveyed this message to him at Dewas and I am hoping that he will visit Sholapur and see the Kolhapur battalion at an early date in September. I am constrained to remark that the Maharaja is not taking the slightest interest in the administration of the State and the welfare of the people.

Mr. Hire, President of the Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee, and Mr. Chavan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Bombay Government, came to Kolhapur last week in order to organise a District Congress Committee in place of the State Praja Parishad. Attempts were also made to bring together the rival political groups in the States. Their attempts, however, have been unsuccessful so far and they have programmed to visit the State again after about a fortnight.

The differences between the two rival political groups in the State led by Bagal and Ratnappa Kumbhar are again becoming acute as merger is expected by the public in the near future. Bagal and his men . . . are organising themselves to fight the merger with the support of some of the Jagirdars and under the auspices of the Maharaja. Their strength is however negligible and I have no doubt of the fate they will meet when the State merges. A majority of the people are awaiting merger anxiously.

84. SARDAR TO ASAF ALI,  
DATED 24 AUGUST 1948

Thank you for your letter of 14 August 1948. Since then, Mahtab has been here and we have had a conference with the Rulers. Mahtab will tell you what happened. I think they are now coming round and seem to have reconciled themselves to the view that the merger is final and absolute and that it has only to receive the formal sanction of the Constituent Assembly. I do not anticipate any further trouble on this score and if any does take place we are bound to take a strong line.

85. MAHARAJA OF BARODA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 25 AUGUST 1948

Let me thank you for the patience and courtesy with which you have listened to me. I have also had the pleasure of a full and frank discussion with Mr. V. P. Menon and on his suggestion I have signed the enclosed proclamation.

There are one or two matters which I wish to submit for your consideration.

- (1) It relates to my prerogatives as a constitutional Ruler. I would like to point out that as a constitutional Ruler I will be enabled to summon the Legislature, to prorogue the Legislature, to appoint the Ministers, etc. Further as my position as Commander-in-Chief of Baroda State Forces will remain as at present, in other words while I am prepared to act on advice on this as in other matters, I hope the Ministry will submit to me the promotions and appointments of the Baroda State Forces.
- (2) There is no provision in the letter or in the proclamation safeguarding the succession to the throne or safeguarding the privileges of the Ruler or the Ruling Family.
- (3) As for the privy purse, once it is fixed by you the question how it should be utilised should be left to my discretion. You were anxious that the position of the Maharani and the children should be safeguarded. I can assure you I will not do anything to jeopardize their interests.

Mr. Menon mentioned to me that you desire that the money taken recently from the State should be handed back

to the State as soon as possible. When I go to Baroda I shall look into my accounts and shall hand over as much as I can immediately and the rest in instalments.

I understand Mr. Menon is writing to me separately about jewellery.

As for the financial matters raised by the Dewan (including the question of my privy purse and my investments and property), I am agreeable to these matters being scrutinised by such finance officer as you may appoint and shall accept and carry out any directions that you may make after considering the report of such officer.

I need hardly assure you of my determination to co-operate in every way with the Government of India and to foster the interest and well-being not only of my State but of the whole of India. Nothing is farther from my mind than to act otherwise as a constitutional Ruler or to obstruct in any way the establishment of full responsible government in my State. I trust I will always continue to enjoy your blessings and guidance in fulfilling this resolve.

86. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF BARODA,  
DATED 25 AUGUST 1948

Many thanks for your letter of 25 August 1948 and the Proclamation enclosed there with. I am very glad to note the contents of both and I have no doubt that the Proclamation will be warmly welcomed by Your Highness' subjects.

The specific matters to which Your Highness refers in para 2 of your letter should not in my view present any serious difficulty in practice. I do not think Your Highness' position and status as a constitutional Ruler will in any way be prejudiced and you will continue, with the aid and advice of your Ministry, to perform the functions to which you refer.

It is true that no provision has been made in the letter or the Proclamation for safeguarding the succession to the throne. But that is so because there is no intention to interfere with the succession according to law or with the due privileges of the ruler and his family.

I agree that once the privy purse is fixed it should be left to the discretion of the ruler how to use it; I have no doubt however that the discretion will be judiciously exercised. I note with satisfaction Your Highness' assurance that the position of her Highness and the children will be fully safeguarded.

I am also gratified by your assurance in para 3 of your letter.

I am prepared to undertake the task which Your Highness has assigned to me in para 5 of your letter and will communicate to you my decision as early as possible.

It gives me great pleasure to see that the out-standing points have been so satisfactorily settled, thanks to your Highness' very helpful attitude. I on my part heartily reciprocate your offer of co-operation.

(Note : Baroda State was one of the best administered of the Indian States, but after 1943, the personal extravagances of the Ruler became more and more manifest and the administration of the State deteriorated in consequence. In 1948, there was a strong popular movement for responsible government. Under pressure from Sardar and the States Ministry the Ruler appointed Dr. Jivraj Mehta as Dewan. Dr. Mehta enjoyed the confidence of the Dhara Sabha — the State Legislature. But an enquiry into the financial transactions of the Ruler showed that he had made huge unauthorised withdrawals from Government funds, and committed other serious financial irregularities. The Dhara Sabha became hostile. Eventually, the Ruler agreed to merge his State with Bombay Province : and the administration was taken over on 1 May 1949. Actually

the State was not one homogeneous unit, but several scattered bits of territory, mostly in the Gujarati speaking region of Bombay, and integration with Bombay was obviously the sensible solution).

87. RATNAPPA KUMBHAR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 26 AUGUST 1948

I am writing to you after fairly long time because I did not want to trouble you during the period of your convalescence. I am glad that you have fully recouped your health and are again at your post in the service of our country. May God give you good health and long life.

2. The main object of writing this letter is to show to you that the time to take a decisive step and merge the State has now come. Just now, all the opposition forces are most demoralised and at their lowest ebb. The Maharaja is frightened because the Administrator has asked him to refund the huge sum of Rs. 65 lakhs or so which the Maharaja has illegally taken from the treasury. The party of Mr. Bagal is also most demoralised because of the enquiry under Justice Coyajee. The rabid communal organisation of Messrs. Jedhe and More has not had any time to spread its feet in Kolhapur. The friends of the Maharaja are also trembling in their shoes because they have lost all influence and are feeling that an early merger is inevitable. The Maharaja himself has become so unpopular with the public at large owing to his vices that merger will be deemed to be a relief by most of the subjects of the State. The most critical time has, therefore, arrived and the State must be merged, if ever, now. The question should, under no circumstances, be postponed beyond September. The Governor of Bombay recently paid a visit to Kolhapur when we could meet him and when he could study the situation first hand. I feel that he was also convinced of the extreme desirability of deciding the merger issue without delay.

3. There is no truth in the statement that riots will break out in Kolhapur if the State is merged. Such prophecies were made on several occasions in the past, viz., when the Bagal Ministry was dismissed, Mr. Madhavrao Bagal was arrested, etc. But nothing happened. Now the conditions are so favourable that a reaction is least likely to happen. The situation is well under control, as the Administrator will testify. I therefore feel that there is no point in postponing merger on a panicky forecast of eventualities.

4. I would also like to impress upon you the complications that will arise if the merger issue is postponed. It will not be possible then to delay elections any longer. Once the elections start, all opposition forces which are now demoralised and at the lowest ebb will be strengthened again. The Maharaja will spend huge amounts in subsidising all reactionary and communal elements. An attempt will be made to secure a majority for the rabid communalists in the forthcoming elections and then to create fresh difficulties with their support. The politics of Bahujan Samajvad of Jedhe and More will be introduced in Kolhapur and fully developed on the election platform. I am afraid that these and numerous other complications will arise if a decision on the merger is postponed and elections are held (as they inevitably must be). These complications must be avoided at any cost.

5. I have seen Sjt. Balasaheb Kher and discussed the situation with him in detail. I would, therefore, request you to kindly discuss the situation with Sjt. Kher during his next visit to Delhi and take a final decision on the matter.

6. I would also be grateful if you can find some time to see me. I am coming to Delhi on about the 28th instant, and at the time of our interview, I will be able to explain the whole local situation personally.

88. V. P. MENON'S SUMMARY RECORD OF TALKS  
RE : FORMATION OF GREATER RAJASTHAN,  
JANUARY 1949.

Before I met the Rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner, Sir V. T. (Krishnamachari), (C.S.). Venkatachar and myself had an informal discussion. Sir V. T. raised the point whether it would be in the interests of India to have one Union of the Rajputana States. His argument was that in the present situation in the East Punjab vis-a-vis the Sikhs it was not advisable to create a similar problem and have a Rajput hegemony or alternatively a Jat hegemony in the area bordering on the East Punjab. While he had no objection to the principle of integration, he suggested that instead of one we should have three units, namely, the present Rajasthan Union, Jaipur, Alwar and Karauli forming another and a third, the Western Rajputana States consisting of Bikaner, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer. So far as Bharatpur and Dholpur were concerned, since they are predominantly a Jat area, they had to go to United Provinces.

Both Venkatachar and myself did not see much force in Sir. V. T.'s argument. Even if there are three separate administrative units, it will not be politically possible to split up the Rajput community and hold them up in three sections. The trend of political events will prevent any such course. There will be the overall Congress organisation in Rajputana which will keep the Congress elements together. Similarly, the Rajputs will also develop an all Rajaputana consciousness. The attachment of the Rajput Jagirdars has been traditionally to the rulers of the different States. The system of responsible government brings about a definite cleavage in their traditional relationship and the authority of the ruler will no longer be there to hold the Rajput elements together. It therefore follows that conditions

will be created by the trend of political development to bring about integration of the Rajputs even if they are split up into three separate administrative units.

Sir V. T. ultimately came to the view that one Union would be desirable provided a strong administrative machinery was set up to hold together the various parts of Rajputana, including the western area which from the defence and the point of view of law and order is a vital section of the Union.

The most important point on which we desire H.M.'s decision is the administrative set-up till the elections to the Legislative Assembly take place. It is the unanimous view of all of us that responsible Government in its true sense cannot be set up immediately after integration. In the first place, the Union, if it is formed, will, in area, be larger than any province in India today and in population the fourth biggest province. The elementary administrative system is lacking in all these States. Further, we have got a most unnatural and the longest frontier with Pakistan. The suggestion we favour for the interim administrative set-up is similar to that now prevailing in Jaipur, namely, there should be a President of Council who should have overall responsibility for the administration assisted by two experienced officials and a small number of Congress, Praja Mandal and Jagirdar representatives.

Secondly, the Socialists have already a programme of integration and have raised the cry of a United Rajasthan. If we now abandon this idea of a United Rajasthan, we will be placed in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the Socialists and we will be compelled later on to do it on account of pressure coming from that quarter.

In view of the importance of the frontier, we also suggest that in the Covenant a provision should be included that in the interests of law and order and defence the Central Government should have superintendence and control in these matters in regard to the entire frontier area which lies from the border of Kutch to the East Punjab.

A special problem of this area is the jagirdari system. A composite Government during the interim period will be essential in order to have a stable administration during this period and to secure the co-operation of this element which co-operation would be ultimately to the good and stability of the Union. The jagirdars are prepared to dissociate themselves completely and separate out from the rulers. In order to give them assistance to organise themselves and to play their part and to create confidence in them for a short period an assurance may be given to them that there will be no expropriation of the jagirdari system during the next three years, during which period they are expected to organise themselves. If they do not, then it is their own look-out.

Lastly, the rulers in this area are frankly suspicious of any guarantees which we give them. They assert that since the States Ministry have gone back on all the promises made by them, they want to know what guarantees we could give them to see that the Covenant is respected. I told them that this question would be examined and that we would be prepared to give them whatever protection is practicable. This has to be examined, but I only mention this for H. M.'s information.

#### 89. CONCLUSIONS REACHED AT MEETING ON 3 FEBRUARY 1949 BY V. P. MENON WITH PREMIERS OF JAIPUR AND JODHPUR AND GOKULBHAI BHATT

1. In regard to the administrative set-up for the new Union, all the three popular representatives are against a composite Cabinet consisting of both non-officials and officials as Ministers. It is their unanimous view that the best scheme, which would have a chance of success, would be that Advisers should be interposed between the Ministers and the Secretaries in important departments. In case of difference of opinion between an adviser and a Minister, the matter should be referred to the Premier; in event of the difference remaining unresolved the Premier

should make a reference to the States Ministry and the decision of the Government of India should be final.

2. The popular representatives agree that there should be two or three Advisers. These Advisers should be attached to the Ministers of (a) Integration (b) Finance (c) Revenue and (d) Law and Order. It may be possible to combine these departments and to allot them to two Advisers.

3. The Premier should himself hold the portfolio of Integration. Though the number of Ministers could not now be decided, it is appreciated that the number should not exceed nine.

4. On the question of the representation of jagirdars, the popular leaders are of the view that having regard to the desirability of the Cabinet pursuing a homogeneous policy, it is inadvisable to include in the Cabinet a jagirdar representing directly the jagirdars or answerable to any of the jagirdars' organisation. However, the desirability of including in the Cabinet non-Congress members representing other interests including those of jagirdars is appreciated.

5. The popular leaders recognise the de facto position that till a constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly of the Union becomes operative, the ultimate responsibility for peace and good government in the Union rests with the Government of India; they therefore agree to a provision being made in the new Covenant as well as in other Covenants to the effect that during the interim period the Government of the Union will function subject to the superintendence, direction and control of the Government of India. Thereafter, the position of the Unions will be similar to that of the provinces.

6. As regards the inclusion of Matsya Union, it is suggested that the question should be further discussed with the leaders of the various States. It is, however, hoped that a decision will be arrived at before the meeting of the Matsya Rulers on the 13th.

7. The leaders are of the view that His Highness of Jaipur should be made the Raj Pramukh for life-time and that His Highness of Udaipur, who should continue to receive his present allowances, should be given a distinctive position without prejudicing the general administrative set-up of the Union.

8. As regards the privy purse of the Rulers, since the three major States of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner, are more or less on par with Indore, their privy purse should be fixed at Rs. 17½ lakhs per annum on the analogy of the Ruler of Indore, who draws a privy purse Rs. 15 lakhs per year plus an allowance of Rs. 2½ lakhs as Up Raj Pramukh. So far as Jaipur is concerned, an allowance of Rs. 5½ lakhs may be given to him as Raj Pramukh thus bringing the total of his allowance to Rs. 23 lakhs. The Rulers' privy purse will cover the allowances of the Rulers, consorts and children but will not include the allowances at present received by the Rajmatas and other members of the Rulers' families.

9. The privy purse as suggested in the preceding paragraph will hold good only during the life time of the present Rulers. The privy purse of their successors will be fixed at Rs. 10 lakhs per annum.

10. It is agreed that the question of the capital of the Union will be decided by the Hon'ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in consultation with popular leaders.

Approved and accepted by :

1. G. D. Bhatt.
2. Hiralal Shastri.
3. Jainarain Vyas.
4. Manikyalal Verma\*

\* (I was not present at yesterday's meeting. But I agree to all decisions taken yesterday.)

(*Note* : The question whether the Constituent Assembly should function as an Interim Legislature was also considered. In view of the contemplated provision in the Covenant that till the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly becomes operative the Union Government is to function subject to the superintendence, direction and control of the Central Government it was considered inadvisable to convert the Constituent Assembly into an Interim Legislature because during this period the responsibility of the Union Government will be to the Government of India.)

90. NAWAB OF RAMPUR TO SARDAR,  
DATED 18 MAY 1949 (EXTRACT)

Mr. V. P. Menon arrived in Rampur on the 15th and we got to work immediately. I found Mr. Menon very considerate and helpful in finalising all the proposals which, in their essentials, had already received your approval and blessing.

2. Mr. Menon had interviews with my Ministers, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, Members of the Legislative Assembly, senior officers of the State, the Rampur Congress Committee and some leading citizens. He also held a Press interview and gave a clear explanation of the policy of the Ministry of States in regard to the States in general and Rampur in particular. The announcement and the lucid clarification made by Mr. Menon were well received by all sections of the people. Mr. Menon was also good enough to make some kind remarks about me and Zaidi for which we feel grateful.

3. Your decision to take over Rampur State as a Centrally-administered Area for the time being has given great satisfaction to the people of Rampur, and they realise that this is entirely due to the affection and regard you have always had for me and my people. . . .

5. Now, pray, permit me to offer you, on my own behalf and on behalf of my people, our grateful thanks for having extended to us the highest measure of consideration and kindness in so arranging the integration of Rampur with the Centre that everybody has a vivid realisation of the fact that the interests of Rampur were and will always be safe in the hands of the great Sardar, and that he will not allow anything to be done which is calculated either to ruffle the feelings of the Ruler and the people of Rampur or to cause them any disappointment. It is a matter of great pride to me that the integration has been achieved so smoothly and tactfully, and that in spite of the first phase of depression — which is but natural — everyone will begin to lead a peaceful and prosperous life under the aegis of the Government of India and look forward to a very bright future. True to their traditions of communal harmony and concord, the people of Rampur are determined to remain loyal to the Government of the Indian Union. I trust that you will continue to reserve a special niche in your warm heart for us.

6. In the end, please allow me to tell you how great my regard and admiration for you is. In my relations with the Government of India and with the Ministry of States, I have always tried to extend the fullest measure of co-operation. I have always endeavoured loyally to serve the Motherland, and to see that all of us in this State did nothing which was not worthy of true sons of India. But it is not for me to sing my own praises or to refer eulogistically to the people of Rampur. It is for you and for the Government of India to judge.

Please accept my most grateful thanks for all that you have done for me personally. I have a very grateful heart and I shall never forget all your kindness to me. May God spare you for many years to guide the destiny of India !

## 91. SARDAR'S MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE TAKING OVER OF RAMPUR, DATED 1 JULY 1949

On the taking over of the administration of Rampur State by the Centre, I should like to give to the people of Rampur our assurance that in seeking their future as part of a bigger entity they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. In the world today, isolated existence of small units is at best precarious. Apart from being a handicap in their growth to full stature, such isolation results in a serious breach of their independence for the obvious limitations on such independence virtually negate it. As part of a bigger unit they can seek the aid and the resources of that unit and can play their part in moulding its policy and administration. We are fully conscious of the responsibility which we are taking over and I can assure His Highness the Nawab and the people that we shall discharge that responsibility to the best of our ability and resources.

I should also like to say how grateful I am for the readiness with which His Highness has responded to every call that we have made for his co-operation in the wider national interests. Before the birth of our independence His Highness had given unmistakable proof of his determination not to entertain any extraterritorial loyalty. He brooked neither delay nor danger in forming his decision. He gave ample proof of his patriotism and his enlightened attitude on the future relationship of the State with the Union. His final decision to merge the State with the Centre was an act of self-sacrifice in keeping with the liberal and helpful attitude which he has throughout adopted in the interests of his people and the country. I can assure him that he will never regret the trust which he has reposed in us.

92. SRI KRISHNA SINHA TO SARDAR,  
DATED 15 OCTOBER 1949  
(EXTRACT)

I am grateful to you for your letter dated 13 September regarding Seraikella and Kharsawan (not printed: Serial No. 80). As I said in my letter of 19 August, I am committed to (giving) full protection to the language and culture of the Oriya-speaking population in the States of Seraikella and Kharsawan, and I have taken steps to ensure that they have no reasonable cause for any grievance on this account. I may perhaps repeat some of the facts concerning these two States for your information. All the schools in which instruction used to be given through the medium of Oriya under the Rulers, or during the period when the States were administered by Orissa, have been continued with Oriya as the medium of instruction, and their teachers have been given much higher salaries and allowances. A number of additional primary schools with Oriya as the medium of instruction have also been opened by us. In no school has the Oriya language been replaced by Hindi. Oriya students have been given special facilities for higher studies either by relaxation of standards for admission in colleges or by awarding suitable scholarships in deserving cases. A boy of an Oriya family, which is definitely known to be helping the agitation started by the Raja of Seraikella, has been awarded a stipend for post-graduate studies at Allahabad University. Another Oriya student who possesses third class qualifications has been admitted into our Medical College where Bihari boys of much higher merit and calibre could not get admission. Oriya has never been the court language in any part of the District of Singhbhum, of which Seraikella and Kharsawan States now form a sub-division; but we have made special provision for the States of Seraikella and Kharsawan where petitions and complaints in Oriya continue to be

received. Oriya members have been given more than adequate representation in the Advisory Councils which were formed to associate the local people with the administration of the two States.

2. The Oriya-speaking population in general has no grievance against our administration. As a matter of fact, a representative deputation of Oriyas waited on Shri Bishwanath Das at Seraikella during his recent visit to that State and told him in unequivocal terms that they were perfectly satisfied with our administrative arrangements under which Government had not only given adequate protection to their language and culture, but had also undertaken a number of development and welfare schemes. It is only a handful of Oriyas who, at the instance of the Raja of Seraikella, are carrying on this agitation, and are making all kinds of false and mischievous allegations against our Government. I explained to you the reasons for this agitation in my previous letter. Mahtab (Hare Krushna) has also written to me that it is the opposition in the Orissa Assembly led by the Raja of Kanika which is using this agitation as a plank for the next election campaign.....

In the end I must express the gratefulness of the province of Bihar for your firm decision to merge Seraikella and Kharsawan with Bihar.

93. SARDAR TO SRI KRISHNA SINHA,  
DATED 24 OCTOBER 1949  
(EXTRACT)

.... I am very glad to note that you have approached the question in the proper spirit. All that I can suggest to you is that you must solve the minority problem in your province, such as Oriyas and Bengalis, in a spirit of goodwill and with generosity. What is necessary is not only that there is this spirit at the top but that even the subordinate officers are imbued with this spirit. Very often we find that, while

the Ministers have a generous heart and the proper approach to the problem, the subordinate officials, particularly officials on the spot, are so much filled with provincial spirit that in their day-to-day administration they unnecessarily create irritation and bitterness. After all 95 per cent of the life of the local population is spent in dealings with the local administration. I hope, therefore, that you will instruct the officers concerned to behave in the spirit which I have mentioned above. As regards the details, I leave it to you to translate your policy in action. . . .

94. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 28 DECEMBER 1949

Thank you for your letter of 27 December regarding Cooch-Bihar and Vindhya Pradesh.

2. I have explained the position in detail in the Cabinet, and I hope it is not necessary for me now to go into these details again. As Menon has also told you, the question of Cooch-Bihar was mentioned to you some time ago — it is possible it has slipped from your mind. In view of that, I did not think it necessary to refer to you again, though it was my intention to mention it in the Cabinet before a public announcement was made. As regards consulting the people of Cooch-Bihar, I have already stated that the local Congress has approved of the merger. There is a local Hitasadhini Sabha, which is partly Muslim with its sympathies definitely with the neighbouring area of East Pakistan and partly consisting of some members of hill tribes who are looking to Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan for the formation of an “Uttarakhand Pradesh”. I feel certain that we should do nothing to encourage this kind of organisation in its mischievous tendencies.

3. As regards Vindhya Pradesh, the position is being explained further in a summary for the Cabinet, which has been sent this morning. I could not naturally refer the case to the

Cabinet until after the rulers had accepted the proposal. Their agreement was essential before any further steps could be taken. Failure of democracy as well as of responsible government in Vindhya Pradesh as a unit needs hardly any proof. Any one who has followed the course of affairs in that area during the last one year will readily agree in that proposition. The problem was what should be done in view of this failure. The only alternatives were Centrally administered areas or merger with neighbouring provinces. In view of the general feeling against becoming a Chief Commissioner's province, because of the denial of local responsible government involved in it, I thought it better to explore the possibility of merger. From my talks with representative Congressmen, I gathered the impression that they would also prefer the latter course since it gave them a chance to continue their political career in the provinces in which their particular constituencies might merge. CP and UP were both anxious, for reasons of their own, to have parts of Vindhya Pradesh. I accordingly convened a meeting of the two Premiers, but could not get an agreement. This was on 25 December. On their failure to reach an agreement, the only course open to me was to recommend to the Cabinet, for the time being, to (make) it a Chief Commissioner's province. This I have done in the summary which has been sent to the Cabinet Secretariat this morning and this is what I mentioned in the Cabinet also.

4. I am quite convinced that these two proposals that we have put forward have saved us from a great deal of embarrassment and complications. Bengalees would never have allowed Cooch Behar to remain away from them for long. Cooch Behar itself is a Bengali area. Assam's attention towards Cooch Behar was directed only because, on account of its geographical isolation from the main area of West Bengal, I had to entrust the supervision over its administration to the Governor of Assam. Otherwise, they have never bothered about it. In any case, organisationally, in regard to Cooch Behar, we have to be guided by what the Cooch Behar

Congress rather than what the Assam Congress tells us to do.

5. I quite agree with you about consulting the Cabinet in important matters. As you will see, it was not my intention to avoid such consultation. Throughout, in regard to important matters, whether of the States Ministry or of the Home Ministry, I have kept the Cabinet in touch, and when necessary, have taken their approval.

95. MAHARAJA OF MYSORE TO SARDAR,  
DATED 20 JANUARY 1950

I am sending with Shri K. C. Reddy, Chief Minister, the covenant duly signed by me regarding my personal rights and privileges and the annual civil list. I am exceedingly grateful to you for all the advice that I have received from you from time to time and, in particular, for the terms of the covenant which would not have received their present shape but for your great consideration.

From the 26th of this month the new Constitution will come into force. I welcome it and share the joy with all our countrymen at the creation of the great Indian Republic. It is my earnest desire that the Indian Republic and the State of Mysore in particular will grow in strength and prosperity and contribute to the great happiness of all the people of this land. I am confident that the Ministry in Mysore, representing the people as it does, will maintain and, in fact, increase the progress that has so far been sustained by the State. The Constitution throws some special responsibilities on me in the discharge of which I shall certainly be assisted by the advice of my Ministers but there may be occasions when I may find it necessary to seek the advice of those at the Centre, especially the President and your goodself. With the experience of the assistance that I have all along received from you, I venture to hope that I can seek your advice from time to time if the necessity arises and I shall be extremely thankful if I am privileged to do so.

96. TELEGRAM FROM MAHARAJA OF BIKANER  
TO SARDAR, DATED 25 JANUARY 1950

ON THIS UNIQUE AND UNPARALLELED OCCASION IN THE HISTORY OF OUR MOTHERLAND MAY I SEND YOU MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS AND HEARTIEST FELICITATIONS AS ONE WHO HAS PLAYED SUCH A NOTABLE AND PROFOUND PART IN THE BUILDING OF NEW BHARAT. IT IS MY FERVENT PRAYER THAT YOU BE LONG SPARED TO GUIDE THE DESTINIES OF INDIA TO AN EVER RISING HIGHER AND HIGHER PHASE AMONGST THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD WHICH IS HER DUE. KINDEST REGARDS.

97. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF BIKANER,  
DATED 27 JANUARY 1950

I am most grateful to Your Highness for your telegram of congratulations and good wishes, in particular the nice terms in which you have phrased it. As one who has taken such a prominent part in the negotiations which preceded the entry of the Princes into the polity of the Indian Union and who has stood by the country with stead-fast loyalty. Your Highness is as much entitled to these congratulations as I myself and hope you will accept the same from me in the same spirit.

98. SARDAR TO MAHARAJA OF MYSORE,  
DATED 28 JANUARY 1950

Thank you for your letter of 20 January 1950, which I received yesterday. It is quite possible that it was held up somewhere.

I am most grateful to Your Highness for the very kind sentiments which you have expressed on the occasion of the

commencement of the new Constitution. I have no doubt myself that under the aegis of the ruling family with its constitutional and democratic traditions the State of Mysore will realise its destiny. Your Highness can rest assured of every help and assistance from me and the Government of India in the discharge of your duties as ruler. You have our goodwill as well as best wishes in the new and historic role which has now devolved upon Your Highness.

99. SARDAR TO JAWAHARLAL NEHRU,  
DATED 28 MAY 1950  
(EXTRACT)

... What I wrote to you on a Purely procedural matter (re: Tonk) was not with a view to preventing you from seeing people or writing to the Chief Ministers of States as you do to former provinces, although there is some difference between the two; because, under the constitutional position assigned to them, the former are under a sort of tutelage. My only intention was to ensure that, before you see deputations, etc., or write to Chief Ministers about any matter of which the States or Home Ministry might already be seized, it would help you as well as prevent possible embarrassments if, before you did so, you could obtain from the Ministry some idea of the material which it might have and its views. I follow this rule for myself in regard to my departmental matters and find it of some assistance in dealing with the interviewers or the Chief Ministers concerned. As I wrote to you about Tonk, we have already had several reports from the Rajasthan Government as to what actually happened and how. I thought that if you had the material you might have been able to deal with the deputationists in regard to their specific grievances more or less on the spot. However, I shall not labour the point further. I hope I have made my intention clear.

I quite realise that in the matter of giving a sense of security to the minority the responsibility of the majority is

paramount; but, at the same time, we have to allow for the irritant effect of fears of the majority on the question of loyalty of the minority community or a section thereof. I do not think it will be possible for us to ignore that altogether. I have already written to you about what happened at a public meeting in Tonk.

100. SARDAR TO V. S. KHODE OF INDORE,  
DATED 28 MAY 1950

I have seen your letter of 23 May and the advance copy of the article which you have sent me. I am both surprised and shocked to find that a public worker of your status and standing should not have realised the nature and consequence of the action which you propose to take. There are certain matters relating to Cabinet proceedings etc. and confidential talks with the States Ministry which you are precluded, under the oath of secrecy which you took, to divulge. In addition, you have mentioned certain alleged discussions and conversations the private nature of which under ordinary laws of decency and private association you are bound to respect, unless you are absolved from it with the consent of the party with whom you held those private discussions. Further, in so far as references to so-called assurances by me are concerned, you have yourself referred to my denial of the same and I am surprised that you, or the group of people for whom you speak should still harp on those alleged assurances. All this seems to indicate that you are not what I have taken you to be all this time and that you are not what you profess to be. I should be reluctant to believe that this is so, but, from what I have read of your speeches and of the misrepresentations that have been made in the Press in Madhya Bharat on this issue, I am afraid I cannot come to any other conclusion but that, in the atmosphere of local rivalries and group prejudices, your judgment has been clouded and you are unable to approach questions from that sense of responsibility and

fairness which must be the sole aim of a public worker. Your proposal to publish this article with the background of your idea of publishing an open letter to me (I do hope you realise that open letters are generally intended for those who cannot otherwise be approached by the writer of such open letters) is likely to be understood as your attempt to force the States Ministry and those who do not see eye to eye with you in this controversy into conceding your objective. I must make it clear that we are not likely to submit to any such attempt and that any such manoeuvre will cause no benefit to the people of Madhya Bharat or those who might feel that thereby they might make us yield. It will certainly compel us to consider whether the relationship which has subsisted between us and you and your friends on the basis of respect for each other's confidence can now be sustained.

You have expressed a desire to see me. I have already written to the President of the Madhya Bharat Provincial Congress Committee that he and his deputation, in which your name is included, can see me on the 31st. I hope you will not misunderstand my frankness because I do feel that politics and public workers in Madhya Bharat seem to have completely lost their balance over a controversy which was certainly not of our choosing, or of our creation. I feel that the methods which are being followed to malign and misrepresent each other and misguide public opinion are entirely unwholesome and betray a negation of that public spirit which alone can retrieve the position.

101. HIRALAL SHASTRI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 21 JUNE 1950

I have returned here after seeing Mr. Menon in Delhi. On receiving some definite information from Mr. Menon I will come to Delhi or Dehra Dun. It is my inner desire not to take your valuable time and not to trouble you as far as possible. Your time should be utilised for more important works of the country, because the great burden of shaping the future of the country rests, on you. It will be better for us, who are your followers, to solve our own difficulties as far as possible. For this reason, I do not approach you very often and also do not write frequently.

For the last year and a quarter anyhow the work of Rajasthan went on well in spite of some difficulties. The Cabinet worked as a team and the officers also co-operated. I am hopeful that no great difficulty will arise. The financial condition of the State is under control. The condition regarding foodstuffs is also not unsatisfactory. Peace and order have been maintained. The movement of jagirdars has also not got any great momentum. The work of consolidation is also complete. The little that remains to be done is being attended to. Many a Congressman tried their best to increase our difficulties. But our work went on. This all is the result of your blessings.

For the last few months I have been facing some difficulties in running the administration. I have explained the circumstances to Menon. According to the Constitution, the control of the Central Government should be there and will be there. But negotiations are going on to make necessary amendments in the memorandum laying down our relationship with the Centre. We will also see to that and everything will be all right. It also seems necessary to think once again what machinery should be there to give effective control to the Centre.

The third question is regarding the officers to be appointed on behalf of the Centre. They will of course be such officers with whom we will find no difficulty in co-operating.

I have tried my best to get on well with all the people. But I could see that I have not been successful to the extent that I wished. When I took over the charge of Rajasthan, I had decided that no complaint about me should reach you. If anybody complains about me, I will be able to satisfy you and the complainant also. I am not sure how far I have been able to satisfy you. If you are not satisfied, there is no value for my success. If I am not able to follow your order faithfully, I have no right in accepting you as my leader. My whole energy is being used in the Government work. But those who complain have more time. How difficult it is to carry on this great work in the present time !

I have admitted so many times before you that my Congress friends have given me a lot of trouble. I had never imagined that any Congressman can go so low. When I knew about these things, I was buried in work of the Rajasthan Government, I could not give any attention to the unity and organisation of the Congress; today also I am not in a position to do that. But I think I have a hold over the pulse of the common people. I hope to defeat the opponents in the next elections. In the elections of the Congress, there is a lot of confusion. If there was no such confusion, or if that had been properly set right, or if it can be set right now, then the results would have been very good or they can be good. Now since it has happened, we will have to see what the final picture is. I infer that that picture will not be bad. But as far as I can see, the real importance is that of elections by the masses. If your blessings are with us, we have no reason for fear of the success in these elections. I hope that we will also get this success as in the case of other States.

102. HIRALAL SHASTRI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 2 AUGUST 1950

For the last two weeks I have made it possible to give my personal attention to Congress organisational work. Those who have been in charge of the office of the State Congress Committee created ad hoc committees for election work all over the State. In these committees, only members of their own way of thinking were included, to the exclusion of all others who were actually at a great disadvantage in the matter of enrolment of members and election of panchayat. The unhappy and futile task of making complaints to the AICC office fell to the lot of all those who were unable to gain the favour of the office holders of the State Congress Committee. Not much effective help could have been extended to the complainants by the AICC office. The delegates' constituencies were created in such a way that they served as safe pockets for their creators. Irregularities of all varieties were committed by the State Congress Committee, the election tribunal, the credentials committee, the ad hoc committees and the returning officers — all combined to work in a planned manner to keep out 'undesirable' elements. Under these circumstances the non-office-holder side had to fight against very high odds. At a stage which was much too late Sardar Pratap Singh was sent out to look into the complaints. He set aside as many as 40 elections in delegates' constituencies and a far larger number of elections in Panchayat constituencies. It is expected that all elections, re-elections will be completed in two weeks' time.

Temperamentally and also by conviction I am a firm believer in unity and therefore I regard the existence of factions in the Congress organisation as suicidal. Before and after my election as Leader in February 1949 some of my friends got

displeased with me and they led a campaign against me. I kept quiet in indifference and disgust which was perhaps a mistake. Your own decision and, later, the Congress Working Committee's decision did not succeed in persuading my friends who had increased in numbers by then, to give up their harmful tactics and activities. Attempts continued to be made to show that the Rajasthan Ministry was no good at all and conditions in the State were extremely bad. These attempts resulted in bringing down the prestige of the Congress. Deliberately, I did not retaliate—so the one-sided campaign continued. Being in charge of administration in the State which has been in the process of creation and formation out of an entirely heterogeneous material, I was open to criticism and attack on all sides. I was not in a position to take decisions with a view to pleasing people who approached me with late orders. My duty was to do what was right and proper regardless of whether my actions pleased or displeased interested parties. This helped the friends who have been opposing me on the platform and in the Press. Even in the Congress elections the slogan has been "help the organisation as against the Government which has done nothing for you" !

In Rajasthan there is no issue (as such) over which Congressmen are divided. On the one hand there are Congressmen who are in favour of co-operating with the Ministry; on the other hand there are others who are bent on giving a bad name to the Ministry. These others fail to see that if the Ministry gets a bad name, the whole Congress organisation, including themselves, will have to share the bad name. I have no group of mine and would like to have none. I only wish that Congressmen should recognise the futility of running down the Ministry and should help us as far as they can. I cannot talk in terms of this group or that group. But I think that as a result of the Congress election the position would be that nearly half the total number of the delegates (which will be 131) will be in favour of helping the Ministry — some of the remaining delegates may also be converted to this view. I intend to do as much as I can to make the new members

of the State Congress Committee understand that the path trodden by many of them during the last 16 months was the wrong path leading them nowhere. I do not know with how much success my efforts will meet. But I know that I have had your blessings and I have received all possible help under your guidance. Therefore I have a feeling that you might like to help me again by calling some of my 'friends in opposition' and asking them to desist from their destructive activities. My own idea is that the new Rajasthan State Congress Committee should elect its president by a unanimous vote. The president may be anybody but he should be a believer in unity — and on that basis he should form his working committee. As I have said I will do all that I can to achieve this end, but I hope also that you will kindly help me a little. Just an indication from you will make my friends see that unity is the need of the hour and that if we are to look for success in the general elections we must be united from today.

I do not know how you feel about it and how far it may be possible — but I share the feelings of many that you should accept the presidentship of the Congress this time — that way alone lies hope for the Congress and for the unity.

103. HIRALAL SHASTRI TO SARDAR,  
DATED 4 AUGUST 1950

This is in continuation of my letter of 2 August which I hope you have received and read. On further consideration I felt that I should explain why I have made the suggestion that you might send for some of my friends and offer them suitable advice. For a considerable length of time they had been keeping away; but recently it seems they approached you with some request in regard to the charges framed against some of them. I have already expressed myself in favour of the charges being dealt with by you. After seeing the explanations submitted by them you will be in a position to form your own judgment about the next step. I had thought that while doing all this you might as well like to speak to them regarding the

way they have been going during the last year and a half. For myself I am all in favour of unity and I utterly dislike parties and factions, even though they may be based on certain genuine differences. In the case of Rajasthan there are no differences of this kind. Here a clique was formed behind my back and while I was busy with my heavy responsibilities these friends of mine spared no efforts to drag me down. But they were told by the Congress Working Committee that it was not within their rights to pass a no-confidence motion against the Ministry. I think that the position is the same today. There is no other issue on which there may be a division. In the election of the president of the State Congress Committee I am fundamentally opposed to the casting of votes in favour of one and against another. That election must be by a unanimous vote. That being done there will be unity in the Congress organisation. As regards the charges against some of my friends, the matter will be entirely in your hands.

Now a word again about myself. I have already made the confession that I have been simple enough to be befooled by the very friends whom I had been trusting as usual. Then, the propaganda indulged in by my friends would not be counteracted by me. My attitude was mostly that of indifference. I had no time left for looking to the Congress organisation along with the faithful performance of my duties as Chief Minister. The result was that the clique continued; any way it was not broken. But in spite of all the efforts made by my friends to disturb the administration, I claim everything has gone on well. This was due to the unity and homogeneity of the Ministry on the one hand and the co-operation and help given by the officers. Above all, I have had your blessings which have cheered me throughout the course of my difficult journey. If you choose to offer my friends proper advice and they accept your advice in the interest of the Congress organisation -- well and good. If not, kindly continue to shower your blessings on me. I do hope not only to hold my own against anything

that may come, but also to get victory for the Congress in the general elections, whenever they are held.

PS.

In any event, I would not like any premium being put on the tactics and activities of some of these friends, about the quality of which I think the less said the better.

A copy of a statement given by me to the Press is enclosed for your perusal.

104. V. SHANKAR TO V. P. MENON,  
DATED 7 OCTOBER 1950  
(EXTRACT).

I am sorry it has not been possible to write to you so far at some length about Madhya Bharat affairs. I promised to Buch that I would be doing so, but here I have had no rest, even though I have been working till about 11 or 11.30 at night. I have been having a very strenuous time and am feeling so very tired and fatigued.

When we reached Indore, we were told about the proceedings of the Congress Party the previous night. The party decided not to discuss the question of firing at all, because the whole matter was the subject of a judicial enquiry. They, however, discussed the general question of the effect which the firing had on the Congress and the party. The discussion ended inconclusively. There was severe criticism of the Ministry by interested people, and eventually the Chief Minister told the party that he would discuss the whole matter with H. M. the next morning and would call a meeting in the light of his discussions with H. M. Vijayavargiya came and saw H. M. the next morning. He told H. M. that so far as he was concerned he was prepared to place his resignation in his hand if that would bring about a stable Ministry. He also stated that, in spite of his best efforts, it had not been possible for him to get Liladhar Joshi's unqualified support or to persuade him to withdraw his resignation. He hoped to get a majority for

his own continuance as Chief Minister if matters were put to vote.

Liladhar Joshi stated his side of the case and complained bitterly about the Chief Minister's treatment. He very sheepishly told H. M. that he had resigned out of sheer disgust because he could not stand it any longer. H. M. reproached him for having taken this step without previous consultation with him. Liladhar Joshi expressed his regret and said that he would not repeat this conduct again. He was of the view that if Vijayavargiya and he stood out, election of a leader either unanimously or by a substantial majority might be possible. He said that the two persons, round whom this might be evolved, were Takhat Mal Jain and Dikshit. He was, however, definitely of the view that Vijayavargiya could not carry on without damage to the Congress and to the Government. Dikshit came and saw H. M. and he was also of the same view. Then came Nandlal Joshi, who told H. M. that Vijayavargiya's calculations were wrong and that a majority was not definitely in his favour. Nandlal Joshi more or less confirmed Liladhar Joshi's estimate about the two other persons and felt that they might be able to gather unanimity or a substantial majority, if an effort were made towards that end.

It was in these circumstances that H.M. decided that matters brooked no delay. Lal and Rau also felt that the whole administration was becoming ineffective on account of these dissensions and that something should be done to put matters right. In these circumstances, H.M. sent a message to the party (a copy of which I am enclosing) and asked Vijayavargiya to an informal meeting of the party the same evening. What happened at the party is now public property and I need not discuss it here. The attitude of the workers was definitely very helpful and co-operative, and the next morning, when H. M. addressed the workers' meeting, Totla who tried to create some difficulty was in ignominious isolation. The same night, there was another meeting of the Congress Party, at which, after some attempts to secure unanimity, Takhat Mal Jain was elected. The next morn-

ing, Takhat Mal Jain, Liladhar Joshi, Nandlal Joshi, Vijayavargiya and Haribhau Upadhyaya came to see H. M. H. M. then gave his blessings and impressed upon all of them that administrative work should now proceed with full vigour. H. M. also told them that he would be sending me to Madhya Bharat next month to finalise all integration proposals, and that they must not waste any time in vacillation or listening to public outcry over one proposal or the other. H. M. then left for Aurangabad, and from Aurangabad he sent a message to Vijayavargiya (a copy of which also I enclose). All those who had come to see H. M. on the morning of the 3rd prior to our departure requested him to send a message. They repeated their request at the aerodrome while we were leaving. . . .



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